The Metropolitan Project:
Leadership, Policy, and Development in St. Louis, Missouri, 1945-1980

Máire Agnes Murphy
St. Louis, Missouri

B.A., St. Louis University, 1996
M.A., University of Virginia, 1998

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Department of History

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

Abstract

Through a case study of St. Louis between 1945 and 1980, this dissertation explores how a new group of urban leaders, working within the difficult context of metropolitan political fragmentation and Sunbelt competition, combined public and private policies in an effort to strengthen regional growth and, at the same time, to revitalize the urban core. By 1980, industrial-belt cities like St. Louis, Pittsburgh, and Detroit had failed to regain their once vibrant industrial base. But it is not enough merely to record the decline of these cities and the tectonic regional shift in the American economy as northern manufacturing shifted to the Sunbelt. We must also analyze the process of political-economic change in these urban centers if we want fully to comprehend the transformations that occurred after WWII. The record of local leadership is a critical, but heretofore understudied, factor in the transformation of these cities after the war. We need to understand more clearly and at greater depth what local leaders did, how and why they made the choices that they made, what limitations they encountered, and how they interpreted the problems they faced, if we wish to understand both the record of local leadership and the patterns of economic change in these cities. Despite St. Louisans' impressive efforts at metropolitan restructuring, in the face of Sunbelt competition and hampered by metropolitan political fragmentation, their policies were unable to generate investment sufficient to reverse inner-city decline in St. Louis. By revealing how these urban leaders addressed local and national political-economic changes, this dissertation uncovers a crucial but missing link in explaining why the dynamics of urban development since 1945 proved successful at boosting suburban

growth and the central business district yet failed to create the infrastructure, jobs, and investment needed for a fundamentally sound urban economy. These findings also have implications for our interpretation of northern urban liberalism in general. I find that northern urban liberalism was a pragmatic and creative partnership with Washington, D.C., that ultimately did not fail due to internal contradictions but against the formidable challenges posed by Republican pro-growth coalitions of the Sunbelt.

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Chapter One
The "Spirit of St. Louis":
Local Leadership and Redevelopment in the Industrial Belt

During the 1970s, St. Louis, Missouri, became a national symbol of the decline of America's rustbelt cities, characterized by massive loss of jobs and population. Similar levels of catastrophic decline afflicted cities like Pittsburgh, Detroit, Camden, and Milwaukee. St. Louis suffered the "supreme indignity," in the words of Kenneth Jackson, by becoming the nation's second leading exporter of used bricks, as homes and commercial and industrial buildings were torn down wholesale due to disinvestment and abandonment; after losing hundreds of factories to the Sunbelt in the previous decade, St. Louis itself was now being carted away. Many scholars and commentators in the media use the phrase "urban crisis" to refer to the post-World War II experience of cities like St. Louis: massive job loss, racial tensions, white residential abandonment, industrial and commercial disinvestment, and municipal financial crises. The urban-crisis narrative commonly accepted in contemporary scholarship obscures not only the deeply-rooted causes of central city disinvestment and of racial tensions, but also a fuller understanding and proper appreciation of the performance of northern urban liberalism. This narrative compresses the rich and variegated histories of industrial-belt cities into a simplistic formula which tends to portray central city decline as inevitable and local leaders as impotent in the face of these problems.

A fundamental tenet of post-war liberal thinking had been that local leadership combined with governmental activism could successfully promote economic and social development and expand civil rights. The results, however, while mixed, have been

largely unsuccessful. Despite mounting major social and economic policies, northern urban leaders failed to generate adequate jobs and housing for urban residents, and, consequently, the liberal faith in government activism collapsed in the 1970s. Extant literature suggests various causes for this irony of northern liberalism.[1] For example, some scholars have indicated that the leaders of the new postwar urban politics were unwilling or unable to respond to the demands of neighborhood interests and consequently faced an irreconcilable crisis of public authority (Wilson and Katznelson). Other scholars have demonstrated how racial prejudices led to economic policies that hemmed low-income blacks in the inner city and promoted the migration of white residents and capital out the urban core (Hirsch and Sugrue). Historians have also highlighted the conflict between economic and rights liberalism as postwar liberals were unable to satisfy the concerns of both their working-class and their African-American constituencies (Brinkley and Lichtenstein). John Mollenkopft and Kenneth Jackson have emphasized the counterproductive nature of metropolitan policies that encouraged businesses and residents to move out of central cities and relocate to the suburbs and to the Sunbelt. Studies up to now demonstrate how internal contradictions curtailed the

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[1] James Q. Wilson, ed., *Urban Renewal: The Record and the Controversy* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966); Ira Katznelson, *City Trenches: Urban Politics and the Patterning of Class in the United States* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981); Arnold R. Hirsch, *Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Thomas J. Sugrue, *The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); John Mollenkopf, *The Contested City* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983); Kenneth T. Jackson, *Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Alan Brinkley, *The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Press 1995); Nelson Lichtenstein, *The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor* (New York: Basic Books, 1995). Other literature representative of this theme includes Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority* (New York: Norton Press, 1969).

overall success of postwar liberal policies. Taken as a whole, however, they tend to suggest these efforts ultimately collapsed due to the inconsistencies within liberalism itself. This scholarship has provided important insights into postwar liberalism. One issue, however, has yet to be dealt with directly: the overall record of local leadership, which is critical to our understanding of liberalism's performance. To remedy this lacuna in the scholarship and to provide still another perspective, my dissertation focuses explicitly on local urban leaders in order to assess their efforts within the scope of the possibilities available and the limitations they faced.[2]

Through a case study of post-war St. Louis, my dissertation shows how a new group of urban leaders, working within the difficult context of metropolitan political fragmentation and Sunbelt competition, combined public and private policies in an effort to strengthen regional growth and, at the same time, to revitalize the urban core. In addition to revealing the role of local leaders in this case study, my findings have implications for our interpretation of northern urban liberalism overall. St. Louis can tell us a great deal about the historical significance of northern urban leadership because the city exhibited some of the most impressive achievements (Gateway Arch) and abject failures (Pruitt-Igoe housing project) of post-war urban policy. As the bibliographical essay details, this dissertation relies on the records of city planning and urban renewal

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[2]June M. Thomas' *Redevelopment and Race: Planning a Finer City in Postwar Detroit* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997) provides the closest model of such an approach. Thomas credits Detroit's leadership for their ambitious efforts; she focuses on how racial biases and the inadequacy of planning tools curtailed the effectiveness of their programs. I build on her insights but center more on the process of policy making and also adopt a metropolitan framework that broadens the scope of the leadership and redevelopment efforts that I include in my study.

agencies, business groups, county government, and metropolitan organizations, as well as on industrial census data.

My study is organized into five chapters. The introductory chapter, Chapter I, highlights how local leaders in early twentieth-century St. Louis established the public-private alliances, conceptual framework, and municipal tools that influenced post-WWII strategies and reveals that many of the city's economic challenges had become evident by WWI. Chapter II shows how St. Louis City officials, planners, and business leaders after World War II constructed a conceptual framework for inner-city industrial revitalization placed within a metropolitan perspective and built a local-federal coalition which defined northern urban liberalism. In Chapter III, I demonstrate how these leaders fostered a local-metropolitan-state-federal alliance in order to carry out the Gateway Arch project, which was critical to their plans for metropolitan development and revitalization. Chapter IV shows how business leaders, planners, and suburban officials promoted the industrialization of St. Louis County, arguing that the suburbs would partner with the city in promoting sound economic growth. The final chapter, Chapter V, shows how St. Louis leaders created a regional institutional framework to support their metropolitan initiatives, with particular emphasis on the promotion of research and development and public planning.

The historical record shows that St. Louis leaders devoted a great deal of energy, imagination, and commitment to saving their city and establishing more equitable social and economic conditions; their endeavors relied significantly upon alliances between city and suburban officials and business leaders. The ensuing coalitions funded massive

industrial-commercial revitalization programs in the urban core, promoted downtown cultural sites, stimulated growth in high-tech industries in the city and the county, fostered research in universities, and advanced industry in the suburbs. Nevertheless, despite their impressive efforts at metropolitan restructuring, in the face of Sunbelt competition and hampered by metropolitan political fragmentation, their policies were unable to generate investment sufficient to reverse inner-city decline in St. Louis. This dissertation is the first in-depth study of post-WWII leadership and economic policy in St. Louis. By revealing how these urban leaders addressed local and national political-economic changes through metropolitan growth strategies, my dissertation uncovers a crucial but missing link in explaining why the dynamics of urban development since 1945 proved successful at boosting suburban growth and the central business district yet failed to create the infrastructure, jobs, and investment needed for a fundamentally sound urban economy.

My findings also have implications for our interpretation of northern urban liberalism in general. Current literature tends to negatively characterize the performance of local urban leaders in light of the decline of modern industrial cities without looking more closely at the challenges, possibilities, and limitations that they faced. The literature suggests that local leaders should have foreseen the dramatic population losses, job decline, and the race riots of the 1960s and planned more accordingly to meet the needs of urban residents. My study, in contrast, assesses the record of local urban leaders in one major city squarely within their political-economic context, rather than inferring it from the unpredictable outcome of their policies. Employing this vantage point, I have been

able to reveal more fully their motivation, decision-making processes, alliances, worldview, and the extent to which their policies matched the social and economic realities of the time. My findings suggest that urban leaders had a more sophisticated strategy, more disinterested policies, and a stronger sense of mission in saving their cities than we tend to conclude. To be sure, local leaders had their flaws, displaying racial and class biases and a short-sightedness that curtailed their effectiveness; and unregulated capital mobility made their goals almost impossible to achieve. Nevertheless, this study demonstrates that northern urban leaders, in one city, St. Louis, worked hard to generate jobs within the tripartite framework of city-region-nation and achieved important, if limited, results. I find that northern urban liberalism was a pragmatic and creative partnership with Washington, D.C., that ultimately did not fail due to internal contradictions but against the formidable challenges posed by Republican pro-growth coalitions of the Sunbelt.

Leadership and Development in Early Twentieth-Century St. Louis

St. Louis leaders after WWII built upon a long tradition in St. Louis of setting forth innovative and ambitious efforts to revitalize the urban core. The story of how St. Louis leaders grappled with the problems of their modern, industrial city in the difficult context of fragmentation and regional competition began not in 1945, but in the early 20th century. While local leaders in this period generally felt optimistic about St. Louis' future, they identified fundamental concerns which, left unresolved, threatened the long-term prosperity of the city. In response, they sought to exert a "directed political will"

against the problems of the city through their establishment of comprehensive urban planning and development.

The early 20th century was thus a formative period for the issues that would drive post-WWII development. Apparent in the first two decades of the twentieth century are many of the problems that hindered economic growth in the urban core after WWII and the conflicts local leaders would face as they sought to promote new growth strategies in the second half of the century. Moreover, the intellectual framework that would guide post-WWII restructuring efforts had its roots in this early period as city planners, businessmen, and public officials conceived of the principles and strategies that would guide modern urban planning generally, and their response to St. Louis' development, specifically. And by the mid-1920s, local leaders in St. Louis had established the municipal policy structure that would influence public planning and development for the rest of the century. They also established a precedent of building new coalitions between public- and private-sector leaders and, eventually, integrating their alliances across racial and class lines. The flourishing of local-federal partnership in response to the Great Depression and especially during WWII dramatically broadened the potential scale and scope of their efforts; it also laid the basis for a new generation of local-federal coalitions and programs after WWII. During the 1930s and early 1940s, the challenges that local leaders faced intensified; in light of increasingly rapid decentralization, city officials promoted significant innovations in their governing alliances and in their policy structure. The main problems, conceptual framework, and even the strategies that they identified in

the first two decades of the century, however, were not fundamentally altered and continued to drive redevelopment efforts throughout this period.

Local leaders in post-1945 St. Louis exhibited a civic spirit similar to that of early twentieth-century St. Louis leaders. The challenges that local leaders faced in the early twentieth century were not unique to them, but were common among urban leaders in diverse industrial centers. The problem of stabilizing the inner city took on significance to St. Louisans earlier and in sharper relief than in many other cities, however; moreover, the leadership's innovative development efforts would become a template for the modern planning profession. Many scholars have provided detailed analyses of these issues as they unfolded in St. Louis and in other industrial centers. In order to more fully evaluate the performance of local leaders in St. Louis after 1945, nevertheless, we must identify the conceptual framework, alliances, and policies upon which they built.

Concern Amidst Optimism: Identifying the Problems

For seventh months in 1904, St. Louis City hosted the World's Fair Exposition and its twenty million attendees. For St. Louis leaders the Fair, a showcase of American enterprise, technology, and industrial progress, portended their city's economic success in the new century.[3] Men like David R. Francis (head of the campaign for the Fair and former St. Louis mayor and Missouri governor), St. Louis City Mayor Rolla Wells (1901-1909), and W. K. Bixby (founder of American Car and Co. and railroad magnate) had reason for optimism. In 1900, St. Louis City counted 575,238 inhabitants and ranked

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[3]On the World's Fair, see James Neal Primm, *Lion of the Valley: St. Louis, Missouri, 1764-1980* (3rd ed., St. Louis: Missouri Historical Society, 1998) 373-75, 382, 391. The official version is David R. Francis, *The Universal Exposition of 1904* (2 vols., St. Louis, 1913).

fourth in the nation in size, yielding only to New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia. While the city's population would grow less slowly during the following decades, by the start of WWII the city counted around 816,000 residents.

St. Louis' central location on the Mississippi River, railroad networks, skilled labor force, exceptionally diverse economic base, and mature financial institutions had made it one of the nation's leading industrial centers by the beginning of the twentieth century.[4] The area's rich resources and St. Louisans' entrepreneurial ambition gave an early start to the city's most prominent industries: automobile, train, and streetcar manufacturing and the aviation, chemical, and electrical industries were well established by the interwar period.[5] Despite St. Louis' economic downturn during the Great Depression, its role as a key industrial and distribution center during WWII confirmed St. Louis' position as an economic hub. St. Louisans had also built their city into a well-established commercial-financial hub in the Mississippi Valley and in the nation, gaining confirmation of this role when St. Louis was chosen as the seat of the eighth federal-reserve banking district after the passage of the Federal Reserve Act (1913).

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[4]In 1890, St. Louis ranked fourth in the gross value of its manufactured products and fifth in the amount of capital invested in manufacturing. Between 1900 and 1910 capital invested in manufacturing had grown by 15% to $269.3 million; the value of manufactured products had grown by 79% to $430.2 million. St. Louis' particular mix of industries was not unique to St. Louis. The industries in which St. Louis excelled at the turn of the century (i.e., dress manufacturing, furniture making, book publishing and job printing, boots and shoes, lumber products, newspaper and periodical publishing, and tobacco) characterized maturing cities like St. Louis that had large populations, approximate equality of men to women, and relative cultural maturity. In 1900, manufacturing in St. Louis employed about 38% of workers while retail, wholesale trade, and transportation employed about 32%, reflecting St. Louis' historic role as a commercial and distribution center. Of the remaining workers, around 25% were employed in domestic and personal service, 5% in professions, and 1% in agricultural, Primm, *Lion of the Valley,* 327, 331, 338, 394. On St. Louis' industrial diversity, see also St. Louis City Plan Commission, *Comprehensive City Plan* (1947).

[5]Contemporary accounts of business leaders include John W. Leonard, *The Book of St. Louisans: A Biographical Dictionary of the Leading Living Men of St. Louis* (St. Louis, 1906, 1912) and James Cox, *St. Louisans* (St. Louis, 1900). On early business histories, see Ernest D. Kargau, *Mercantile, Industrial, and Professional St. Louis* (St. Louis, 1902).

In hosting the 1904 Fair, St. Louisans also demonstrated their ability to promote the city's economic progress. St. Louis businessmen and city officials raised ten million dollars in public and private funds to underwrite the Fair and sponsored infrastructure upgrading and beautification in the urban core. The city's public-private partnership introduced local residents to a mode of development that would become increasingly common and move "the private city toward an era of greater public influence over the built environment," in historian Keith Revell's words.[6]

Despite their optimism, political leaders like Mayor Rolla Wells, businessmen like John Gundlach (prominent real estate agent and public improvement proponent) and civic activists like Dwight Davis (city parks commissioner) identified fundamental problems that had to be addressed if they hoped to secure the city's long-term prosperity.[7] In preparing for the Fair, real challenges came under focus: the deteriorating conditions of waterfront industrial and commercial facilities, the city's undercapitalized infrastructure, and a disorganized and fragmented urban landscape. Moreover, city leaders grew increasingly concerned about the intensifying social conflicts manifest in

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[6]Keith D. Revell, "Regulating the Landscape: Real Estate Values, City Planning, and the 1916 Zoning Ordinance," in David Ward and Olivier Zunz, eds., *The Landscape of Modernity: New York City, 1900-1940* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 39-40. Although city building had been very much a private enterprise, public-private alliances underwrote important facets of urban development, infrastructure in particular. See Sam Bass Warner, Jr., *The Private City: Philadelphia in Three Periods of Its Growth* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968). Governmental functions, especially on the local level, have expanded primarily to promote economic growth. Jon C. Teaford called their ability to provide public services and foster democratic governance the "unheralded triumph" of late nineteenth century government. Jon C. Teaford, *The Unherald Triumph: City Government in America, 1870-1900* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984).

[7]Gundalch would gain national influence as a board member of the national American Civic Association. Davis served as a member of the St. Louis City House of Delegates (1907-1909) and chairman of the City Planning Commission (1911-1915) and served in other local positions. Davis became Secretary of War (1925-1929) and acted in other nationally prominent capacities. He also established the Davis Cup for international tennis.

the 1900 streetcar strike, which left three St. Louis workers dead.[8] The primary sources of these problems, according to planning proponent John Grundlach, were threefold: the westward movement of business and population away from the inner city; the city's fixed boundary with St. Louis County; and the absence of an integrated physical environment. The trinity of problems that businessmen, public officials, and planners in pre-WWII St. Louis would identify as the main threat to the city's stability thus became evident early on. Urban engineer and planner Harland Bartholomew would become the most influential individual in St. Louis to draw attention to these problems. In 1915, Bartholomew moved to St. Louis from Newark, New Jersey, to work for the City Plan Commission and by 1919 had become the City Planning Commissioner, the first full-time planner employed by any American city. Bartholomew's pioneering research would broaden St. Louisans' comprehension of these issues and would help him to become one the foremost theorists of modern urban planning.[9]

St. Louis city planners would be among the first to raise the alarm on decentralization in American cities—or what they would come to call the

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[8]At the turn of the century, St. Louis leaders were increasingly concerned with labor discontent. After the 1917 East St. Louis race riot, they would center ever more concern on tensions between whites and blacks.
[9]The twenty-five year old Bartholomew, a civil engineer by training, already had notable professional planning experience before he was recruited by Henry Wright and other planning advocates to St. Louis. Working in the office of New-York based E.P. Goodrich, Bartholomew had helped to design port facilities for Portland (OR), Los Angeles, and Newark (NJ). Bartholomew currently served as director of city planning in Newark, a unique position in municipal government at the time, and supervised the creation of Newark's comprehensive plan. The young engineer viewed St. Louis as an opportunity to grapple with the challenges of planning a much larger and fragmented industrial city. That year he also established Harland Bartholomew and Associates, a consulting firm, and would serve as its chairman until his retirement in 1962.On Bartholomew, see Eric Sandweiss, *St. Louis: The Evolution of an Urban Landscape* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001), 213; Joseph Heathcott , "The City Remade: Public Housing and the Urban Landscape in St. Louis, 1900-1960" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Indiana University, 2002), 142-50; E. F. Porter, *Harland Bartholomew* (St. Louis: St. Louis Public Library and Landmarks Association of St. Louis, 1990); Eldridge Lovelace, *Harland Bartholomew: His Contributions to American Urban Planning* (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1993).

metropolitanization of urban centers, as firms and households relocated away from the urban core and eventually across city boundaries. In the context of a generally unregulated urban land market and spurred by land speculation and small-time landlords, this trend in cities like St. Louis led inner-city industrial and commercial districts to experience the increasingly rapid succession of land-use and concurrent deterioration of their facilities, while residential neighborhoods evidenced cycles of overcrowding and vacancy. In St. Louis, the consequences of this economic process were becoming apparent by the time of the World's Fair in the deterioration of riverfront facilities (as barge traffic decline) and of elite residential areas like downtown Lucas Place.

Although St. Louis City's industries would not begin to suburbanize until after WWII, city residents had begun to move to the county in growing numbers since the turn of the century.[10] The city's demographic trends represented a particularly menacing threat to the urban core, according to St. Louis City officials, businessmen, and planners. Registering their concern, St. Louis City Mayor Wells (1901-1909) and members of the St. Louis Civic Improvement League, calling for new downtown beautification projects, asked, "how are we to retain [residents] unless the city offers something in which they feel a civic pride?"[11] Wells had identified what became St. Louis' predominant demographic pattern: Between 1910 and 1920, population in St. Louis County (497

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[10]As Chapter Two of this dissertation shows.

[11]Prompted by the Civic Improvement League, Mayor Wells appointed two high-profile planning groups in 1902 and 1904, respectively, to supervise two new projects. Mayor Wells intended the Kingshighway Boulevard project to create a monumental drive out of the existing North-South thoroughfare. The Public Building group's '"Municipal Court and Public Parkway" envisioned the organization of existing downtown public buildings and a new courthouse around a landscaped recreational parkway. For details, see Sandweiss, *Evolution*, 192-96. Sandweiss provides an excellent and unparalleled study of urban land development and of the evolution of city planning ideals in St. Louis City in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

square miles) grew by 22% to reach 100,373 and by 1940 it had grown to 274,230 inhabitants. That year, the city registered its first population decline in one-hundred and twenty years; although a mere 1% decline, the pattern had become evident. Growing concern over residential and industrial dispersion encouraged city planners in St. Louis to devote a great deal of energy to tracking and analyzing this trend. The accelerating rate of decentralization would lead planners to highlight this problem with ever greater urgency, as evidenced in reports like the *City Plan for St. Lou*is (1907), *Problems of St. Louis* (1917), *Urban Land Use Policy* (1936), and most vociferously in their 1942 report, *St. Louis After the War*, in which they documented their recommendations for post-WWII redevelopment.

St. Louis City's fixed boundary with St. Louis County aggravated the problems posed by decentralization. As Jon Teaford has shown, the ability of central cities to annex land accounted for the significant territorial growth of many industrial centers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; as a result, they were better positioned to capture businesses and residents within their political boundaries.[12] St. Louis City, however, could not take advantage of this possibility. Since its separation from St. Louis County in 1876 and legally prohibited from annexing contiguous land, the city's size became fixed at sixty-two square miles.[13] This limitation made St. Louisans attuned to the problem of decentralization earlier than most local leaders whose cities were able to annex and remained integrated within their counties. As residents and businesses moved in "a wave-

[12]Jon C. Teaford, *Cities and Suburbs: The Political Fragmentation of Metropolitan America, 1850-1970* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979).
[13]As both a city and a county, the city is legally prohibited from expanding through annexation into the county. There is no state law in Missouri that allows annexation across county lines.

like action from east to west," civic improvement and planning advocates understood, they represented a direct loss to the city's tax- and job-base if they relocated across the political boundary.[14] Highlighting concerns voiced by business and political leaders, Bartholomew's *Problems of St. Louis* (1917) made the most explicit link yet between the city's municipal structure and the fiscal viability of the urban core. During his career, Bartholomew would direct disciplined research into the dynamics of metropolitanization in St. Louis and the consequences for urban core stability therein (Chapter Two). City planners, Bartholomew in particular, made it a matter of ongoing policy to encourage leaders to find a way to enact a city-county merger, albeit without success.[15]

In the early twentieth century, St. Louis political and business leaders also centered a great deal of their public debate on what they called the problem of fragmentation. The city's disorderly growth and disjointed urban landscape, they argued, had direct implications for its long-term prosperity. Civic leaders like W. W. Harmon (engineer for the city's Board of Public Service) and professionals like Henry Wright (architect, planner, and eventual consultant to the St. Louis City Plan Commission) understood that these physical conditions made economic development and public service delivery highly inefficient. Moreover, the fragmented landscape reinforced existing social divisions among residents and inhibited the civic cohesion necessary for the city's stability. Wealthy St. Louisans concentrated in the central corridor (the city's

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[14]St. Louis City Plan Commission, *St. Louis After the War* (1942), 29. Primm, *Lion of the Valley*, 445-47.
[15]St. Louis reformers have tried, and failed, more than in any other place to create metropolitan-level governments (in 1926, 1930, 1959, 1962, 1989, and 1990). Dennis R. Judd and Todd Swanstrom, *City Politics: Private Power and Public Policy* (3rd ed.; New York: Longman, 2002), 332-34; See also Chapter Three in Jones's *Fragmented By Design*.

approximately six mile East-West axis originating in the central business district) while working- and middle-class residents populated the heavily German and Irish neighborhoods to the North and South and the small black neighborhoods north of downtown (blacks comprised around 6% of the city's population in 1900).[16] As Eric Sandweiss has shown, this highly distinct residential pattern intensified the reality and perception of a division among St. Louis residents arising from their social class and ethno-religious differences. St. Louisans at the time described this fissure quite accurately as "the neighborhoods versus the central corridor."[17] As political scientists Lana Stein and Robert Salisbury have shown, this division was reinforced by St. Louis City's highly fragmented governmental structure, which fueled neighborhood-based ward organizations.[18] The problem of fragmentation captured the attention of local leaders in

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[16]Between 1900 and the 1930s, most of the city's most powerful economic, political, and civic leaders lived in private places in the West End neighborhood, located about three miles directly west of the central business district. See Primm, *Lion of the Valley*, 347-48; David Beito and Bruce Smith, "The Formation of Urban Infrastructure Through Non-Governmental Planning: The Private Places of St. Louis, 1869-1920 *Journal of Urban History* v16 (May 1990): 263-303.

In 1900, St. Louis ranked seventh among the twenty-five largest American cities in the number of foreign-born and seventeenth in percentage of foreign-born inhabitants (Germans predominated). See Ruth Crawford, *The Immigrant in St. Louis* (St. Louis: Studies in Social Economics, 1917), Merle Fainsod, "The Influence of Racial and National Groups in St. Louis Politics, 1908-1928" (A.M. Thesis, Washington University, 1927), Maire A. Murphy, "Radical Ideology and German-American Identity: The German-American Freethinkers and the Process of Assimilation in Nineteenth-Century St. Louis, Missouri" (M.A. Thesis, University of Virginia, 1998), Audrey Olson, "St. Louis Germans, 1850-1920: The Nature of the Immigrant Community" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Kansas, 1970), and Margaret Lo Piccolo Sullivan, "St. Louis Ethnic Neighborhoods, 1850-1930" (Bulletin of the MHS, January 1977). St. Louis ranked second after Baltimore in the percentage of blacks in the population among major cities at this time. Katharine T. Corbett and Mary E. Seematter, "Black St. Louis At the Turn of the Century," *Gateway Heritage* VII (Summer 1986): 40-48.

[17]A main theme in Sandweiss, *Evolution*.

[18]Despite various charter reform efforts, St. Louis City has retained a highly decentralized system of governance. On the origins and implications of the city's municipal structure, see Lana Stein, *St. Louis Politics: The Triumph of Tradition* (St. Louis: Missouri Historical Society Press, 200), Robert H. Salisbury, "St. Louis Politics: Relationships Among Interests, Parties, and Governmental Structure," *Western Political Science Quarterly*, XIII 2 (June, 1960): 498-507, and E. Terrence Jones, *Fragmented By Design: Why St. Louis Has So Many Governments* (St. Louis: Palmerston and Reed Publishers, 2000).

diverse American urban centers in the early twentieth century. In St. Louis City, however, this issue took on particularly acute implications due to the combination of a conspicuous residential pattern and a municipal structure which remained among the most decentralized of the industrial-belt cities.

According to prominent St. Louisans, the city's fragmentation, expressed through social conflicts and through the urban landscape, presented the greatest obstacle to their promotion of the city's overall welfare. Neighborhood-based skepticism of central corridor interests had deterred City Hall from carrying out a number of public improvement initiatives in the early twentieth century.[19] Moreover, the absence of a more integrated urban landscape would sustain St. Louis' sectionally-based divisions and thus hinder greater social cohesion. Unresolved, these conditions rendered the city economically inefficient and socially volatile in the long-term.

Based on their assessment of St. Louis' problems and possibilities, local political leaders, businessmen, and city officials in the early twentieth century agreed on the fundamental challenge that they faced: St. Louis leaders had to find a way to promote orderly economic development and at the same time foster social cohesion among a heterogeneous population. Only by thus stabilizing their diverse, industrial city could they preserve St. Louis' competitive position, attract investment, and ensure long-term economic growth. In 1913, the St. Louis City Chamber of Commerce coined the slogan "Spirit of St. Louis" to reference what they viewed as the ultimate vitality of the city and

[19]For example, small- and middle-class property owners, especially in the heavily German wards, maintained a conservative position that had amounted to civic neglect. They feared that they would bear the biggest burden of increased taxes as downtown businessmen promoted public improvements for the central corridor. Primm, *Lion of the Valley*, 422.

her leadership. To be sure, the downtown businessmen and political leaders who rallied behind this challenge had a great deal to gain if they preserved the city's profitability. Yet they were motivated not merely by self-interest but also by their view of themselves as community stewards. These St. Louisans exemplified urban leaders who "felt they labored patriotically for the welfare of the whole city," in historian Zane Miller's words.[20] They responded, indeed, to their cities' most urgent challenges.

The problems that Gundlach, Bartholomew, and their allies identified underscored a structural conflict that would continue to impede inner-city redevelopment efforts: St. Louis leaders would have to promote urban core revitalization within the difficult context of metropolitan political fragmentation. Locked into its extant territory and burdened by a densely developed inner city and by an undercapitalized industrial and residential infrastructure, the city would be severely limited in its ability to accommodate firms requiring new facilities or greater space for land-intensive production and residents seeking modern and less congested housing conditions (Chapter Two). The combination of the city's fixed boundary and its physical conditions placed St. Louis City at a great disadvantage with St. Louis County in attracting residents and businesses, as the suburbs offered large expanses of undeveloped land as well as relatively lower taxes (Chapters Two and Four). Consequently, St. Louis City leaders would confront the paradox of having to compete with St. Louis County for industry and residents yet having little available space to capture and retain the very firms and people the city needed to remain vibrant.

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[20]Zane Miller, *Boss Cox's Cincinnati: Urban Politics in the Progressive Era* (New York, 1968), 128.

St. Louis' metropolitan political structure created an even more fundamental conflict for twentieth-century redevelopment efforts, however. In order to promote sound regional growth and at the same stabilize the urban core, local leaders needed to be able to guide development on a metropolitan scale, as business and residential expansion does not stop at municipal boundaries. Yet St. Louis' city-county political divide inhibited cooperation and positioned them both as competitors for investment and residents. As Bartholomew suggested as early as 1917, this scenario, in the absence of strong investment, threatened to create the conditions under which the suburbs grew at the expense of the urban core and consequently rendered metropolitan development a zero-sum game (Chapters Four and Five).[21] Finding a way to promote sound economic development within the context of metropolitan political fragmentation would become one of the most intractable challenges facing St. Louis leadership in the twentieth century. It was in the early part of the century that local leaders took their first systematic steps to stabilize the urban core by addressing the more apparent problem of the city's unguided development.

Public-Private Partnership for Redevelopment: A Directed Political Will Against the Problems of the City

In order to stabilize their diverse industrial city, St. Louis political and business leaders determined that they must promote comprehensive city planning and development under municipal auspices. The challenges posed by inner-city growth dynamics encouraged local officials and businessmen in cities like St. Louis to advance public development tools that would enable them to guide industrial, commercial, and

[21]St. Louis City Plan Commission, *Problems of St. Louis*.

residential development and to promote improvements to the infrastructure. In the estimation of individuals like Gundlach and Bartholomew, effective public development tools would enable them to ameliorate the dynamics of decentralization and promote an integrated urban landscape. They thus committed themselves to exerting a directed political will against the problems of the heterogeneous industrial center and consequently to reinforce the primacy of the urban core. Local urban leaders faced a significant political and intellectual task. In order to build support for continuous governmental intervention into the urban land market, they had to effect an enduring alliance between the business community and municipal officials. Moreover, advocates in cities like St. Louis had simultaneously to establish a conceptual framework for comprehensive urban planning. Their evolving ideas would both create the theoretic foundations of modern urban planning and provide an argument for centralized planning itself.[22] Proponents' effectiveness would depend upon their ongoing ability to convince their city's diverse inhabitants that public planning would benefit all residents.

In 1911, St. Louis municipal officials and downtown businessmen and professionals created the St. Louis City Plan Commission in order to translate planning advocacy into public policy. Their successful partnership and organizational effort relied upon a decade of emerging alliances among businessmen and public officials in the interest of planning. Downtown industrial, commercial, and financial leaders sparked this

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[22]On the development of planning ideas, see, among others, M. Christine Boyer, *Dreaming the Rational City: The Myth of American City Planning* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1983); Peter G. Hall, *Cities of Tomorrow: An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Oxford, 1989); Mel Scott, *American City Planning Since 1890* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, 1969); Mary Corbin Sies and Christopher Silver, eds., *Planning the Twentieth-Century American City* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

enterprise when they created the Civic Improvement League in 1901, which gained its financial support from over nine hundred business and professional men, renamed the Civic League in 1905.[23] The organization included prominent businessmen like brewer Adolphus Bush and merchant Charles Stix. As a private organization, the Civic League sought to ally with local government agencies in an effort to study urban development problems and create a systematic and unified approach to public improvements. Downtown businessmen had recognized their immediate stake in improving the city's investment climate; their interest in promoting civic improvements, moreover, dovetailed with the burgeoning City Beautiful movement in urban centers like St. Louis.

The Civic League consequently found strong support in St. Louis' City Hall. Mayor Wells appointed energetic civic activists like Dwight Davis in his effort to modernize and beautify the urban core, promoting projects like the Public Parkway system in the central corridor. Wells relied upon the members of the Civic League, which included landscape architects and planners, to provide guidance for these endeavors.[24]John Gundlach best exemplified how the early planning movement in St. Louis bridged public-sector and private-sector leadership. This successful North St. Louis

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[23]Downtown business firms, banks, and manufacturing enterprises would provide much of the financial support for the St. Louis Civic League through WWI. Through WWI, St. Louis' Civic League included prominent businessmen and professionals such as industrialists J. Charles Cabanne and W. K. Bixby; merchants William Fuller and Murray Carleton; real estate barons W.P.H Tuner, Frederick Zeibig, and Pierre Chouteau; and professionals like World's Fair landscape architect George Kessler, Washington University president Robert Brookings, and engineer Calvin Woodward. Sandweiss, *Evolution*, 196, 208. Stein, *St. Louis Politics*, 10-11.

[24]This project was the '"Municipal Court and Public Parkway." The proposal earned their support mainly among downtown businessmen and civic leaders, planners and architects, and pro-growth daily newspapers. City voters, however, sent the Central Public Parkway bill to defeat in 1915, depriving the project of funding. This general idea, however, guided subsequent greenway improvements in downtown St. Louis during the interwar period, such as the widening of Market Street and the construction of Aloe Plaza in the 1920s.

real estate agent served as city council president in the 1910s and became one of the most influential planning advocates of his day. The connection between business and political leaders in St. Louis was bolstered by their shared goal of creating "a new order based on economic growth," as historian Thomas Spencer noted.[25] This pro-growth ambition brought together St. Louisans of both the Democratic and Republic parties and of diverse professional and economic interests; it also allied the predominantly Anglo-American St. Louis downtown leaders with influential German entrepreneurs like Adolphus Bush. The objective of economic growth would prove to be the lynchpin around which political leaders in cities like St. Louis would build diverse coalitions in the twentieth century (Chapters Two-Five). By the 1910s, leading politicians and businessmen in St. Louis demonstrated their support for public planning and development. But they had to find a far more effective way to direct their efforts into comprehensive and centralized planning. The goal of the nascent planning movement in St. Louis, then, was to tie more closely the interests of big business, public policy, and progressive civic ideals.

In order to achieve their aims, League members like Gundlach and Davis concluded that they needed to establish a public agency rather than rely upon organizational ties between a civic league and local government. The organizational structure and public image of the League had proven to be a hindrance to city planning in St. Louis. The League's exclusive membership, concentrated in the downtown business

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[25]See Thomas M. Spencer's rich study on St. Louis elites, *The St. Louis Veiled Prophet Celebration: Power on Parade, 1877-1995* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2000), 67 (quoting historian David Thelen).

community, dampened broad citizen awareness and support for its agenda.[26] The League was also comprised of numerous commissions that focused on particular issues, for example, street improvements, and thus risked adopting a "problem-solving" method despite its advocacy of a unified approach. Gundlach and Davis argued that a planning body, in contrast, must have official political status and be centralized under municipal auspices in order to develop and utilize municipal powers effectively, powers such as eminent domain, bond financing, and legislation governing land use and development. A public commission for planning would concentrate municipal development powers in the hands of experts working as a cohesive group towards the city's welfare. In their estimation, such an agency would ensure that planning in St. Louis did not devolve into piece-meal problem-solving but instead would develop as a continuous public policy to guide long-term growth. Building on the alliances between the League and the mayor's office, they subsequently established the St. Louis City Plan Commission (CPC) in 1911, staffed by planning and engineering experts like Bartholomew, headed by municipal officials like Dwight Davis and industrialists like Edward Mallinckrodt (chemicals), and including nine citizen representatives.[27]

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[26]In the early twentieth century, city residents' skepticism of the two major projects that the Civic League supported—planned under the direction of Mayor Wells—reflected the problems that the Civic League faced. Viewing the parkway proposal as a boon to downtown interests at the taxpayers' expense, voters had defeated the bond to fund the project. Concurrently, the Kingshighway project, intended to create a pleasure drive along this North-South thoroughfare, stopped short as property owners on the North end brought law suits against the encroachment on their property and on the South end, business traffic overran the boulevard. See Sandweiss, *Evolution*, 192-96.

[27]Civic League activists first created the private City Plan Association, whose members then established the City Plan Commission. Sandweiss discusses the creation of the CPC in *Evolution*, 204-207. See also, Heathcott, "City Remade," 130-40. Heathcott offers an outstanding study of public housing in St. Louis and the local and national political-economic context that shaped its evolution and contributed to its ultimate failure. He provides an analytical lens through which to evaluate the more fully the objectives as well as the successes and limitations of twentieth-century public housing policy.

Moreover, proponents like Davis wanted to create a public agency in order to build legitimacy for their endeavors. Planning advocates, as historian Joseph Heathcott has emphasized, recognized that they must shape public debate over urban development if they wanted to justify their exercise of augmented governmental powers. They were indeed promoting a significant new role for local government as they called for greater public influence over the urban landscape. In order to become successful, Gundlach and their allies needed not only an organizational structure for their endeavors, but citizen support as well. St. Louisans like Henry Wright and Dwight Davis believed that a public commission provided a platform upon which to argue persuasively that planning would benefit all residents because municipal government, at its best, promoted the general welfare. Herein Wright and Gundlach and their allies interpreted a pragmatic connection between their rhetoric on planning's public interest and their creation of an appointed expert commission. Their efforts were not intended to exert unchecked power in the urban environment; rather, governmental expertise and appointed commissions, in the view of proponents, offered an experimental and pragmatic measure to meld politics and professionalism to rationalize industrial development and ameliorate social polarization.[28]

For all their efforts, St. Louis leaders' ambition to direct a "political will" against the dynamics of industrial development highlights one of the fundamental obstacles urban leaders confront in bolstering economic growth, that is, unregulated capital

[28]Keith Revell and Mark Weiss suggest that the seeming contradiction between planners' magnified rhetoric on the public welfare and their creation of a "shadow government" of experts insulated from electoral politics was not an exercise in social control. Rather, planning advocates viewed this not only as a logical but as an imperative response to the problems of the city. See Revell, "Regulating the Landscape," and Marc A. Weiss, "Density and Intervention: New York's Planning Tradition," in Ward and Zunz, eds., *Landscape of Modernity*, 46-75. This theme is also apparent in Keith D. Revell, *Building Gotham: Civic Culture and Public Policy in New York City, 1898-1938* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2003).

mobility. Local urban leaders work within a political-economic context that contains a fundamental conflict for inner-city redevelopment efforts: they need to trap investment in the urban core yet firms can leave at will. Urban leaders in the early twentieth century sought to address this problem by strengthening and innovating municipal development tools; believing that they could create the conditions under which many firms would choose to stay in the urban core, they embarked on their endeavors with confidence. St. Louis leaders and their counterparts in other cities would augment these powers dramatically with local-federal partnership from the 1930s on (Chapter Two). For St. Louisans, this conflict between the imperative of inner-core stability and capital mobility became increasingly apparent as the rate of industrial decentralization accelerated in the pre-WWII period. Their ability to reshape the physical landscape and also to offer tax incentives, however, provides local leaders with only limited tools to promote investment in the context of unregulated capital mobility—despite their best attempts. The consequences of these limitations would become only more acute after WWII in the face of a new regional competitor, the aggressively pro-business Sunbelt.

"For the City as a Whole": Creating a Conceptual and Policy Framework for Planning

St. Louisans' effective promotion of centralized planning depended largely upon the force and cogency of their arguments for this endeavor. As planners, municipal officials, and businessmen in St. Louis built a coalition for public planning in the early twentieth century, they perforce elaborated a conceptual framework for their enterprise. Contributing to and drawing from planning debates underway in cities like Chicago and

New York, St. Louis proponents, Harland Bartholomew most influentially, helped to shape the fundamental principles behind modern city planning.[29] By the end of WWI, St. Louisans had identified the nascent principles that would guide their practices throughout the twentieth century and had laid the foundation for their municipal planning tools. Their ability to create an operative intellectual framework and persuasive rhetoric to explain it was critical not only to foster residents' ongoing support for their proposals. Advocates' vision of urban development would shape the direction and scope of their redevelopment policies and thus the reorganization of prominent spaces in the urban core.

George Markham, Civic League executive board member, and his allies explicitly linked the welfare of the industrial city to centralized planning under municipal auspices. As their 1907 *City Plan for St. Louis* stated, the nation's first comprehensive city plan: "the industrial future of the city demands it."[30] Assessing the intensifying rivalry from other industrial-belt cities, these St. Louisans concluded that they must establish a new role for local government—in essence, a new public policy obligation—in order to sharpen their city's competitive edge. Otherwise, Civic League members stated, St. Louis will lose out to its competitors and fail to remain "one of the great American municipalities."[31]

The *City Plan for St. Louis* reflected advocates' evolving presumptions about the city and about the dynamics of planned urban development. Fundamentally, proponents

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[29]The emergence of these debates is explored in literature such as Boyer, *Dreaming the Rational City,* Hall, *Cities of Tomorrow,* Heathcott, "City Remade," Sandweiss, *Evolution*, and Scott, *American City Planning Since 1890*, and in the essays in Sies and Silver, eds., *Planning the Twentieth-Century American City*, and in Ward and Zunz, eds., *Landscape of Modernity*.
[30]Civic League of St. Louis, *A City Plan for St. Louis* (1907), 8.
[31]ibid.

like Gundlach viewed the city as a single organic unit whose constituent parts worked together for the greater whole. The job of planning, in their estimation, was to ameliorate the fragmentation that hindered the city from achieving its full potential. Disinterested experts could identify the most productive spatial arrangement of economic activities and infrastructure delivery in the city and promote this organization through municipal redevelopment powers. Complementing planners' focus on efficiency and industry, in the view of Wright, Wells, and their allies, was their promotion of beautification projects in the urban core. As Gundlach told St. Louis businessmen and officials in 1915, "Industrial St. Louis and Beautiful St. Louis must advance hand in hand."[32] Through this comprehensive conception of urban development, planners could trade public amenities for social peace and pull together the fragmented city for the good of all residents.

Planning advocates, however, had to justify the potentially radical proposal of continuous governmental intervention into the real estate market and augmented public control over the urban landscape. Proponents like Gundlach had to ensure St. Louis' broad business community that planning was consistent with free enterprise and also persuade the city's diverse residents that planning benefited all St. Louisans. Public planning and development tools, they argued, would enable impartial professionals to regulate the excesses of private land development and eliminate some of the inefficiencies of private enterprise. Planning was not injurious to free enterprise; rather, planning enabled it to function more productively. Using the city-as-business analogy common among early planning proponents, St. Louisans like Markham and Dwight

[32]Sandweiss, *Evolution*, 208. Quoted from John Gundlach, "City Planning and the Industrial Future," *The St. Louis Idea I* (2) (October, 1916), 13.

asserted in the 1910s that "cities are nothing more than great business institutions wherein the human factor plays a leading part."[33] Planning merely rationalized existing growth patterns for the good of the "city as a whole," they asserted.[34]

For Gundlach, Bartholomew, and like-minded individuals, government activism thus represented a primarily pragmatic response to urban problems. Through municipal development tools, they could ameliorate the decentralization of firms and households that weakened inner-city property values and undermined the city's tax base. Planning would foster the orderly city necessary for sound economic development and social cohesion and thereby enable local leaders to meet the challenges posed by their heterogeneous, industrial city. Defining the public interest increasingly in terms of leaders' ability to guide long-term development, proponents in the first two decades of the twentieth century managed to transform their planning advocacy into a new public policy obligation for local government. St. Louisans were not unique in the conceptual framework that they articulated for urban planning, but participated in a broader conversation among like-minded public officials, planners, engineers, and businessmen in other cities. St. Louisans would be among the most influential, however, due to the national prominence that Harland Bartholomew would gain over the course of the interwar period.

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[33]St. Louis City Plan Commission, *Problems of St. Louis* (1917), xxii.

[34]Sandweiss emphasizes in *Evolution* that the radical potential of planning was tempered as early proponents sought to manage existing growth patterns and "tighten" what they viewed as a complex and variegated but natural urban map (and thus not fundamentally redistribute resources across the urban landscape). They viewed their efforts as benefiting the city as a whole.

St. Louisans translated their planning principles into redevelopment strategies specific to their city. Most fundamental to St. Louisans' twentieth-century redevelopment efforts, they identified the city's central corridor as pivotal to St. Louis' growth overall. According to Markham, Wells, and Gundlach, upgrading the corridor would radiate improvements to its North, South, and West. The central corridor, furthermore, served as a primary focus around which to organize a more unified landscape.[35] The manifestation of these ideas became apparent as early as 1905, in Mayor Wells' proposed public parkway in the downtown central corridor.[36] Equating central corridor investment with the general interests of St. Louis, local leaders would target long-term redevelopment efforts most heavily in this section of the city. Like their counterparts elsewhere, St. Louis leaders identified industrial-commercial revitalization and beautification in the inner-city as mutually reinforcing strategies to boost growth. Moreover, they estimated that razing deteriorating sections in the urban core for new development was imperative because it created new spaces for more economically productive uses, an economic cycle which would become central to municipal redevelopment agendas. St. Louisans' 1907 *City Plan* suggested their nascent conceptualization of these principles; they would make their assumptions increasingly explicit over the course of the next decade in reports such as Bartholomew's *Problems of St. Louis* (1917).

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[35]They intended to accomplish this through initiatives such as integrated street improvements (as suggested in the City Plan Commission's *Central-Traffic Parkway of St. Louis* (1915) and *A Major Street Plan for St. Louis* (1917) and by planning neighborhood civic centers in a constellation oriented to the urban core (albeit never realized as first envisioned in the *City Plan* of 1907).

[36]Sandweiss, *Evolution*, 192-96. This was the Municipal Court and Public Parkway plan which was sidelined by 1915. Subsequent projects in the pre-WWII period like Aloe Plaza, however, were guided by this principle.

By the mid-1920s, St. Louisans also had established a municipal policy structure that enabled them to exert greater public control over the urban landscape. Public officials passed the nation's second comprehensive zoning ordinance, doubled the city's debt limit, strengthened municipal condemnation powers, and advanced the city's bonding resources—the $87.4 million bond in 1923 was the largest yet passed by an American city. Bartholomew's ongoing research and analysis of the city's land-use patterns laid the basis for the City Plan Commission's *Zone Plan* (1919). Public officials had to lobby the Missouri state legislature, however, in order to gain passage of the city's zoning ordinance after it was initially defeated in the state courts; it was officially enacted in 1926.[37] Achieving this goal was critical because zoning became planners' primary tool to guide urban development. Bartholomew and W.W. Harmon were largely responsible for increasing the city's debt limit in order to fund public improvements, heretofore hampered by the city's strict debt ceiling. Conceived during research for the 1917 report, *Problems of St. Louis*, Bartholomew and Harmon successfully lobbied the state legislature to raise the limit to 10% from 5% in major Missouri cities. Concurrently, the City Plan Commission's reports helped to convince municipal officials to promote greater powers of condemnation, central to the potential of their redevelopment initiatives. At the same time, Mayor Henry Kiel (1913-1925) orchestrated a major campaign for the 1923 bond upon recommendation by city planners for a general

[37]The absence of home rule in St. Louis City has made such legislative changes exceedingly cumbersome, and often not pursued, because proponents had to gain approval from state legislators, who historically have been opposed to enhancing the city's powers. St. Louis' first zoning ordinance was challenged in court and struck down by the state supreme court in 1923. In July 1925, the state legislature passed an enabling act which the high court said was in keeping with the Supreme Court's Ambler decision (which legitimated zoning). This led to a second zoning ordinance that became effective on May 26, 1926.

improvement bond (which included twenty-one city-wide projects). Mayor Kiel, prominent business and civic leaders, and Plan Commissioners like Bartholomew convinced city voters to support all but one of the proposals; they passed by more than the necessary two-thirds majority. St. Louisans' willingness to quadruple the city's bonded debt reflected their commitment to energize municipal powers for long-term development.[38]

Some facets of St. Louisans' concepts and strategies for urban redevelopment would lead, however, to counterproductive outcomes. The post-1945 urban renewal projects would most clearly exhibit this conflict, although St. Louisans in the early twentieth century had laid the intellectual foundations which made their approach to redevelopment seem logical, not paradoxical. As St. Louis City Plan Commission's earliest reports had shown, planners recommendations' built upon the assumption that the destruction of deteriorating sections of the urban core in order to build new facilities and for beautification was in fact sound policy (Chapters Two and Three). Inner-city redevelopment projects, as we know, would eventually displace of thousands of residents and tend to raze more commercial facilities and housing units than they replaced. St. Louisans' central corridor strategy, moreover, would reinforce highly uneven investment patterns in St. Louis. As public and private leaders focused redevelopment in this section of the city, large pockets of the urban core in the North and South, burdened by

[38]The city's debt in 1923, according to Primm, was $19.7 million. Primm, *Lion of the Valley*, 422. The bond included funds for new downtown public buildings, street improvements in the central city and in neighborhoods on the northside and southside, and upgraded waterworks, sewers, electric lighting, and recreational sites. In addition, Mayor Kiel promised attorney Homer G. Phillips and other African American leaders a hospital in the heart of the black district (in "the Ville" neighborhood) in return for their support of the bond.

undercapitalized infrastructure and deteriorating housing stock, remained unattended. Local leaders' strategy to promote industry-commerce projects and beautification as mutually reinforcing endeavors highlighted and reinforced a paradox they faced in inner-city revitalization: in the context of limited space for redevelopment, local leaders' beautification efforts would reduce land available for industrial and commercial facilities; in some cases they razed facilities for beautification (Chapter Three).

Local leaders in St. Louis neither fully anticipated, nor fully questioned, these conflicts emerging in inner-city redevelopment. Bartholomew, Gundlach, and other planning proponents based their policies upon the underlying principle that physical redevelopment could improve the economic efficiency and social well-being of the city. Working within a conceptual framework that presumed disinterested policies and long-term economic stability, they interpreted displacement and large-scale demolition as short-term maladjustments. St. Louisans in the early twentieth century conceived and conducted planning based upon their best estimation of productive growth strategies. For many, however, this included the promotion of de facto racial segregation as a cynical measure to check blight.[39] Although leaders after WWII would integrate rights liberalism, to a limited extent, with economic liberalism, the conflict between the stated goal of sound and equitable development, on one hand, and racial and class biases, on the other, would aggravate development patterns that left inner-city neighborhoods bereft of adequate services and housing stock. Local leaders, not fully exploring the needs of inner-city residents, remained blind to their full social and economic reality.

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[39]Heathcott, "City Remade," 148.

Innovation and Transition

St. Louisans' public-private partnership for redevelopment would expand its constituent reach and its influence during the interwar years. In this period, as M. Christine Boyer, Mel Scott, and others have shown, planning professionals would take on a pivotal role in urban governance as they enabled city officials to carry out beautification and public works projects.[40] Public leaders' efforts were expanded significantly by the local-federal partnership that flourished in the 1930s. In the context of this partnership, mayors in cities like St. Louis began to foster coalitions around the goal of federally-assisted slum clearance; St. Louis Mayor Bernard F. Dickmann (1933-1941), for example, laid the foundation for an "anti-slum coalition" among business and civic groups, African American and church groups, and labor and social reform organizations. Political leaders like Dickmann thus began to integrate African American and labor representatives into their coalitions in an effort to foster political support and also social stability.[41] City leaders built their alliances around the presumption that their programs promoted job growth; their ability to pursue these objectives would rely increasingly upon their collaboration with planning experts and upon their creative use of federal policies. The efforts of Dickmann (and especially Mayor Joseph Darst, 1949-1953) set the precedent for the liberal economic policies pursued by postwar mayors, particularly Mayor Raymond R. Tucker (1953-1965). Tucker, as smoke commissioner during Dickmann's administration, gained local and national repute for his astute resolution of

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[40]Boyer, *Dreaming the Rational City*; Scott, *American City Planning*.
[41]See, for example, Oscar H. Allison, "Raymond Tucker: The Smoke Elimination Years" (Ph.D. Dissertation, St. Louis University, 1978); William J. Harrison, "The New Deal in Black St. Louis: 1932-1940" (Ph.D. Dissertation, St. Louis University, 1976); Heathcott, "The City Remade."

the city's controversial pollution problem. Under Dickmann, Tucker honed his political skills and technocratic approach to governance that would help him to become one of the nation's leading urban renewal mayors.[42]

During the 1920s and 1930s, city officials launched redevelopment projects that introduced St. Louisans to a mode of government-led change that would become central to municipal agendas after WWII. The conceptual and municipal policy approach that local leaders had established by the mid-1920s remained fundamentally unaltered during this period; but the possibility of federal assistance since the 1930s (for slum clearance and public housing) enabled them to expand dramatically the potential breadth of their programs. One of the most notable endeavors that city officials undertook at this time was the clearance of forty blocks along the Mississippi riverfront for the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial (Gateway Arch, Chapter Two). Public officials, moreover, began to development the city's first federally-subsidized public housing projects. Also encouraging St. Louisans' more ambitious proposals was the acceleration of business and population decentralization in the urban core. In light of these trends and in consideration of the city's postwar development, the City Plan Commission issued its prophetic report, *St. Louis After the War*. The 1942 report advanced planners' most significant conceptual innovation in their policy framework: prefiguring Title One of the Housing Act of 1949, Bartholomew called upon local leaders to harness systematically the power of the federal government to help them raze obsolete sections of the inner city and do so on an unparalleled physical scale. Asserting that this "postwar reconstruction job" was

[42]On Tucker's experiences, see Allison, "Raymond Tucker."

imperative to St. Louis City's fiscal solvency, Bartholomew linked the exertion of federal political will to the stability of the nation's industrial centers.[43] Stalled by WWII and then energized by the passage of the Housing Act, the City Plan Commission would amplify its message in the early 1950s and find an enthusiastic ally in Mayor Tucker.

The experience of WWII demonstrated the central importance of large-scale federal-business cooperation and planning in its success. As historians like John Bauman have shown, this encouraged local urban leaders to embrace large-scale planning—and its corollary political alliances—as a critical function of municipal government.[44] The war experience reinforced St. Louisans' coalition strategies and their approach to meeting the challenges of urban core redevelopment. After WWII, a new generation of urban politicians came to power by mobilizing the business community, labor, and the middle-class behind programs of urban revitalization that were unprecedented in their scale and scope. Their efforts were made possible by the federal government, which supplied the funds for the programs.[45] In St. Louis, local leaders shifted their perspective from a city-centered approach to an explicitly metropolitan framework as they sought to promote inner-city revitalization and regional stability in the face of rapid suburbanization and also growing competition from the Sunbelt. Mayor Tucker promoted the Mill Creek Valley urban renewal project as central to his efforts to rejuvenate the urban core and promote sound metropolitan development in postwar St. Louis.

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[43]St. Louis City Plan Commission, *St. Louis After the War* (quote noted on a graph).
[44]John Bauman, "Visions of a Postwar City: A Perspective on Urban Planning in Philadelphia and the Nation, 1942-1945," Donald A. Kruekeberg, ed., *Introduction to Planning History in the United States* (New Brunswick: Center for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers University, 1983), 186-87.
[45] Judd and Swastrom, *City Politics*, 102.

Chapter Two
The Mill Creek Valley Urban Renewal Project: Meeting the Challenge of Postwar Metropolitanization

Revitalizing the Post-WWII Inner City: Mill Creek Valley, Metropolitan Development, and Economic Liberalism in the Urban North

In the early 1950s, St. Louis City Mayor Tucker launched the Mill Creek Valley (MCV) redevelopment project, the city's largest urban renewal endeavor. According to St. Louis City officials, the transformation of MCV's deteriorating residential neighborhood (454 acres) into an industrial-commercial park would become a "milestone in the revitalizing of American cities."[46] Critically, MCV redevelopment would keep St. Louis City the "nerve center for an expanding metropolis."[47] MCV represented the most ambitious effort by St. Louis city planners, public officials, and business leaders to strengthen the city's industrial foundations. More broadly, this chapter argues, MCV was central to St. Louis City leaders' strategy to meet the challenges posed by the metropolitanization of industrial and commercial firms and residents after WWII. Metropolitanization, in their view, presented them with the challenge of creating the conditions under which businesses and residents would choose to remain in the urban core rather than relocate to their suburbs. Yet they also had to learn how to conceptualize the metropolitan region and determine the role that the central city could play within the

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[46]Passonneau also served as chief of design for the Tennessee Valley Authority. "Mill Creek Valley Plan May Be a Milestone in Revitalizing U.S. Cities," by Joseph R. Passonneau, *St. Louis Globe- Democrat*, November 17, 1958.

[47]St. Louis City Plan Commission (hereafter cited as the St. Louis CPC), *Land Use Plan for St. Louis City* (1956), 8. St. Louis CPC reports are held at numerous university and public libraries in St. Louis and at the Missouri Historical Society (hereafter cited as MHS).

metropolitan economy. In so doing, they could keep the central city competitive for a distinct component of industry and commerce within the metropolis.

The Mill Creek Valley project, this chapter asserts, thus became a critical part of St. Louis leaders' metropolitan restructuring strategies as they sought to stabilize the central city within the context of metropolitanization. Significantly, in planning for MCV, St. Louis city planners, public officials, and their allies in industrial real estate development began to conceptualize the postwar metropolis and dramatically rethink the role of the urban core role within it. During the 1950s, Mill Creek Valley earned a national reputation as the largest inner-city project of its kind and a pioneering model for industrial-commercial revitalization. This chapter explores how St. Louis City planners, public officials, and business leaders constructed an intellectual, planning, and policy framework for inner-city industrial revitalization and how Mayor Raymond Tucker managed to build the local-federal coalition necessary for his urban renewal agenda.

The popular image of industrial-belt decline after WWII implies almost wholesale loss of traditional industries from their urban cores. This narrative also suggests that local urban leaders became paralyzed in the face of intra-metropolitan and regional shifts (from the Northeast to the Sunbelt) of industrial investment. This might also suggest that MCV was a doomed project led by idealists in city planning and development offices. Yet the largely unwritten story of inner-city industrial planning after WWII forces us to consider how urban leaders combined local and federal policies to

influence the dynamics of metropolitan economic transformations.[48] MCV is significant because it shows how urban leaders, in one city, tried to overcome the obstacles to inner-city growth and the success, albeit very limited, that they achieved. More broadly, MCV's history reveals how city planners, public officials, and business leaders in St. Louis linked inner-city revitalization to metropolitan growth overall in the face of growing competition from the Sunbelt. Their policies would face fundamental limitations and contradictions. Yet we cannot evaluate the record of local urban leadership against the unpredictable outcome of their efforts, rather, we must assess them against the challenges that they faced and in the context of the policy tools, intellectual worldview, and political possibilities available to them. MCV actually represented a creative and impressive effort by local leaders to resolve the critical contradictions of inner-city industrial-commercial development after WWII.

Mill Creek Valley's story provides an opportunity to assess the liberal agenda of one Democratic administration in the 1950s urban North. MCV shows that Mayor Tucker placed economic liberalism—job and investment growth specifically—at the top of his administrative agenda. Tucker would integrate rights liberalism to a limited extent within his liberal redevelopment programs. Yet economic growth, to be sure, not civil and social rights, shaped his liberal agenda. Mayor Tucker's urban renewal agenda compared similarly with that of many other northeastern and Midwestern cities, as scholars such as

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[48]Giuan McKee discusses post-WWII industrial planning in Philadelphia in "Liberal Ends Through Illiberal Means," *Journal of Urban History* 27, #5 (July 2001): 547-83.

Jon Teaford have shown.[49] Yet Mill Creek Valley represented a pioneering project in industrial-commercial renewal led by one of the nation's most aggressive "urban renewal mayors," according to Todd Swanstrom and Dennis Judd.[50] St. Louis lost among the highest percentage of jobs and population from the city during the 1960s and 1970s. Given the city's downward trends, on the one hand, and its large-scale renewal projects, on the other hand, St. Louis City provides a useful case study to explore the potential and constraints facing local governments as they sought to save their cities after WWII.

Industrial Losses and Resolutions in the Postwar City: Inner-City Redevelopment Within Metropolitan Context

The St. Louis City Plan Commission Sounds the Alarm on Industrial Decline

Harland Bartholomew, St. Louis' preeminent urban planner and engineer, ranked among the most aggressive proponents of inner-city industrial development in the 1940s and 1950s. He was rapidly building a national reputation as a theorist of modern planning and as an advocate of metropolitanism, that is, thinking about the central city within its metropolitan context.[51] Under his watch, the St. Louis City Plan Commission pulled the alarm on St. Louis City's industrial decentralization trends. In the early 1950s, the St. Louis CPC set out to place industrial redevelopment squarely within St. Louis City Mayor Raymond Tucker's urban renewal agenda.

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[49]For example, see discussions of urban renewal coalitions and agendas in Jon C. Teaford, *The Rough Road to Renaissance: Urban Revitalization in America, 1940-1985* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990) and Dennis R. Judd and Todd Swanstrom, *City Politics: Private Power and Public Policy* (3rd ed.; New York: Longman Press, 2002).

[50]Swanstrom and Judd, *City Politics*, 187.

[51]Bartholomew also became professor of civic design at University of Illinois and acted as expert advisor in many cities, including consultant of the National Capital Park and Planning Commission in Washington, D.C.

In its 1948 report, *The Pattern of Industrial Land Use in St. Louis*, the St. Louis City Plan Commission warned that the scarcity of land available for industrial expansion in the sixty-two square mile city would force many firms to move to St. Louis County or across the Mississippi River to the so-called "East Side."[52] The CPC's warnings were dramatized by the 1950 *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* series, "Progress or Decay? St. Louis Must Choose," which fostered citizen and administrative support for industrial renewal policies. The CPC weighed in forcefully on the need to make industrial redevelopment a key concern of public policy in its prescriptive report, *Rebuilding Industry-Commerce in St. Louis* (1953). The CPC identified traffic congestion, absence of off-street parking and loading areas, lack of on-track industrial sites, obsolete and outdated buildings, blighted neighborhoods, and the existence of small (about one and one-half acres) and scattered vacant lots as the main obstacles to inner-city industrial expansion.[53] "It is a well-known fact that St. Louis faces a serious shortage of industrial tracts of five acres or more," the CPC argued.[54] And with 90% of the city's land occupied, private development was extremely limited because the cost of purchasing and clearing land proved prohibitively

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[52]The Illinois municipalities of East St. Louis City and Monroe and Madison Counties are collectively referred to as the "East Side" and are part of the statistical St. Louis metropolitan unit.

[53]In 1956, existing land use in the city comprised: 45% residential; 21% light and heavy industrial; 9% open recreation; 6% other public and semi-public uses; 5% commercial, 3% cemeteries; and 11% vacant. See *The Pattern of Industrial Land Use in St. Louis* (1948) by the St. Louis CPC. In 1953, 31% of the city's industrial plant was built after WWII; 33% between 1920 and 1945, and 36% before 1920. MCV housed the most rapidly deteriorating facilities. See *Highlights of Findings from the Existing Industrial Facilities Within St. Louis, Missouri* by Alan M. Voorhees and Associates, for the St. Louis City Plan Commission, October 1969 (MHS Library).

[54]The City Plan Commission quote comes from a letter to the St. Louis Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority (hereafter cited as the LCRA) from the St. Louis CPC on June 21, 1956, page 5 (City of St. Louis, Office of the Mayor, Files of Raymond R. Tucker (hereafter cited as the Tucker Files), Series 1, Box 13, Folder: LCRA, 6/1955-8/1956; University Archives Collections, Washington University).

high to businessmen.[55] "St. Louis is noted for its high quality of diversified industry," the CPC asserted, but "to retain this standing the physical facilities must be kept in pace with new production methods and the transportation arteries must allow free movement of goods and people."[56] As a 1953 *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* writer observed, "St. Louis leaders now generally recognized that one of the city's most urgent needs is to open ground large enough to attract new industry and to keep in St. Louis plants requiring room for expansion."[57] Otherwise, the city's physical conditions threatened its fundamental employment and fiscal base.

Contrary to the popular image of industrial firms fleeing their inner cities after WWII, St. Louis City real estate experts and urban planners in the City Plan Commission recorded strong demand among local firms for industrial sites.[58] For example, the Wenzlich Real Estate Company's 1956 industrial analysis of St. Louis found persistent requests for two to ten acres or more in the city; industrial reports in the 1960s reflect continued demand for such sites. St. Louis City's problem, in the early 1950s, then, was not absence of demand but scarcity of supply. The city could not meet the changing spatial and physical demands of modern industrial and commercial firms. Urban

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[55]2,800 acres of the metropolitan area's vacant ground zoned for industrial use is in St. Louis County while 1,200 is located in the city. Only around 330 acres were ready for immediate development (mainly due to threat of flooding). See Roy Wenzlich Real Estate and Company, *Market Analysis and Reuse Appraisal of Mill Creek Valley Redevelopment Project* (1956), page 94 (Roy Wenzlich Real Estate Company Records (hereafter cited as the Wenzlich Records), Series 4, Box 3, Folder 75; Western Historical Manuscripts Collection, University of Missouri, St. Louis (hereafter cited as the WHMC).

[56]St. Louis CPC, *Land Use Plan for St. Louis City* (1956), 8.

[57]"New Industries for Old Slums," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, February 4, 1953.

[58]Scholars such as Thomas Sugrue, Barry Bluestone, and Bennett Harrison emphasize the rapid flight of industrial firms out northern inner cities. Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, *The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry* (New York: Basic Books, 1982) and Thomas Sugrue, *The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

manufacturers traditionally concentrated in multistory facilities within dense industrial-commercial quarters in proximity to rail- and water-transportation facilities. Yet technological advances in production and operational techniques (i.e., in mass production lines) and in transportation (i.e., trucking and air transport) were restructuring the spatial and locational requirements of firms, as many scholars have shown.[59] Increasingly, emphasized Harry Wilensky (*St. Louis Post-Dispatch* writer), manufacturing, warehousing, and wholesaling firms demanded facilities that accommodated technologically-advanced production and operations on one or maybe two levels, space for off-street parking and loading, and convenient access to truck, rail, air, and water transport.[60] Moreover, as the aesthetic environment became increasingly important for employee recruitment, business leaders sought landscaped settings set apart from the dust, dirt, and decay of old inner-city spaces. From the perspective of planners like Bartholomew and industrial real estate experts like Wenzlich, then, the city's physical conditions and undercapitalization of its industrial plant were the root cause of firms' decentralization away from the urban core. They diagnosed the problem effectively but faced a critical contradiction: their cities could not meet the physical and spatial demands of industrial firms while their suburbs became increasingly attractive to those businesses upon which their city depended (Chapter 4).

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[59]For discussions of technological changes fueling industrial modernization in the twentieth century, see, for example, Joshua B. Freeman, *Working-Class New York: Life and Labor Since WWII* (New York: The New Press, 2000) and discussions in Sugrue, *Origins*.

[60] "St. Louis At—or Past—Crossroads of Continued Industrial Growth," by Harry Wilensky, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, May 26, 1957.

In *Rebuilding Industry-Commerce in St. Louis*, Bartholomew called for the large-scale physical reconstruction of St. Louis' urban core in order to resolve this contradiction. Only in this way, the CPC informed Mayor Raymond Tucker, could the city accommodate the modern factory designs and land requirements demanded by industrial and commercial firms. The suburbs (the 498-square mile St. Louis County specifically) were becoming increasingly attractive to firms due to their large expanses of undeveloped land, relatively low taxes, and uncongested transportation arteries, planners and industrial real estate experts warned. City officials, however, had only limited tools to make the urban core more competitive for industrial-commercial investment. In the context of unregulated capital mobility, a fundamental principle of American free enterprise, city officials could not compel firms to remain in the urban core. But they did have the power to reshape the city's physical landscape through public policy tools. Thus they might create the conditions under which firms would find the urban core a productive place in which to do business. Indeed, city officials' best strategy to strengthen St. Louis' fiscal base was to redevelop portions of inner-city land for economically more productive uses, as urban land market experts like Homer Hoyt and Bartholomew had long argued (primarily by razing deteriorating residences, so-called "slum clearance").[61] The Mill Creek Valley clearance and redevelopment project would become part of this well-known economic cycle in which urban leaders create new spaces in order to boost the wealth- and job-producing capacity of these inner-city sites. City officials could thereby not only open up more space for business expansion but also

[61]Eric Sandweiss. *St. Louis: The Evolution of an American Urban Landscape* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001), 214-16.

lower the relative tax burden of city businessmen as revenue-producing enterprises replaced decaying residential areas (which cost St. Louis City around four million dollars more a year in services than they contributed in taxes). In so doing, they would ameliorate the two main factors encouraging businessmen to relocate to the suburbs, according to Aloys Kaufman (president of the St. Louis Chamber of Commerce and former St. Louis City mayor).[62]

Yet the City Plan Commission's *Rebuilding Industry-Commerce* represented a dramatic innovation in this economic cycle: the CPC called upon St. Louis City Hall officials to utilize new federal legislation to undertake massive public intervention in the city's physical map. Indeed, without the Housing Act of 1949, the Mill Creek Valley project, and the larger urban redevelopment agenda of which it was a part, would have proven impossible. Yet federal urban redevelopment legislation did not spark Bartholomew's proposal for large-scale reconstruction. Rather, it would enable St. Louis planners to realize the vision of postwar redevelopment they articulated during the 1940s: the CPC's *Comprehensive City Plan* (1947), building upon the recommendations of the CPC's *St. Louis After the War* (1942), had called upon city officials to "wipe out the obsolescent blighted areas and costly decaying slums" in St. Louis City.[63]

In a 1940 speech that reached a national audience, Harland Bartholomew had warned that central cities would weaken as their businesses and residents relocated to

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[62]In contrast, the Chamber of Commerce estimated that the downtown business district in 1948 paid approximately $5,000,000 more a year in taxes than it costs the city for services. See "Areas Like Number One Eyesore Cost City $4,000,000 a Year More for Services Than Yield in Taxes," by Richard G. Baumhoff, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, October 20, 1948.

[63]Lana Stein, *St. Louis Politics: The Triumph of Tradition* (St. Louis: Missouri Historical Society Press, 2002), 95.

their suburbs.[64] Bartholomew did not foresee in 1940 the emergence of the Sunbelt as a cut-throat competitor with the Northeast and Midwest for industrial capital. But by the 1950s, the economic impact of suburban and Sunbelt competition with central cities was becoming painfully apparent to urban officials. The shift of manufacturing away from central cities to their suburbs and to the Sunbelt would cause industrial-belt cities to lose thousands of manufacturing jobs by the late 1950s. St. Louis City recorded among the highest losses. Between 1947 and 1958, the growth of manufacturing employment in St. Louis City declined by 21.1% while manufacturing employment in St. Louis County grew by 41.7%. This trend, as geographer James Kenyon noted, reflected the rapid suburbanization of manufacturing in industrial-belt cities.[65] Between 1954 and 1958 almost all manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries in St. Louis City recorded decline.[66] Concurrently, St. Louis' downtown offices began decentralizing to the suburbs, including those of the prominent Brown Shoe Co., Monsanto Chemical Company, and Grove Laboratories.[67] Astute St. Louis planners and business leaders recognized that

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[64]Harland Bartholomew, "The American City: Disintegration is Taking Place," *Vital Speeches* 7 (1 November 1940): 61.

[65]In comparison, Baltimore's manufacturing employment declined by 7.5% over this time, Philadelphia lost 10.4%, Cincinnati lost 18%, Chicago recorded a 18.5% decline, Cleveland lost 22.4%, Pittsburgh declined by 25.3%, and Detroit lost 42.9%. These cities experienced concurrent strong manufacturing employment growth in their suburbs. See *Metropolis on the Move: Geographers Look at Urban Sprawl*, ed. Jean Gottmann and Robert A. Harper (New York City: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), 103-109. See also, "St. Louis At-Or Past-the Crossroads of Continued Industrial Growth," by Harry Wilensky, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, May 26, 1957.

[66]Apparels and related products would suffer the greatest losses, followed by declines in food products and fabricated metal. As noted in *Technical Report on Industrial Development Potential for St Louis*, 1968, by Gladstone and Associates, prepared for the St. Louis CPC, December 1968 (MHS Library). A useful source for discussion of economic changes in St. Louis can be found in the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* 1963 ten-week series (September through November), "A Constructive Analysis: St. Louis Today," by Allan Merritt.

[67]"Using Blighted Areas for Industry," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, January 9, 1953; "What's Wrong With St. Louis?" by Harry Wilensky, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, April 25, 1954; "Progress or Decay? St. Louis Must Choose: Report to the People," by Richard G. Baumhoff, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, March 2, 1952.

strong aggregate growth (nationally) would not simply ensure local economic well-being.[68] Thus, they concluded, public-private action (local-federal partnership specifically) was urgent to stabilize industry in St. Louis City. As J. Ben Miller (president of the Real Estate Board, St. Louis branch) and Edwin M. Clark (president, Southwestern Bell Co.) argued in 1953, the city's industrial base was being "bled by a constant exodus to St. Louis County" and this trend "menaces the core of the city."[69] According to Bartholomew, Clark, and Miller, this trend threatened St. Louis City's traditional position as a Midwest manufacturing and distribution hub. The metropolitanization of St. Louis firms would spur city leaders' redevelopment agenda—with MCV at its center—and the emerging metropolitan framework within which they conceived their industrial development policies.

The Challenge of Post-WWII Metropolitanization for American Central Cities

St. Louis City planners, public officials, and business leaders thus were facing the formidable challenges of postwar metropolitanization. As scholars Morris Janowitz and Gerald D. Suttles describe this process, the primacy of urban centers became less significant as manufacturing, retailing, wholesaling, and households located in growing numbers beyond municipal boundaries, a process that accelerated rapidly after WWII.[70] Metropolitanization, in the view of planners and public officials, presented them with the

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[68]National affluence in the 1950s led many to think that downturns were only temporary dislocations. See, for example, Sugrue, *Origins of the Urban Crisis*, 155-57.
[69]See "Using Blighted Areas for Industry" *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, January 9, 1953, and "What's Wrong With St. Louis?" by Harry Wilensky, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, April 25, 1954.
[70]Amos H. Hawley and Vincent P. Rock, eds., *Metropolitan America in Contemporary Perspective* (New York: Sage Publications, 1975), 12.

challenge of creating the conditions under which businesses and residents would choose to remain in the urban core rather than relocate to their suburbs. More broadly, they had to learn how to conceptualize the metropolitan region and determine the role that the central city, once the undisputed industrial-commercial-residential hub, could viably play within the expanding metropolitan economy. In so doing, they could keep the central city competitive for a distinct component of industry and commerce and thereby meet the challenges posed by metropolitanization. St. Louis city planners, as *Rebuilding Industry-Commerce in St. Louis* reflects, would promote this evolution through the large-scale physical reconstruction of the urban core. Emerging city-suburban growth dynamics after WWII thus were forcing urban officials to think about inner-city industrial development in new, metropolitan terms.

Bartholomew's 1940 speech, *The American City: Disintegration is Taking Place*, reflected discussions emerging among urban specialists and business and political leaders over these problems posed by metropolitanization. During the 1940s, Rexford Tugwell (chair, New York City Planning Commission), Urban Land Institute members, and numerous chambers of commerce, for example, began to argue that suburbs were growing at the expense of their central cities.[71] By the 1950s and 1960s, planners, geographers, and other practitioners and theorists of urban development debated how city officials should respond to metropolitanization. For example, urban geographers James Kenyon and Jean Gottmann and planner Raymond Vernon argued that the suburbanization of industry was a natural growth process and urban leaders should

[71]Bartholomew, "The American City," 61. See also Mel Scott, *American City Planning Since 1890* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 371.

"rationalize" this process.[72] Consequently, they should foster the "natural" evolution of the urban core into a metropolitan service and tourism/cultural hub—its emerging primary role—not fight a losing battle against industrial decentralization (service sector: government, accounting, advertising, real estate, insurance, banking, medical and health related fields, clerical positions, special professions like architecture). In the well-known Mumford-Jacobs debate, historian Lewis Mumford long advocated the decentralization of dense industrial centers while planning critic Jane Jacobs in the 1960s argued against the loss of their spontaneity, anonymity, and diversity (critiquing modern planning for hastening this loss).[73]

Yet urban planners in industrial-belt centers like St. Louis and Philadelphia refused to accept all of the apparent consequences of metropolitanization as inevitable. Thus they began to conceptualize industrial strategies appropriate for inner-city development. In a paradigmatic shift within their profession, spurred by federal urban renewal legislation, planners debated the extent to which they should partner with policy makers in city and federal government to intervene in the urban development process and in so doing take on a quasi-political role in city building.[74] In St. Louis, under Bartholomew's influence, planners came down squarely on the side of the "actionists"

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[72]Raymond Vernon, *The Myth and Reality of Our Urban Problems* (Harvard University Press, 1962, 1967); Wolf Von Eckardt, *The Challenge of Megalopolis: A Graphic Presentation of the Urbanized Northeastern Seaboard of the United States*. Based on the original study by Jean Gottmann published in 1961 (Macmillan Company, 1964). See James Kenyon's chapter in *Metropolis on the Move*.
[73]Jane Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (New York: Random House, 1961). Among Mumford's best known works area *The Culture of Cities* (first edition; New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1938) and *The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its Prospects* (first edition; New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961).
[74]Scott, *American City Planning*, 347.

rather than "orthodox" planners, as reflected in their 1953 *Rebuilding Industry-Commerce in St. Louis*.[75]

St. Louis City leaders thus would contribute to an intellectual transformation among American planners and urban officials in the 1950s and 1960s as they learned to conceptualize the postwar metropolis and the function of the urban core within it. The dynamics of metropolitanization would force St. Louis City officials to innovate industrial planning and development practices: they would have to determine which kinds of firms the city could realistically retain and which were most likely to relocate to the suburbs regardless of industrial retention policies. Therefore, they had to assess the dynamics of metropolitan development, determine the potential and limitation of inner-city industrial development, and evaluate the most effective distribution of industrial-commercial activity within Greater St. Louis. Industrial planning on this model would enable them to guide, albeit not direct, metropolitan growth trends. Mayor Tucker, Bartholomew, and other local officials would frame inner-city redevelopment as a way to boost the city's competitive edge against her suburbs. But ultimately they viewed the urban core and her suburbs as partners in boosting Greater St. Louis, not competitors. The evolution of the Mill Creek Valley project reflects how St. Louis leaders envisioned the postwar inner city and its contribution to St. Louis' industrial development. By restructuring the urban core within a metropolitan framework—and premised upon strong regional growth in the long-term—St. Louis leaders believed that they could meet the challenges posed by metropolitanization. Only in this way could they revive the urban

[75]As Scott discusses in chapter seven of *American City Planning*.

core and strengthen St. Louis' regional and national position in the context of growing Sunbelt competition. In urban centers like St. Louis, local politicians also began to innovate their coalitions as they built local-metropolitan-federal partnerships to pursue their urban renewal agendas.

A "New Convergence of Power" in Industrial-Belt Cities: Mayor Raymond Tucker and St. Louis' Liberal Coalition for Growth

St. Louis City Mayor Raymond Tucker (1953-1965) provided the critical force behind St. Louis' urban renewal initiatives. The election of Tucker in 1953 reflected a changing political climate in St. Louis. In contrast to his predecessor, Tucker was an independent Democrat.[76] Tucker was a Washington University engineering professor and had earned a national reputation in the 1930s and 1940s for his successful smoke abatement program (Chapter One). Tucker's prior public service included acting as St. Louis City's Director of Public Safety and Director of Civil Defense. Tucker was a technocrat, not a ward heeler, and committed to the role of experts in "good government." Tucker's energetic commitment to revitalization, his public service, and his political independence earned him support across party lines and thus enabled him to work from a position of strength in local government. Tucker's predecessors Aloys Kaufmann (1944-1949) and Joseph Darst (1949-1953) paved the way for Tucker's "urban renewal coalition" as they built ties among civic groups, business leaders, and city planners for slum clearance and public housing programs (Chapter One). Mayor Tucker

[76]In fact, St. Louis voters elected him against the wishes of the Democratic Party machinery. Tucker had been chair of the Board of Freeholders in 1949 that proposed a controversial new city charter. The charter would have eliminated hundreds of patronage jobs, much to the disapproval of local Democratic politicians. See Charles K. Cummings, "Rent Strike In St. Louis: The Making of Conflict in Modern Society" (Ph.D. Thesis, Washington University, 1976), 123-30.

would broaden St. Louis' redevelopment agenda and center on industrial and commercial revitalization, with Mill Creek Valley as its anchor.

St. Louis at mid-century had a trio of unusually talented leaders: Raymond Tucker, Harland Bartholomew, and national urban renewal expert Charles Farris. In 1953, Mayor Tucker appointed Farris executive director of the St. Louis Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority (LCRA), the main agency behind urban renewal. Mayor Tucker hoped that a man of Farris's stature would improve St. Louis' chances of receiving federal urban renewal funds, particularly as congressional leaders debated funding cuts during the Eisenhower administration.[77] Farris would be an appropriate fit for Tucker's ambitious agenda. Leaving his position as deputy director of the Housing and Home Finance Administration's (HHFA) slum clearance and urban redevelopment program, Farris came to St. Louis with an impressive record in public- and private-sector leadership.[78] Farris began his federal career in 1935 in the Department of Agriculture, after which he worked for the Office of Emergency Management and War Production Board. After WWII, Farris worked for the National Association of Manufacturers and also became executive vice president of Yukon Corporation. Farris would direct the LCRA until 1980 (but for a three-year absence) and become one of the most influential men in St. Louis City's postwar redevelopment. Tackling inner-city redevelopment

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[77]June Manning Thomas argues that the Eisenhower administration was actually reluctant to approve funding for projects that were not residential in character. During this administration only 7.7% of urban renewal grant funds went to non-residential projects, even though the Housing Act of 1954 allowed up to 10%. Thomas thus argues that John Mollenkopf's and Mark Gelfand's characterization of the 1954 Housing Act as a boon to business developers is misleading. June Manning Thomas, *Redevelopment and Race: Planning a Finer City in Postwar Detroit* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 79.
[78]Paul C. Scrivner, "The Politics of Urban Renewal, A Case Study: The Mill Creek Valley Urban Renewal Project, St. Louis, Missouri" (Master's Thesis, Washington University, 1967), 16.

required strong public leadership, as the experience of St. Louis, Philadelphia, and other cities show.[79] Mayor Tucker well understood, however, that he needed the cooperation of local business leaders in order to launch his urban revitalization program.

Immediately upon taking office, Mayor Tucker strengthened the ties between City Hall and businessmen that coalesced under Joseph Darst. To this end, Tucker fostered a close relationship with Civic Progress (heavily Republican) whose membership was restricted to the heads of St. Louis' leading corporations.[80] As the mayor said, "you never found any objections from the businessmen if Civic Progress had approved."[81] Civic Progress president Powell B. McHaney, in turn, said that they could not have created an effective coalition without a man like Tucker as he was "above party politics." "With a ward-heeling type mayor, Civic Progress would have been stymied from the start," said one member. "But Tucker has had the respect of the business community," he asserted.[82] Democratic leaders and Republican businessmen in St. Louis thus forged a pragmatic partnership in the interest of economic growth.

At mid-century, urban political and business leaders believed that working together for inner-city redevelopment added up to "good politics." Public officials needed

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[79]1950s political leaders who fostered ambitious urban renewal projects included Philadelphia mayors Joseph Clark and Richardson Dilworth and Pittsburgh's Mayor David Lawrence.
[80]In 1953, Mayor Darst created an elite civic organization in order to foster public-private partnership. Darst's idea came out of conversations with Donald Danforth (president of Ralston Purina) who argued that St. Louis needed a "civic task force" like Pittsburgh's Allegheny Conference on Municipal Development. Tucker enlarged what became Civic Progress, Inc., to include St. Louis' most prominent business leaders. Inspired by Pittsburgh, Tucker observed that Pittsburgh city officials could not "get to first base" in redevelopment until they brought business leaders into the game. Unlike the Pittsburgh group, Civic Progress would be limited to businessmen and small in number in order to remain flexible and foster close cooperation. See "A New St. Louis Rips Up Its Past," *Business Week*, September 10, 1955.
[81]Cummings, *Rent Strike*, 124.
[82]ibid., 132.

the financial and political support and visibility that business leaders could provide their economic policies; business leaders in turn would benefit from public-sector redevelopment that enhanced the area's investment potential. Business and political leaders like those in St. Louis created a "mutually reinforcing alliance of formidable power" in many of the nation's urban centers.[83] Political scientist Robert Salisbury characterized St. Louis' alliance as "a new convergence of power," and John Mollenkopf and Clarence Stone demonstrate that these coalitions placed pro-growth policies at the forefront of postwar urban politics.[84] Attesting to the potential of this new partnership, a 1956 *Fortune* magazine article praised St. Louis' "new era" in leadership and credited it with the city's "forward surge" in redevelopment.[85]

Centered on the Mill Creek Valley project, Mayor Tucker would also integrate labor union and African American leaders into his urban renewal alliance. In so doing, Mayor Tucker, suggesting the goals of other northern Democratic leaders after WWII, hoped to foster class- and race-consensus through his liberal economic agenda (using government to foster growth and jobs). Tucker would build St. Louis' local-metropolitan-federal coalition for renewal from the bottom up by integrating his Democratic coalition across class and racial lines, among different levels of political leadership and areas of professional expertise, and by reaching across political party and municipal boundaries (business leaders with suburban interests). And while these local leaders emphasized

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[83]Judd and Swanstrom, *City Politics*, 186, 188.
[84]John H. Mollenkopf, *The Contested City* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983); *The Politics of Urban Development*, ed. by Clarence N. Stone and Heywood T. Sanders (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1987); Robert Salisbury, "Urban Politics: The New Convergence of Power," *The Journal of Politics*, 26 #4 (November 1964): 775-97.
[85]The *Fortune* magazine article described Civic Progress as a behind the scenes powerhouse in public improvements.

different goals, among them economic growth (like Mayor Tucker and Edwin Clark) and social and civil rights (like Dr. J. Owen Blache, president, Urban League of St. Louis), in the 1950s they agreed that federally-supported growth policies were a positive good and that harmonizing race and class tensions benefit the city's well-being. Historian Alan Brinkley's distinction between rights and economic liberalism is useful in evaluating local leaders' agenda, because in St. Louis, the mayor's coalition would focus on economic liberalism rather than making rights liberalism its priority.[86]

Reimagining the Urban Core: The Tucker Administration and the Mill Creek Valley Urban Renewal Project

Federal Urban Renewal Legislation and Mayor Tucker's Local-Federal Partnership for Industrial-Commercial Development

Upon appointing Charles Farris as LCRA Executive Director in 1953, Mayor Tucker instructed him to focus on inner-city reindustrialization. Concurrently, the St. Louis City Plan Commission proposed a detailed industrial development program, with the assistance of local real estate businessmen, the LCRA, Pittsburgh industrial planning experts, and federal urban renewal officials.[87] The CPC targeted a number of inner-city

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[86]Brinkley argued that rights liberalism "has focused less on the broad needs of the nation and the modern economy than on increasing the rights and freedoms of individuals and social groups. It has sought to extend civil rights to minorities, women, and others previously excluded from the mainstream of American life. . . .But there has been little room within rights-based liberalism for the broad efforts to reshape the capitalist economy that concerned previous generations of reformers." Alan Brinkley, *The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War* (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 10.

[87]St. Louis officials viewed Pittsburgh's industrial development program as a model for their own efforts. See "New Industries for Old Slums," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, February 4, 1953, and "New Plans for Giving St. Louis a 'Face Lift': Urban Redevelopment Proposal Would Follow Pittsburgh's Blueprint," by John Costello, *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, February 1, 1953.

areas for redevelopment (identifying about 800-900 acres for such development).[88] The CPC's program, they said,

> Reflects mounting concern over the movement of industry out of the city. . . . Without creating room for modernization and expansion, firms in the city would be at a marked disadvantage in competing with manufacturers whose plants are in suburban or rural areas where space is plentiful and land is much cheaper.[89]

The Plan Commission designated the 454-acre Mill Creek Valley area as their primary renewal project. Mayor Tucker, the CPC, and the LCRA thus launched St. Louis' industrial redevelopment agenda. The MCV project—and their liberal economic agenda broadly—would be made possible through new federal urban renewal legislation.

One of Charles Farris's chief duties, according to Tucker, was to interest local businessmen and public officials in the Housing Act of 1949, under which the LCRA could acquire property for private development. Title 1 of the 1949 Housing Act enabled city officials to apply for participation in the new federal slum clearance and

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[88]The areas targeted by the City Plan Commission for long-term redevelopment included: Mill Creek Valley, Kosciusko, O'Fallen neighborhood (for light industry), Soulard neighborhood (mainly residential), the neighborhood by Jefferson and Franklin avenues for residential and commercial development, 12th street area for residential and commercial development, and the Lafayette area for residential and commercial. These areas totaled around 1500 acres. The Plaza Apartment complex in mid-town and some public housing were already constructed or underway in 1955. See "St. Louis Redevelopment Areas," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, January 25, 1955.

The CPC's confidence in MCV may have been bolstered by the fact that some industrialists, whose firms were located in along the riverfront, created their own organizations to improve these areas. For example, the Conduit Industrial Redevelopment Corporation (formed by real estate developers G.J. and John J. Nooney in 1955) reclaimed 220 acres of floodland. Thirteen industrial plants were built in the area and over four million dollars invested in the plants between 1955 and 1960. See "Riverfront Floodlands Redevelopment Hailed," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, April 26, 1960. Also, local businessmen in the Southside Industrial and Commercial Development Association encouraged Tucker and the LCRA to revitalize Kosciusko for industry and commerce. See, for example, the LCRA publication, *Facts About Urban Renewal in St. Louis: Projects of the St. Louis Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority* (n.d) (MHS Library); Letter to Eugene Farrell, Chairman, LCRA, from Bakewell, Bakewell, and Cramer Attorneys, October 1, 1954 (Tucker Files, Series 1, Box 13, Folder: LCRA, 8/1952-3/1955).

[89]"Slum Clearance Plan to Make Room For Plants, Warehouses Announced," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, February 1, 1953.

redevelopment program.[90] The passage of the Housing Act, following vociferous congressional debate over federally-supported public housing, slum-clearance, and urban redevelopment, marked a significant expansion of "cooperative federalism" that emerged during the 1930s, as Phillip Fungiello and Roscoe Martin have shown.[91] Title 1 empowered the Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA) to provide federal grants-in-aid and loans to local urban renewal agencies like the St. Louis LCRA for land purchases, assembly, and clearance.[92] The grant-in-aid system was the primary channel through which the federal government tapped money directly to cities and structured the postwar city-federal partnership.[93] Furthermore, by granting eminent domain, the new legislation enabled local renewal agencies to condemn so-called "blighted" private properties and redevelop them for "higher" public uses.[94] These new federal policies

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[90]Title 1 of the 1949 Housing Act was soon regarded by urban renewal and public housing experts as too narrowly remedial in its approach, although it had been considered bold at its time. The Housing Act of 1954 broadened this earlier measure by adopting the concept of preventive action through a more inclusive approach to the problems of blight and slums. "Urban renewal" was adopted as the title for the redevelopment program. Amendatory acts passed in 1956, 1959, and 1961 further expanded the urban renewal concept, notably to use renewal to boost the job- and tax-base.

[91]Roscoe C. Martin, *The Cities and the Federal System*, (New York: Atherton Press, 1965), and Phillip J. Funigiello, *The Challenge of Urban Liberalism: Federal-City Relations During WWII* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1978).The controversial issue of federal subsidies for private redevelopment gained increasingly broad support by the late 1940s due to arguments like those of economists Alvin Hanson and Guy Greer. They asserted that the responsibility for "civic sanitation" lay in the hands of society and thus federal assistance to municipal governments was for the "public good." See Scott, *American City Planning*, 383.

[92]Title 1 was slated for residential areas or, areas that would become residential after reconstruction. The 1954 Housing Act would allow 10% of urban renewal funds for non-residential projects, although they still had to be linked to housing development

[93]The grant-in-aid system flowered during the 1930s New Deal and was augmented through the 1949 and 1954 Housing Acts. The grant-in-aid through Title 1 of the 1949 Housing Act intended to help local agencies absorb the write-down cost on land for redevelopment. The write-down was the difference between a local agency's cost of assembling and clearing the site and a negotiated below-market price subsequently offered to private developers for the land.

[94]"Blighted" properties were deemed beyond rehabilitation. City planners had authorization to label an area blighted after studying the site, a necessary label before the city could acquire and raze the properties. But blight was a loose term that could be applied to many areas.

ultimately gained congressional approval because their supporters persuasively argued that they fell within the bounds of the "public good" and thus were legal and constitutional. Moreover, as the Tucker-Civic Progress alliance shows, urban renewal would acquire an almost nonpartisan standing as most business and political leaders came to view central city redevelopment as vital to their interests. By taking on the burden of land clearance, the local-federal partnership would significantly lower the cost of private development in the urban core. By thereby removing one of the key obstacles to inner-city industrial and commercial expansion, this local–federal partnership would make the inner city more competitive with her suburbs for investment capital. Thus it would help city leaders to meet the challenges posed by rapid suburbanization.

In order to promote his urban redevelopment agenda, then, Mayor Tucker relied increasingly upon building a partnership between urban officials in St. Louis like Charles Farris and in Washington, D.C., like James W. Follin (director of the federal slum clearance and urban redevelopment program). By making it possible for local leaders to bring the power of the federal government to bear on inner-city development, this partnership allowed them to influence the structure and performance of their local industrial economy to a degree not possible with merely local government authority. As this dissertation shows, creative local-metropolitan-federal partnerships (for urban renewal—Chapter Two, beautification—Chapter Three, suburban industrial development—Chapters Four and Five, regional planning and high tech development—Chapter Five) enabled urban leaders in the North to try to revitalize their inner cities within their evolving framework for metropolitan development. In a regional and national

context, this partnership critically influenced their metropolitan restructuring strategies and coalitions as they sought to become more competitive against the Sunbelt.

Yet federal urban renewal policies left a large measure of local autonomy and urban renewal programs would ultimately rely upon local sponsorship. Critically, cities required a mayor and allies who could organize the talent, finances, and political support at home and political influential in Washington, D.C., to procure federal renewal funds. Raymond Tucker, in fact, would prove to be among the nation's most aggressive "urban renewal mayors." Mayor Tucker might have described St. Louis' local-federal alliance as "pragmatic liberalism": Tucker's coalition harnessed intergovernmental expertise, federal funding, and new government powers and crossed political party lines in order to meet a local growth challenge. [95] For St. Louis City political leaders, this partnership had tremendous importance because it made it possible for them to initiate large-scale, job-creation programs.

Mill Creek Valley: St. Louis' "Number One Eyesore" in the Heart of the City

Mill Creek Valley, according to St. Louis urban renewal advocates, provided the ideal site for the city's most ambitious industrial-commercial redevelopment project. In fact, clearing MCV of old housing was imperative for the city's socioeconomic health, most business, political, and civic leaders agreed.[96] Mill Creek Valley is located within the city's East-West corridor (about one-third mile wide), which starts at the riverfront/central business district and extends about three miles to Forest Park. The area

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[95]Guian McKee uses this phrase to describe the attitude of city planners and local officials behind Philadelphia's industrial renewal program. See McKee's article, "Liberal Ends."
[96]The absence of municipal funding stymied the slum-clearance campaigns of the 1940s.

considered for redevelopment was a fifty-six block quarter contained by Fourteenth Street on the East, Olive Street on the North, Market Street and the railroad on the South, and Grand Avenue on the West. According to one local official, this area must be razed because "first it was ringing the downtown, and second it was a stretch of endless crappy housing. There was no place to cut it off-it was all bad."[97] Clearance advocates cited the 1950 Housing Census which estimated that 19,770 individuals (95% black) were packed into 5,630 dwelling units, 80% of which lacked private toilets or baths and 67% of which lacked running water.[98] MCV was "a national disgrace" and "injurious and inimical to the public health and safety and to the morals and welfare of residents of Missouri," in their view.[99]

Critically, Mayor Tucker argued, MCV presented an obstacle to downtown investment and urban core revitalization overall. MCV occupied prominent real estate. MCV was located about one mile from St. Louis' other major redevelopment project, the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial (Gateway Arch, Chapter Three). The close proximity of these two projects reflects how local leaders conceived of beautification and industrial-commercial development as complementary in revitalizing the urban core. In fact, both had long been sold by urban planners and inner-city real estate experts as necessary to stabilize downtown property values (Chapter One). And Bartholomew, among other planners, argued that this combination was critical for the city to compete

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[97]Scrivner, "The Politics of Urban Renewal," 8.
[98]*Newsrelease: Statement by Raymond Tucker*, August 8, 1954 (Tucker Files, Series 1, Box 13, Folder: LCRA, 8/1952-3/1955).
[99]See, LCRA, *Facts About Urban Renewal in St. Louis*, page 2; "The Good and Bad Old Days in Mill Creek Valley," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, January 5, 1958.

successfully with her suburbs for business and residents.[100] Their proximity also showed the centrality of the East-West corridor to St. Louisans' metropolitan restructuring plans (Chapters Three, Four, and Five). Massive clearance and beautification went hand in hand in cities' urban renewal agendas. St. Louis planners, elected officials, and business leaders thus did not consider it paradoxical to destroy some parts of the city in order to save the whole. Indeed, according to Mayor Tucker, "demolition and redevelopment represented the only solution" to Mill Creek Valley.[101] Relying upon the recommendations of leading urban planners and developers at mid-century, St. Louis officials believed that this cycle of destruction and redevelopment was imperative for their city's fiscal, employment, and residential base.

Yet Mill Creek Valley residents had a far different view of their home than did local officials and leading businessmen. Tailors, restaurants, beauty shops, pool halls, grocers, retailers, hotels, funeral parlors, wholesalers, and other small enterprises fueled MCV's commercial life, as did health, financial, and other professional services (see appendix). Some of St. Louis' most well-known African Americans lived in MCV, such as entertainer Josephine Baker and NAACP leader Roy Wilkins.[102] Historians Allan H. Spear and Arnold R. Hirsh and sociologists Stanley Lieberson and Douglas S. Massy

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[100]Sandweiss, *Evolution*, 222. Philadelphia's prominent planner Edmund Bacon, for example, heavily pushed downtown cultural development and recommended it for St. Louis. See his article, "The Gateway Arch and Mill Creek," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, January 27, 1963.

[101]*Mayor's Statement: Housing and Land Clearance Committee, Board of Alderman*, January 22, 1963 (unprocessed file on Mill Creek Valley, MHS Archives).

[102]MCV's residential area was interspersed with important industrial firms as well, like Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., Armour and Co., Mott Carton Company, the Sterling Lacquer Manufacturing Company, and the shops and yards of the Pullman Company. See also JoAnn Adams Smith, *Neighbors and Neighborhoods of St. Louis* (St. Louis: Vaughn Cultural Center, 1988). Ron Fagerstrom's *Mill Creek Valley: A Soul of St. Louis* (private publishing, 2001) interviews former MCV residents.

have shown the conscious discrimination and unforeseen policy consequences that hemmed blacks into segregated areas like MCV.[103] And St. Louis City, with its black population concentrated in the central and North side, ranked among the most residentially segregated cities.[104] But there was another side to the coin of segregation in the urban North, as scholars St. Clair Drake and Horace R. Cayton showed in their classic 1940s study of Chicago: urban blacks built strong community life.[105] Many African Americans in St. Louis would eventually criticize the MCV project as "Negro Removal."[106] From the perspective of City Hall, however, MCV clearance had a pragmatic, not overtly racial, end: convert valuable inner-city property into more

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[103]Writing in the 1960s, sociologist Stanley Lieberson argued that the segregation patterns of neighborhoods were fundamental to the broader system of American racial stratification. Sociologist Reynolds Farley made important contributions to the study of black demographic trends in the 1970s in his book *Growth of the Black Population: A Study of Demographic Trends.* And in his 1984 *Blacks and Whites: Narrowing the Tap?* Farley found that the basic patterns of residential segregation did not change significantly between 1960 and 1980. Farley built on the work of Lieberson and moved beyond this sociologist by asking qualitative questions regarding the quality of life blacks could achieve in light of segregation. William Julius Wilson's *The Truly Disadvantaged: the Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy* (1987) brought ecology more squarely back into the sociological study of racial stratification. Wilson, a sociologist, argued that concentrated poverty and racial segregation were mutually reinforcing. More recently, sociologists Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton have written on the perpetuation of racial segregation and its relationship to urban poverty in their 1993 *American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass.* In his 1967 work, *Black Chicago: The Making of a Negro Ghetto, 1890-1920*, historian Allan H. Spear argued that the first Great Migration reinforced racial residential patterns and racial attitudes that had existed since the late nineteenth century. In 1983, Arnold R. Hirsh's *Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960* invigorated debate on the mid-twentieth century ghetto by showing how policies create and perpetuated inner-city segregation. Thomas Sugrue's study, *Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit* (1996), drew attention to the dynamics by which manufacturing job loss in the urban North contributed to racialized poverty in the inner city.

[104]St. Louis ranked fourth in 1940 after Chicago, Cleveland, and Milwaukee in the degree of residential racial segregation. Between 1940 and 1980, the degree of residential segregation in St. Louis City declined only marginally. See Reynolds Farley and Walter Allen, *The Color Line and the Quality of Life in America* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1987), 141, and Massey and Denton, *American Apartheid*, 70, 72.

[105]St. Clair Drake and Horace R. Cayton, *The Black Metropolis: A Study of Negro Life in a Northern City* (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1945).

[106]The term 'Negro removal' derived from the fact that over three-fourths of the people displaced by urban renewal nationwide in the first eight years of the program, and 66% of those displaced through 1961, were black. Judd and Swanstrom, *City Politics*, 191.

productive uses. To be sure, though, they did not want poor residential areas, black or white, dampening investment in the central corridor.[107]

A "Vast and Modern Suburb in the City": Conceptualizing Industrial Development in the Urban Core

According to the St. Louis City Plan Commission, Mill Creek Valley was not only a slum that must be razed but also the ideal location for an "inner city suburb." The CPC and the LCRA believed that the most competitive way to promote inner-city industry in the context of metropolitanization was to create a "vast and modern suburb within the city."[108] Modern urban planning ideals called for the eradication of dense, mixed-use areas which were prohibitive to private industrial and commercial development. In their place, planners and developers should foster orderly and efficient spatial arrangements of land use in "superblocks" (contiguous land parcels) with convenient access to river, rail, road, and air transport. The CPC's recommendations in 1953 for an industrial-commercial park reflected the innovations urban planners made as they sought to prepare older industrial cities to meet the spatial and aesthetic demands of modern manufacturing and commercial operations.[109] City planners like Paul W. Lashly (CPC, Industrial Development Commission) viewed their plan as a "new concept in industrial development" and appropriate to urban core revitalization.[110] Their concept

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[107]City officials also cleared predominantly white neighborhoods, most notably the 220-acre Kosciusko area south of downtown. Economic concerns rather than overtly racial issues drove their policies, although they viewed black areas as dampening investment incentives.

[108]*St. Louis' Vital Valley*, Mill Creek Valley Advertisement, by Union Electric (League of Women Voters of St. Louis Records, Addenda (hereafter cited as the League of Women Voters Records), Box 103, Folder 1302; WHMC).

[109]Scott, *American City Planning*, 483.

[110]*Mill Creek Park: Commercial and Industrial Sites in Thriving St. Louis* (promotional pamphlet for MCV) c1965 (Wenzlich Records, Series 4, Box 3, Folder 75).

seemed to make sense given the tangible obstacles that they faced in inner-city redevelopment (dense land usage, undercapitalized physical plant, congested traffic arteries) and the competition that suburban areas posed for industrial capital.

An industrial-commercial park would capture a large expanse of city space geared specifically to the requirements of modern businesses. This inner-city "suburb" would provide a landscaped setting in which the city's industrial and commercial firms could expand their operations in modern facilities on one or two levels with space for parking, loading, and transportation access. An industrial park, as defined by the National Industrial Zoning Committee, is

> A tract of land the control and administrating of which are vested in a single body, suitable for industrial use because of location, topography, proper zoning, availability of utilities and accessibility to transportation. The uses permitted are regulated by protective minimum restrictions, including the size of the site, parking and loading regulations. . . .all requirements are. . . . to enable a group of industries to operate within it efficiently. [111]

In the view of St. Louis city planners, then, businessmen would be attracted to an industrial park because it protected property values, allowed mutually compatible firms to group together, and enable firms to negotiate with one party (via the LCRA) which also improved infrastructure and other services. St. Louis County planners like Hermann F. Wagner (director, County Plan Commission) and developers like Andrew H. Bauer had a head start in creating industrial parks in St. Louis County (Chapter Four). Yet St. Louis City planners and public officials believed that they had a winning formula in MCV because it would combine the best of both worlds: the benefits of suburban work

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[111]Quoted in "St. Louis County's Dramatic Change: Bucolic to Boom," *St. Louis Commerce* v41 (November 1967): 11-12; "The Planned Industrial Subdivision: It Is a Plus for Economic Development," *St. Louis Commerce* (November 1967): 8-9. St. Louis County officials noted that tax incentives also encouraged firms to move to suburban industrial parks in "Acres for Industry: St. Louis Industrial Parks," *St. Louis Commerce*, v37 (September 1963): 18.

environments (modern facilities, landscaping, more space) and the advantages of a central city location (proximity to the central business district (CBD), existing services and infrastructure, and nearby educational and cultural institutions). Critically, MCV's status as a federal urban renewal project subsidized the cost of inner-city private development and thus helped to equalize the cost of capital expansion in the urban core with that in the suburbs. In this way, city officials could overcome some of the obstacles facing inner-city business expansion and create a competitive space in which firms might choose to invest rather than relocate to St. Louis County.

Mill Creek Valley, according to the St. Louis City Plan Commission, met precisely the conditions necessary for successful industrial-commercial zones as laid out in its *Land Use Plan for St. Louis City* (1956), which reflected state-of-the-art planning ideals.[112] The MCV site captured a large expanse (454 acres) of contiguous city blocks on no-fill, even grade land. These physical conditions, after clearance, would make MCV's redevelopment relatively straightforward. Moreover, the MCV site was well-served by major transportation arteries, situated within an existing industrial corridor, proximate to downtown financial, retail, and cultural districts, and easily accessible from working- and middle-class neighborhoods. As businessmen's inquiries to the LCRA about Mill Creek

[112]The City Plan Commission called for the improvement of vacant property along the Mississippi River and of mixed-use industrial areas. Industrial redevelopment sites should fit in well with the existing land use, located near transportation facilities, and in an area where the effect of industry on adjoining properties would not be harmful. These sites must accommodate space off-street parking, loading, and expansion; include local streets connected directly to major street systems; have direct access to rail, river, and air transportation; access to CBD services; and esthetic consideration. Other benefits of an industrial zone are that utility and transit service and police and fire protection could be provided more economically and industries could group together. In 1956, the CPC called for industrial activity in 26% of land use, commercial 5%, residential 45%, open recreational and other public and semi-public space 24%, cemeteries 3%, and vacant 0%. See St. Louis CPC, *Land Use Plan for St. Louis City* (1956), 7.

Valley would reflect, many small and medium-sized firms in St. Louis City requested these attributes for a relocation or expansion site. Reflecting the apparent potential of the MCV model to promote downtown investment in the context of rapid suburbanization, Joseph R. Passonneau (dean, Washington University School of Architecture) asserted that MCV "has intrinsic advantages that far exceed the advantages of. . . .attractive suburban work environments" and that it "may prove a milestone in the revitalizing of American cities."[113]

The expansive MCV area, moreover, was attractive to St. Louis City planners like Arthur Schwarz (CPC, Industrial Development Commission) because they could claim a central location for modern housing and a highway extension as well as new businesses. The LCRA *Redevelopment Plan* would allot about one-fourth (113 acres) of Mill Creek Valley property for industrial use (and eighteen acres for commercial, seventy-five acres for residential, and one-hundred acres for highway expansion). While their inner-city park was only partially geared to support new industrial plants, warehouses, and offices, the CPC viewed the industry-residence ratio as necessary to boost industrial investment and thus the potential of existing industrial capacity overall. Residential development diminished the amount of land available for industrial uses, but, the CPC estimated, "industry and commerce would favor an opportunity to locate in the heart of such a readily available labor market."[114] Including middle-income, modern housing in MCV thus would encourage businesses and residents to locate in the urban core—a very

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[113]Passonneau also served as chief of design for the Tennessee Valley Authority. See "Mill Creek Valley Plan May Be a Milestone in Revitalizing U.S. Cities," by Joseph R. Passonneau, *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, November 17, 1958.

[114] "St. Louis Redevelopment Areas," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, January 25, 1955.

productive exchange, in their estimation. Yet Farris, Tucker and their allies also intended to spark critically needed new middle-income housing and thereby ameliorate one factor—the shortage of decent housing—encouraging residents to move to the suburbs (St. Louis City lost 12.5% of her population in the 1950s and fell to 750,026; St. Louis County almost doubled during that time to 703,532). This business-residential combination replicated, in microcosm, suburban developers' strategy to bring in close proximity work place and residence.[115] This conceptual relationship the CPC and the LCRA made between business and residential development within an inner-city "suburb" would help to build MCV's reputation in the 1950s as a pioneering experiment in revitalization. Significantly, as we will see, Tucker and Farris also envisioned MCV housing as racially integrated. Beautifying and anchoring the central corridor with middle-class housing, then, was a critical component of their industrial strategy. Highway development would absorb almost one-fourth of the MCV site. Yet industrial and commercial growth, according to Tucker and Farris, would face critical limitations if the urban core was not easily accessible to metropolitan business and residents. The composition of economic uses in MCV intended to bolster, then, not only new industrial facilities but also the infrastructure components (housing and transportation) upon which they believed successful industrial policies—and city revitalization overall—would depend.

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[115]As Robert Fishman argued in *Bourgeois Utopias: The Rise and Fall of Suburbia* (New York: Basic Books, 1987), 190-91.

Planning for Inner-City Industrial Development: The Urban Core as Metropolitan Center for "Non-Fordist" Industry

Yet St. Louis city planners and industrial real estate experts had to determine which kinds of firms their inner city could realistically retain. Postwar industrial transformations were forcing them to conceive of inner-city development in new, metropolitan terms. If St. Louis business and political leaders and urban planners wanted metropolitan development to become a win-win scenario in which both the city and her suburbs prospered, not a zero-sum game in which the suburbs grew at the expense of the city (Chapter Four), they had to diagnose the emerging relationship between the urban core and the periphery. The St. Louis CPC had to determine what kinds of firms would gain a competitive advantage by remaining in the inner city and those that would gain a competitive advantage in the suburbs and thus likely to leave. Targeting industrial development policies on this model, they predicted, would enable city and suburban officials to develop their respective municipalities in partnership, not competition, and serve metropolitan growth overall. On a broader level, then, these St. Louis leaders were beginning to conceptualize the economic role of the inner city in Greater St. Louis and the structure of the metropolitan industrial economy.

The City Plan Commission's industrial strategizing thus was a significant component in their ability to overcome a fundamental contradiction posed by metropolitanization: cities must compete with their suburbs yet they were poorly equipped to meet the physical and spatial requirements of modern firms. The St. Louis CPC and its allies in industrial real estate, as we have seen, called for massive physical

reconstruction in order to resolve this tension. But they had to determine, then, which types of firms would still choose to remain in the city and thus target their industrial planning policies effectively.

The St. Louis CPC intended postwar industrial policies to build upon St. Louis' historic pattern of industrial development and its highly diversified economy.[116] By the end of WWII, St. Louis had become a large, comparatively mature and diversified industrial area with a well-defined land-use pattern.[117] Industrial activity in St. Louis City concentrated in a well-established "T" zone (North-South along the Mississippi River and East-West along the central axis) and accounted for 21% of the city's land utilization.[118] St. Louis City's economic structure at mid-century compared similarly to those industrial-belt cities that combined traditional commercial functions with large-scale manufacturing, in particular, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Cincinnati, and Chicago.[119] Unlike

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[116]St. Louis CPC, *Comprehensive City Plan* (1947) and St. Louis CPC, *Pattern of Industrial Land Use in St. Louis* (1948).

[117]The 1947 Directory of Manufacturers for the St. Louis area includes 357 of the 468 industrial classifications used by the United States Bureau of the Census. The key manufacturing activities in St. Louis City included food products, tobacco manufacturers, textile mill products, apparel and related products, lumber and wood products, furniture and fixtures, pulp and paper products, printing and publishing, chemicals, rubber products, leather and leather goods, stone, clay, and glass, primary metals industries, fabricated metal, electrical and non-electrical machinery, and transportation equipment. St. Louis CPC, *Comprehensive City Plan* (1947) and St. Louis CPC, *Pattern of Industrial Land Use in St. Louis* (1948).

[118]St. Louis CPC, *Pattern of Industrial Land Use in St. Louis* (1948).The major industrial areas of St. Louis City are North Broadway, South Broadway, and Carondolet (forming the Mississippi River cross arm of the "T"), Mill Creek Valley (forming the stem of the "T"), and smaller, scattered industrial sites in North and South St. Louis City. Light industrial use accounted for 1,497 acres, heavy industry for 1,873 acres, and railroad for 1,717 acres. For the industrial composition of these areas at mid-century, see Virginia Anne Henry, "Sequent Occupancy of Mill Creek Valley" (Master's Thesis., Washington University, 1947).

[119]In contrast to the economic structure of these urban centers, the other major industrial-belt cities (Pittsburgh, Buffalo, Cleveland, Detroit, and Milwaukee) had a predominant focus on manufacturing. The internal differentiation of St. Louis City's economy compared closely with that of other commercial-manufacturing centers. In 1940, St. Louis had 36% of its industrial workforce in manufacturing, 11% in wholesale, financial, and business services, and 6% in the business and pleasure industry. See Beverly

cities that depended heavily upon one industry (like Detroit), St. Louis had the most diversified industrial foundation among central cities. And while St. Louis City had Fordist operations (like its thirty-year old, 175-acre General Motors plant in North St. Louis), around sixty percent of the city's manufacturers employed twenty workers or less, heavily based in skilled crafts and trades and flexible production. [120] According to St. Louis businessmen like John D. Kerr, Jr. (St. Louis Chamber of Commerce Industrial Development and Transportation Department), "such diversity ensures economic stability" in the long run. [121]

In light of St. Louis City's economic composition, planners and industrial real estate experts determined, reasonably, that industrial policies should focus on small and medium-size firms from the city's diverse sectors. During "the age of Ford," as historian Josh Freeman characterized mid-century America, St. Louis City could not accommodate an expansion of Fordist production.[122] Not only was the city's land densely developed, the city itself comprised only sixty-two square miles (the CPC viewed industry ideally comprising one-fourth of land utilization). Fordist operations like the GM plant required a large amount of land to house technologically-advanced mass production lines and in-

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Duncan and Stanley Lieberson, *Metropolis and Region in Transition*, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1970), 145-50.

[120]*Findings from the Analysis of Development Potentials Within St. Louis, Missouri*, page 8, prepared for the St. Louis CPC by R. Gladstone and Associates, Economic Consultants, Washington, D.C., December 1968 (MHS Library).

[121]Kerr held this position in the early 1960s. See also "Metropolitan St. Louis: Gateway to the West, *New York Times*, September 13, 1964, Section 12, page 12. Duncan and Lieberson found the relative positions of industrial-belt centers with respect to their level of specialization in manufacturing sectors remarkably stable between 1900 and 1960. See *Metropolis and Region*, 158, 163, 165-67.

[122]In *Working-Class New York*, Joshua Freeman defined this period as "the age of Ford" because modernized mass production after WWII fueled the national industrial economy and employed a large percentage of America's industrial workers.

house services and inventories.[123] Firms modernizing on this model, the St. Louis CPC assessed, would inevitably move to St. Louis County to meet their needs—or move to the Sunbelt (Chapter Four). Industrialists not engaged in extensive and integrated operations characteristic of Fordist operations also sought to relocate from older inner-city facilities to modern plants and offices. But these smaller firms, city planners believed, might stay in the urban core if they created the conditions under which those firms could acquire appropriate location, space, and facilities. St. Louis' small- and medium-sized firms, they determined, required ten acres or less and depended upon the external economies provided by inner-city industrial and commercial districts (like subcontractors, warehouses, and services firms). Thus an inner-city location actually remained ideal for these types of operations. Planners and industrial real estate experts, consequently, focused much of their industrial and commercial planning (but not exclusively) on these firms.[124] In MCV, they would plan for primarily light industry (and thus be a "good

[123]The Fordist system of mass production, first created by Henry Ford at Highland Park in Detroit in the early teens, required a large amount of land to house mass production lines and access to transportation facilities. As historians Josh Freeman and Thomas Hughes point out, manufacturing firms were likely to leave the urban core when their products became standardized and sold in large quantities and when their production could become routinized through firms' relocation to modern plant facilities. Firms engaged in Fordist operations maintained predictable, high-volume production of standard goods and do not depend upon the external economies that inner-city districts provide (Fordist firms have specialized, in-house services, maintenance operations, and extensive inventories of supplies). For these firms that compete on the basis of price rather than uniqueness of product, speed of delivery, or quality of workmanship, the high unionization rates and costs of labor, land, rent, and taxes in the city put them at a disadvantages—and lack of space made large-scale operations difficult to create. Thus many sought suburban and rural locations. See Freeman, *Working-Class New York*, 14, and Thomas Hughes, *American Genesis: A Century of Invention and Technical Enthusiasm, 1870-1970* (New York: Viking Press, 1989), 8-9, 203-20. See also St. Louis CPC, *Land Use Plan for St. Louis City* (1956).

[124]The City Plan Commission planned Kosckiusko for the expansion of existing firms in the area. Large companies who planned to expand in Kosckiusko included the American Car Foundry, Anheuser Busch, Inc., Monsanto Chemical Co, Nooter Boiler Corp., and Bemis Bros. Bag Company. See Gladstone and Associates, *Findings from the Analysis of Development Potentials Within St. Louis*, pages 8-12. On industrial real estate assessments of Mill Creek Valley, see Wenzlich, *Market Analysis*.

neighbor") and for industrial and commercial firms requiring five acres or less. [125] According to real estate expert Roy Wenzlich, his surveys found "a strong demand for the type of industrial property to be offered in the Mill Creek district."[126] In the view of St. Louis City planners, then, room existed in "Fordist" America for "non-Fordist" development, as their counterparts in Philadelphia and New York City similarly assessed.[127]

St. Louis city planners and developers in the 1950s thus intended to build upon the inner city's comparative advantages within the metropolitan area. Inner-city sites like MCV, in contrast to suburban locations, offered close proximity to downtown financial and commercial districts, multi-nodal transportation facilities, and well-established infrastructure. By building upon these competitive advantages through industrial-commercial policies, they intended make the urban core the metropolitan center for "non-Fordist" economic activity and so retain that sector of industry most suited to operate in the urban core. Concurrently, both city and suburban officials (like St. Louis County Supervisor Lawrence K. Roos) envisioned St. Louis County as home to many of the area's larger industrial operations. Developing St. Louis County's industrial capacity was critical, these local leaders agreed, to encourage firms to remain in the St. Louis area rather than head South (Chapter Four). According to CPC commissioners, inner-city

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[125]This reflected their effort to boost St. Louis City's metropolitan role as the site for heavy industrial production. St. Louis County officials and residents rejected heavy industry, while industrial zones in the city, particularly along the riverfront due to the transportation capacity, housed heavy industrial production. The East Side housed the main concentration of heaving industry in the Greater St. Louis area. See St. Louis LCRA, *Redevelopment Plan for Mill Creek Valley* (1957) (MHS Library).

[126]Wenzlich, *Market Analysis*, page 2.

[127] Freeman characterizes New York City uses as a non-Fordist city in the age of Ford in *Working-Class New York*.

redevelopment on this model was crucial "if St. Louis City is to function as the nucleus of the expanding metropolitan area."[128] Within this metropolitan framework and policy agenda and in expectation of strong investment in Greater St. Louis, the city and the suburbs were emerging as partners in boosting postwar regional growth, local leaders estimated.

Through inner-city industrial-commercial redevelopment, local leaders also intended to secure St. Louis' regional economic position. By the early 1950s, local officials warned that Memphis, Kansas City, Oklahoma City, and Dallas were becoming St. Louis' most direct competitors in the Midwest for new manufacturing, assembly, and distribution sites. Although the suburbanization of city firms sparked St. Louis officials' industrial policies, strengthening the city's traditional manufacturing and distribution capacities through projects like the MCV would help St. Louis to remain a Midwest economic hub. Mill Creek Valley, in their view, thus would serve a dual function by helping to keep the inner city a vibrant part of the metropolis and by keeping the metropolis a competitive player in the regional and national economy. St. Louis leaders, then, had a well-articulated concept of how inner-city restructuring could prepare St. Louis to cope with structural changes in the nation's economy, in particular, the regional shift of northern industrial production to the South and Southwest.

The Metropolitan Framework for Inner-City Industrial Development in St. Louis

St. Louis City leaders' planning for MCV unfolded within their emerging framework for metropolitan development. In order to understand how they intended

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[128]St. Louis CPC, *Land Use Plan for St. Louis City* (1956), 7.

inner-city industrial development to contribute to central city revitalization, MCV must be placed within this metropolitan context. Mill Creek Valley redevelopment would create a central anchor for the "corridor of renewal" that city planners and public officials imagined extending from downtown beautification projects (Gateway Arch, Chapter Four) to university medical redevelopment sites in the Central West End neighborhood (Chapter Five).[129] Emphasizing what city planners in the 1950s and 1960s viewed as the compatibility of industrial-commercial development and inner-city beautification, one *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* writer asserted,

> Like the prospective riverfront memorial to the East, Mill Creek would help anchor and solidify the business district and downtown property values, which are of great importance in the welfare and progress of the whole community. There would be a 'radiation value' in the midtown improvement, which would tend to spread rehabilitation to other slum and blight districts to the North, South, and West. [130]

Moreover, MCV's central location provided an ideal space to accommodate the planned Daniel Boone expressway. In the 1950s, urban leaders like Mayor Tucker agreed that highways would invigorate central business districts by linking them with the suburbs and decongesting traffic arteries, as many scholars have discussed.[131] St. Louisans'

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[129]Tucker explained that he is concerned with beautifying the downtown area where MCV adjoins it and cites Philadelphia's Edward Bacon as an inspiration for his plans. See Letter to Stratford Lee Morton of Boatmen's Bank, from Raymond Tucker, February 6, 1963 (Tucker Files, Series 3, Box 18, Folder: Mill Creek Valley, St. Louis Redevelopment Corporation, May 1961-April 1963).

[130]"Midtown Area Overripe for Slum Clearance Job: Number One Eyesore," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, February 12, 1948. And as another observer wrote, "The types of redevelopment to which this area logically lends itself should serve to reinforce and stabilize the central business district." See "Market Street Area Next Site for Slum Clearance, Industrial Redevelopment Is Major Purpose," *St. Louis-Post Dispatch*, August 8, 1954.

[131]While historians have shown that city leaders and planners believed that highways would revive downtown, they also analyze how highways hastened residential and business deconcentration. See, for example, Bernard J. Frieden and Lynne B. Sagalyn, *Downtown, Inc.: How America Rebuilds Cities* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1989), 20-21, 27-31; *Revitalizing Urban Neighborhoods*, ed. by W. Dennis Keating, Norman Krumholz, and Philip Star (Lawrence, University of Kansas Press, 1996); Raymond A. Mohl, "Whitening Miami: Race, Housing and Government Policy in Twentieth-Century Dade County," *Florida Historical Quarterly* 79(3) (2001): 319-45; and Teaford, *Rough Road*, 31-31, 93-97, 212-13.

envisioned corridor of renewal reflects their faith that physical redevelopment would generate inner-city growth and maintain the primacy of the urban core.

Through their planning for Mill Creek Valley, St. Louis city planners and urban officials thus began to develop an explicitly metropolitan framework for postwar reconstruction. As the St. Louis CPC strategizing shows, planners sought to anticipate the dynamics of metropolitan development and create a mutually advantageous relationship between the urban core and the periphery.[132] MCV's central location actually mirrors, in microcosm, how local officials viewed the city's emerging role within her metropolitan economy. They intended MCV not only to promote industrial growth but also to enhance the city's business and service districts, tourism/cultural institutions, and educational institutes (Chapter Three). They viewed the urban core as having a comparative advantage within the metropolis as a commercial, administrative, and leisure center because of its CBD, historic riverfront, and other attractions easily accessible by expanding freeways. Developing these components of the inner city, according to prominent planners like Philadelphia's Edward Bacon, was critical to revitalization.[133] And indeed the burgeoning service and tourism sectors nation-wide, spatially concentrating in inner cities, seemed to legitimate their strategy. On the one hand, then, St. Louis City leaders wanted the urban core to remain the hub of (non-Fordist) industrial production and distribution, and on the other hand, they wanted the inner city to function

[132]Well-known urban planner Konstantinos A. Doxiadis asserted that most local city leaders and planning commissioners in the 1950s and 1960s did not grapple with the dynamics of metropolitan development. See his *Urban Renewal and the Future of the American City* (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1966).
[133]According to Charles T. Henry, Philadelphia's cultural institutions revived its downtown and St. Louis should similarly concentrate its cultural sites. See "The New St. Louis and the Philadelphia Renaissance," by Charles T. Henry, January 1963, page 11, 23 (magazine name is missing) (League of Women Voters Records, Box 103, Folder 1300).

as the commercial and cultural nucleus of Greater St. Louis. But in their view, these dual roles were complementary, not in competition. If St. Louis stabilized the wealth- and job-producing capacity of its industrial base they would encourage investment in the city's commercial and service districts. In turn, many industrial firms would be attracted to the city's downtown amenities. This "nucleation" of economic activity in the urban core, as urban land market experts like Homer Hoyt argued, would attract businesses and residents.[134]

St. Louisans' interpretation of these "dual roles" reflects both the paradox that metropolitanization created for inner-city development and their resolution to this contradiction. On the one hand, their efforts to transform the urban core into the cultural-service "nerve center for an expanding metropolis" in effect facilitated and "rationalized" metropolitanization.[135] Yet, on the other hand, they wanted to ameliorate industrial decentralization to the suburbs. But these strategies were complementary, in city leaders' estimation, because both simply built upon the comparative advantages that the city possessed in relation to its suburbs. Developing both facets of the inner city was critical, in their view, to integrate the urban core fully within the metropolitan economy. The city developed along this model could satisfy many of the cultural, financial, educational, and administrative service demands of metropolitan businesses and consumers and so remain central to their interests. Concurrently, the concentration of inner-city manufacturing, warehousing, and wholesaling industries near metropolitan transportation facilities would

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[134]See, for example, Homer Hoyt's publications like *The Urban Real Estate Cycle-Performance and Prospects* (Washington, D.C.: Urban Land Institute, 1960) and *The Changing Principles of Land Economics* (Washington, D.C.: Urban Land Institute, 1968).
[135] St. Louis CPC, *Land Use Plan* (1956), page 8.

stabilize St. Louis' position within her regional and national markets. As the most productive metropolitan site for these particular activities, the urban core would prosper as it fostered these important metropolitan functions regardless of suburbanization. In this way, St. Louis leaders believed that their reconstruction strategy would resolve the paradox posed by metropolitanization.

St. Louis City officials recognized the apparent contradiction in simultaneously competing with St. Louis County for investment and fostering a mutually advantageous relationship with the suburbs. Yet they premised their inner-city project on strong long-term growth and, as we have seen, on the promotion of distinct economic roles for the urban core and periphery. Under these conditions, they believed, their reconstruction model would solve this apparent contradiction as both the city and suburbs generated new investment and fostered strong metropolitan growth (Chapter Four). From their perspective in the early 1950s, local leaders' expectations seemed reasonable. The CPC's industrial policies reflected astute assessments of the urban land market, business requirements, and metropolitan growth patterns. They had reason to believe, in the words of Wenzlich, that "in an atmosphere of national prosperity," creative industrial policies can reverse ostensibly temporary downward trends. They viewed Greater St. Louis' expansion as evidence of the city's potential and asserted that "the Mill Creek industrial district can do much to further this growth."[136] St. Louis leaders were well aware that the problems posed by suburbanization were becoming only more acute. But they believed that they possessed the local-federal policy tools, the leadership initiative, the funding

[136]Wenzlich, *Market Analysis*, 1, 30.

capacity, and the intellectual framework to influence metropolitan development and revitalize their city.

Planning, Policies, and Partnerships for Growth: Transforming Mill Creek Valley into an Industrial-Commercial Renewal Project

Within this intellectual context, St. Louis planners and public officials set out to transform the Mill Creek Valley proposal into what would become the nation's largest inner-city industrial-commercial park of its kind. Local officials had to set the urban renewal process in motion by applying for and meeting the conditions of participation in Title 1 through the HHFA. In 1954, the St. Louis City Plan Commission and the LCRA launched the necessary research, planning, and legislative processes. The steps they took reflect the internal workings of the city-federal partnership that would turn redevelopment proposals into reality. Concurrently, Mayor Tucker reached out to labor and African American leaders to cultivate his urban renewal coalition.

Yet Mayor Tucker could do nothing for MCV without substantial municipal finances. The federal urban renewal program required cities to document their ability to contribute one-third of the estimated total cost of their project in order to become eligible for participation. Tucker immediately tapped two sources of municipal fund raising: the earnings tax and the bond issue. Tucker argued to St. Louis City voters that the passage of a permanent earnings tax and major bond would fund critical public improvements—like MCV—that boost jobs and quality of life in the city. Mayor Tucker led aggressive campaigning by City Hall, Civic Progress, the Chamber of Commerce, and the *St. Louis Globe-Democrat* and the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* for these proposals. Convinced, St.

Louis City voters overwhelmingly approved a permanent earnings tax in 1954 and a $110,639,000 bond in 1955 (the largest bond passed in the city to date), eleven million dollars of which was slated for MCV.[137]

Tucker credited Civic Progress for much of the success of these campaigns. Civic Progress' strong promotion of the tax and bond proposals advertised to St. Louis City voters their own socioeconomic stake in these initiatives. Moreover, as St. Louis' most prominent business and civic leaders, Tucker surmised, they managed to convince most voters that these initiatives were critical to the city's vitality. Mayor Tucker believed that Civic Progress' enthusiasm for the urban renewal projects also assisted the city's ability to procure substantial federal funds from the Eisenhower administration (by 1958, St. Louis City had received $999,1990 in capital grants).[138] According to the mayor, Civic Progress' strong financial support for the Republic Party helped to earn St. Louis' urban renewal applications a particularly favorable hearing.[139] And significantly, Civic Progress' support for MCV helped to convince HHFA officials that the project must have strong investment potential and thus would prove to be a prudent use of urban renewal funds. Reflecting how urban renewal advocates in the 1950s linked physical redevelopment with inner-city economic growth, the HHFA's James Follin, after

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[137]St. Louisans added an amendment to the city charter that authorized the city to levy an earnings tax without legislative permission. This was especially important because urban renewal programs provided property tax abatements to many private interests. In 1959, the earnings tax was increased from .5% to 1%. "A New St. Louis Rips Up Its Past," *Business Week,* September 10, 1955. See also Scrivner, *Politics*, 28-29. The 1955 bond was the largest bond issue ($110, 639,000) in the city to date. Learning from the failure of the 1948 slum clearance bond, Tucker stressed that the city would relocate residents displaced from the MCV project in safe and sanitary housing.

[138]Teaford, *Rough Road*, 107. St. Louis City ranked number eleven among central cities in terms of amount of capital grants received by March 31, 1958.

[139]Cummings, "Rent Strike," 124.

inspecting the MCV site, asserted that "St. Louis has tremendous possibilities for growth through rehabilitation of such blighted neighborhoods."[140]

In order to start the local legislative process required for slum clearance and redevelopment, the St. Louis CPC submitted to the St. Louis Board of Aldermen a resolution in 1954 stating that the 454-acre MCV site was a blighted district. This step was essentially a formality as most aldermen were long convinced that MCV was beyond rehabilitation, and the board members quickly declared the MCV area officially blighted. In so doing, the Board of Aldermen granted the LCRA the authority it needed to move forward with its clearance plans. Meanwhile, Paul W. Lashly, Saul Dubinksy, Albert H. Baum, and other members of the CPC's Industrial Development Committee worked with Charles Farris to create a general land-use plan for MCV. With aldermanic approval of the CPC's slum clearance resolution and mayoral approval of the LCRA's land use plan, the LCRA could start the application process for participation in the federal urban renewal program. The LCRA submitted its general land-use plan to the Division of Slum Clearance and Urban Redevelopment in Washington, D.C., which would designate or reject the proposed redevelopment area as a potential urban renewal site. MCV's general land-use plan indeed met the requirements of the Division that it cohere with the St. Louis CPC's comprehensive city plan and indicate that the LCRA and CPC could carry out the redevelopment. The MCV thus earned the designation of the Division as an urban renewal site and so could receive funds for further planning and research and move

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[140]"Market Street Are Next Site for Slum Clearance, Industrial Development is Major Purpose," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch,* August 8, 1954.

toward the next step in becoming an official urban renewal project. [141] The LCRA and CPC now had to create an official redevelopment plan approved by the St. Louis City mayor, the Board of Aldermen, and the federal Urban Renewal Administration (URA). In addition, Farris and Tucker had to document St. Louis City's ability to contribute one-third of the project's total estimated cost. If their application proved successful, Mill Creek Valley would become an official urban renewal project.

The entire planning and application process for MCV would take almost three years and coalesce in 1958.[142] That year, the LCRA's *Redevelopment Plan for Mill Creek Valley* (1958) was approved by the necessary three parties. Concurrently, Farris and Tucker provided evidence that the city could contribute total cash and non-cash grants-in-aid in the amount of $12,278,303, its estimated share of the cost.[143] During this time, the MCV project gained national attention as a pioneering model and as the nation's largest inner-city industrial-commercial park to date.[144] St. Louis leaders' breadth of thinking about large-scale redevelopment within a metropolitan context helped to convince federal officials that MCV would promote the revitalization that federal renewal legislation

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[141]*Newsrelease: Statement by Raymond Tucker*, August 8, 1954; LCRA, *Facts About Urban Renewal in St. Louis*.

[142]Letters on the planning timetable can be found in the Tucker Files, Series 1, Box 13, in the numerous folders on the St. Louis Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority.

[143]In the mid-1960s, however, MCV's overall costs declined. The federal government cut its share from an earlier estimate of $23,900,000 to $18,750,000, and the city's cost declined from $11,467,000 to $10,050,992. "Estimated Cost of Mill Creek Project Cut by One-Fifth," by Thomas W. Ottenad, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, July 27, 1965. Letter to Charles Farris from Robert Duffe, Secretary to the Mayor, January 2, 1958 (Tucker Files, Series 2, Box 17, Folder: Mill Creek Valley Project); Letter to Robert Duffe, Secretary to the Mayor, from Charles Farris, December 3, 1957 (Tucker Files, Series 2, Box 17, Folder: Mill Creek Valley Project); LCRA, *Facts About Urban Renewal in St. Louis*; *Newsrelease: Mayor Raymond R. Tucker*, June 19, 1958 (Tucker Files, Series 2, Box 17, Folder: Mill Creek Valley Project); "City to Donate Non-Taxed Land for Mill Creek," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* (League of Women Voters Records, Box 103, Folder 1302).

[144]The interest MCV earned among prominent developers across the country reflected this fact.

intended. Farris's national stature also helped; in 1959, Farris accepted the presidency of the National Association of Housing and Renewal Officials.

An exuberant Mayor Tucker announced on June 19, 1958, that the URA approved a $62,000,000 loan and grant for MCV. This victory, Tucker asserted, "clearly indicates that St. Louis is moving ahead in its efforts to surround the downtown area with attractive living, business and park area, rather than depressing slums and vacant riverfront property."[145] Tucker's statement tied together the complementary roles of the MCV and the Gateway Arch—industrialization and beautification—in inner-city revitalization, as local urban leaders saw it. Farris, in turn, emphasized MCV's significance as a "new concept in industrial development" and the local–federal partnership behind it.[146] The LCRA Executive Director boasted that the "St. Louis program is now several years ahead of the rest of the country" in thinking about and overcoming the obstacles to inner-city industrial-commercial expansion.[147] Raymond Tucker, like Farris, received national recognition for his commitment to making American cities work. The American Municipal Association would appoint Tucker president in 1959, and he became president of the American Conference of Mayors in 1963.[148] At home, Tucker used his political skills to foster support among key interest groups for Mill Creek Valley.

Democratic urban leaders like Mayor Tucker sought consensus-building alliances for their liberal economic agendas. These urban mayors needed to convince the city's

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[145]*Newsrelease: Mayor Raymond R. Tucker*, June 19, 1958.
[146]"Mill Creek Park: Commercial and Industrial Sites in Thriving St. Louis," promotional literature for Mill Creek Valley, c1965 (Wenzlich Records, Series 4, Box 3, Folder 75).
[147]Cummings, "Rent Strike," 127.
[148]The American Municipal Association was the forerunner to the National League of Cities, the country's largest organization serving municipal governments.

primary constituencies, particularly business, labor, and African Americans, that they stood to benefit from their redevelopment policies. In turn, Tucker's economic programs provided him with an opportunity to foster race and class consensus in St. Louis City. By integrating these interest groups into his postwar coalition, Tucker intended to build wide support for his program. For urban leaders in the 1950s and 1960s, growing consensus on redevelopment was thought to stabilize social and economic relations in American urban communities. David Truman's analysis of interest-group politics at mid-century focused on the role of labor, and he asserted that it could stabilize political-economic relations. In considering Tucker's governing approach in St. Louis, this concept describes Tucker's view of his relationship with labor and African American leaders: city officials might harmonize political dynamics by integrating these diverse groups more closely into governmental institutions.[149] As Edwin Clark argued (president, Civic Progress), political and business leaders needed to improve these relations in order to boost the city's investment appeal.[150] Concurrently, growing activism by African Americans for equal access to political, economic, and educational institutions illustrated blacks' growing political influence.[151] Allying with both labor leaders and African American leaders became critical, in Tucker's estimation, to the success of his agenda. The St. Louis mayor relied upon city agencies, particularly the LCRA, as one way in which to integrate representatives from these diverse constituencies into his coalition.

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[149]Truman, David B., *The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), 149.

[150]Clark is noted in "What's Wrong With St. Louis?" by Harry Wilensky, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, April 25, 1954. Clark, however, placed most of the responsibility for improving labor-management relations on the unions.

[151]In St. Louis City, for example, black voters' rejection of the city's 1948 slum clearance bond (due to inadequate relocation plans) caused its defeat, according to former mayor Aloys Kaufman.

The only alderman to vote against the *Redevelopment Plan for Mill Creek Valley* was Archie Blaine (Democrat, Ward Six). Ninety-seven percent of MCV was located in Blaine's ward. The alderman argued that the project failed to include adequate "provisions. . . for rehousing the area's low-income residents." [152] Blaine remained unconvinced that the LCRA would provide adequate relocation assistance to safe and sanitary housing for displaced residents as now required by federal legislation.[153] Yet Mayor Tucker's outreach to St. Louis' African American leaders convinced most of them, in the 1950s, that the MCV project could benefit black residents. Through the LCRA, Tucker incorporated representatives from religious and social institutions, the city's black press, and civil rights organizations into his MCV coalition. In the early 1950s, for example, Tucker appointed Rev. John E. Nance (pastor, Washington Tabernacle Church near MCV) to the LCRA's five-member Commission and later would place Howard Wood (editor of the *St. Louis Argus*) on the Commission. Concurrently, Tucker and Farris created a thirty-member Mill Creek Valley Citizen Advisory Group and a Relocation Committee within the LCRA. In the 1950s, the MCV Advisory Committee included Dr. J. Owen Blache (president of the Urban League of St. Louis),

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[152]"Aldermen Pass Measures on Mill Creek Plan by 27 to 1," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, March 21, 1958. Blacks displaced by urban renewal, Blaine anticipated, would be forced to crowd into high-rise public housing projects or compete with low- and middle-income blacks for older homes abandoned by whites. Alderman Blaine thus weighed in on a cycle of black residential displacement that critics would come to call "Negro removal." Most of these critics, like Robert C. Weaver, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, focused on urban renewal's impact on inner-city blacks. Conservative critics like Martin Anderson, however, asserted that displacement evidenced that federal intervention in the private market was counterproductive. Anderson became nationally known for his 1964 critique, *The Federal Bulldozer: A Critical Analysis of Urban Renewal, 1949-1962* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Pres, 1964).

[153]Although Blaine did not voice this concern publicly, the MCV relocation project would relocate a large portion of his constituency outside of his ward. Blaine was concerned that the MCV project thus might lead to the replacement of one of the few black aldermen on the board of aldermen.

Rev. G. Wayman Blakely (pastor of St. Paul A.M.E. Church in MCV), and Ernest Calloway (president of the St. Louis Branch of the NAACP).[154]

Tucker and Farris met regularly with these committees during the 1950s. They argued that MCV actually represented an opportunity to provide MCV residents with far better housing through their relocation efforts. Moreover, Tucker and Farris emphasized that MCV housing would be racially integrated. They conceded that the housing would be too expensive for most former MCV residents but stressed the opportunities this provided to higher-income black families. In a city patterned by extreme residential discrimination, this was an important, if limited, step by city officials to address African Americans' growing demands for equal housing opportunities.[155] In so doing, Tucker sought to integrate rights liberalism with his liberal economic agenda. MCV's integrated housing reflects how Tucker employed economic redevelopment in an effort to foster race consensus in St. Louis. He also demonstrated the growing racial liberalism of some white public officials in the urban North. Ernest Calloway, president of the St. Louis NAACP (and research director for the St. Louis Teamsters Joint Council) strongly supported MCV for another reason besides housing: Calloway hoped that it would create job opportunities for black skilled and semi-skilled workers.[156] Having a greater stake in

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[154]LCRA, *Minutes: February 9, 1954*, page 2 (Tucker Files, Series 1, Box 14, Folder: LCRA Minutes, 1952-55); *Memo on Mill Creek Valley Advisory Committee* (Tucker Files, Series 2, Box 17, Folder: Mill Creek Valley Project).

[155]The prominent St. Louis African American newspaper, the *St. Louis Argus*, consistently discussed African Americans' efforts to secure equal opportunity in housing in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s.

[156]*Statement by Ernest Calloway before the Housing and Land Clearance Committee of the St. Louis Board of Alderman in Support of Slum Clearance in Mill Creek Valley Area,* Public Hearing, Kiel Auditorium, March 17, 1958 (held at the Sate History Society of Wisconsin). An exception to most labor unions, the Teamsters' leadership in St. Louis integrated social and civil rights concerns into their labor agenda. See, for example, Robert Bussel, "A Trade Union Oriented War on the Slums: Harold Gibbons, Ernest

the city's governing coalition and in the context of growing civil rights activism, many black leaders in 1950s St. Louis held out cautious hope that African Americans would benefit from the MCV project.

Labor leaders in St. Louis City also supported the Mill Creek Valley renewal project. Political scientists Robert Salisbury and Lana Stein have shown that union officials in St. Louis City historically viewed business and political leaders marginalizing the interests of working-class neighborhoods.[157] Yet similar to labor leaders in other cities, they found it mutually advantageous to ally with the mayor for slum clearance, public housing, and urban renewal. By allying with labor representatives, particularly from the influential Teamsters and Building Trades unions, Tucker could build support among white, working-class residents for his liberal economic policies. In turn, workers would benefit from these job-creation projects and better integrate their interests with City Hall's agenda.[158] Speaking for "twenty-thousand workmen," Henry S. Till, manager of Associated General Contractors of St. Louis, told Tucker in 1958 that "we heartily endorse the program for redevelopment of the Mill Creek" because "it will bring not only

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Calloway, and the St. Louis Teamsters in the 1960s," *Labor History*, v44 #1 (February 2003): 49-68. See also the *Missouri Teamster* newspaper in the 1950s and 1960s. African American leaders like Ernest Calloway dramatically upped their efforts to break the color line in skilled labor unions, as the *St. Louis Argus* discusses frequently in the 1950s and 1960s.

[157]Labor leaders' political power was rooted in the city's ward-based political structure, as discussed by Robert Salisbury in "St. Louis Politics: Relationships Among Interests, Parties, and Government Structure," *Western Political Quarterly* XIII, #1 (March 1960) and by Stein in *Politics*, 84 and 87.

[158]Since the mid-1940s, St. Louis mayors reached out to white, organized labor (by placing labor representatives on commissions, for example), and labor, in turn, strongly supported slum-clearance, housing, and other urban renewal projects in St. Louis. As one example, see the Western Union Telegram from Henry S. Till, manager of the Associated General Contractors of St. Louis, to Edward N. Goltermann, Secretary to Mayor Tucker, March 17, 1958, page 2 (Tucker Files, Series 2, Box 17, Folder: MCV Project) which cites the Building Trades Unions strong support for MCV. See also *Statement by Ernest Calloway before the Housing and Land Clearance Committee of the St. Louis Board of Alderman* from March 17, 1958.

business to the firms, but jobs to thousands of workmen."[159] Also demonstrating how urban renewal could advance the mutual interests of city halls and union halls and thereby create common ground between them, the St. Louis Teamsters would contract with the LCRA to construct housing in MCV for retired union workers. Tucker appointed labor representatives like Louis Justi (vice president of St. Louis' Building and Construction Trades Council) to the LCRA Commission and sought closer partnership with aldermen from the city's working-class wards.[160] In addition to Rev. John Nance and Louis Justi, the LCRA Commissioners included businessmen Eugene C. Farrell (a small manufacturer) and Raymond J. Noonan (president of Hauschulte Real Estate Co.).[161] The LCRA Commission, then, reflected the political-business-labor-African American coalition that Tucker fostered behind MCV.

Exchanging "New Industries for Old Slums": Clearance and Redevelopment in Mill Creek Valley

MCV redevelopment began officially in June1958 when the LCRA purchased its first MCV property. The Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority under Farris would become the driving force behind the project as it coordinated the jobs and agencies for land purchases (and condemnation) and clearance and private redevelopment contracts.[162]The St. Louis City Plan Commission would play a critical but less visible

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[159] Western Union Telegram from Henry S. Till, March 17, 1958, page 2.

[160]Although they often conflicted on more localized, ward-based issues. The Board's twenty-eight unit ward structure reflects the influence of ward politics in St. Louis.

[161]"Farrell, Nance, Voted to Give Mill Creek Job to Zeckendorf," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* (League of Women Voters Records, Box 103, Folder 1302).

[162]The State of Missouri authorized St. Louis City to create the LCRA in 1951, which is headed by five non-salaried commissioners appointed by the mayor. The constitutionality of redevelopment legislation was affirmed in the 1954 U.S. Supreme Court decision in favor of the Washington, D.C., Redevelopment

role as it surveyed and planned Mill Creek's development.[163] The LCRA estimated that exchanging "new industries for old slums" would require ten years to complete. St. Louis had "a great deal to gain or lose" in this development, according to George McCue of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch.*[164]

The LCRA's *Redevelopment Plan for Mill Creek Valley* reflected the radical transformation of this 454-acre space in the heart of St. Louis. The *Plan* called for the demolition of 2500 structures to make way for 113 acres for industrial use (industry would ultimately utilize 132 acres), eighteen acres for commercial use, seventy-five acres for residential use, and thirty-one acres for public and semi-public use. Close to 100 acres in MCV would accommodate an extension of the Daniel Boone Expressway. Public rights-of-way occupied thirty-four acres in the *Plan* and present owners retained eighty acres. In the view of planners and developers, this land-use arrangement reinforced the critical "nucleation of activity" in the inner city. And Mill Creek Valley, given its central location, would then bolster investment to its North, South, East, and West given the economic components represented in MCV (industry, commerce, highway, and housing).

The Mill Creek Valley project earned the attention of some of the nation's most prestigious industrial and residential developers. Significantly, MCV's appeal evidenced that federal intervention in the urban land market enabled city officials to overcome some of the constraints they faced in attracting private investment to the inner city. The

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Act of 1945 (*Berman* v. *Parker*). The Court sanctioned the use of the police power to achieve aesthetic ends and validated the taking of properties in blighted areas for redevelopment, asserting that the city officials had the right to develop the city as they deemed in the public interest.

[163]Federal legislation in the 1950s secured the role of the CPC in the MCV project: it required cities to coordinate their planning for urban renewal projects with a master plan for the city. This would change in the 1960s as federal agencies began to favor single projects over master planning.

[164]"Mill Creek Valley Looks Promising," by George McCue, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, January 23, 1966.

companies chosen by the LCRA to redevelop MCV would purchase the cleared property from the LCRA at a subsidized cost and develop it for the private market. Although profit earned in urban renewal projects was capped at 8%, they calculated that demand for this inner-city space would prove strong enough to make their investment worthwhile. Two nationally-known real estate developers, City and Suburban Homes Company (CSHS) and Webb and Knapp, Inc., submitted MCV's top bids to become the primary developer.[165] A local corporation, St. Louis Redevelopment Corporation (SLRC), also made LCRA's list of main competitors. In 1958, LCRA Commissioners Farrell, Nance, Justi, Noonan, and Sidney S. Cohen announced their decision to grant contracts to the St. Louis Redevelopment Corporation and City and Suburban Homes Company as MCV's primary developers.[166]

The St. Louis Redevelopment Corporation would handle the industrial and commercial development of MCV.[167] The LCRA chose the St. Louis Redevelopment Corporation largely because the SLRC represented local business interests. Real estate leaders in St. Louis City, Real Estate Board president J. Ben Miller among them, created the SLRC in 1958 in order to engage in local urban renewal projects. SLRC associates well understood the land requirements, locational factors, and aesthetic preferences

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[165]By the late 1950s, City and Suburban Homes had become one of the largest operators and owners of residential property in the United States. The company had been created initially to improve housing for working people in New York. Zeckendorf was president of Webb and Knapp, Inc., which had substantial ties to the Rockefeller family and became known in the 1950s for ambitious commercial developments such as the 300-plus acre Roosevelt Field Shopping Center on Long Island.

[166]Scrivner details the LCRA's choice of developers in "Politics," 30-60.

[167]The board members included the past twenty presidents of the St. Louis Real Estate Board. See *List of St. Louis Redevelopment Corporation Members*, January 2, 1958 (Tucker Files, Series 2, Box 17, Folder: Mill Creek Valley Project, 2/58) and *List of Subscribers to the Capital Stock of St. Louis Redevelopment Corp.* (Tucker Files, Series 2, Box 17, Folder: Mill Creek Valley Project, 2/58).

influencing the investment decisions of St. Louis firms and thus could become shrewd developers for MCV, the LCRA estimated.

CSHS would handle MCV's primary residential developments. City and Suburban Homes Company brought its national prestige to St. Louis' urban renewal project. The corporation's CEO, James H. Scheuer, had a reputation for being on the cutting edge of his field. Scheuer intended to replicate suburban residential enclaves in "Laclede Town" (a 655-unit housing complex): low-rise garden apartments and split-level colorful townhouses organized around recreational and green spaces.[168] In this way, Scheuer asserted, MCV could offer city residents the best of both worlds: a central city location and a suburban-like environment. Furthermore, Scheuer was nationally-recognized for his commitment to integrated housing, and he would bring this commitment to the Laclede Town development. On all counts, the LCRA chose a resourceful developer for their experiment in inner-city, integrated housing.[169] In total, MCV developers would construct housing for around 2100 middle-income families (including high rises, town houses, and Laclede Town). By encouraging further residential development throughout the city, Scheuer asserted, MCV would help to limit the outflow of middle-income residents to the suburbs (but MCV alone could have a

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[168]"Laclede Town" was located along Laclede Street.

[169]Scheuer created the University Heights Village Corp. as a subsidiary of CSHC to carry out MCV's redevelopment. Scheuer brought on the I. E. Millstone Construction Company of St. Louis as partial owner. The SLRC was responsible for developing one-fifth of the residential structures. "Company Selected to Redevelop Mill Creek Valley Has Pioneered in Low-Rent Housing for 62 Years," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, January 5, 1958; "Mill Creek Will Yield Large Tax Income for City," *St. Louis Argus*, May 23, 1958.

minimal effect: between 1960 and 1970 the city would lose 17% of its population and hit 622,236. Meanwhile, St. Louis County increased by over a one-third to 951,671).[170]

In addition to MCV's two primary developers, the LCRA allotted space in MCV to three other parties for development: the State of Missouri Highway Department, St. Louis University, and the Teamsters. While the Highway Department constructed its new expressway, St. Louis University (SLU) extended its campus on twenty-two acres in the site. SLU, which bordered MCV at Grand Avenue on the West, supported MCV clearance proposals since the 1940s because it wanted to expand its campus. Farris and Mayor Tucker welcomed SLU's bid because the university's growth, they believed, would highlight the educational and cultural advantages of city living and business. Moreover, MCV's university-industry mix would strengthen ties between St. Louis' business and education leaders. SLU's expansion was part of local leaders' strategy to boost research-based industrial production in metropolitan St. Louis (Chapter Five).[171] The Teamsters also negotiated with the LCRA to purchase nine acres for its $20,000,000 Council Plaza housing project.[172] According to Harold J. Gibbons (president of the

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[170]"Mill Creek Will Yield Large Tax Income for City," *St. Louis Argus*, May 23, 1958. In 1950, St. Louis City population hit its all-time high of 856,796. Between 1950 and 1960, the city lost 12.5% of its population and dropped to 750,026. Between 1960 and 1970, the city lost 17% and fell to 622,236, and between 1970 and 1980 the city lost 27.2% and fell to close to its 1890 population count of 453, 084. In the 1960s, St. Louis City lost the most population of any major city in the United States.

[171]A religious group that advocated for the strict separation of church and state brought a lawsuit against SLU's bid for MCV land because, in their view, it violated the separation of church and state (SLU is Catholic). See *Don't Knock the Door off the Hinges!: Mill Creek Valley, St. Louis University, and $6,000,000 Tax Dollars*, by the St. Louis Chapter of Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State (Tucker Files, Series 2, Box 17, Folder: Mill Creek Valley Project).

[172]The project planned a convalescent hospital, a commercial center, union offices, medical center for the St. Louis Labor Health Institute, and a two-acre park. Harold J. Gibbons was president of the Teamsters Joint Council 13 and among the most influential labor leaders in St. Louis during the 1950s. *Newsrelease: Teamsters Union Public Relations*, September 29, 1964 (Tucker Files, Series 3, Box 18, Folder: St. Louis Redevelopment Corporations, MCV Project, 4-1-63).

Teamsters Joint Council 13), Council Plaza served Teamsters leaders' goal to secure economic and social rights for St. Louisans beyond the workplace.[173] The close involvement of SLU and Teamster leaders in MCV reflects how city officials intended their restructuring program to mutually reinforce tradition blue-collar employment (industry) and burgeoning white-collar employment (services and education) in the urban core. Significantly, union and university involvement in MCV also suggests how Mayor Tucker intended his liberal economic agenda to include class-consensus building programs in the postwar city.

Federal urban renewal legislation granted the LCRA the public powers and federal funding necessary to procure private property in MCV through negotiated settlement or condemnation. According to LCRA records, the Authority often, but not always, negotiated settlement without dispute. In any event, MCV property owners like Paul F. Bruns and Jacob Wittels had little choice but to sell or relinquish their land since the Authority could acquire it by eminent domain.[174] After purchasing the MCV property, the LCRA oversaw the razing of MCV's 2194 residential buildings and 286 non-residential structures. In the 1960s, bulldozers carried out wholesale demolition and left

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[173]On their broad agenda, see Bussel, "'A Trade Union Oriented War on the Slums.'"

[174]"Two Landlords Got $300,000 for Property in Mill Creek," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, January 30, 1966. Some disputes arose between business owners and the LCRA over the amount of compensation offered for their properties or treatment they received. See, for example, Letter to Charles Farris from S. R. Redmond, July 30, 1956, and Letter to H.B. Baldwin, Natkin and Company, from Charles Farris, December 9, 1955 (Tucker Files, Series 1, Box 13, Folder: Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority, 8/1952-3/1955); Letter to R. C. Robinson, Regional Director, Federal Urban Renewal Administration, from Charles Farris, June 18, 1959 (Collection of the Freedom of Residence, Greater St. Louis Committee, Addenda (hereafter cited as the Freedom of Residence Collection), Drawer 5, Folder 396; WHMC); Letter to Raymond R. Tucker from E.L. DeWinter, Jr., vice president of Suburban Tire Co, April 20, 1962 (Tucker Files, Series 3, Box 18, Folder: Mill Creek Valley, St. Louis Redevelopment Corporation, May 1961-April 1963); Letter to Robert C. Robinson, Regional Director, Urban Renewal Administration, from James Drought, Deputy Director, St. Louis LCRA, May 12, 1960 (Freedom of Residence Collection, Drawer 5, Folder 396).

in its wake a 454-acre expanse of barren land.[175] Those who lost in the ostensibly win-win scenario of MCV redevelopment would be the Mill Creek residents.

Despite Mayor Tucker's assurances, the 772 families and 610 individuals displaced from MCV received inadequate or no relocation assistance. Tucker would defend the LCRA against criticism from African Americans in the 1960s by arguing that most residents left Mill Creek before the LCRA could assist them.[176] These residents moved to new public housing projects and old private-sector housing in North St. Louis, chronically underserved and underinvested.[177] MCV clearance also weakened a base of black entrepreneurialism and institutional life in St. Louis City.[178] St. Louis City Directories show that over one-half of the business and non-business enterprises in MCV disappeared from the city by the mid-1960s: 446 closed, 195 relocated within the central corridor or North St. Louis, twenty-one remained at their MCV address or moved to another MCV address, and nine moved to St. Louis County.[179] Urban renewal clearance

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[175]Those facilities deemed suited to meet the structural and aesthetic requirements of MCV's guidelines for construction were allowed to remain in MCV. "Farrell, Nance, Voted to Give Mill Creek Job to Zeckendorf," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* (League of Women Voters Records, Box 103, Folder 1302).

[176]In fact, a 1964 congressional report criticized St. Louis City officials' inadequate assistance. See Cummings, "Rent Strike," 129-135; Letter to Raymond Tucker from Charles Farris, September 8, 1954, (Tucker Files, Series 1, Box 13 Folder: LCRA, 8/52-3/55); *Relocation Plan for the Mill Creek Valley Project*, by the LCRA and Housing and Land Clearance Committee, St. Louis Board of Alderman (Freedom of Residence Collection, Drawer 6, Folder 539).

[177]Most displaced residents did not move into public housing, however, because they either did not get help in identifying their options or because they did not want to live in "almost a ghetto within a ghetto," according to one St. Louis housing official. See Ramin Bavar, *Laclede Town: An Analysis of Design and Government Policies in a Government-Sponsored Project* (Master's Thesis, Washington University, 1994), 63-64. See also *Technical Report on the History of Renewal for St. Louis, Missouri*, by the St. Louis Development Program Staff for the St. Louis CPC (MHS Library). On earlier black residential movement, see *Trend of Negro Areas in St. Louis* (1947), by the Urban League of St. Louis (Urban League of St. Louis Collection, Box 1, Folder 5; WHMC).

[178]See also William L. Clay, *Anatomy of an Economic Murder: A Statistical Review of the Negro in the St. Louis Employment Field* (St. Louis: Private Publication, 1963) (MHS Library).

[179]Based on city directory research, businesses operations and services in MCV in 1952 can be grouped into two categories: small business listed along with residential addresses, and business establishments listed

projects like MCV consequently helped to solidify the metropolitan pattern of segregation in cities like St. Louis, as historian Kenneth Fox has argued.[180]

"A Wise Move": Local Businessmen and Mill Creek Valley

In order to recruit local businesses to Mill Creek Valley, the LCRA sent out detailed advertising pamphlets to St. Louis business groups and firms in the 1950s and 1960s. MCV's extensive publicity, however, had already raised strong interest among industrialists.[181] In 1960 the SLRC's Clarence Turley announced that he had received more applications for MCV land tracts from St. Louis firms than Mill Creek could accommodate.[182] St. Louis' leading businessmen and elected officials viewed MCV, and the inner-city restructuring strategy which it referenced, as "a new era. . . .dawning upon St. Louis." [183]

The voices of some St. Louis City businessmen suggest why many local firms viewed MCV as an attractive investment location.[184] For example, L.J. Vogler (district manager of Chase, Brass, and Copper Co.) asked Charles Farris in 1954 about relocating

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independently. Using city directories, I compared MCV in 1952 with MCV in 1965, 1970, and 1973 to determine who stayed and who left. For those that left, I traced them in the 1965 and 1970 St. Louis City and St. Louis County directories to see if they disappeared from the listing or relocated to another address after leaving MCV (the various retail branches in MCV in 1952, like liquor and drugs, kept branches elsewhere in the city but its unclear if this was a relocated MCV branch). Twenty-six firms moved to the West End, thirty-two moved downtown, thirty-seven relocated just west and north of MCV, seventy-five moved further north in St. Louis City, and twenty-five to the south central and south side area.

[180]Kenneth Fox, *Metropolitan America: Urban Life and Urban Policy in the United States, 1940-1980* (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1986).

[181]The LCRA also advertised MCV nationally. See, for example, the twenty-page supplement to the *New York Times* sponsored by a variety of St. Louis businesses, "Metropolitan St. Louis: Gateway to the West, *New York Times*, September 13, 1964, Section 12.

[182]"Many Firms Seek Sites in Mill Creek," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, April 4, 1960.

[183] "First Commercial Structures Rise in Mill Creek Valley After Years of Careful Study," September 4, 1962, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch;* Cummings, "Rent Strike,"127.

[184]I have not seen business records that reflect how individual firms went through the process of deciding to invest in MCV.

his firm to MCV. Volger instructed Farris that his relocation site must offer advertising value; at least 150,000 square feet for future expansion and parking; access to public transportation; adequately-shaped land parcels; no-fill ground; proximity to working- and middle-class neighborhoods for "satisfactory office and warehouse personnel"; convenient transportation access; railroad siding; and stabilizing property values.[185] And Philip R. Hoffman (president of Hoffman-Marquard Machinery Co.) said that he made "a wise move" by choosing to expand operations in MCV rather than at a competing site in St. Louis County. Hoffman said that MCV's inner-city location provided good municipal services, transportation accessibility, and advantages for employees and out-of-town customers (nearby cultural attractions and business and personal services). [186] Hoffman's views reflect those of many manufacturers surveyed in a 1970 study of downtown St. Louis firms.[187] Similar economic surveys suggest that a notable percentage of St. Louis City businessmen shared Hoffman's preference. For example, a study of eighty-five inner-city industrial firms that relocated their operations in 1968 found that fifty-five stayed in St. Louis City due to its labor pool, central location, proximity to customers, and low cost of space.[188] A 1965 survey found that seven out of ten St. Louis City

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[185]Letter to the LCRA from L.J. Vogler, district manager of Chase, Brass, and Copper Co, August 27, 1954 (Tucker Files, Series 1, Box 13, Folder: LCRA, from 8 August 1952 to March 1955).

[186]Robert E Hannon, "Mill Creek and Kosciusko: Commercial-Industrial Parks in the Heart of the City are Attractive and Highly Successful," *St. Louis Commerce (*November 1967): 14-15.

[187]Ibid; James W. Bodenstein, *Manufacturing in a Central Business District: St. Louis, Missouri* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1970) (MHS Library).

[188]Twenty-seven firms went to St. Louis County. Around half said they relocated due to old facilities and need for space. Other reasons cited include: poor neighborhood environment, operations consolidated with another plant, and inadequate supply of materials. See *Economic Development Program: St. Louis, Volume 1: The Economic Development of a St. Louis Poverty Area*, by Management and Economic Research, Inc., July 1968, for the Economic Development Administration, United States Dept. of Commerce (MHS Library)

businesses (out of 161 respondents) wanted to expand in the urban core.[189] And A. Bergram, executive director of the SLRC, asserted that the high number of wholesaling and warehousing businesses interested in MCV confirmed the inner city's comparative advantage within metropolitan St. Louis for local and regional distributive firms.[190] Scholars such as Thomas Sugrue, Barry Bluestone, and Bennett Harrison emphasized the rapid flight of industrial firms out of inner cities after WWII. The case of MCV shows, however, that in the 1950s and 1960s many small and medium-sized firms from diverse industrial sectors actively sought to remain in their urban cores.[191]

The SLRC records document firms' bidding on MCV land, although most do not explain why the firms decided upon MCV. They do shed light, however, on the types of operations that MCV attracted (see appendix). United Parcel Service, for example, wanted to build a one and one-half acre, one-story warehouse. Liquid Carbonic, a division of General Motors, hoped to purchase a few acres for two one-story buildings and loading space. Eagle Stamp Company wanted to build new general office buildings in MCV, while the Bissell Auto and Body Company applied to construct a new shop and office buildings. Modern Engineering Company bid for four and one-half acres for a new office building and warehouse, a parking area, and truck dock loading facilities. And the Fischman Redevelopment Corp. saw MCV as a prime site for a new office building for

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[189]32% had a preference for suburban areas, see Gladstone and Associates, *Technical Report on Industrial Development*, 70-75.
[190]"Many Firms Seek Sites in Mill Creek," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, April 4, 1960.
[191]Bluestone and Harrison, *Deindustrialization of America*; Sugrue, *Origins of the Urban Crisis*.

automated business equipment sales and services.[192] The LCRA records suggest that most bids were accepted in a relatively smooth negotiating process as the SLCR and LCRA evaluated whether or not the firm's proposal fit within MCV's *Redevelopment Plan.*[193] Upon approval, some firms purchased as little as one-half acre, while Lindberg Automotive purchased twenty acres for a new dealership. The average, however, fell between two and five acres, as city planners had anticipated. Charles Farris declared MCV officially complete in 1973. Redevelopment, to the frustration of Farris and Tucker, had been delayed by about four years due largely to disagreements within the SLRC and the LCRA over the phases of development.[194] Between 1967 and 1972,

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[192]Contracts and documents in this and other folders in the St. Louis Land Clearance Division files of the Tucker Files show approval of these requests. See, for example, Tucker Files, Series 3, Box 15, Folder: Land Clearance and Housing Authorities, March 1965; Tucker Files, Series 3, Box 18, Folder: St. Louis Redevelopment Corporation, Mill Creek Project, April 1, 1963; Tucker Files, Series 3, Box 15, Folder: Land Clearance and Housing Authorities, March 1, 1964.

[193]These folders contain letters, news releases, and reports regarding the proposed bid and the acceptance of tracts in MCV: Tucker Files, Series 3, Box 18, Folder: St. Louis Redevelopment Corporation, Mill Creek Project, April 1, 1963; Tucker Files, Series 3, Box 15, Folder: Land Clearance and Housing Authorities, March 1, 1964. A full record of who applied and the outcome of their bids does not appear to be documented.

[194]For example, see "The Gateway Arch and Mill Creek," by Edmund N. Bacon, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, January 27, 1963; "Mill Creek Valley Losing That Bombed Out Look," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, November 26, 1965. Various letters and documents in the Tucker Files also discuss criticisms of MCV due to delays. See, for example, Letter to the *New York Times* editor, from Charles Farris, July 27, 1964, which discusses Ada Louise Huxtable's critical appraisal of Mill Creek Valley. Huxtable's commentary appeared in the *New York Times* on June 28, 1964 (Tucker Files, Series 3, Box 18, Folder: St. Louis Redevelopment Corporation, Mill Creek Project, April 1, 1963-(n.d.).

Members of the LCRA and the SLRC blamed one another for not doing a better public relations job regarding criticisms over the delays, while Mayor Tucker and his successor, A. J. Cervantes, came to MCV's public defense. For example, see Letter to Charles Farris from Clarence M. Turley, Realtor, December 14, 1962 (Tucker Files, Series 3, Box 18, Folder: Mill Creek Valley, St. Louis Redevelopment Corporation, May 1961-April 1963); Letter from Robert C. Saunders of the St. Louis Redevelopment Corp. to Charles Farris, February 12, 1965 (Tucker Files, Series 3, Box 18, Folder: St. Louis Redevelopment Corporation, Mill Creek Project, April 1, 1963-(n.d.).

essentially the additional years MCV required, St. Louis City lost 250 firms to the suburbs and the Sunbelt (while St. Louis County gained 420 firms).[195]

Mill Creek Valley Composition in 1973

In 1973, the 147 firms listed in the MCV renewal zone represented many of St. Louis City's primary industrial sectors.[196] Based on St. Louis City Directories research, the appendix lists the number of establishments by sectoral composition and the in-migration patterns of businesses and other institutions into MCV. Based on that data, this section considers how MCV influenced and also reflected the dynamics of industrial and commercial transformations in inner-city St. Louis in the 1960s and early 1970s. The following commercial and industrial classifications and non-economic institutions were represented in MCV in 1973:

> *manufacturing*: printing plants; *manufacturing*: paints, chemicals, and soap; *manufacturing*: electrical equipment and appliances; *manufacturing*: meat processing, dairy, flour; *manufacturing*: misc: handbags and zippers; railway facilities; warehouses; wholesalers: sporting goods, electrical supplies, appliance parts, jewelry; medical and pharmaceutical supplies and distributing; printing and photography; publishing and packaging; paper and office supply stores; automated office equipment; machinery and equipment supply stores and offices; electrical appliance parts, repair, and related services; chemical and cleaning supply stores and services; mechanical services and auto parts stores and distributors; apparel: retail; auto leasing and auto dealers; financial and professional services; union offices; hotels restaurants; schools and community centers; religious and social services or institutions.

The composition of firms in MCV reflects that the inner city provided an attractive site to the city's diverse industrial sectors, not to just one or two sectors, as city

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[195]But more and more industries were going to the southern states where labor is considered more stable and less demanding, according to Harry Wilensky. The reasons firms said they were leaving the city included lack of space, old buildings, "the urge to get away from crime, from blacks, from spreading slums," and desire to locate near better schools, according to Wilensky in "Area Economy's Split Personality," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, December 4, 1972.

[196]In 1973, the St. Louis City Directory listed around 156 non-residential addresses located within the MCV urban renewal site. Of these addresses, 147 were occupied and nine listed vacancies.

officials had diagnosed. MCV attracted a mix of small manufacturers, wholesalers, warehouses, retail stores, service and sales offices, and financial and professional services. Most of the land absorbed in MCV was accounted for by non-manufacturing industries. Yet MCV did attract fifteen small manufacturing plants and one large manufacturing plant, which in 1973 employed around 900 people. Notable concentrations in MCV were distributors; printing and photography services, retail, and suppliers; automated business office equipment sales and offices; chemical and cleaning supply stores and services; automobile dealers and services; and financial services.[197]

The firms moving into MCV represent staple industries of St. Louis City. To be sure, these economic sectors weakened dramatically between 1950 and 1980. But the majority of business classifications represented in MCV in the early 1970s continues to be represented today in the city's economic structure. Most MCV firms, then, did not represent at-risk industries that used MCV to take their last breath; even if an individual firm moved out of MCV, in most cases, the particular sector it represented has not disappeared from the urban economy.[198] In this light, St. Louis City officials' renewal project did not reflect a futile attempt to bolster industries that were inevitably disappearing from the urban core (although some did, particularly apparel and shoe manufacturing and meatpacking). By opening up MCV to the wide diversity of St. Louis City industries, MCV created an opportunity to reinforce those industrial components

[197]Based on city directory research. See appendix.

[198]The exception to this was the meat packing and processing firm located in MCV. The meatpacking, apparel, and shoe industries were the highest risk industries in St. Louis City. By 1973, few were left in St. Louis City. Local business and political leaders argued that these labor- and land-intensive industries sought cheaper land, modern facilities, and lower wages in the Sunbelt.

best suited to operate in the city. The business composition of MCV suggests, then, that this urban renewal project played an important, if very limited, role in trapping investment in the inner city and from those sectors with the greatest potential to stabilize local economic activity.

St. Louis leaders in the 1950s and 1960s thus reasonably interpreted the potential of MCV, within the framework of metropolitan development, to encourage inner-city investment. As MCV's initial popularity suggests, they correctly identified the locational and space needs of inner-city businesses and those kinds of firms (primarily non-Fordist) most likely to remain in the urban core if these conditions were met. St. Louis city officials realistically assessed the ability, from their vantage point in the 1950s, of the inner city thus stabilizing its position as a metropolitan industrial-commercial hub even as many plants, warehouses, and offices continued to move to the suburbs. [199] The inner-city could, in their view, boost its comparative advantage within the metropolitan area for small- and mid-sized firms. Building upon these advantages through projects like MCV, city officials intended to compete effectively with the suburbs for these particular kinds of firms. They could thereby create a distinct industrial role for the urban core within the metropolitan economy and mutually reinforce St. Louis' regional and national position.

Dynamics and In-Migration Patterns in Mill Creek Valley

The in-migration pattern of establishments in MCV in 1973 breaks down into four categories: relocations, expansions, repurchases in MCV, and firms with no prior St. Louis address. Of the 147 establishments located in MCV in 1973, forty-six represented

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[199] "Many Firms Seek Sites in Mill Creek," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, April 4, 1960.

relocations from other St. Louis City locations to MCV. Of these relocations into MCV, twenty-five moved from downtown St. Louis locations, fifteen from midtown locations, five from south-central and South St. Louis, and one from North St. Louis. Of the establishments in MCV in 1973, twelve represented St. Louis City firms expanding their operations by buying or leasing space in MCV. Thirty-four firms in MCV in 1973 represent establishments that were in MCV prior to redevelopment and either retained their facilities or repurchased sites in MCV. Fifty-five firms listed in MCV in 1973 had no prior address in St. Louis City or in St. Louis County.

MCV development reinforced the traditional industrial composition of the central industrial corridor. The relocations suggest that these particular inner-city firms planned to leave their original facilities since they were willing to invest in relocation costs. Thus, they may well have left the city if MCV did not offer them locational advantages and space for modern facilities. In this way, MCV intervened in the decentralizing trend of St. Louis' firms away from the city to the suburbs or to the Sunbelt. Yet, relocations did not necessarily generate significant new investment in the local economy (depending upon investment in upgrading). Nevertheless, MCV retained these firms in the central corridor and thus provided some stabilization for this East-West axis. The industrial and commercial firms that expanded their operations in MCV were also city-based firms. Therefore their new warehouses, plants, and offices in MCV represented an expansion of investment in the local economy while also helping to anchor this section of midtown St. Louis. Similarly, the redevelopment of MCV helped to convince around thirty-four establishments to remain within the Mill Creek area.

Yet the composition of firms that moved into MCV without a prior city address reflect the economic transitions underway in industrial-belt cities like St. Louis City after WWII: the service sector accounting for an increasing economic share and manufacturing proportionately smaller share. The composition of MCV firms just establishing in the city was weighed more heavily in the service sector than in the industrial sector. This arrangement evidenced that St. Louis City officials might retain some existing manufacturing firms but would have an extremely difficult time competing with suburban and Sunbelt locations in attracting new industrial firms to the urban core. Indeed, the in-migration trends in MCV during the 1960s and early 1970s reflect the metropolitan industrial transformations underway in central cities like St. Louis. The MCV investment composition shows that the urban core was increasingly viewed by metropolitan area businessmen as a site for commercial and service-sector activity and increasingly less for manufacturing activities. Their views and investment practices fostered and reflected metropolitan economic dynamics underway. The urban core, in their estimation, should stabilize its existing manufacturing sector. But they believed that in the long run, local officials could best promote urban core economic growth and contribute to metropolitan development overall by relying upon expansion in the commercial and service sectors. The suburbs, in turn, would become Greater St. Louis' main engine of industrial expansion (Chapters Four and Five).

St. Louis City leaders agreed that expanding the service sector would be a boon for the urban core. Given the advantages that the inner city offered to financial institutions, business administrative offices, professional services, and cultural

institutions, and given the increasingly rapid share of these components in the national economy, St. Louis leaders felt confident that these activities would fuel the inner-city economy. Given their close proximity to the CBD and the historic riverfront, MCV commercial and service firms would become part of this expanding radius of downtown economic activity. In this way, MCV would advance local leaders' efforts to transform the urban core into St. Louis' metropolitan service and cultural center. As we have seen, developing the city for both services and industry were complementary and in fact necessary to boost inner-city industrial investment incentives, in their view. And given the limited potential of inner-city industrial expansion, they needed to tap these alternative sectors in order to bolster overall investment and job growth. From the perspective of local leaders, the industrial-service sector balance in 1973 in MCV validated that they had planned appropriately for long-term growth and had wisely assessed metropolitan, regional, and national economic transformations.

Mill Creek Valley's Record of Success in 1974

Industrial renewal policies appeared to exert a tangible, positive influence on the city's overall welfare in the 1960s and early 1970s in the view of local business and political leaders. A number of industrial studies credited Mill Creek Valley and another industrial-commercial redevelopment project, the 220-acre Kosciusko project located just south of downtown (the city's two main industrial-commercial urban renewal zones), with "contribut[ing] significantly to the maintenance and preservation of the city's

industrial base." An industrial analysis report by R. Gladstone and Association of Washington, D.C., stated that

> Land made available for plant expansion and relocations has likely prevented appreciable economic losses to the community. It is clear that out-migration of city industries would have been accelerated at considerably higher rates without the opportunities for industries to locate within St. Louis on sites which have been provided. . . within the Mill Creek Valley and Kosciousko renewal areas.[200]

Combined, MCV and Kosciusko accommodated firms representing virtually every manufacturing sector in St. Louis.[201] James D. Idol (director of Industrial Development-Transportation, St. Louis Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce) praised Mill Creek and Kosciousko as "excellent examples of how rundown residential-commercial areas producing relatively little tax revenue can be upgraded through conversion into modern commercial-industrial districts."[202] And *St. Louis Commerce*, St. Louis' premier business journal, praised MCV and Kosciousko for providing firms with an opportunity to remain in the urban core rather than relocate to the suburbs.[203] Inspired by MCV's performance, Tucker's predecessor, A. J. Cervantes (1965-1973), stated that "we want every last available acre of industrial ground in St. Louis covered with plants that mean jobs for our people and revenue for our city."[204]

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[200]Gladstone and Associates, *Technical Report on Industrial Development Potentials Within St. Louis*; "St. Louis Needs 355 Acres of Industrial Space," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, February 25, 1969.
[201]Gladstone and Associates, *Technical Report on Industrial Development Potentials Within St. Louis.*
[202]James D. Idol, "Suggests Re-Zoning Rundown Areas for Industrial Use," *St. Louis Commerce* (November 1967), 21. Idol served as the Director of Industrial Development-Transportation Dept. of the St. Louis Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce.
[203]Robert E Hannon, "Mill Creek and Kosciusko: Commercial-Industrial Parks in the Heart of the City are Attractive and Highly Successful," *St. Louis Commerce (*November 1967): 14-15; Bodenstein, *Manufacturing in a Central Business District.*
[204]*Newsrelease: A. J. Cervantes*, July 28, 1965 (City of St. Louis, Office of the Mayor, Files of Alfonso J. Cervantes (hereafter cited as the Cervantes Files), Series 1, Box 34, Folder: MCV, SLRC; University Archives Collections, Washington University).

Concurrently, MCV's housing developments filled up quickly. In fact, Laclede Town earned national praise in the early 1970s as the most successful middle-income, racially integrated housing project in an American inner city.[205] MCV planners and developers were correct that an untapped market existed in 1960s St. Louis for integrated living (albeit primarily among young professionals, artists, and university faculty and students). MCV offered extremely limited housing opportunities in light of the thousands of residents leaving the city each year. Yet Tucker, Farris, and their allies interpreted MCV's initial success as evidence that proper planning and development could rebuild middle-class population in the urban core. Moreover, they viewed Laclede Town as evidence that their effort to make some room for civil rights concerns within their economic agenda could mitigate the racial tensions that exploded in cities like Detroit and Watts in the late 1960s. The absence of race riots in St. Louis suggested to many white Democratic officials that they were finding some balance between the civil rights demands and the economic needs of urban residents—although activists like Ivory Perry and Percy Green vociferously critiqued City Hall's record on civil rights.[206]

According to the LCRA's tally in 1974, the balance sheet for the MCV project looked promising. Renewing MCV produced 132 acres of new industrial sites, twenty-six

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[205]See, for example, "Mill Creek Valley: Slum to Showcase," by Robert Adams, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, December 22, 1968; "Mill Creek Integration Acclaimed," by William K. Wyant, Jr., *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, July 31, 1968. See also Ramin Bavar, *Laclede Town,* 81-82. Prominent magazines like *Architectural Forum*, *Fortune*, and *Business Week* praised Laclede Town and pointed to MCV as evidence of what local-federal partnership can accomplish. Roger Montgomery, an architecture professor at Washington University, asserted that Laclede Town "proves too that even in a stodgy old Midwestern town, where everyone thought segregated, class-conscious suburbs, and ghettos took over inexorably, a huge untapped market exits for living in an urban human stew," in Bavar, "Laclede Town," 81-82.
[206]George Lipsitz, *A Life In the Struggle: Ivory Perry and the Culture of Opposition* (first ed.; Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988).

acres of new commercial sites, and eighty-three acres of new residential construction, and 215.5 acres for schools, parks, churches, the expressway, and other public and semi-public uses. The total city, federal, and private investment by 1974 amounted to $150,936,232.[207] The LCRA estimated that property tax yield from MCV to the city after the abatement period would be almost four times the amount this area contributed in 1957.[208]

Mill Creek Valley and the Postwar Inner City: Limited Successes and Downward Trends

Mill Creek Valley, in the LCRA's calculations, portended the potential of St. Louis City leaders to realize the urban core renaissance that they had imagined. Yet MCV was a promising oasis in the midst of an increasingly troubled city. Within a year of MCV's completion, a Rand Report asserted that St. Louis City "had stepped into an open grave and probably could not get out" and St. Louis' Pruitt-Igoe housing project, once touted as a national model of public housing, met an explosive demise as the Department of Housing and Urban Development dynamited the deteriorating complex (1972).[209] The expansive optimism that St. Louis City political and business leaders exhibited for MCV, against this backdrop, seemed like an antidote to the devastating trends afflicting industrial-belt cities like St. Louis: persistent industrial disinvestment, residential abandonment, rising crime and poverty rates, and insipid racial segregation.

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[207]Total investment: City ($7,037, 058), federal government ($21,111, 174), private (new construction) ($96,000, 000), private (rehab) $1, 788,000, and Breakthrough construction and land investment by 1974 ($25,000,000). See the LCRA publication, *Highlights on Urban Renewal* (St. Louis, 1974) (MHS Library).
[208]This would be supplemented, they asserted, by increased revenues from other tax sources like merchants and manufacturers, personal property, and corporate earnings taxes as MCV economic activity bolstered the city's fiscal base. See the LCRA publication, *Mill Creek Fact Sheet* (1962) (Tucker Files, Series 3, Box 18, Folder: MCV, St. Louis Redevelopment Corporation, May 1961-April 1963).
[209]"Dire Prognosis Spurs St. Louis," by Roy Reed, *The New York Times,* December 21, 1973.

Yet their optimism in MCV was not entirely misguided, even though it belied their underlying anxieties and seems naive in hindsight. Inner-city redevelopment on the MCV model could not have reversed St. Louis' industrial losses. But without MCV and the city's other industrial renewal sites, St. Louis City would have suffered even greater losses than it did. The drastic business and residential losses that central cities like St. Louis experienced after WWII tends to hide the significant efforts that local leaders mounted—and the outcomes that they yielded—in the face of the formidable challenges of suburbanization and Sunbelt competition.

Mill Creek Valley's trajectory between 1974 and 1990 actually confirms the importance of their project as a tangible investment anchor in the central corridor. In 1990, Mill Creek Valley remained home to numerous industrial and commercial firms and a vibrant St. Louis University. Out of the approximate 147 establishments located in MCV in 1973, around forty-two of these same firms were still in MCV in 1990. In 1990, there were around 129 business establishments and institutions with addresses in MCV, and the area retained the general sectoral composition that it had in 1973. Many of the firms located in MCV in 1973 stayed until 1980 or 1985 (MCV lost the most firms during the late 1980s).

Yet the out-migration patterns of firms located in MCV in 1973 reflect a much more pessimistic story of economic transition in postwar St. Louis (see appendix for retention rates and out-migration trends). The percentage of firms that closed or left the St. Louis area, or, relocated to St. Louis County suggests the general trends in St. Louis in the 1970s. In total, fifty-two closed or left St. Louis City (this includes a few branches

that closed; in some cases the firm had branches elsewhere in the city), eleven relocated to another St. Louis City address, and twenty-one relocated to St. Louis County. On the one hand, MCV has functioned as a "revolving door" for investment in this particular part of the city. On the other hand, MCV has been a last stop, maybe the city's last best hope, for many individual firms before they left the urban core. Mill Creek housing, similarly, reflected broader demographic trends in metropolitan St. Louis: by 1980, Laclede Town had fallen to disrepair, abandonment, and crime, and St. Louis City had lost 27.2% of its population since 1970.[210]

Possibilities and Limitations of Postwar Urban Liberalism

The record of Mill Creek Valley places northern urban liberals in a somewhat different light than much of the scholarly literature on postwar urban liberalism and on urban renewal. Some scholars such as James Q. Wilson and Theodore Lowi have faulted northern urban liberals for failing to address the social and economic concerns of urban residents. But the story of Mill Creek Valley shows that local leaders, in one city, placed job creation programs at the top of their agenda and thus tried to meet one of the most fundamental needs of urban residents.[211] Some critics of urban renewal, like historian Sam Warner, Jr., have argued that municipal officials mounted renewal programs for narrow commercial and downtown interests rather than for the well-being of the city and

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[210]By the late 1960s, the MCV housing units recorded a strong occupancy as reflected in the St. Louis City Directories. MCV included the original 2,022 family units and an additional 454 residential units constructed under Operation Breakthrough, a federal demonstration program.

[211]James Q. Wilson, ed., *Urban Renewal: The Record and the Controversy* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966).

in the interest of more balanced metropolitan growth.[212] Political scientist John Mollenkopf has focused on how national- and local-level Democratic leaders used federal urban policies to build political networks.[213] The case of MCV demonstrates, however, that many St. Louis City leaders had a more comprehensive, a more pragmatic, and a more equitable vision of inner-city renewal: they intended to shape the dynamics of metropolitan development and secure job- and tax-producing enterprises in the city. And while St. Louis certainly suffered from the deep, grassroots racism that Thomas Sugrue places behind liberalism's demise, northern urban liberalism, from the perspective of local leadership, looks slightly more hopeful than his account.[214] But certainly economic redevelopment, not civil rights, topped the postwar agenda of St. Louis City Hall, and local programs failed to meet the specific needs of inner-city African Americans.

In the end, St. Louis' postwar liberal agenda met critical shortcomings. Inner-city redevelopment proved fundamentally inadequate in the face of regional and national economic and demographic transitions and it heightened racial tensions by burdening, rather than benefiting, African Americans.[215] And from the perspective of preservationists, the demolition of Victorian homes and row houses in MCV was a

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[212]Sam Bass Warner, *Urban Wilderness: A History of the American City* (Harper and Rowe, 1972), 244.
[213]Mollenkopf, *Contested City*.
[214]Sugrue, *Origins of the Urban Crises*.
[215]As Thomas decisively shows in *Redevelopment and Race*. Cummings asserts that Tucker lost to Cervantes in 1965 because of a black and a white backlash against his large-scale urban renewal projects (as blacks lost homes and "invaded" white city neighborhoods). Cervantes campaigned against wholesale demolition on this scale. See also Alfonso J. Cervantes, *Mr. Mayor* (Los Angeles: Nash Publishing, 1974).

detrimental miscalculation as neighborhood rehabilitation since the 1980s has helped to revive inner-city neighborhoods.[216]

Yet evaluating the record of local urban leaders against the unpredictable outcome of their efforts obscures an important story of activism and suggests that they could have foreseen economic and demographic transformations and foretold the race riots of the 1960s. In order to more fully understand the motivation, the goals, and the performance of northern urban leaders, we must assess their record in the context of the policy tools, the intellectual worldview, and the political possibilities available to them at the time. The development of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial further illuminates how St. Louis leaders interpreted the challenges that they faced and how they worked within the political context of their time to create what they understood as an effective strategy to revive the urban core.

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[216]Many scholars who study the process of so-called gentrification demonstrate that as property values and rents increase, lower-income residents are forced out of these neighborhoods. See Madeline Cirillo Archer, "Where We Stand: Preservation Issues in the 1990s *Public Historian* 1991 13(4): 25-40; David Ley, *The New Middle Class and the Remaking of the Central City* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Kathryn P. Nelson, *Gentrification and Distressed Cities: An Assessment of Trends in Intrametropolitan Migration* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988); J. John Palen and Bruce London, eds., *Gentrification, Displacement, and Neighborhood Revitalization* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984).

Chapter Three
The Gateway Arch: Downtown Cultural Boosterism for Metropolitan Development

The "Metropolitanization" of the Inner City: The Role of the Downtown Cultural-Service Sector in Postwar Metropolitan Planning and Development

In 1965, engineers completed the construction of Eero Saarinen's 630-foot Gateway Arch while St. Louis political, business, and civic leaders proclaimed the "rebirth" of St. Louis City. The Arch stands as the centerpiece of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial (JNEM), a 90.66 acre national park located at the site of Old St. Louis on the Mississippi riverfront. St. Louis political and business leaders in the 1930s began the JNEM as New Deal public works program intended to revitalize the riverfront commercial district. St. Louis City officials after WWII, however, placed the JNEM at the center of their postwar urban revitalization strategies. The New Deal project thus became enveloped within St. Louis leaders' liberal economic solutions to the challenges posed by metropolitanization and by regional industrial decline. After WWII, St. Louis' Democratic mayoral administrations worked closely with St. Louis business and civic leaders to foster a local-metropolitan-state-federal coalition for the JNEM. Their tenacious bi-partisan alliance kept the JNEM project on track through numerous financial and political roadblocks and six presidential administrations.[217]

The construction of the Gateway Arch reflected the transformation of a 1930s public works project into local leaders' most ambitious effort to anchor inner-city

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[217]Suggesting that postwar urban coalitions were more integrated across municipal and political lines than historians such as Jon Teaford have argued. See Jon C. Teaford, *City and Suburb: The Political Fragmentation of Metropolitan America, 1850-1970* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979).

revitalization to St. Louis' evolving tourism and service sectors. By strategically linking the Gateway Arch to upgraded office, entertainment, financial, retail, and residential districts, St. Louis city officials, businessmen, and planners intended to counteract the relocation of the city's firms and residents to the suburbs. The story of the Arch is significant because it uncovers how St. Louis leaders in the 1950s and 1960s responded to the challenges posed by metropolitanization and how they conceptualized the role of the urban core in the postwar metropolitan economy. The history of the Gateway Arch, viewed in conjunction with Mill Creek Valley (Chapter Two), reflects their ideal vision of the postwar inner city. They intended the urban core to become the locust of the region's tourism and service sectors (complemented by non-Fordist industries) and thus function as the economic-cultural focal point of metropolitan St. Louis. As we will see, they viewed this transformation as the "metropolitanization" of the inner city. Local business and political leaders interpreted Saarinen's Arch as an incalculably pragmatic response to rapid metropolitan expansion: the Gateway Arch would at once revive the inner city and unify the region through a symbolic civic landscape. The Gateway Arch became, in form and function, St. Louisans' most optimistic answer to inner-city economic decline.

The Gateway Arch represents not merely local leaders' vision of downtown revitalization. The evolution of the JNEM, I contend, critically shaped how city and suburban planners, businessmen, and political leaders imagined and planned postwar regional development. JNEM advocates argued that riverfront redevelopment would strengthen investment incentives in the metropolitan area and viewed the JNEM as a

critical component of their efforts to promote high-tech, R&D, and conventional industrial production in the suburbs (Chapters Four and Five). Yet as we have seen, metropolitanization created contradictions for inner-city redevelopment: local leaders wanted the urban core to become the metropolitan cultural-commercial center, on the one hand, and the center of a robust metropolitan economy, on the other hand. Yet St. Louis leaders in the 1950s and 1960s agreed that a reconstructed urban core could thrive in tandem with regional expansion because the inner city would provide specialized and nucleated cultural-commercial functions demanded by metropolitan industries, institutions, and residents. In this way, the Arch was critical to city and suburban leaders forging what I call a "metropolitan compromise" on inner-city cultural development in the 1960s—as they fought a "cold war" over metropolitan industrial development (Chapter Four).[218]

Yet the Arch did not become the silver bullet of revitalization that St. Louis leaders at mid-century had imagined. I argue that the Arch was a great success in its ability to serve as the keystone of urban renewal and metropolitan development efforts in St. Louis. Moreover, Saarinen's Arch received the uncontested support of local and national architectural, legislative, and funding committees at mid-century because his design resonated with leaders' aspirations for postwar urban America. The Arch would become the nation's most dramatic symbol of postwar urban renewal philosophy that pinned inner-city revitalization to the physical redevelopment of the urban core. Yet it took almost twenty year before engineers transformed Saarinen's vision into a concrete-

[218]"No Metropolitan Cold War," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, October 11, 1967.

and-steel reality. During that time, the political-economic and intellectual context had changed dramatically from that in which the Arch was conceived and chosen. By the late 1960s, industrial and population losses severely weakened St. Louis City, and Detroit and Watts exploded in racial violence. The Arch stood for a set of ideals and assumptions about postwar urban America that were fundamentally challenged by deeply-rooted economic transformations and racial struggles locally and nationally. The inability of the Arch to resurrect inner-city St. Louis does not amount to a failure of Saarinen's monument. Rather, it reflects the fundamental limitations of postwar urban renewal philosophies and praxis that treated the physical symptoms of capital flight and population decline, a prescription that could not cure the structural ailments and racial tensions that ripped at the heart of the nation's cities.[219]

Origins of Riverfront Redevelopment: From Progressive Era Impulse to New Deal Public Works Project

By 1870, St. Louis had grown dramatically to over 300,000 residents, but the steamboat and river commerce that underpinned the city's growth declined with the advent of rail transport following the Civil War. St. Louis soon became the nation's second largest rail terminal, yet with this transformation in transportation came a corresponding deterioration of the city's waterfront area. The decline of the "open air factory" of riverfront commerce caused great alarm for early twentieth-century politicians like Mayor Rolla Wells, civic and business leaders like John Gundlach, and city planners

[219]Mel Scott's *American City Planning Since 1890* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969) provides an early standard text of urban planning history. More recently, scholars like Peter Hall have published more analytical histories such as *Cities of Tomorrow: An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1996).

and engineers like W. W. Harmon and George Kessler as they witnessed St. Louis' oldest commercial district fall into disrepair (Chapter One). Concurrently, the World Exposition of 1904 had encouraged city leaders like Wells to upgrade the declining waterfront and sparked interest in civic improvements. Subsequently, civic activists like Mayo Fesler, secretary of the St. Louis Civic League, linked riverfront renewal with economic improvement for the urban core (as in the 1907 *City Plan for St. Louis*), an equation that has characterized riverfront redevelopment efforts to the present day.[220]

During the next twenty years, city planners and engineers like Harland Bartholomew suggested numerous riverfront redevelopment plans in order to meet local leaders' economic and civic goals.[221] The St. Louis City Plan Commission's (CPC) early proposals depended upon rail and barge commerce to rekindle the waterfront's economic life. But in the 1930s, local leaders would emphasize the site's historic significance and instead bank on its history, through tourism, to rejuvenate the Mississippi waterfront.[222]

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[220]On the park's legislative and construction history, see Sharon Brown, *Administrative History: Jefferson National Expansion Memorial* (St. Louis: Missouri Historical Society, 1984); Regina M. Bellavia and Gregg Bleam, *Cultural Landscape Report: Jefferson National Expansion Memorial, St. Louis, Memorial* (Omaha: National Park Service, 1996); W. Arthur Mehrhoff, "The Image of the City: The Jefferson National Expansion Memorial as Monument to Progress," *Urban Affairs Quarterly* v24 #1 (September 1988): 46-68; and Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association (hereafter cited as the JNEMA), *Jefferson National Expansion Memorial General Background and Status*, 1957 (National Park Service: Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Archives, United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission Records, 1933-1973 (hereafter cited as the USTEMCR), Series 2, Box 4, Folder 34; St. Louis City Old Courthouse, Library and Archives).

[221]The St. Louis City Plan Commission (hereafter cited as the St. Louis CPC), *Plan for the Central Riverfront* (1928), for example, sought to balance beauty with utility in Progressive Era style. See Eric Sandweiss, *St. Louis: The Evolution of an American Urban Landscape* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001): 214-16.

[222]The civic reforms of the early twentieth century were a "search for order," according to Robert Wiebe, by the emerging urban professional classes. And as Eric Sandweiss and Sam Bass Warner, Jr., have shown, urban elites in the early twentieth century began to view downtown as the center of an increasingly fragmented metropolitan area. See Sandweiss, *Evolution*, Sam Bass Warner, Jr., *The Urban Wilderness: The History of the American City* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), and Robert H. Wiebe, *The Search for Order: 1877-1920* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967).

St. Louis political and civic leaders wanted a riverfront design that would restore economic vitality to the waterfront but also create a unifying function for the riverfront. City planners like Bartholomew and Harmon and political leaders like Mayor Barney Dickmann (1933-1941) envisioned the riverfront as the "climax" to the unified landscape of the "fully planned city."[223] This vision would take on increasing significance in the context of post-WWII urban renewal as St. Louis leaders sought to make downtown the civic-cultural center of the expanding metropolis.

Plans to build a national memorial on the waterfront coalesced in the early 1930s under the energetic drive of Luther Ely Smith, a prominent attorney and civic booster. Smith suggested constructing a memorial to the Lewis and Clark Expedition and the Louisiana Purchase at the site of Old St. Louis.[224] In so doing, Smith believed, St. Louisans could commemorate American achievements—and American optimism desperately needed during the Depression—and also spark riverfront redevelopment, provide jobs, and create a symbol for the city that would restore the waterfront "to its rightful place in the civic scheme," as a *St. Louis Globe-Democratic* editor remarked in 1937.[225]

In the mid-1930s, St. Louis political and business leaders brought institutional life to Smith's vision. Smith, an independent Republican, understood that his campaign for the memorial must remain bi-partisan as he needed to ally a Democratic City Hall with a predominantly Republican business community. Smith introduced his idea to Mayor

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[223]Sandweiss, *Evolution*, 221.
[224]Smith had recently participated in the construction of a memorial to George Rogers Clark in Vincennes, Indiana, which inspired his recommendation for St. Louis.
[225]Mehroff, "Image of the City," 60.

Barney Dickmann in the hopes of building broad support among city officials and other local leaders. Dickmann immediately embraced the proposal and in December of 1933 presented the idea to a group of St. Louis community and business leaders. Inspired by Smith, a number of them founded the non-profit Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association (JNEMA).[226] The JNEMA intended to build on the riverfront a "suitable and permanent public memorial to the men who made possible the western territorial expansion of the United States, particularly President Jefferson."[227] The JNEM would comprise about forty city blocks between the Eads Bridge and Popular Street and bound by the Leonor K. Sullivan Blvd. on the East and Memorial Drive and Highway 70 on the West. Prominent civic leaders like Smith and Morton May (department-store magnate) and eventually five St. Louis mayors would comprise the JNEMA board over the next four decades. The Association would retain its initial bi-partisan composition and integrate both suburban- and city-based St. Louisans into its alliance.

In the 1930s, Democratic and Republican JNEM Association members spearheaded the metropolitan-state-federal alliance behind the riverfront project. JNEMA members quickly allied with Missouri U.S. congressmen in order to request federal support for the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial (JNEM). The JNEM supporters would convince House and Senate members to write a joint resolution (authorized by President Roosevelt in 1934) to create the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission (USTEMC), a fifteen-member commission charged with overseeing the

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[226]JNEMA founders included Morton May (department-store magnate), Charles Nagel (former Secretary of Commerce and Labor), and Sidney Maestre (Mercantile Trust executive).

[227]*Decree of Incorporation of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association*, June 11, 1934 (USTEMCR, Series 5: JNEMA Reports, 1947-1967).

construction of a permanent memorial to Thomas Jefferson "at or near the site of Old St. Louis."[228] The USTEMC structure would foster intergovernmental cooperation and bi-partisan support for the memorial, as the nation's chief executive, the president of the Senate, speaker of the House, and the JNEMA each appointed a specified number of committee members. The efforts of the JNEMA reflected the bi-partisan and intergovernmental alliances that would prove critical to keeping the project alive through political and financial congressional roadblocks over the next four decades. The USTEMC would provide the legal and institutional support for Washington, D.C.'s, participation in the riverfront redevelopment. Nevertheless, between 1934 and 1980, JNEMA supporters would have to return to Washington, D.C., repeatedly to procure federal funds for their project.

Beneath the mantle of historic commemoration, the JNEM actually began as a New Deal pump-priming measure. Although congress had created the USTEMC, JNEM advocates now had to secure federal monies to support the project. Dickmann, Smith, and their allies sought federal funding through the Public Works Administration (PWA), headed by Harold Ickes, and the Works Progress Administration (WPA), chaired by Harold Hopkins. Arguing that the riverfront had become one of the nation's largest "Hoovervilles," they convinced Hopkins and Ickes that the project met eligibility

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[228] *Senate Joint Resolution 93* (USTEMCR, Series 4, Box 6, Folder 13) and JNEMA, *Thomas Jefferson and the Pioneers* (1935). A copy of *Thomas Jefferson and the Pioneers* is held at the University of Virginia Alderman Library, Special Collections, Folio F474, S2, J4. An overview of the JNEM history during the 1930s also appears in Letter to U. S. Representative Ken Regan, Chairman of the Library Subcommittee, Committee on House Administration, from Luther E. Smith, March 6, 1950 (USTEMCR, Series 2, Box 2, Folder 9). See also JNEMA, *History of Authorization and Funding, 1934-1966* (Downtown, St. Louis, Inc., Papers, Box 2, Folder 4; Western Historical Manuscripts Collection, the University of Missouri in St. Louis (hereafter referred to as the WHMC).

guidelines for New Deal work relief funds. Meanwhile, the National Park Service (NPS) promised to assume responsibility for the maintenance of the memorial. After political pressure from Dickmann, Smith, and around twenty other St. Louis civic leaders who traveled to the capital in 1935, President Roosevelt authorized the release of the work relief funds with the requirement that they match the funds three to one with local funding.[229] Dickmann's brassy commitment to local growth needs reflected the political persistence St. Louis leaders would exhibit in redeveloping the riverfront in the subsequent decades. FDR's executive order provided the Secretary of the Interior with broad powers to carry out the project through the NPS and included almost seven million dollars in combined WPA and PWA funds for site acquisition, clearance, and grading. NPS Superintendent of the Memorial John Nagle would supervise these initiatives between 1937 and 1942.[230] The federal government would have an overwhelming influence on the JNEM development due to the NPS superintendent and the millions of dollars in federal monies. But the fortitude of the local-federal partnership was due to efforts from the ground up, as St. Louis leaders fought to keep Washington, D.C., involved in the project.

Meanwhile, Smith, Dickmann, May, and other Association members built local support for the riverfront project by arguing that the ambitious enterprise would promote the public good. The JNEM project reflected the vision of an elite, white business and

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[229]In an unusual move, President Roosevelt authorized these funds through the new Historic Sites Act, making the JNEM site the country's first national historical site designated under the law. Mayor Dickmann argued that his threat to campaign against Roosevelt if the president failed to release the funds drove Roosevelt to change his initial rejection of the authorization request (reportedly due to budgetary concerns) and save face by releasing it under the new Historic Sites Act. See "When Barney Dickmann Went to Washington," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, June 8-9, 1968.

[230]Julian Spotts would replace Nagle in 1942.

civic group whose downtown-centered constituency would benefit most directly from the enormously expensive reclamation of waterfront space. Nevertheless, the JNEM encountered only limited local opposition in the 1930s even though working-class St. Louisans often rejected early twentieth-century reform proposals out of concern that downtown leaders were serving their own interest at the expense of the working class (Chapter One).[231] JNEM supporters built broad support for their vision by emphasizing that the memorial project would generate critically needed jobs during the Depression, boost revenue for public services, and improve the national image of St. Louis. In 1935, St. Louis voters passed a special bond that authorized seven and one-half million dollars in city funds for riverfront renewal, which local officials intended to meet the three-to-one matching funds required by the federal government.[232] Analyzing the self-conscious role urban leaders played in early twentieth-century city building, historian Zane Miller captured the essence of St. Louisans' justification of their programs. Miller said that these leaders were "addicted to the formula of boosterism and reform" and "felt they labored patriotically for the welfare of the whole city."[233] Local leaders after WWII would elaborate this argument to include the whole of the St. Louis region. By the early 1940s, then, city leaders had procured the local funds and the federal dollars necessary to begin

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[231]Some business owners brought legal challenges against the condemnation of their properties but were defeated by the legal provisions of the Historic Sites Act. Other residents bemoaned the loss of St. Louis' oldest commercial district. On opposition to civic reforms, see Chapter One of this dissertation and Chapter Ten in James Neil Primm's *The Lion of the Valley: St. Louis, Missouri, 1764-1980* (3rd ed.; St. Louis: Missouri Historical Society, 1998).

[232]In a city once noted for its low-debt, low-spend political culture this achievement reflected the success of the JNEM booster campaign.

[233]Zane Miller, *Boss Cox's Cincinnati: Urban Politics in the Progressive Era* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1968), 128.

redevelopment. But WWII stalled their efforts to transform the old commercial-manufacturing district into a cultural site commemorating the "gateway" to the West.

The nation's transition to wartime status in the early 1940s significantly changed the terms on which local and national leaders would conceptualize and execute the JNEM project. Specifically, WWII altered the financial and cultural context in which St. Louis leaders conceived of and pursued riverfront renewal. The event that shaped the trajectory of the JNEM project—its chronology, political alliances, and design—perhaps most dramatically after the war occurred in 1941, when the WPA ceased to operate federally-sponsored programs. Subsequently, work relief funds were no longer an option for public projects and federal funds for the JNEM would depend upon congress' approval of its appropriation bills, a laborious legislative process during which JNEM lobbyists would hit numerous political and budgetary setbacks. Moreover, the experience of the second global war encouraged local officials to envision a monument far more dramatic in its appeal to American civilization broadly conceived and move beyond the commemorative specificity of the Louisiana Purchase. Stalled by wartime demands of personnel and resources, JNEM supporters could make little progress until the end of WWII. But even after the war, the fate of the JNEM hung in the balance due to federal funding delays. Strategic campaigning and coalition-building efforts by local leaders would be necessary to keep the memorial project on track. St. Louis leaders, however, had recognized an urgent problem that made riverfront redevelopment increasingly critical to the city's stability, thus fueling their efforts: the increasingly rapid decentralization of residents, commerce, and industry during the postwar years.

"An Anchorage for the Riverfront": The Problem of Metropolitanization and Rejuvenating Support for the JNEM, 1945-1949

The end of WWII renewed debate among St. Louis businessmen and politicians over the development of the JNEM site, which had sat dormant for over three years. As a growing number of local businessmen began to reconsider the potential future use of the site, they started to suggest more "economical" uses for the riverfront other than an historic memorial. Some downtown retailers, like Ingram F. Boyer, offered alternative conceptions of this downtown space such as a permanent parking lot, new commercial structures, and other facilities that they believed would initiate more rapid redevelopment and generate higher downtown property values.[234] But in order for the city to receive federal funds for development, the waterfront must house an historic memorial per NPS guidelines. City officials like Mayor Aloys Kaufmann (1943-1949) and members of the JNEMA were unwilling to sacrifice their vision of a civic centerpiece for St. Louis—and large federal subsidies—in exchange for a massive parking lot. The debate emerging among St. Louisans in 1945 over their competing interpretations of riverfront space reflected how JNEM supporters would have to balance local growth interests and national prerogative in the waterfront project. The renewed publicity campaign in 1945 for the JNEM would lead to the international competition in 1947 that brought to the world's attention Eero Saarinan's Arch, a monument that would satisfy immensely both local and

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[234]The riverfront site served as a 4,500 car parking lot until post-WWII redevelopment. On local leaders' debates over the use of the space, see: City of St. Louis, Office of the Mayor, Files of Raymond R. Tucker (hereafter cited as the Tucker Files), Series 4, Box 1, Folder: JNEM File #1; University Archives Collections, Washington University. Federal officials agreed to transfer the land back to St. Louis City if requested. See Letter to the Secretary of the Interior from the National Park Service Director, Newton B. Drury, November 2, 1949 (USTEMCR, Series 2, Box 1, Folder 34). See also Chapter Five in Brown, *Administrative History*.

national interests.[235] The end of WWII, which had created the opportunity for JNEM advocates to place their project back on track, coincided with economic and demographic changes in St. Louis that heightened the stakes in inner-city redevelopment. These coincidental transitions thus heated the debate over riverfront redevelopment. By the mid-1940s, as we have seen, local leaders increasingly called attention to the critical problem with which they must grapple: the acceleration of residential and business decentralization and corresponding disinvestment in the inner city. A grand tourist destination on the riverfront, Smith and his allies argued, would help the city to meet these challenges posed by metropolitanization. A memorial would at once encourage business and consumer investment in the inner city and symbolically unify the metropolitan area through a monumental civic landscape.

Metropolitanization created a greater sense of urgency for riverfront renewal and reframed local debate over the waterfront memorial. Leaders would debate not only the merits of riverfront development in stabilizing the central business district but would broaden their discussion to consider how the riverfront project, in tandem with other inner-city redevelopment strategies, could keep St. Louis City the economic and civic focal point of the metropolitan area. As the Mill Creek Chapter showed, local leaders envisioned the urban core as the center for non-Fordist industrial production and distribution in the metropolitan area. They also intended the urban core to become the cultural-civic center of the metropolis with the JNEM as its centerpiece. Postwar planning would reflect the ideas of urban land-use experts like Homar Hoyt who

[235]As discussed in documents in USTEMCR, Series 1: Correspondence of Luther Ely Smith, 1937-1949.

promoted the "nucleation of different uses" as the most efficient strategy to revive the inner city (Chapter Two).[236] Combined, cultural revitalization and industrial-commercial projects would counter the trend of population and business decentralization and enable the inner city to become a vibrant metropolitan center, local leaders believed. Most business and political leaders not already in support of the JNEM came to agree with civic leader Chapin S. Newhard's assertion in 1944 that the JNEM would help to "reverse the city's westward population trend by an anchorage at the riverfront" and that its designers must devise "a scheme which would check the westward migration of residential and commercial facilities."[237] Local leaders' conception of the role of the memorial in reviving the inner-city—and the relationship between inner-city renewal and metropolitan development broadly conceived—would evolve over the next three decades as population and business relocation continued to fuel the postwar suburban boom. The JNEM project would take on growing significance as the "silver bullet" that city leaders hoped would revive inner-city St. Louis.[238]

The metropolitan-based membership of the JNEMA would enable proponents to give life to their vision of tourism-based riverfront renewal. Their political and financial

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[236]Homar Hoyt's publications include *Dynamic Factors in Land Values* (1960), *The Urban Real Estate Cycle-Performance and Prospects* (1960), and *The Changing Principles of Land Economics* (1968).

[237]Chapin S. Newhard was a Municipal Airport Commission member. See *St. Louis Commerce*, v14 #2 (January 3, 1940), 6, and (January 10, 1940), 6. St. Louis Chamber of Commerce members declared that the out-migration of businesses demanded a "new kind of development" that went beyond the parochial construction of parking lots and commercial and residential facilities. Similarly, Mayor Darst argued that the JNEM would "recapture the riverfront site" as an "engine for economic growth" for the city. See "Here is the Up-to-Date Version, the Newest Proposal for Use of the Riverfront Memorial Area," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, May 21, 1944, and *Mayor's Address to Mortgage Bankers Association of St. Louis*, October 27, 1949 (USTEMCR, Series 2, Box 1, Folder 34).

[238]Local urban leaders believed that cultural development would drive inner-city rejuvenation. See, for example, Jon C. Teaford, *The Rough Road to Renaissance: Urban Revitalization in America, 1940-1985* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990).

clout would enable them to keep local fire under the project while sustaining strong alliances among congressional members and presidential administration officials in the following years. Significantly, JNEMA membership reflected the fact that St. Louisans with both city- and suburban-based interests, like aircraft engineer William A. McDonnell and Monsanto executive Charles E. Caspari, Jr., conceptualized inner-city renewal as key to structuring metropolitan development. This showed how St. Louis leaders in the early 1950s began to equate downtown tourist-service sector development with regional growth overall.[239] As political scientist Lana Stein observed, political, civic, and business leaders at mid-century were predominantly St. Louis born and bred (white) men who traversed public and private positions in their alternate roles as business leaders and civic stalwarts.[240] They historically supported downtown civic improvements in an effort to meld their public and private interests (Chapter One). Mid-century leaders' support for riverfront development also reflected their desire to improve the image and the investment climate of the St. Louis area as a whole. These JNEM advocates would argue that boosting downtown tourism and commerce through riverfront renewal would sharpen St. Louis' competitive edge in attracting new investment to the regional economy. Yet they would not view their position as contradictory, rather, as mutually reinforcing inner-city and metropolitan growth.

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[239]In the JNEM Association, the St. Louis mayor holds an honorary chair while the executive board and committee included prominent individuals like William W. Crowdus (attorney), Bernard F. Dickmann, Aloys P. Kaufmann, James M. Douglas (attorney and former Chief Justice of the Missouri Supreme Court), and Carl F. G. Meyer, III (president of Meyer Bros. Drug Co.) The Board of Trustees included leading industrial, financial, civic, commercial, and political leaders like August A. Busch, Missouri Senator Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., and William A. McDonnell (industrialist and Washington University chancellor).
[240]On JNEMA members, see *JNEMA Annual Meeting Report* from June 28, 1954 (USTEMCR, Series 2, Box 4, Folder 30).

In 1947, then, in the context of still-tentative public support for an historic tourist-site and increasingly rapid metropolitanization, the JNEMA held a nationally-publicized design competition. The Association hoped that the competition would regenerate local and national support for their memorial plans. Smith asked Philadelphian George Howe, a prominent fellow of the American Institute of Architects (AIA), to serve as competition advisor for the JNEM Jury of the Award (the committee was comprised of architectural experts from around the country) and thereby lend his national stature to the event.[241] In order to carry out the competition, however, JNEMA members had to meld local and national interests: they must frame the competition criteria and goals in a manner that would attract local financial support for the competition and satisfy NPS guidelines for the memorial. Reminding them of the financial interests they have at stake in riverfront development, Smith emphasized to business and civic leaders that the memorial would be "of great importance in stabilizing land values."[242] After a year-long effort, JNEMA arguments for the memorial convinced local businessmen to contribute the necessary $225,000 to hold the competition.

George Howe's modern architectural philosophy and international purview shaped competition guidelines. Howe, like Smith, believed that the area should be dedicated to "inspirational, educational, and recreational" facilities. Specifically, the JNEMA guidelines required that entrants design a landscaped park that would preserve the site of Old St. Louis, provide a memorial to Thomas Jefferson's "vision of greater

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[241]The JNEMA selected seven prominent architects and planners to serve as jury members, among them Fiske Kimball (Director of the Philadelphia Museum of Art) and Roland Wank (Consulting Chief Architect for the Tennessee Valley Authority).
[242]Bellavia and Bleam, *Cultural Report*, 25.

opportunities for men of all races and creeds," provide for recreational facilities and parking, relocate the railroad tracks, and include the placement of an interstate highway.[243] The JNEM Association, however, intended the memorial to have international cultural and political significance. The memorial should not only symbolize the triumph of American democratic values in WWII but also, as Smith stated, the design must be "transcending in spiritual and aesthetic values" and attract international visitors.[244] As Dr. Charles E. Merriam (USTEMC vice chairman) asserted, "it was always our hope and dream that from the winning design would come the finest product of American genius, of such intrinsic and challenging merit that travelers from other lands would come to America just to see the Memorial in St. Louis."[245] And as the Jury of the Award members agreed, their "aim in originating and carrying through the competition was to secure a design of such epic proportions and significance as to achieve world acclaim for American genius in the field of monumental memorials."[246]

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[243]*Architectural Records* v103 (April 1948): 92-103. See also Bellavia and Bleam, *Cultural Report*, 26-28. Similarly, a letter to the St. Louis City Board of Aldermen supported the call by the JNEMA for zoned commercial and highway development around the Arch because this "border is inappropriate for manufacturing use." See Letter to Alfred I. Harris, Chair of the Zoning Committee, Board of Alderman of St. Louis, February 23, 1950 (author unknown) (USTEMCR, Series 2, Box 2, Folder 9).

[244]Bellavia and Bleam, *Cultural Report*, 25. On JNEMA discussion of the competition, see the files in USTEMCR, Series 1: Correspondence of Luther Ely Smith, 1937-1949.

[245]*Memorandum*, by the JNEMA (n.d.) (National Park Service: Jefferson National Expansion Memorial: JNEMA Records, JEFF-9017, Record Unit 104 (hereafter cited as the JNEMA Records), Box 30, Folder 61; St. Louis City Old Courthouse, Library and Archives). Among those individuals who comprised the USTEMC in the early 1950s were J. Lionberger Davis (St. Louis), Col. James Thomson (Gaylord, Virginia), U.S. Sen. Clinton S. Anderson (New Mexico), and U.S. Rep. Frank M. Karsten (St. Louis). As noted in Letter to Eero Saarinen from William Crowdus, March 11, 1953 (JNEMA Records, Box 30, Folder 8).

[246]Form letter sent to contributors to the JNEMA competition fund, from the JNEM Association, May 28, 1948 (JNEMA Records, Box 30, Folder 2). See also *Statement by the Jury of Award on the Winning Designs in the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Competition,* 1947 (JNEMA Records, Box 29, Folder 16).

In 1948, the JNEMA competition jury received 172 entries and unanimously chose the design submitted by Finnish-American architect Eero Saarinen.[247] According to the final competition report of the Jury,

> The entire concept. . . .is a work of genius, and the memorial structure is of that high order which will rank it among the nation's greatest monuments. . . .We are still breathless at the vision you have opened up for us by your marvelously fine design.[248]

Moreover, Smith informed Saarinen, "it was your design, your marvelous conception, your brilliant forecast into the future that has made the realization of the dream possible.... far beyond the remotest possibility that we had dared visualize in the beginning."[249] According to the Jury, the Arch design was an outstanding choice because "it repeats none of the types of existing memorials either in this country or abroad, such as the Washington Monument, the Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials" and proved "so suitable in its symbolism as a Gateway to the West."[250] Reflecting on his design, Saarinen explained that he wanted his monument to have "lasting significance" and to become a landmark of our time.[251] He recognized that "an absolutely simple shape—such as the Egyptian pyramids or obelisks—seemed to be the basis of the great memorials that have

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[247]Eero was the son of the distinguished Finnish architect Eliel Saarinen, who also submitted a design.
[248]*Final Report of the Jury of Award to the Professional Adviser on the First and Second Stages of the JNEM Competition,* quoted in Bellavia and Bleam *Cultural Report*, 37-38.
[249]ibid.
[250]Jury criticisms of Saarinen's design related mainly to landscaping details. See the *Statement by the Jury of Award on the Winning Designs* (JNEMA Records, Box 29, Folder 16); *Notes on the Five Premiated Designs*, by the JNEM Jury, September 26, 1947 (JNEMA Records, Box 29, Folder 17); *Comments of S. Herbert Hare on Designs Selected by the Jury for the JNEMA Competition* (1947), (JNEMA Records, Box 29, Folder 17); *Comments on Individual Projects*, by the JNEM Jury (1947) (JNEMA Records, Box 29, Folder 17); *Comments on Second Stage design Winners*, by the JNEM Jury, c. September 26, 1947 (JNEMA Records, Box 29, Folder 17). *Final Report of the Jury of Award to the Professional Adviser on the First and Second Stages of the JNEM Competition* (September 1947) (JNEMA Records, Box 29, Folder 16).
[251]William Graebner, "Gateway to Empire: An Interpretation of Eero Saarinen's 1948 Design for the St. Louis Arch," *Prospects* v 18 (1993): 370.

kept their significance and dignity across time."[252] Such a monument, Saarinen asserted, "could be a triumphal arch for our age as the triumphal arches of classical antiquity were for theirs."[253] The design that won these accolades was an arch that reflected "the purest expression of the forces within it." Saarinen's design was a mathematically precise catenary curve in which the thrust of forces are kept within the center of the arch legs. The architect intended the arch to be built of stainless steel with a concrete core and have an upward-thrusting form (with a visitor viewing room at the top). His design kept the monument on axis with the Old Courthouse, located across the street, and drew the Mississippi River into the total composition as required by the basic concept of the competition. The components of Saarinen's model—an arch, tree-lined mall, grand staircase, and underground history museum—would remain the core of the JNEM complex. The Jury's winning design required UTEMSC approval, which would then recommend the design to the NPS for its endorsement. In 1948, both the UTEMSC and the NPS gave its uncontested approval to Saarinen's design.[254]

The Significance of Saarinen's Design in Postwar America

Saarinen's Arch did not simply satisfy the stated goals of the JNEM competition and the interests of civic and business leaders for waterfront revitalization. The Arch design reverberated strongly with local and national leaders in the context of postwar intellectual and cultural trends. For this reason, Saarinen's Arch gained the unfettered

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[252]Bellavia and Bleam, *Cultural Report*, 28-33.
[253]Graebner, "Gateway to Empire," 370.
[254]Letter to the Chairman of the USTEMC, A. W. Barkley, from William E. Warne, Acting Secretary of the Interior, June 4, 1948 (JNEMA Records, Box 29, Folder 21); Form letter sent to contributors to the JNEMA, May 28, 1948.

support of three bureaucratic committees (the Jury, the USTEMC, and the NPS) and held the imagination of St. Louisans and congressional supporters long after its construction twenty years later.

The Arch, its design, form, materials, and the overall aestheticism of the monument, evoked both transformations underway in postwar urban America and the sense of stability urban leaders and other Americans searched for during the early postwar years. The design had to survive the scrutiny of three bureaucratic bodies before St. Louis leaders received approval by the federal government to erect the monument. I argue that the symbolic power of Saarinen's design to counter the fears and express the aspirations of civic, political, and business leaders on the local and national levels accounted for the unanimous approval and outstanding praise that the Jury of the Award, the NPS officials, and the USTEMC members gave to the Arch. In these agencies, the architects on the JNEM Jury, the political and civic leaders comprising the USTEMC, and the state officials in the Department of the Interior approved Saarinen's Arch without demanding alterations to its proposed design, form, and building materials.[255] In this instance, the architect did not face conflict between his artistic intent for the public monument and the objectives of the institutions upon which the creation of the monument depended. Artists like Saarinen who relied upon bureaucratic institutions to fund their public art projects frequently face demands from these bodies to alter their original design as bureaucrats seek to gain approval of vested and often conflicting institutional

[255]The JNEMA and USTEMC records in St. Louis reflect little debate over the Arch design itself and focus instead on the unanimously positive Jury critiques of the Arch. These archives record the JNEMA Jury informing the NPS of their decision but provide no further evidence of debates among USTEMC and NPS committee members over their decision to accept the Jury recommendations for Saarinen's design.

interests.[256] Saarinen's Arch earned the political support necessary to survive this approval process intact because the monument evoked for mid-century leaders their aspirations for postwar America: stability amidst social and economic transformations, national economic progress, consensus over conflict, and American dominance internationally.

The massive form of the Arch and the very concept behind the memorial evoked stability in the midst of rapid changes in the nation's urban centers and following the domestic upheaval of WWII. Most mid-century architects worked from the assumption that a central function of architecture and design was to bring order to "a chaotic social universe" and to regain the "lost control of the shaping of [man's] physical environment." Former Bauhaus architect Walter Gropius, architectural critic Lewis Mumford, and city planner Harland Bartholomew, among others, asserted that cities had an "indiscriminate jumbling" of downtown functions and needed a "complete overhaul" through the demolition and the reconstruction of blighted areas.[257] The enormity of the Arch, its sheltering and cathedral-like parabolic curve, the invulnerability of its stainless steel to rust, and its carefully planned 90-acre parkscape appeared to bring order and stability to St. Louis' inner core. Paradoxically, the memorial encouraged transitions underway in postwar St. Louis (as the city demolished forty blocks of warehousing facilities for the JNEM), but the Arch also created a symbolic bridge to the past by bringing a time-

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[256]As an example of this potential conflict: the outcry by religious and social conservatives over art performances and installations supported by the National Endowment for the Humanities reflects the fact that in democratic societies, artists need strong political support in order maintain their original creative intent in public display of their work.

[257]Graebner, "Gateway to Empire," 373.

honored architectural form to the riverfront. Moreover, it harkened back to the nation's nineteenth-century Westward expansion—economic expansion that local and national leaders hoped the postwar American economy would replicate. Reflecting on his monumental work, Saarinen asserted that the purpose of architecture was "almost like a religious one....The permanence and beauty and meaningfulness of his surroundings give [observers] confidence and a sense of continuity" with accomplishments of the past.[258] In this way, the Arch as cultural icon suggested to bureaucratic committee members that the transitions shaping America locally (residential and industrial decentralization in metropolitan areas) and nationally (wartime mobilization and postwar demobilization) could be managed successfully by mid-century American leaders.

In postwar urban centers, city leaders like those in St. Louis wanted harbingers of a promising future, not symbols of their industrial past. The JNEM reflected an enduring effort by St. Louis leaders to restructure the urban form of the heterogeneous riverfront into an orderly image consistent with their vision of progress and growth. Saarinen went beyond the imagination of 1920s planners in "transform[ing] what remained of the complex, differentiated landscape of the nineteenth-century city into the image of a unified, modern urban landscape."[259] St. Louisans thus could replace some of the ramshackle remnants of the city's industrial past (even submerging the railroad tracks) with the modernity of the design, the engineering, and the economic function of the Gateway Arch tourist site. The Arch, whose stainless steel skin would remain immune to

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[258]ibid.
[259]Sandweiss, *Evolution*, 225.

rust and decay, provided a most fitting way for local leaders to reclaim their deteriorating waterfront district.[260]

While the Arch thus symbolized a rejection of inner-city deterioration, Saarinen's design simultaneously seemed to legitimate the metropolitanization of people, industry, and commerce. The 630-foot soaring Archway and the spatial composition of the landscape model reflected the postwar architectural and planning trend toward "openness." By choosing the arch design with its commitment to relatively open space, members of the Jury, the NPS, and the USTEMC revealed the value that they placed on open spaces to promote social and economic stability in urban centers.[261] Saarinen's design, then, with its towering archway commencing the whole of the St. Louis region, suggested not only downtown green spaces but also metropolitanization (expansion) as a necessary accompaniment to the population and industrial growth that St. Louis leaders anticipated. The memorial thus provided a perfect symbol for those who argued that the simultaneous promotion of downtown revitalization and metropolitan development would mutually reinforce long-term stability in St. Louis.

The Arch design also resonated with those mid-century American leaders who cultivated the political ideal of a so-called American "consensus." Jury of the Award advisor George Howe argued that an era's best architecture should be able to invoke a feeling of "connectedness" among its observers, particularly through "flowing" open

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[260]Kristin Hammerstrom, "The St. Louis Scene: History, Place, and the St. Louis Arch," *Gateway Heritage* v19 #2 (Fall 1998), 26.

[261]The idea of open public spaces as a "safety valve" to reduce class and racial tensions goes back to the urban planning ideas of Frederick L. Olmstead. A variant of this notion is apparent in the nineteenth-century notion of the open frontier as a safety valve for urban discontent.

form. Howe, like his contemporary designers and architects, believed that architecture should foster the "consensual society" because people were unnecessarily divided from each other and within themselves. Indeed, the experience of WWII and the emerging Cold War would encourage many intellectuals, politicians, and other Americans at mid-century to promote "consensus" on the nation's liberal democratic and capitalist systems; in so doing, they hoped to submerge the very real class, racial, and ideological divisions in the United States. The Arch must have greatly appealed to the committee members, then, because its universal form, "flowing" open space, and absence of surface detail set the Arch outside of any particular artistic tradition or ideological persuasion.[262] Moreover, committee members could read into its simple form and apparently seamless steel construction the cultural metaphor for a supposedly unified American citizenry. And the Arch's enormous scale would diminish all of its observers to equally humble spectators before the monument. For local political and business leaders, the Arch metaphorically united all St. Louisans, although their interpretation masked the gulf between the haves and the have-nots in postwar urban America.

The Jury of Award members viewed Saarinen's model as part of a century-old tradition of American monumental architecture and design. Jury members like Charles Nagel, Jr., compared the JNEM memorial to Washington D.C.'s, 555-foot Washington Monument (1884), the Lincoln Memorial (1922), and the Jefferson Memorial (1943) in terms of its historical, cultural, and political significance.[263] The Arch, like the three

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[262]Bellavia and Bleam, *Cultural Report*, 26-28, and as Graebner discusses in "Gateway to Empire."
[263]The Washington Monument was built on thirty acres near the Potomac River and was dedicated in February 1885. The Washington National Monument Association in January 1848 got approval from

capital memorials, anchors a cardinal point of the comprehensive city plan and creates a ceremonial setting for the urban center.[264] The memorials to these American presidents blend classical architectural forms with a distinctly American set of ideals invoked by the memorials, as did Saarinen's design. Informed by classical motifs, the imposing structure of the presidential memorials with their heroic statuary proportions and marble and granite building materials intended to bestow a sense of timelessness, durability, and inevitability to American traditions. Indeed, these were the very sensibilities that Saarinen hoped to inspire through his Arch. And St. Louis leaders, like their counterparts in Washington, D.C., placed the monument in the city center and thereby symbolically

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Congress to direct and finish this monument to honor the nation's first president, after lack of funds and conflicts over its location delayed the project since its inception in the mid-1830s. The Association wanted a memorial that would blend durability, simplicity, and grandeur. The Association chose architect Robert Mills's marble, obelisk design as the original plan for the monument that would be erected (Mills died in 1955). U.S. Commission for Dedication of the Washington Monument, *The Dedication of the Washington National Monument* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1885) and H. M. Pierce Gallagher, *Robert Mills: Architect of the Washington Monument, 1781-1855* (New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1966).

Two years after Lincoln's assassination, Congress established a commission to erect a monument to his memory but it would be fifty years before the memorial was completed. The memorial was designed by architect Henry Bacon as a Neoclassic American version of a Greek Doric temple with a Roman Style Attic-a Parthenon, but with the main façade and entrance on the side instead of at the end. Daniel Chester French designed the statue. As Christopher Thomas argued, the memorial can be appropriated for many worthy causes provided that they are consistent with "American values" of liberty and equality for all citizens. See U.S. Department of the Interior, *Lincoln Memorial* (Washington D. C.: Government Printing Office; Division of Publications, National Park Service, 1986) and Christopher A. Thomas, *The Lincoln Memorial and American Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).

The Jefferson Memorial was erected at the Tidal Basin in West Potomac Park south of the White House. FDR dedicated the memorial on April 13, 1943, calling it a "shrine to freedom." The Democrats created the memorial after they returned to power in 1933. Serious interest in a memorial to Jefferson arose among Democrats at the turn of the century, as Democrats viewed him as the father of their party. In 1934 Congress, created a twelve-member Thomas Jefferson Memorial Commission, which retained John Russell Pope, the foremost interpreter of American classical architecture. Pope's circular plan for the memorial was based upon the Roman Pantheon, a form dear to Jefferson himself, and the memorial was constructed with granite foundations and marble exterior and the statue in bronze. Like Saarinen, Pope died before he could see his original plan come to fruition. See the U.S. Department of the Interior, *Jefferson Memorial, An Essay by Merrill D. Peterson* (Washington D. C.: Government Printing Office; Division of Publications, National Park Service, 1997).

[264]In the late eighteenth century, Pierre C. L'Enfant laid out the capital city's urban plan with five distinct anchors: the three memorials, the White House, and Capital Hill.

buttressed the political authority of the federal state as the architect of local-national relations.[265]

Saarinen worked within this tradition of American monumental architecture, but his design moved beyond its traditional conventions. Saarinen's soaring design did not reach back to the past to signify America's greatness as much as it did to the vision of a future America whose political values and economic dynamism would triumph internationally. The Arch as Gateway to the West (invoking the nation's imperialist impulse) signified the renewal and the expansion of American cities as the nation's nerve centers and America's traditions of liberal democracy, free enterprise, and cultural innovation that would be exported in the postwar period. "Political authority," as Clifford Geertz asserted, "requires a cultural frame in which to define itself and advance its claims."[266] The Arch, interpreted through Geertz's framework, not only bolstered federal authority and materialized its cultural claim to international prominence. The Arch, more specifically, signaled a new era of federal-local relations. The construction of the Arch, overwhelming in scale, state-of-the-art engineering, and seemingly indestructible materials, represented the power of urban leaders dramatically to reshape city space through federal intervention. Saarinen's design proved to be quite brilliant, in fact, because it coalesced local and national interests in a powerful visual form. The Arch evoked the ideals and the assumptions of mid-century American leaders about their nation and established an economic enterprise that satisfied local revitalization initiatives.

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[265]Scholars like Charles T. Goodsell link cultural symbolism to political authority. See Goodsell, *The Social Meaning of Civic Space: Studying Political Authority Through Architecture* (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1988).

[266]Quoted by Goodsell in *Social Meaning of Civic Space* (first page, no page number).

Saarinen's Arch in Postwar St. Louis

St. Louis business and political leaders interpreted the Arch as an incalculably pragmatic response to metropolitanization. Chamber of Commerce president Aloys Kaufmann exclaimed that "it is my firm belief that development of the JNEM will be of incalculable benefit" to St. Louis by boosting the inner-city even as metropolitan growth proceeded. Concurring with Kaufmann, the St. Louis Real Estate Board predicted that the Arch would

> Rejuvenate the entire downtown district, and most assuredly all property in the downtown metropolitan area. . . .it would encourage the rebuilding of the buildings on Third and Fourth Streets. . .and bring additional revenue to the government in the form of income tax from earnings on these properties that have been lying dormant for years. It unquestionably would attract national attention and bring untold profits to the entire city of St. Louis.[267]

National response to Saarinen's Arch proved to be overwhelmingly positive. Arch enthusiasts cloaked the memorial design with civic and national symbolism beyond the expectations of the JNEMA members. They also anticipated the booster currency the memorial would have for St. Louis in the postwar period. For example, the *New York Times* characterized the Arch as "a modern monument fittingly beautiful and impressive," while an M.I.T. architectural expert asserted that "the Arch will be to St. Louis what the Eiffel Tower is to Paris."[268]

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[267]Letter to the JNEMA from the St. Louis Real Estate Board, March 6, 1950 (USTEMCR, Series 2, Box 2, Folder 9). Similarly, Morton May anticipated that "a developed memorial area on the riverfront would serve as a cultural and recreational center for the entire city" and "as a national shrine." See the Letter to Alfred I. Harris from the JNEM Association, March 1950 (USTEMCR, Series 2, Box 2, Folder 9). See also "$150,000 River Front Gesture Criticized as 'Affront to City,'" *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, February 8, 1956.

[268]Bellavia and Bleam, *Cultural Report*, 36-37. See also Letter from William Wurster, Dean of M.I.T. School of Architecture and Planning, to William Crowdus, November 1, 1949 (USTEMCR, Series 2, Box 1, Folder 34).

The civic and economic significance that the monument held for the public also became apparent from the Arch's detractors. The design generated the hottest controversy on the national stage. Gilmore D. Clarke, chairman of the National Commission on Fine Arts, compared the design to an arch approved by Benito Mussolini for a Fascist exhibit in Rome in 1942. Consequently, Clarke asserted, Saarinen's model proved unfitting for a memorial to Jeffersonian democracy. The Jury's argument that the arch structure harkened back to centuries of design and to modern engineering quickly ended the controversy, however.[269] The Arch captured the imagination of St. Louis residents, and the project, despite its fruition in the city's most prominent circles, did not encounter class- or race-based opposition.[270] The hesitancy of some residents to support the Arch stemmed mainly from their concern that the federal government would not provide the funds necessary for the monument, not from a fundamental rejection of the JNEMA's imagined urban landscape.

Yet the building of the massive Arch was by no means inevitable. During the early and mid-1950s, while JNEM supporters fought a continuing effort to procure federal money for the park, the riverfront space remained subject to ongoing reinterpretation as some local businessmen promoted alternative uses for the site. Even Mayor Darst in 1949 questioned whether or not the NPS would receive federal funds

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[269] *St. Louis Star-Times*, February 26, 1948; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, February 26, 1948; and *New York Herald Tribune*, February 26, 1948 (as noted in Brown, *Administrative History*, 136-39). Some letters to St. Louis editors and officials agreed with Clark. For example, see Letter to J. Darst from E. A. Luchtemeyer, May, 1951 (Tucker Files, Series 4, Box 1, Folder: JNEMA File #3).

[270] St. Louisans' response to the design in 1948 and 1949 show that they recognized their own economic and aesthetic stake in the transformation of their urban landscape. Among the few detractors, some residents called the design a "giant hairpin," a "stainless steel hitching post," and a "white elephant" (according to some businessmen) that would never regenerate downtown. See Brown, *Administrative History*, 136-39.

sufficient to complete the memorial. But the JNEMA and Darst tried to keep these tensions under wrap because their local and national campaign for the Arch depended upon a unified front between the Democratic City Hall and the heavily Republican business community.[271] As long as federal money appeared forthcoming, detractors did not provide a likely alternative to Saarinen's vision.

The 1947 competition guidelines reveal how JNEM advocates began to conceptualize the riverfront as a node within a burgeoning metropolitan area that would anchor downtown St. Louis. While St. Louis leaders since the 1930s viewed the JNEM most immediately as a waterfront revitalization project, after 1950 they increasingly linked the JNEM to their emerging vision of the city's role in the metropolitan economy. For example, Saarinen's *Report on the Redevelopment of Land Surrounding the JNEM Park* called for the development of adjacent apartments and hotels, restaurants, and commercial stores to enhance the downtown district.[272] Linked physically to the expanding highway system, the riverfront tourist-recreational site would become an easily accessible destination for residents in the metropolitan area. The transformation of the old warehousing district into a memorial park would stabilize commercial and

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[271]In his letter to the editor of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, October 24, 1949, Mayor Darst stated his support of the Arch despite rumors otherwise (Tucker Files, Series 4, Box 1, Folder: JNEM Tunnel); *JNEMA Memo*, October 27, 1949 (USTEMCR, Series 2, Box 1, Folder 33); "Riverfront Discord," *St. Louis Globe Democrat*, October 22, 1949. Darst says he emphatically supports the Arch in "Mayor Darst on the Memorial," *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, October 26, 1949. The letter to Charles Nagel, Jr., and William W. Wurster from Mrs. Perry S. Forthmann of the JNEMA, October 27, 1949, shows that tensions between Darst and the JNEMA leaked due to newspaper articles in 1949. The JNEMA and Darst effectively countered these articles (USTEMCR, Series 2, Box 1, Folder 33). Wurster wrote to the JNEMA to support the Arch as necessary for St. Louis's revival, see the Letter to William W. Crowdus from William W. Wurster, November 1, 1949.

[272]*Report on the Redevelopment of Land Surrounding the JNEM Park*, by Eero Saarinen and William W. Wurster (USTEMCR, Series 6, Box 7, Folder 2). Other maps and documents of the riverfront development can be found in USTEMCR, Series 6, Box 7, and also in USTEMCR Series 8: News Clippings, 1947-1969.

industrial property values, encourage investment and job growth, and create a revenue-generating enterprise for the city while providing an "architectural focal point for Greater St. Louis," as JNEM lobbyist and U.S. Senator Stuart Symington (D-MO) explained.[273] Symington's view actually emphasized how metropolitanization created contradictions for inner-city redevelopment as local leaders wanted the urban core to become a metropolitan center for commercial and cultural investment as well as the center of a robust metropolitan economy. Yet city leaders in the late 1940s and the 1950s felt confident that the urban core, through inner-city reconstruction, could thrive as regional growth advanced because it would provide specialized business services and cultural functions demanded by metropolitan residents and businesses.[274]

During the 1950s and 1960s, local leaders' conception of the interrelationship between urban core restructuring and metropolitan development would evolve, and their vision would inform their understanding of the potential of the Arch to rejuvenate the city. The Arch, in turn, would shape strategies for redevelopment as industrial, commercial, and residential losses from the city increased. After the war, the memorial park became the cornerstone of the revitalization agenda of five consecutive urban renewal administrations (Joseph Darst, 1949-1953, Raymond Tucker, 1953-1965, and A. J. Cervantes, 1965-1973.) City Hall officials and their allies in the private sector would launch an integrated series of redevelopment projects (industrial-commercial, residential,

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[273]See JNEM progress reports in *St. Louis City Plan Commission Annual Report* 1958-1959 and 1959-1960 Reports of the St. Louis City Plan Commission (hereafter cited as the St. Louis CPC) can be found in many university libraries and public libraries in St. Louis.

[274]Even though federal officials moved away from regional planning efforts by the early 1940s, local leaders in St. Louis used their local-federal partnership to shape the contours of regional development. Thus federal participation in the inner city significant influenced how St. Louis leaders promoted metropolitan economic development despite the absence of federal regional planning.

and tourism-cultural programs) that relied upon a dynamic local-state-federal partnership. As the Mill Creek Valley project demonstated, local leaders intended their industrial-commercial programs to stem disinvestment and to foster some degree of race and class consensus in the urban core. They intended the Arch, as a beautification project linked to service-sector development, to assist these efforts. Thus the early New Deal initiative would become enveloped within postwar liberal economic solutions to the problems created by metropolitanization and by regional industrial decline.[275]

Yet St. Louisans would have to wait until 1965 to witness the topping off of the Arch. The memorial park with all its constituent parts would not be officially completed until 1980. Congressional appropriations for the project would come in piecemeal fashion and thus only allow for the phased development of the site. Moreover, upon accepting Saarinen's design, the Interior Department declared that work could not begin on the Arch itself until the elevated tracks in front of the proposed memorial were removed, a problem that the railroad officials, the city officials, and the NPS director would not resolve until 1959. But advocates' immediate challenge, in 1949, was to nourish a local-state-federal alliance and to lobby for congressional funding for the JNEM.

Building a Metropolitan-State-Federal Coalition for the JNEM, 1950-1980

In 1950, city officials and JNEMA members identified their key allies in Washington, D.C., and launched their metropolitan-state-national coalition to procure

[275]The JNEM did not become subject to the partisan conflicts that surrounded urban renewal projects like slum clearance and public housing in the 1950s and 1960s. As the site would be developed for public purpose, the problems that charged the issue of federally-subsidized clearance for private development (such as eminent domain and relocation for subsequent) did not arise. Moreover, JNEM advocates maintained a strong bi-partisan coalition to support the project.

federal funding for the JNEM. While the post-1945 coalition included JNEM supporters from the prewar period (like May, Dickman, and Smith), the postwar coalition would include growing numbers of new supporters from St. Louis city and suburbs and from congressional districts outside of the St. Louis area. Given the influential state- and national-level politicians with personal interests in St. Louis, they felt confident that federal officials would grant appropriations for the development of the park. The nation's most influential politicians were well aware of the JNEM: President Harry Truman (former Missouri senator) and Vice President Alben Barcley (D-Kentucky) (first USTEMC chairman). Moreover, Missouri Representative Clarence Cannon served as chairman of the House Appropriations Committee. The national government had already invested $6,500,000 in the project by 1950 for property acquisition and clearance. JNEM supporters believed that this investment would provide sufficient incentive to federal officials to fund the project's completion. With a broad coalition behind them, JNEM supporters would introduce in 1950 the first of several legislative funding bills drafted by Association members, Missouri senators, NPS Director Dury, and Superintendent Spotts (with final approval by the USTEMC and by the Interior Department). They would begin the year with high hopes of success.[276]

Mayor Darst and other memorial supporters enlisted the support of state- and national-level politicians for the 1950 appropriation bill. Missouri representatives and senators would foster strong congressional allies for JNEM legislation for the duration of the riverfront project. As the records of Mayor Darst and the JNEMA reflect, the

[276] *Authorization Bills*, 1951, by the JNEM Association (USTEMCR, Series 2, Box 2, Folder 19); *History of Authorization and Funding, 1934-1966*, by the JNEM Association.

Democratic mayor and his Republican and Democratic allies in the Association rallied Missouri Representatives John Sullivan, Frank Karsten, Leonor Sullivan, Clarence Cannon, and Thomas Curtis and Missouri senator Thomas Hennings behind the 1950 bill.[277] The St. Louis area congressional delegation also included Representatives C.W. "Runt" Bishop and Melvin Price from neighboring Illinois municipalities. Over the course of the 1950s, the delegation would expand to include over fourteen Missouri and Illinois legislators. JNEMA president William Crowdus also appointed a committee comprised of prominent civic and business leaders to assist the passage of the 1950 bill in the U.S. Congress.[278] The St. Louis area delegation reflected the metropolitan-based and bi-partisan local-state-federal alliance that would keep JNEM funding bills on the desks of congressional committees between 1950 and 1980.

Meanwhile, Luther E. Smith, Association members, and city officials contacted congressional members from outside of the St. Louis area to promote inter-state support for their riverfront project. Smith, Darst, and other St. Louisans gained the support of Representative Ken Regan (TX), Representative Mary Norton (NJ), and other members of the House and Senate administration committees by promoting the role of the project as a national monument. They also reminded them of the federal government's

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[277]On lobbying efforts for the 1950 bill, see Tucker Files, Series 4, Box 1, Folder: JNEMA File #2 (a); Letter to William Semsrott from Ronald J. Foulis, January 10, 1951 (USTEMCR, Series 2, Box 3, Folder 2); and also other USTEMC records like Series 5: JNEMA Reports, 1947-1967.

[278]The committee included former Missouri Supreme Court Judge James M. Douglas, Howard I. Young (former chair of the board of the St. Louis Chamber of Commerce), and William H. Semsrott (president of the Associated Retailers of St. Louis). See "Riverfront Project Committee Named," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, March 8, 1950.

commitment in the 1930s to the project.[279] They bombarded congressional committee members with letters, telegrams, and other messages of support for the bill and presented a unified lobbying front in Washington, D.C., through oral and written testimonies.[280] Concurrently, the USTEMC put its full support behind the St. Louis-based lobbying committee as did Interior Department officials. While JNEM congressional supporters watched the 1950 bill progress through a maze of congressional law making, daily papers and paid advertisements in St. Louis publicized the JNEM as a distinctly national project, with local economic dividends, in order to increase support at home and in Washington, D.C., for the memorial.

St. Louis leaders realized that federal appropriations for the JNEM project would come in piecemeal fashion, but they did not anticipate a three-decade lobbying onslaught before they could complete the riverfront memorial. In 1950, the Association's congressional allies like Clinton Anderson (AZ) had recommended that the 1950 bill request an authorization of five million dollars rather than the anticipated fifteen million dollars that the project would cost. Moreover, he recommended that the legislation target the funds to cover specific elements of the memorial park, not the entire project. Thus the funds from the 1950 bill would pay for landscaping and railroad track relocation, among other features, but not the construction of the Arch itself; they would request money for

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[279]Letter to U. S. Representative Ken Regan, Chairman of the Library Subcommittee, Committee on House Administration, from Joseph M. Darst, March 10, 1950 (USTEMCR, Series 2, Box 2, Folder 9). On lobbying efforts also see Tucker Files, Series 4, Box 1, Folder: JNEMA file #2 (a), and Brown's *Administrative History*.

[280]For example, St. Louis city officials presenting oral arguments for the bill in 1950 included the current mayor, former mayors Dickmann and Kaufmann, the city's counselor, and the city comptroller. Testifying also were the presidents of the St. Louis Chamber of Commerce and the Associated Retailers of St. Louis and NPS Director Newton Drury. Railroad officials, St. Louis businessmen, state governors, and George Howe (the competition advisor) contributed written statements. See Brown's *Administrative History*, 154.

the Arch at a later date. Beltway insiders like Anderson anticipated that in a time of growing fiscal conservatism in congress, federal officials would not authorize the full fifteen million dollars at one time.[281] Bolstering his recommendation was the fact that the JNEM park was just one among many parks for which the NPS had to request federal funding. And, critically, congressional committees already indicated that they would not grant appropriations for the construction of the Arch until the railroad relocation issue was resolved. Yet these negotiations had been underway since the early 1940s and a solution still seemed far off.[282] But Anderson concluded that introducing bills to cover these elements of the JNEM in piecemeal fashion would prove to be the most successful strategy to convince congress to appropriate, eventually, funds sufficient to complete the memorial.

Clinton Anderson's formula, however, faltered on international and domestic political pressures. Truman dedicated the riverfront park in 1950, raising the hopes of JNEM supporters. Yet growing fiscal conservatism on Capital Hill combined with the start of the Korean War to induce congressional committees to put the 1950 bill on hold. They would not return to this legislative issue until the end of the Korean War in 1953, although they would pass a 1954 bill for five million dollars for JNEM development.[283] Despite the disheartening three-year delay, the 1950 lobbying effort proved critical to the

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[281]See materials in USTEMCR, Series 4: USTEMC Legislation and Reports, 1948-1973, and USTEMCR Series 5: JNEMA Reports, 1947-1967.

[282]For documentation on the railroad relocation problem, see the Tucker Files, Series 4, Box 1, Folder: Tunnel, and Tucker Files, Series 2, Box 18, Folder: JNEM November 1, 1957 to July 3, 1958. The USTEMCR also documents the railroad issue in many of its series. For example, see Series 4: USTEMC Legislation and Reports, 1948-1973, Series 5: JNEMA Reports, 1947-1967, and Series 6: JNEM Legislation and Construction.

[283]For legislative background pertaining to the years 1950-1955, see the JNEMA report, *JNEM General Background and Status*, and Bellavia and Bleam, *Cultural Landscape Report*, 41-42.

future success of JNEM advocates. The lobbying onslaught helped JNEM supporters to hone the arguments and to build the local-state-national alliance that would enable them to procure a total of around twenty-six million dollars from federal coffers to relocate the railroad tracks, landscape the park, build the Arch, construct the underground Museum of Westward Expansion, and, by 1980, place the finishing touches on the 90.66 acre national park.

Throughout their thirty-year legislative effort, the most stalwart supporters would ensure that the JNEM coalition remained a bi-partisan and metropolitan-based alliance. The coalition's politically and municipally diverse composition reflected a critical campaign strategy adopted by the St. Louis mayors, Association board members, and key congressional supporters like Representative Leonor Sullivan (D-MO). Thus it was not merely the agglomeration of local interests behind the project. While City Hall officials envisioned the Arch as a New Deal-cum-urban renewal project, St. Louis officials after WWII, as the late 1940s and early 1950s campaigns showed, publicized the JNEM as a revitalization strategy that would boost metropolitan growth. Arguing that the Arch would benefit not only downtown but the "greater St. Louis area," Mayor Tucker, Senator Stuart Symington, and other advocates marshaled financially and politically influential St. Louis area residents from both parties behind the project.[284] Sustaining Republican and Democratic representation locally and nationally would prove crucial,

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[284]For example, see the *Booklet of Congressional Statements* by St. Louis political and business leaders on May 19, 1953, to the United States House of Representatives Committee on House Administration, Subcommittee on Library, in support of Bill H.R. 2216. Among the testimonies are those of Sullivan, Karsten, Curtis, Tucker, Kaufmann, May, Crowdus, and St. Louis County Supervisor Luman Matthews (Leonor K. Sullivan Papers (hereafter cited as the Sullivan Papers), unprocessed archival item; Special Collections, St. Louis University Law Library).

Sullivan, Tucker, and other supporters understood, to maintain a viable lobbying effort for the long-term project. St. Louis City officials and the JNEM board anticipated in 1950 that they would eventually have to cooperate with both Republican and Democratic administrations. Thus a bi-partisan coalition could best convince congressional committees and administrations weighted alternatively Democratic or Republican that the riverfront project was more than legislative pork and a partisan project for the Midwest city. The JNEM board worked closely with Rep. Sullivan and other allies to ensure that the congressional delegation and USTEMC members represented both the Democratic and Republican parties.[285] By nurturing this bi-partisan and metropolitan-based support group, St. Louis leaders could more convincingly sell the riverfront project at home and in Washington, D.C., as a government obligation, a nationally significant NPS project, and a postwar pump-priming effort and thus beyond the parochial interests of Democratic administrations in City Hall.

The circuitous path of the 1950 legislative bill foreshadowed the political fortunes of future legislative efforts by the JNEM coalition. Representatives Sullivan and Karsten and other congressional allies introduced numerous funding bills for the JNEM in the ensuing years. In the 1950s and 1960s, Congress put their bills on hold time and again due to budgetary constraints and international concerns that proved to be more pressing than constructing Jefferson's Memorial in the Midwest. Moreover, rising construction costs forced the St. Louis area congressional delegation back to the lobbying arena

[285]For example, in a typical correspondence, JNEMA President Crowdus wrote to Sullivan in 1955 urging her to continue to recruit "strong Republican and Democratic support and keep the U. S. Commission non-partisan in its membership. It's now pretty top-heavily Democratic." See Letter from William Crowdus to Leonor Sullivan, November 10, 1955 (USTEMCR, Series 2, Box 4, Folder 32).

numerous times in the 1960s and 1970s for funds to complete unfinished features of the memorial. Yet St. Louis mayors and the Association and their national allies were able to keep the heat on the JNEM project in Washington, D.C., until its completion due to their broad base of supporters, their well-placed allies on congressional appropriation committees, and their arguments in support of their case. Senators Morse (OR), Martin (PA), Anderson (NM), and Symington (MO), for example, continued to stress the patriotic symbolism of the project.[286] And Morse and other lobbyists consistently reminded national leaders that the federal government, during Roosevelt's first term, had promised St. Louis that it would support the project and thus they had a moral and civic obligation to fulfill this promise.[287] Hennings and his senate allies also stressed that St. Louis City rapidly lost money as long as the riverfront site remained undeveloped, thereby implicating the federal government in the economic decline of the downtown area. The delay, they said, was holding up private investment and so undermining the tax base of the city as well as that of the federal treasury.[288] During and after his mayoral term, Darst wrote to congressional representatives to bolster these arguments. Mayor Tucker also lobbied frequently before congressional subcommittees arguing, as he did on

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[286]Evidence of lobbying statements include *Statement by Congresswoman Leonor K. Sullivan Before House Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior Department*, January 31, 1956 (USTEMCR, Series 2, Box 4, Folder 32); *Congressional Statement of George C. Smith*, October 10, 1950 (Tucker Files, Series 4, Box 1, Folder: JNEMA File #2a). Statements by Sullivan and Smith stressed the federal and local tax revenues that the national park will generate.

[287]For example, in a meeting not uncommon for JNEM supporters, Missouri Senator Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., advised President Truman in 1953 of the merits of the project and of the government's obligation to make good on Roosevelt's promise. *Statement by Senator Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., to the United States President*, February 18, 1953 (League of Women Voters of St. Louis Records Addenda (hereafter cited as League of the Women Voters Records), Box 91, Folder 1182; WHMC).

[288]"Ike Supports Riverfront Fund Increase," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, June 21, 1960; "Gateway to West Still Sags After 20-Year Old Promise," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, February 5, 1956.

February 18, 1960, before the Interior Department Sub-Committee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, that the JNEM represented "teamwork of federal and local interests at its best."[289] Other City Hall officials, JNEMA members, and civic and business leaders presented oral testimonies before congressional committees and sent written statements in this spirit to congressional members during the 1950s and 1960s.[290] And while JNEM advocates bolstered their federal legislative efforts in the nation's capital, St. Louis leaders continued to hone alliances at home behind the memorial project.

For local business and civic leaders, the importance of the JNEM lay predominantly in its potential to boost economic growth. Thus publicity campaigns for the Arch quickly built support across political party and municipal lines in metropolitan St. Louis. In pressing his case to congressional subcommittees in 1950, for example, Luther E. Smith highlighted the support of the "highly conservative" St. Louis Real Estate Board for the JNEM. Smith argued that even conservative groups like the Real Estate Board supported large federal expenditures for the JNEM because the project

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[289]*Statement of Raymond Tucker before the Sub-Committee on Interior Department of the Senate Appropriations Committee*, February 18, 1960 (Sullivan Papers, Folder: Jefferson Memorial, 1960-61); *Statement before Congress: Raymond Tucker*, January 18, 1960 (Sullivan Papers, Folder: Jefferson Memorial, 1960-61).

[290]Letter to Rep. Ken Regan from Joseph Darst, March 10, 1950 (USTEMCR, Series 2, Box 2, Folder 9). Congressional statements by Tucker and other St. Louisans for the JNEM can be found in the folders in the Tucker Files, Series 2, Box 18. For example, Joseph P. Clark, president of the St. Louis Labor Council AFL-CIO, testified on February 18, 1960, and argued that the local economy depended upon the construction of the Arch. See his statement in the Tucker Files, Series 2, Box 18, Folder: JNEM February 1, 1960 to May 21, 1960. The folders in Box 19 in the Tucker Files, Series 3, concern legislation bills for JNEM funding for the years 1962-1964. Another example that shows the persistent lobbying of JNEM advocates is the Letter to Rowland R. Hughes, Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget, from Senator T. C. Hennings, July 15, 1953. Similar letters were sent to Orme Lewis, Assistant Secretary of the Department of Interior, and other federal officials. See T.C. Hennings Collection, Box #1, Envelope: National Expansion Memorial, held at the Missouri Historical Society (hereafter cited as MHS).

would generate high revenues for the city and raise property values. The Board's assessment, Smith hoped, would help to convince both conservative and liberal congressional members that the initial federal expenditures would prove to be a sound financial investment.[291] Many other conservative business and political leaders from the St. Louis area also advocated economically liberal strategies for riverfront development. Wallace C. Brunner, for example, a St. Louis officer of the Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. who self-consciously advocated "less government spending," made an exception in the case of the Arch. The government is "evading its responsibility to provide the federal funds required," Brunner wrote to Rep. Sullivan. Over one hundred million dollars in private downtown redevelopment projects hinge on the completion of the JNEM, he wrote. If the government does not provide the additional federal funds, "the rebirth of St. Louis will come to an end," Brunner predicted.[292] Similarly, Arthur E. Wright, executive director of Downtown St. Louis, Inc., told Congresswoman Sullivan that "the real "key" to all of it [downtown redevelopment] is JNEM. Without the key, we can't open the door!"[293] Businessmen from the St. Louis area sent numerous letters in this vein to the Association and to St. Louis mayors during the 1950s and 1960s.[294] Their

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[291]Letter from Luther E. Smith to Rep. Ken Regan, Chairman of the Library Subcommittee, House of Representatives, March 6, 1950 (USTEMCR, Series 2, Box 2, Folder 9).

[292]Letter to Leonor K. Sullivan from Wallace C. Brunner, Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co., February 10, 1960 (Sullivan Papers, Folder: Jefferson Memorial, 1960-1961).

[293]Letter to Leonor Sullivan from Arthur E. Wright, Director of Downtown, St. Louis, Inc., May 4, 1960 (Sullivan Papers, Folder: Jefferson Memorial, 1960-1961).

[294]In a similar letter to Sullivan, Robert Dubinsky (Dubinsky Realty Company) was "distressed to read about the niggardliness of the federal government concerning the appropriation for the Riverfront Memorial Arch. . . . In this era of seventy billion dollar budgets the few million dollars which the Arch represents is minute. . . .I am sure that the daily wastage of the federal government is far more than that of the few million we in St. Louis are asking for." He urged congressional lobbyists to fight hard for JNEM funding because it is vital to metropolitan St. Louis. See Letter from Robert Dubinsky to Leonor K. Sullivan, May 11, 1960 (Sullivan Papers, Folder: Jefferson Memorial, 1960-1961).

arguments for the memorial dovetailed with Senator Symington's news release in 1957 which stated that the "Jefferson Memorial is the keystone to progress" for metropolitan St. Louis.[295]

The JNEMA membership rosters reflect the support of residents from St. Louis City and its counties due to the potential economic growth and status that the Arch would generate for St. Louis.[296] The JNEMA annual reports and records also reflect the financial support, booster efforts, and political assistance that the members of the St. Louis Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce, local politicians, and other influential St. Louisans provided.[297] For example, Representative Tom Curtis (R-MO), in his *Report from Your Congressman* (1957), urged his constituents and local leaders to support national lobbying efforts and local bonds for riverfront development. Curtis, a staunch critique of public housing programs, was perhaps the most potent example of how the Arch campaign attracted individuals from across the ideological spectrum and political boundaries in St. Louis.[298]

Indeed, the ability of JNEM Democratic supporters to ally with influential Republicans enabled advocates to leverage federal funds at critical moments in the 1950s and 1960s, according to Representative Sullivan. The elite business groups, Downtown

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[295]*Jefferson Memorial: The Keystone to Progress*, an address by Senator Stuart Symington to the JNEMA and for release to the St. Louis newspaper, April 12, 1957 (USTEMCR, Series 2, Box 4, Folder 34). Letters from local businessmen can be found in the Sullivan Papers in the numerous folders entitled "Jefferson Memorial." Similar letters can also be found in the folders for the JNEM in the Tucker Files, for example, in Series 2, Box 18, and in USTEMC records such as Series 3: Correspondence of Ronald J. Foulis, 1959-1970.

[296]For example, see *JNEMA Minutes: June 14, 1960* (USTEMCR, Series 5: JNEMA Reports, 1947-1967, folders on annual reports) and the Sullivan Papers, Folder: Jefferson Memorial, 1960-1961.

[297]ibid.

[298]*A Report from Your Congressman*, by Representative Tom Curtis (R-Missouri), June 24, 1957 (USTEMCR, Series 2, Box 4, Folder 34).

St. Louis, Inc., and Civic Progress, Inc., worked closely with Sullivan to encourage Republican financial donors in St. Louis to pressure Republicans on the national level to appropriate JNEM funds. As Arthur E. Wright, Jr., wrote to Sullivan in May 1960, a moment when forthcoming federal appropriations hung in the balance, "we are now following through and doing exactly what you suggest; namely, getting top Republican financial supporters here to go as high as possible in the administration to make certain the White House will approve the $2.9 million supplemental appropriation."[299] Sullivan informed local Republican businessmen that preserving the administration's commitment to the riverfront project "is a job which [right now] can be done only by some of our big contributors to the Republican Party."[300]

The JNEM coalition lobbied for ten years before the NPS received federal money to fund the construction of the Arch, while the NPS intermittently received funds for landscaping, design, and railroad relocation. By the end of President Kennedy's tenure, the federal government had appropriated most of the $17,250,000 of the total funds that the government authorized for the memorial between 1953 and 1962. This amount included $9,497,000 for the construction of the Arch itself. Between 1953 and the end of 1962, the total authorization of federal funds for the Jefferson Memorial Park amounted to $23,003,150 (these funds were in addition to the $9,000,000 spent between 1935 and

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[299]Wright explained that Dave Calhoun (president of the St. Louis Union Trust Co.) had arranged high-level meetings in Washington, D. C., to discuss the JNEM and encouraged top officials like Frank Corley (Republican National Committeeman from Missouri) to lobby for the project. Wright informed Sullivan that "Corley has agreed to. . . .marshal 'rich Republicans' behind it." See Letter from Arthur E. Wright, Jr., executive director of Downtown St. Louis, Inc., May 9, 1960, to Leonor Sullivan (Sullivan Papers, Folder: Jefferson Memorial 1960-1962).

[300]She urged them to "get busy and force action by the White House and the Budget Bureau in support of the funds that we need to keep the construction work on schedule." Letter from Leonor Sullivan to Robert Dubinsky, May 16, 1960 (Sullivan Papers, Folder: Jefferson Memorial, 1960-1961).

1959).[301] In the mid-1960s, the USTEMC would successfully solicit Congress for authorization to add $8,000,000 to the NPS budget to complete the project, finally realizing this goal in 1980.[302]

Between 1950 and 1980, while some of the names changed, the essential contingent of City Hall officials, JNEMA members, NPS bureaucrats, and congressional allies comprised the coalition that saw the JNEM to its completion. Tragically, the key visionaries behind the project passed away before the Arch was constructed. Smith died of a heart attack in 1953, and Saarinen died of a brain tumor in 1961.[303] But by that time, Saarinen, the NPS director, and city officials had made most of the major decisions on

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[301]Although $3,345,667 had yet to be appropriated.

[302]Of the eight million, the federal government would contribute $6,000,000 and St. Louis City would contribute $2,000,000. The lobbying effort was spearheaded by Senators Symington and Long (MO), Clinton Anderson (AZ), Wayne Morse (OR), Roman Hruska (NE) and Representatives Karsten, Curtis, and Sullivan, Price (IL), and Glenn Cunningham (NE). Meanwhile, Mayor Cervantes, the Association members, the NPS Superintendent, the USTEMC, and Sullivan would successfully campaign for a 1967 bond to raise the $2,000,000. Reflecting the metropolitan-based support upon which JNEM advocates depended, the JNEM president requested its members, "although they all don't live in St. Louis City," to campaign for the city bond. *Newsrelease: Mayor Alfonso J. Cervantes*, November 21, 1966 (Sullivan Papers, Folder: JNEM January-March 1967); *Statement by Congresswoman Leonor K. Sullivan on the Bond Issue to Complete Work on the JNEM*, 1966 (Sullivan Papers, Folder: JNEM January-March 1967).

The Arch was ready for visitors in 1967 but it took thirteen more years to complete the park. Between 1967 and 1980, the NPS superintendent of the memorial, Association board members, and St. Louis Board of Public Service officials would tackle questions regarding the design of the museum, landscaping, parking, and other features. They would have to lobby repeatedly to get federal appropriation of the authorized six million dollars to complete the park. See *Address by Representative Leonor K. Sullivan to the Annual Meeting of the JNEMA*, July 12, 1974 (J. Orville Spreen Papers, Box 1, Folder 5; WHMC). Details on the lobbying efforts during the 1970s can be found in the folders regarding the JNEM during the 1970s in the Sullivan Papers and in Brown's overview in *Administrative History,* Chapter 8.

[303]Saarinen's architectural firm supervised the memorial's completion. Saarinen had supervised the project since the mid-1950s and kept close contact with NPS Director Julian Spotts, city officials, and Association members concerning details of the development. Saarinen also worked with local engineers and the U.S. Corp. of Engineers to draft plans for the construction of the Arch. The Secretary of Interior and NPS Director needed to approve all of the plans. The architect also drafted a zoning proposal for the surrounding buildings and streets intended to create a "unified and modern cityscape," as city planners like Bartholomew and Harmon since the 1920s had envisioned.

the JNEM and had resolved the track relocation impasse with the railroad interests.[304] Thus, when congress appropriated federal funds in the early 1960s for the construction of the Arch, all systems were ready to go to build the monument.

A New Spirit of St. Louis?: The Gateway Arch and the Changing Fortunes of St. Louis, 1965-1980

When engineers topped off the Arch in 1965, the 630-foot monument ranked as the largest man-made monument in the nation and second to the Eiffel Tower internationally (1,056 feet). The MacDonald Construction Company began constructing Saarinen's Gateway in 1962, although the Arch would not be ready for visitors until 1967.[305] Construction had been held up by a number of delays, the most significant of which was an AFL-CIO walk-out over the hiring of black non-union workers.[306] But finally, in May, 1968, twenty years to the day when the USTEMC accepted the design, Mayor Cervantes dedicated the Gateway Arch.

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[304]Railroad negotiations had been under way since 1940. But delays in these negotiations were persistent as each party (NPS, railroad, and city officials) tried to bear the least cost possible for the removal of the tracks. One of the main factors breaking the impasse was the leadership shown by the new Missouri Pacific Railroad President Russell Dearmont, who convinced railroad board of directors to compromise with city and federal government on relocation. For details, see Brown, *Administrative History*, 177-79.

[305]Bi-State Development Corporation sold $3,300,000 worth of bonds in St. Louis on almost the first day in its bid to raise money for the internal transportation system. The lift of the last section took thirteen minutes, and video crews captured the episode capture dramatically on film. The Arch has a 630-foot span at ground level. The legs are double steel-walled equilateral hollow triangles; their sides measure fifty-four feet at the base and narrow to seventeen feet at the apical. Engineers consider this type of arch to be the most structurally sound because the pressure of its weight passes through the legs and is absorbed in the foundations.

[306]Between 1962 and 1965, many of the slow-downs were due to supply delays and unresolved engineering questions. However, the most significant obstacle took place in 1965-1966 due to a union walk-out by white workers protesting the hiring of non-union blacks. Their protest would prompt the first action taken against a labor union under President Johnson's 1965 executive order which enforced the nondiscrimination clause required in federal contracts. For details, see Robert J. Moore, Jr., "Showdown Under the Arch: The Construction Trades and the First 'Pattern or Practice' Equal Employment Opportunity Suit, 1966," *Gateway Heritage* v15 #3 (Winter 1994-1995): 30-43.

The Arch signified for local residents and for national observers a "new spirit" of St. Louis.[307] The Arch, local leaders hoped, would reverse the image of St. Louis as a declining and unsophisticated industrial city and become the "silver bullet" that would help to reverse the capital disinvestment and residential abandonment that weakened the urban core. The memorial garnered enormous praise from national news, architectural, and engineering publications. Not only did the Arch prove to be a "victory for engineering," *Business Week* wrote in 1965, but the memorial helped "St. Louis snap out of a long, costly lull."[308] Highlighting the comparatively meager investment that the business community had committed to downtown prior to the 1960s, the *New York Times* asserted that "probably nothing less than the shining Saarinen shrine could have inspired such a turnabout by the business community," while *Time* magazine stated that "seldom has a city come closer to the brink of civic disaster, and seldom has a city worked harder or more successfully to recover."[309] Arthur Wright and other businessmen credited riverfront redevelopment with the "renaissance" of downtown St. Louis.[310] With the Arch

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[307]Comparing the booster value of the Arch with that of Lindbergh's 1927 "Spirit of St. Louis" flight.
[308]"The Spirit of St. Louis: New Arch of Triumph," *Business Week* (April 3, 1965), 34; *Business Week* (September 18, 1965), 192-204.
[309]Quoted in Hammerstrom, "The St. Louis Scene," 26.
[310]Some examples of these letters include a 1960 letter from Wright, in which he informed Sullivan that the recent appropriations bill is "by any measurement the best news we've had for downtown St. Louis in the past 25 years. . . .The effect for good it will ultimately have on the revitalization of the downtown area will be tremendous. This is a fact I believe we perhaps appreciate more than most because we are in a position to know the thinking of developers and investors who are considering projects here." Similarly, members of Downtown St. Louis, Inc., thanked Sullivan and her co-lobbyists because the "planning of projects that face the park. . . .is now proceeding very well. . . . now that substantial completion of JNEM is assured by 1964. By that year, St. Louis will have a completely new 'face.'" See Letter to Leonor K. Sullivan from Arthur E. Wright, June 30, 1960 (Sullivan Papers, Folder: Jefferson Memorial, 1960-1961); Letter to Representative Leonor K. Sullivan from Arthur E. Wright, Jr., August 15, 1961 (Sullivan Papers, Folder: Jefferson Memorial, 1960-61).

in relief, local investors poured millions of dollars in new downtown projects like Busch Stadium, Cervantes Convention Center, and office complexes.[311]

The Gateway Arch became the nation's highest profile symbol of the urban renewal philosophy promoted by city officials like Farris, Tucker, and Cervantes. As urban geographer Robert A. Beauregard observed, planners and administrators of urban redevelopment programs designed their projects to produce a symbolic as well as a physical impact. They intended to "remold the image of the city, to replace the perception of the city as a place of disinvestment, deterioration, crime, and poverty. . . .[with a] new image. . . .of progress, growth, vitality, and prosperity." Their projects were "visual symbols and centerpieces of these cities' proclaimed rebirth."[312] Reflecting on the riverfront transformation, a *Business Week* writer aptly noted that the "new St. Louis had literally and figuratively 'ripped up her past.'"[313] Indeed, the soaring Modernist parkscape provided the most dramatic symbol in the nation of a new era in federal-city relations.

The JNEM was not merely an inner-city revitalization project, as this chapter suggests, but a project whose evolution shaped how leaders conceived of and planned metropolitan development in the 1950s and 1960s. The Gateway Arch as tourist

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[311]*First Annual Report*, Civic Center Redevelopment Corporation, March 29, 1963 (League of Women Voters Records, Box 103, Folder 1290); "Half-Billion to be Invested in Downtown Before 1970," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat,* May 12, 1962; "Downtown Stadium Proposal Approved by City Plan Commission," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat,* December 10, 1960; "Big Riverfront Investments Show Faith in City's Future," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, May 8, 1966; "New Downtown Rebuilding Planned," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, September 24, 1965; "Great Day for a Great City," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, May 26, 1964; "$150 Million Center Planned Downtown," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat* October 13, 1972.

[312]Briavel Holcomb and Robert A. Beauregard, *Revitalizing Cities* (Washington, D.C.: Association for American Geographers, 1981), 44, 51.

[313]"New St. Louis Rips Up Her Past," *Business Week* (September 9, 1955), 130-31.

centerpiece shaped their inner-city planning efforts and, in turn, inner-city revitalization plans helped them to interpret the significance of the Arch in St. Louis' postwar development.[314] The local leadership conceptualized metropolitan development within the context of a rapidly changing regional and national economy, in particular, northern industrial losses and the increasingly rapid growth of the tourism and service sectors. As St. Louis City was "being bled by a constant exodus" of industrial jobs to its suburbs and to the Sunbelt, business and political leaders and city planners intended to boost alternative economic sectors (service and tourism) to counter the weakening of inner-city manufacturing.[315] Urban renewal experts like Charles Farris (Chapter Two) believed that the urban core, as the geographic focal point of the metropolis and on the historical riverfront, enjoyed a comparative advantage relative to its suburbs in becoming the

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[314]The St. Louis City Plan Commission announced its *Master Plan for Downtown St. Louis* in April 1960 and harmonized riverfront beautification with inner-city industrial and commercial redevelopment and highway expansion plans. In the 1950s, the planning profession moved away from piecemeal planning and toward master planning for urban centers. In St. Louis, the JNEM significantly contributed to local planners' adaptation of these national planning trends. The St. Louis CPC found in the Arch an effective anchor around which to correlate upgraded office, retail, entertainment, and residential districts that comprised a variegated yet "integrated and harmonious" master plan for downtown St. Louis. The St. Louis City Plan Commission and Downtown St. Louis, Inc., set in motion an integrated set of projects for downtown which included a baseball stadium, hotels, residential areas, expanded shopping and financial districts, and transportation improvements, all linked conceptually to the JNEM site. Their plans enveloped reindustrialization projects like Mill Creek Valley and Kosciusko, cultural projects like the JNEM, and housing rehabilitation into one grand strategy to reverse "the postwar trend of business and trade away from downtown St. Louis" that was "weakening the economic function of the hub of our entire metropolitan community." Meanwhile, NPS Superintendent for the Memorial H. Raymond Gregg forged a cooperative agreement among the NPS Supervisor, city officials, and the state highway department to coordinate expressway projects with the JNEM. In so doing, city officials executed their plans to make downtown St. Louis the cultural-commercial node of an integrated metropolis. See St. Louis CPC, *Master Plan for Downtown St. Louis* (1960) and *The St. Louis Gateway Redevelopment Plan*, 1960, prepared for Downtown St. Louis, Inc. (Stanley Goodman Papers, Box 4, Folder 83; WHMC). The "Master Plan for a New Downtown," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat,* January 11, 1959, also reflects city planners' ideals for downtown development surrounding the JNEM. George B. Hertzog, Jr. (Superintendent of the JNEM) similarly stressed the robust growth that this interlocking set of project would bring to St. Louis. For example, see *Address of George B. Hertzog, Jr., to the St. Louis Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce*, June 5, 1961 (Sullivan Papers, Folder: Jefferson Memorial, 1960-1961).

[315]"What's Wrong With St. Louis?" by Harry Wilensky, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, April 25, 1954.

cultural and services hub for Greater St. Louis (complemented by non-Fordist industries). R. Ray Shockley, president of Downtown St. Louis, Inc., and Mayor Tucker viewed the Arch as "a magnificent sign of progress" and felt "genuinely optimistic about the downtown area's future as a commercial and entertainment center. . . .regardless of future trends to the suburbs."[316] Local leaders conceptually and strategically linked the JNEM with cultural sites such as Bush Stadium and Forest Park.[317] They also linked riverfront beautification with housing and with reindustrialization projects (about one mile away, Chapter Two) as mutually reinforcing strategies to stabilize the inner city.[318] Adjacent to the central business district and located at the intersection of new expressways, the JNEM became the keystone of efforts to calibrate downtown revitalization with metropolitan growth broadly conceived. Downtown St. Louis, according to suburban business leader D. Reid Ross (Chapter Four), would become the "cultural center" and the "intelligence center" of metropolitan St. Louis, central to the region's overall growth.[319] By creating

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[316]"Magnificant progress" quote appears in "30-Story Laclede Gas Building Planned Downtown," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat,* July 13, 1967. "Genuinely optimistic" quote appears in "Half-Billion to be Invested in Downtown Before 1970," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat,* May 12, 1962. Jon Teaford discusses similar downtown projects in *Rough Road to Renaissance.*

[317]Mostly clearly seen in the St. Louis City Plan Commission, *Plan for Downtown St. Louis* (1960). But this is also apparent in other St. Louis CPC reports of the 1950s and 1960s and in the publications and records of the St. Louis Regional Industrial Development Corporation (hereafter cited as the RIDC) and the St. Louis Research Council (hereafter cited as the RC) (their institutional records are held at the WHMC; see Chapters Four and Five of this dissertation).

[318]Also see footnote 98. Beautification would improve the inner-city investment and residential climate and stabilize property values while industrial and commercial redevelopment would strengthen the job- and revenue-producing capacity of the urban core. As the editors of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* and the *St. Louis Globe-Democrat* argued in the 1950s and 1960s, the JNEM would enhance the city's "residential and educational facilities and its opportunities for industrial employment" as pursued in the Mill Creek Valley and Kosciusko projects, St. Louis University's expansion, and in cultural institutions like the St. Louis Planetarium. See, as one example, "Valley and Riverfront Jobs," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, May 22, 1958.

[319]*Remarks by D. Reid Ross to the First Annual Board Meeting of the St. Louis Regional Industrial Development Corp*, July 7, 1966, page 4 (St. Louis Regional Commerce and Growth Association Records (hereafter cited as the RCGA Records), Box 4, Folder 58; WHMC); *Institutions to Serve the Region: The*

these new metropolitan functions for the inner city, St. Louis leaders hoped to "rationalize" and "reduce the friction" of decentralization, as urban development experts like Raymond Vernon and urban geographers like Jean Gottman urged in the 1950s and 1960s.[320]

Yet for all their enthusiasm, city planners and civic leaders in the 1960s were appropriating a project and a set of assumptions about the Arch's ability to revive downtown first conceived in 1948. Twenty years later, St. Louis City faced increasingly racialized pockets of poverty and population, industrial, and commercial losses whose scale and scope city leaders could not foresee when they first predicted that the JNEM would become an engine of postwar revitalization. By the time the Arch was completed in 1967, social activists like Michael Harrington had forced into the national spotlight the discrepancy between national prosperity and persistent poverty in postwar America, while civil rights advocates centered national attention on their fight to gain equality for blacks.[321] In St. Louis, activists like Ivory Perry and Percy Green demonstrated against a myriad of discriminatory practices in the city.[322] Concurrently, the regional shift of northern manufacturing production from the industrial belt to the Sunbelt weakened the structural foundations of cities like St. Louis (Chapter Two). Moreover, when the JNEM

St. Louis Research Council and Regional Industrial Development Corp., by the St. Louis RIDC, 1969, page 11 (RCGA Records, Box 4, Folder 51).

[320]Jean Gottmann and Robert A. Harper, eds., *Metropolis on the Move: Geographers Look at Urban Sprawl* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc, 1967), 35.

[321]Michael Harrington, *The Other America: Poverty in the United States* (New York: MacMillan Press, 1962).

[322]George Lipsitz, *A Life in the Struggle: Ivory Perry and the Culture of Opposition* (revised ed.; Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995).

coalition lobbied Washington, D.C., in 1950, St. Louis City had around 800,000 residents. By 1967, the city's population had fallen by about a quarter of its 1950 count.

By the time the Gateway Arch stood along the Mississippi Riverfront, then, the political-economic and intellectual context had changed dramatically from that in which the JNEM Association conceived the project. The deteriorating cores of cities like St. Louis, Detroit, and Camden, and civil rights demonstrations provided powerful images that reflected the extent to which the ideals symbolized by the Arch (prosperity, mobility, consensus, and democracy) failed to include all Americans.[323] Riverfront beautification took place against the backdrop of urban centers going up in flames. At the end of the summer of 1967, thirty-one cities had experienced outbreaks of racial violence and the death toll for the year reached eighty-six, with injury and arrest rates in the thousands and millions of dollars in property damage. A March 1969 *Newsweek* cover simply read "The Sick, Sick Cities."[324] As historian Robert Beauregard suggests, inner cities had become the communication centers from which national traumas were broadcast.[325] For St. Louisans, the vicarious experience of the 1960s riots and the collective memory of the 1917 East St. Louis riot raised the specter of racial violence, crime, and instability in their own inner city.[326]

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[323]In St. Louis, Percy Green used the city's symbol of civic pride to highlight the contradictions between the nation's creed and practices when he climbed the Arch to protest racial discrimination by the AFL-CIO unions that built the monument. See Lipsitz, *Life in Struggle*, 84, and Moore, "Showdown Under the Arch," 30-43.

[324]"The Cities: Waging a Battle for Survival," *Newsweek* 73 (March 17, 1969), 41.

[325]Robert A. Beauregard, *Voices of Decline: The Postwar Fate of U.S. Cities* (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1993).

[326]Robert Cassidy, "St. Louis Tunes Out the Blues," *Planning* v40 (March 1974): 14. In the mid-1960s St. Louis's black population accounted for about 40% of total population, an almost fifty percent increase since 1945, and the city lost one-third of its white population in the 1960s. During the 1960s, St. Louis

Yet how to explain, then, the wildly optimistic reception that the Arch received when some of its very assumptions were coming under attack? I assert that the Arch actually gained in its symbolic import as a public monument for postwar urban America over the course of the 1960s. The national and local reception that the monument received actually reveals the great distance between what the Arch stood for symbolically and the social, economic, and political challenges facing industrial-belt cities. It was precisely this distance that urban leaders desperately hoped that the Arch would narrow. Their optimistic response to the Arch submerged an enormous amount of anxiety about the fortunes of their city. Mayor A. J. Cervantes belied this distress when he told a 1968 *U.S. News and World Report* journalist that "we just can't make it anymore."[327] By the early 1970s, urban leaders would no longer consider inner-city industrial disinvestment, residential abandonment, and commercial decline a list of curable ailments. The struggle now was for survival, not revival.[328] HUD's destruction of the Pruitt-Igoe housing complex in 1972 (less than two miles from the Arch) offered the starkest admission by urban officials that modern urban planning and federal intervention could not resolve the dislocations traumatizing America's inner cities.

Interpreting the Arch as a failure, however, would obscure the deeply-rooted problems that weakened urban cores after WWII. The Arch's inability to resurrect

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experienced the greatest population decline of any major city in the U.S. St. Louis's comptroller claimed that the 1970 budget proposal revealed "the greatest fiscal crisis in the city's recent history." See *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, April 2, 1969, 1A.

[327]"We Just Can't Make It Anymore," *U.S. News and World Report* 64 (June 24, 1968): 62.

[328]As scholars like Robert A. Beauregard, Thomas Sugrue, John Teaford, and June Manning Thomas, among many others, suggest. See Beauregard, *Voices of Decline,* Sugrue, *The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), Teaford, *Rough Road*, and Thomas, *Redevelopment and Race: Planning a Finer City in Postwar Detroit* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).

downtown St. Louis reflects the limitations of urban renewal philosophies and praxis that could only treat the symptoms of capital flight and population decline. This prescription cannot address the structural factors such as unregulated capital mobility, manufacturing relocation, inadequate city financing structures, and rigid metropolitan political boundaries that weakened the urban core nor could it ameliorate long-simmering racial antagonism. Moreover, the tourist- and service-based inner-city economy that city planners, urban renewal officials, and business leaders heavily promoted since the 1950s does not generate comparably broad job-creation and investment incentives, long-term employment security, and the external economies that their cities' industrially-based sectors had achieved by the mid-twentieth century.

The Gateway Arch, in fact, was an ideological, engineering, and political success for St. Louis leaders if not an engine of growth. Advocates had created a dynamic metropolitan-state-federal coalition to build one of the world's most impressive man-made monuments. The Arch stands as one of the most palpable symbols of city leaders' aspirations for postwar urban revitalization, albeit misguided in hindsight. The Arch also became one of the leading tourist attractions in the nation and a remarkably successful civic symbol for metropolitan St. Louis. Moreover, it helped local leaders to conceptualize metropolitan development in the postwar period. By no means should we undermine the severe shortcomings of postwar economic policies. But we need to recognize the significance and implications of those urban projects in order to understand more fully the dynamics, constraints, and possibilities of local leadership and metropolitan development after 1945.

The Gateway Arch in Metropolitan Perspective

The Gateway Arch project, as this chapter suggests, reflected an important intellectual transformation among St. Louisans as they reinterpreted urban core development after WWII. Their conceptualization of the JNEM reflected the "metropolitanization" of the inner city. Through riverfront development, St. Louis leaders restructured this particular urban space in order to provide distinct economic functions for the metropolitan community, as we have seen, by bolstering entertainment and commercial services and by anchoring the metropolis with a vibrant downtown that ostensibly boost the regional investment climate. Interpreting the Gateway Arch as their response to the challenges posed by the metropolitanization of residents and industries, on the one hand, and framing the Arch as the "metropolitanization" of the inner city, on the other hand, may sound counterintuitive. But these analytical devices so used are appropriate because urban leaders after 1945 structured inner-city redevelopment precisely to offer individuals and businesses, particularly those outside of the city limits, with incentives to invest downtown; they responded to metropolitanization by consciously creating new, metropolitan functions for the inner city.[329] Interpreting riverfront renewal as the "metropolitanization" of the inner city highlights another critical

[329]We could say that prior to this period, St. Louis City, historically the area's production and distribution center, provided "metropolitan functions" to residents and businesses outside of city limits because the outlying regions did not offer comparable services and production facilities, as Beverly Duncan and Stanley Lieberson note in *Metropolis and Region in Transition* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1970), 145-50. But after WWII, as suburban-based businesses and residents became increasingly independent of the urban core, local leaders sought to reinvigorate existing and foster new metropolitan functions for the inner city by making it St. Louis's center for civic, cultural, and commercial activities. They can be considered new functions, conceptually and in the focus on culture and services, because the city could no longer count on being the metropolitan center merely by default, given emerging suburban centers of activity such as Clayton (see Chapter Four of this dissertation). Local leaders had to re-imagine and then promote the inner city as the competitive center in the metropolis for these economic and cultural functions.

aspect of how St. Louisans conceived of and carried out economic redevelopment after the war. While city and suburban leaders would fight a "cold war" over the location of metropolitan industrial investment (Chapter Four), they agreed that concentrating cultural/tourism and service sectors downtown was an unmitigated boon to the regional as a whole. The inner city became common ground upon which a "metropolitan compromise" took place.

The functional manner in which St. Louis leaders imagined the JNEM would complement metropolitan development becomes more apparent when we consider their regional industrial growth strategies: high-tech and large-scale Fordist production in the suburbs (Chapters Four and Five) and regional planning (Chapter Five). As local leaders developed these strategies, they counted on the JNEM to anchor the region's tourism and central business district to serve these industries, institutions, and their constituencies.[330] These growth industries, in turn, would boost consumer demand for downtown cultural and commercial services. Thus they would create a mutually reinforcing relationship between the urban core and the periphery.

St. Louis leaders in the 1960s and 1970s viewed the JNEM as the material and symbolic anchor of their metropolitan restructuring strategies. The Arch, according to Mayor A. J. Cervantes and County Supervisor Lawrence Roos, opened the "front door" to the East-West "cultural corridor" and "research corridor" of universities and R&D labs. Extending from downtown to the suburbs along expressways and spur routes, this

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[330]*Remarks by D. Reid Ross to the First Annual Board Meeting of RIDC*, page 4, and *1965-66 First Annual Report*, by the St. Louis RIDC (RCGA Records, Box 4, Folder 66); "St. Louis Plugs the Brain Drain," April 1968 (magazine title not apparent) (RCGA Records, Box 11, Folder 335).

research and cultural axis encompassed multiple tourist sites, shopping districts, and educational institutions. This axis was complemented by the "T" zone of light and heavy industry that spanned the riverfront a few miles north and south of the JNEM and concentrated in midtown areas like Mill Creek Valley.[331]

Advocates imagined that their three-tier strategy for revitalization (inner city commercial-manufacturing, high-tech suburban industries, and downtown cultural revitalization) would functionally integrate each physical section and economic sector of the St. Louis area and encourage residents to see the interdependence of the parts that comprise the metropolitan whole. Only in this way, local leaders believed, could they counter the trend of convention industrial losses in St. Louis City. From the perspective of many local leaders, as Mill Creek Valley and the Gateway Arch revitalized the urban core, they must open up the area to full metropolitan development—suburban industrialization in particular—to ensure St. Louis' prosperity in the long term.

[331]D. Reid Ross, *Centropolis or Metropolis*, page 22 (RCGA Records, Box 7, Folder 150).

Chapter Four
Industrializing St. Louis County:
Suburban Growth for the Metropolitan Whole

The Politics of "Metropolitanism" and the Limits of Regionalism

In 1974, Mallinckrodt Company's CEO, Harold E. Thayer, announced that his corporation would not expand at their almost one-hundred year old inner-city site but instead build its new facilities in St. Louis County. The chemical giant was not abdicating its commitment to the urban core, Thayer asserted. Mallinckrodt "merely wants to expand in the metropolitan area, enjoying the best of two worlds." Mallinckrodt "does not consider the city and county as separate units, but as parts of the whole," the CEO argued.[332] Thayer represented the trend among hundreds of St. Louis businessmen after WWII who chose to expand their businesses in or relocate them to St. Louis County (497 square miles) instead of St. Louis City (sixty-two square miles). St. Louis County officials like Supervisor Lawrence K. Roos facilitated this trend by vigorously developing industrial sites in St. Louis County. Mallinckrodt executives' suburban choice was prompted by corporate concern for productivity and profit. But Thayer's argument was not simply a justification for the move. The perspective of this CEO, who also served as president of the St. Louis Regional Commerce and Growth Association, reflected a broader, metropolitan framework within which many business leaders and public officials interpreted St. Louis' postwar economic development.

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[332]Thayer, an East Coast native, moved to St. Louis in 1939 and became a nationally-known chemist and eventually the CEO of Mallinckrodt. See "Mallinckrodt Buys County Site for New Headquarters," *Watchman Advocate*, June 1, 1966, and "The Mallinckrodt Connection," *St. Louis Globe- Democrat*, April 26, 1973.

St. Louis County industrial development was critical in the emergence of suburban leaders' argument for postwar metropolitan development and cooperation ("metropolitanism"). Since the early 1950s, these local leaders argued that St. Louis County would become St. Louis City's partner for metropolitan growth: suburban industrial expansion would strengthen St. Louis' production and job growth capacity and boost metropolitan demand for burgeoning inner-city business services and cultural-tourist attractions. According to businessmen like Thayer, then, suburban industrial development and inner-city renewal would prove mutually reinforcing in creating robust growth for metropolitan St. Louis.

Public officials, leading politicians, and businessmen in St. Louis City and St. Louis County recognized that planned development on a metropolitan scale was crucial for postwar economic growth. Indeed, it was the only game in town. The metropolitan political fragmentation that characterized industrial-belt centers like St. Louis forced local leaders to recognize and grapple with the fact that population and economic development did not stop at municipal boundaries. Consequently, a metropolitan-level perspective was necessary if they hoped to guide industrial, commercial, and residential growth that poured beyond central city boundaries—even as city officials like Mayor Tucker encouraged firms and residents to remain in the urban core. Concurrently, leaders recognized that they must develop St. Louis' regional resources to remain competitive for investment capital and residents. St. Louis public officials, developers, and planners opened up St. Louis County to full metropolitan development that included land-intensive and modern industrial facilities, low-density housing, schools, business and government

administrative centers, shopping malls, recreation areas, and multi-nodal transportation hubs that met the infrastructure demands of postwar industrial production and consumer demands of a growing middle-class.

Metropolitanism, as articulated by St. Louis suburban leaders like Lawrence Roos, provided a framework within which local leaders interpreted St. Louis' challenges and possibilities in a rapidly changing American economy. Metropolitanism served as a kind of worldview that positioned St. Louis in a regional and national perspective as the rapid growth of technologically-advanced production and the emergence of the Sunbelt changed the rules of the game of industrial development--and threatened to erode St. Louis' traditional manufacturing base.[333] Metropolitanism was ultimately a larger argument about how industrial-belt leaders should respond to intensifying competition from a new regional player, the South. The aggressive development of St. Louis County to house St. Louis' traditional manufacturing and new high-tech industries could be seen as a loss for the urban core only in the short-term, suburban leaders argued. Viewed in broader perspective, suburban industrial development would encourage firms to stay in the St. Louis area rather than head South. Thus, industrial restructuring on this model was imperative to stabilize their local-regional economy. Metropolitanism offered a powerful perspective that enabled suburban leaders to predict long-term, strong growth for St. Louis, even as the city's dramatic industrial and residential losses during the 1960s revealed St. Louis' counterproductive growth dynamics and raised serious doubts among St. Louis City public officials.

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[333]The Sunbelt region stretches from coast to coast below the thirty-seventh parallel.

Metropolitanism proved to be a contested vision over how St. Louis political and business leaders, public officials, and planners should carry out metropolitan industrial development. St. Louis City officials would fight a "metropolitan cold war," as one observer called it, as they sought to ameliorate industrial and commercial flight to the politically separate St. Louis County. These losses represented a direct hit to the city's tax base, and St. Louis City public officials and business leaders had a city to save from pending budget and job crises and socioeconomic collapse. The "metropolitan cold war" as an analytic framework is useful because it highlights real public policy choices and the concerns of local leaders as they tried to meet the political-economic needs of their municipality while operating within a metropolitan mode of development. By pointing to this stalemate between resolving municipal-specific problems and fostering metropolitan industrial expansion in St. Louis, the "cold war" analysis highlights the unforeseen limitations and unintended consequences of metropolitan development in industrial-belt centers after WWII.

Regionalism on this metropolitan model would prove to be a zero-sum game for postwar St. Louis. Local business leaders and public officials in St. Louis premised their metropolitan theory on robust internal and external investment and high population growth and did so precisely at the time that capital and population were migrating south of the industrial belt. Additionally, suburban leaders' metropolitan viewpoint transcended metropolitan political structures: investment in the suburbs would ultimately benefit center and periphery regardless of their municipal division, argued Roos, Thayer, and like-minded leaders. But given the combination of St. Louis City and St. Louis County

political separation and weak investment in the St. Louis area, the metropolitanization of industry, commerce, and residents would come at the city's expense; metropolitan economic growth would remain relatively lackluster.

St. Louis' story is not unique to the postwar experience of traditional industrial-belt centers. The case of St. Louis provides a prism through which we can investigate how local leaders conceptualized postwar metropolitan development and tried to rationalize the economic and demographic forces (decentralization) that were reshaping their urban centers. Despite the tensions that emerged between city and county leaders, their story is not one of city versus suburb/winners and losers but, instead, a story of the constraints that industrial-belt leaders confronted in their effort to sustain vibrant regional economies in the face of formidable challenges.

St. Louis' unusual political history, however, makes it a particularly useful case to examine these problems. Since St. Louis City separated from St. Louis County in 1876, city leaders' efforts to consolidate with the county or annex adjacent municipalities have failed (Chapters One and Five). Other industrial-belt central cities have tended to remain politically within their county and, until the 1920s, annexed territory. In St. Louis, then, the problems posed by the city-suburban divide took on particularly acute and apparent consequences earlier than in other cities, as we first saw in Chapter One. Consequently, St. Louis leaders may have been more poised than their counterparts in other cities (whose municipal boundaries were still hidden in large but politically consolidated city/counties) to be thinking in new, metropolitan terms of cooperation and development.

Envisioning St. Louis' Suburban Development and Networking for Growth

Between 1940 and 1980, St. Louis County transformed from a sleepy bedroom community for St. Louis City into the area's most prominent industrial and commercial site. Comprising almost 500 square miles, Missouri's largest county abuts St. Louis City on the city's North, South and West sides.[334] Since the separation of the city from St. Louis County, the county grew as a residential community for the city. As historians like Robert Fishman and Sam Bass Warner, Jr., point out, such "streetcar suburbs" generally excluded manufacturing and thereby reinforced the urban core as the metropolitan industrial hub.[335] Despite its humble beginnings, St. Louis County would emerge in the 1950s as the city's rival for metropolitan industrial investment. Yet this structural transition in St. Louis County, from a residential suburb dependent upon the urban core for jobs and services into a suburb with a diversified industrial-commercial base, did not happen automatically or inevitably. St. Louis County public officials, planners, real estate developers, architects, and other local business leaders had to conceptualize postwar development and build institutional networks to carve industrial-commercial sites out the essentially rural Missouri landscape.

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[334]St. Louis County government (based on its 1950 home rule charter) has a County Supervisor and a seven-member County Council. Gene McNary (1958-1962) was the first Democratic Supervisor since 1936. Since Supervisor Lawrence K. Roos (Republican, 1962-1974), St. Louis County would elect Republican supervisors through the 1970s.

[335]Sam Bass Warner, Jr., *Streetcar Suburbs: The Process of Growth in Boston, 1870-1900* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press and M.I.T. Press, 1962) and Robert Fishman, *Bourgeois Utopias: The Rise and Fall of Suburbia* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1987). Beverly Duncan and Stanley Lieberson suggest that until the mid-twentieth century, urban cores remained industrial hubs because their suburbs historically supported little industry, Duncan and Lieberson, *Metropolis and Region in Transition* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1970).

According to John D. Kerr, Jr., industrial development official in the St. Louis Chamber of Commerce, St. Louis County officials had little interest in industrial development until the late 1940s. Until that time, the county "had almost no land held specifically for industry. . . . . the county and the metropolitan area lost several fine plants because of the hostile attitude of county communities and because desirable properties could not be purchased at reasonable prices."[336] But the county's rapid population growth during the 1940s (from 274, 230 in 1940 to 406, 349 in 1950) forced St. Louis County officials like Luman F. Matthews (St. Louis County Supervisor, 1951-1959) and St. Louis Chamber of Commerce members to recognize the county's need for a job- and tax-base sufficient to support the growing community.[337] St. Louis County's growth in the 1940s anticipated the national trend in postwar residential suburbanization: between 1950 and 1970, American central cities grew by ten million people while their suburbs grew by eighty-five million people.[338] In St. Louis County, local officials starkly realized a critical mismatch between the county's anticipated population trends and its current pace of economic development when, in 1948, the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) asked large population centers to prepare industrial dispersion plans. In response to their findings, St. Louis Chamber of Commerce members warned that St. Louis County had "a stifling shortage of property. . . . which was actually available for industrial use."[339]

Due to the extensive transportation and commercial services in the inner city and comparatively little of either in St. Louis County, industry in St. Louis City had remained

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[336] "Showcase-Part II: St. Louis County," *St. Louis Commerce*, v37 (February 1963): 14.
[337] Luman F. Matthews (Republican) served as presiding judge of the St. Louis County Court (1943-1948).
[338] Fishman, *Bourgeois Utopias*, 182.
[339] "Showcase-Part II: St. Louis County," 13-19.

concentrated in the urban core. As late as 1947, while manufacturing in many other industrial-belt cities had begun to suburbanize, essentially no migration of manufacturing to the west of the city's political boundary had occurred, as reflected in the 1948 ODM report and a 1955 study by Edward Noonan of the St. Louis City Plan Commission (CPC).[340] Concurrently, the suburbanization of population in St. Louis in the 1940s and 1950s proceeded more rapidly than in most major metropolitan areas.[341] Consequently, St. Louis County experienced an unusually wide gap between its rate of population growth and its rate of job expansion relative to other metropolitan suburbs.[342] While historians and urban geographers debate the causal relationship between job and population migration in fueling the postwar suburban boom, St. Louis' experience documents a model of postwar suburbanization in which residential migration sparked job migration from the city to its suburbs. And in light of St. Louis County's relatively undeveloped industrial-commercial capacity at this time compared to other metropolitan areas, the case of St. Louis provides a particularly useful opportunity to explore how

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[340]The heavy industries in East St. Louis, Illinois, contributed to the metropolitan growth of bi-state St. Louis since the turn of the century. But these industries generally did not represent a migratory trend of industries out of inner-city St. Louis; most were originally established in East St. Louis. I focus on the migration of St. Louis City industries out of the urban core as they moved westward (on the Missouri side).

While population moved westward, manufacturing in St. Louis City centralized even more rather than suburbanized between 1939 and 1947 (a trend different from other metropolitan areas) due to defense spending during WWII that focused on city industries. Also, gasoline rationing discouraged deconcentration as did the lack of flood protection on the East Side. See Noonan's report in Evelyn M. Kitagawa and Donald J. Bogue, *Suburbanization of Manufacturing Activity Within Standard Metropolitan Areas* (Chicago: Scripps Foundation for Research in Population Problems and the Population Research Center of the University of Chicago, 1955), 109-11.

[341]Between 1939 and 1947, St. Louis' population suburbanized rapidly as the natural overflow of population crossed city boundaries into the suburbs (and spurred by the poor conditions of the city's housing stock). See Kitagawa and Bogue, *Suburbanization of Manufacturing*, 109-11.

[342]Kitagawa and Bogue, *Suburbanization of Manufacturing*, 109-11.

suburban officials after WWII, in one metropolitan area, self-consciously conceived of and launched suburban economic development within a metropolitan framework.

Predicting that postwar job growth in St. Louis City would prove insufficient to support the booming suburban population, St. Louis County officials under Supervisor Matthews began a vigorous campaign to create industrial and commercial sites in their own backyard. In the early 1950s, networking through St. Louis County government offices, the St. Louis Chamber of Commerce, and local business offices, suburban planners and developers initiated land-use plans, public improvements (i.e., road access, flood protection, and utility services), and devised county building codes and tax structures appropriate for industrial-commercial development. Their plans for industrial expansion would unfold within their larger framework for metropolitan development, which combined shopping malls, residential neighborhoods, educational and governmental institutions, and recreational sites to create a "multifaceted community" out of the predominantly residential St. Louis County.[343]

St. Louis County officials like Luman Matthews and their allies in development and planning were eager and prepared to foster the county's development. Many of these individuals had administrative and professional experience through county governmental positions in the 1940s and 1950s. Moreover, numerous St. Louis County business and political leaders had served in governmental positions and active duty during WWII, where they participated in the networking and the strategies that combined resources and manpower for wartime planning and production. They brought to suburban development

[343]Walsh described St. Louis County as a "new community" in "Industrial Parks: Progenitors of Progress," *St. Louis Commerce*, v46 (November 1972): 26.

a belief in the efficacy of good government and of large-scale planning and also a sense of optimism that they not only could accomplish their goals but had a civic duty to do so. St. Louis County public officials and business leaders tended to be native St. Louisans, although they would be joined by businessmen who relocated from outside of St. Louis, generally from the East. Luman Matthews was representative of this breed of suburban officials. Matthews grew up in St. Louis County, focused his professional career on bringing a business approach to government, and became the driving force behind the improvement of social services, infrastructure, and government organization in the county. Matthews' early and significant influence shaped the direction, goals, and style of suburban public officials and businessmen allying through the Chamber of Commerce, county government, and numerous planning and development firms in suburban St. Louis.

Working within this institutional and intellectual framework, St. Louis County leaders in the 1950s began to articulate their vision for suburban industrial expansion. As Supervisor Matthews, planner Hermann F. Wagner, and developer Andrew H. Bauer explained, St. Louis County leaders intended their development strategies to meet three conditions: the creation of a broad employment and tax base, the preservation of a "country-like setting," and the evolution of sites that met postwar industrial planning and design trends. Wagner and Bauer ranked among the most influential proponents of metropolitan planning and development. Wagner held a key position with the St. Louis County planning offices. Bauer led the prominent Bauer Properties and would become a

chairman of the St. Louis Regional Industrial Development Corp. (RIDC) in the 1960s.[344] Their vision became evident in the pages of St. Louis' main business journal, *St. Louis Commerce*, and in the recommendations and studies of the St. Louis Chamber of Commerce and St. Louis County planning and development offices.

St. Louis County's emerging demographic structure, not just its rising population count, raised local leaders' concern for the socioeconomic stability of the county. Between 1950 and 1960 alone, population in St. Louis County increased by 73.2% and by 1970 the county's population had more than doubled its 1940 count. The migration of white city residents to the St. Louis suburbs accounted largely for this growth. St. Louis' residential suburbanization, despite its unusually rapid rate in the 1940s and 1950s compared to other urban centers, reflected a nation-wide trend. In 1970, the percentage of Americans living in suburbs was almost exactly double what it had been in 1940 and more Americans lived in suburban areas (37.6%) than in central cities (31.4%) or in rural areas (31%), a development that St. Louis city planner Harland Bartholomew had forecast in 1940.[345] Observing the transformation of residential and transportation patterns in metropolitan St. Louis, Hermann Wagner noted in 1960 that the

> Increased urbanization of the county, an upsurge in the population, plus wider uses of the automobile forced changes in the county's traditional pattern of development. In addition, employment opportunities in the city itself have not increased enough to absorb all those citizens who live in the county and seek work in the city. In essence, today while the

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[344]Andrew H. Bauer was owner and chairman of Bauer Properties, a prominent industrial and office developer in St. Louis. Like many in his cohort, Bauer came from St. Louis and served in WWII.
[345]Fishman, *Bourgeois Utopias*, 182. Harland Bartholomew, "The American City: Disintegration is Taking Place," *Vital Speeches* 7 (1 November 1940): 61, and St. Louis City Plan Commission (hereafter cited as the St. Louis CPC), *St. Louis After the War* (1942). Kenneth T. Jackson discusses "white flight" in St. Louis in *Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 209.

> living area function is still paramount, *the county is also becoming a source of employment as well.*[346]

As St. Louis County Supervisor Lawrence K. Roos (1962-1974) argued, the industrialization of the suburbs was critical in order to generate jobs for the 40% of the population under twenty years of age and to relieve individual tax payers of some of their tax burden.[347] Following Matthew's lead, Roos would become St. Louis County's most influential Supervisor. This St. Louisan was a banker by profession (and a moderate Republican) but was motivated to run for public office in order to improve government efficiency and guide the county's economic development.[348] Business leaders like John G. Walsh became Roos' right-hand men. Walsh, like Roos, was born in St. Louis and served in the war. He returned to St. Louis to work in business promotion and then head the St. Louis County Business and Industrial Development Corporation (BIDC).[349]

Walsh, Roos, and their allies assessed technological advances in industrial production, in addition to demographic changes, as they evaluated the county's employment demands. The St. Louis County Plan commissioners warned in 1962 that the trend of automation and greater worker productivity "causes larger investments in machinery and results in fewer employees per acre."[350] Thus, BIDC officials concluded,

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[346]"Proposal Urged to Aid Orderly County Growth," *St. Louis Commerce* v35 (July 1961): 9-11. My emphasis.

[347]St. Louis County's expansion since WWII cost the government much more in new services than it got back in new taxes, see "Roos Terms Industrial Program as Productive," *The Register*, October 2, 1965.

[348]Roos was assisted by individuals like Harry Morley, who headed the St. Louis County Department of Administration under Roos. Morely formerly served as a HUD official and later would head Taylor-Morley Homebuilders Corporation and serve on the Missouri Highway Commission.

[349]John G. Walsh directed the BIDC from 1970-1983. He had worked at Monsanto for eighteen years in public relations. Walsh also served as president of the St. Louis Convention and Visitors Commission.

[350]In accordance with historical labor needs, city manufacturing employed about forty-four employees per acre. The Commission estimated that industries relocating to St. Louis County would require about half that many and the ratio would only decrease as firms continued to automate (and eventually employ only about

they faced an even greater urgency to ensure a high ratio between the number of acres converted to industrial use and the number of potential workers in St. Louis County. Reflecting upon the challenges that he and his colleagues faced, Walsh emphasized that "it takes a balanced mix of jobs, housing, and commerce to make new communities successful."[351] St. Louis County officials indeed envisioned themselves creating a new metropolitan community out of their bedroom suburb. In their view, St. Louis County would depend upon downtown St. Louis for many business services and cultural amenities but would rely upon suburban-based commercial and industrial enterprises for job and revenue growth. Development in the center and periphery on this model would transform metropolitan St. Louis into "one economic entity," in Roos' words.[352]

Yet St. Louis County leaders intended that their industrial policies not destroy the "country-like atmosphere" of the suburbs. Suburban residential life in St. Louis and in other metropolitan centers had blossomed in the last half-century as urban residents sought to escape the chaos and dense environment of industrialized city life.[353] As the St. Louis County Plan Commission concluded in 1962, many suburban residents rejected the admission of industrial activity into their community. Yet the St. Louis County Plan Commission asserted that

> Community reluctance to change public controls on land use to favor industry is understandable. The public still thinks of all manufacturing in terms of noise, odors, and smoke. . . . .Before the public surrenders its freedom to build homes on land needed for future factories, *it must be convinced that such a sacrifice is in the best public interest.*[354]

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eleven workers per acre by 1980). See St. Louis County Planning Commission, *Guide for Growth* (1962), 50 (Missouri Historical Society; hereafter cited as MHS).

[351]"Industrial Parks: Progenitors of Progress," 26.

[352] See "City-to-County Moves By Firms Cited in Study," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, March 10, 1965.

[353]See, for example, Fishman, *Bourgeois Utopias,* and Jackson, *Crabgrass Frontier.*

[354]St. Louis County Planning Commission, *Guide for Growth*, 52.

Thus developers like Bauer and planners like Wagner faced the challenge of promoting industrial planning consistent with residents' desire for orderly suburban development. Otherwise, they would face challenges to their proposed land-use plans.[355] County officials' resolution to the problem of accommodating industrial growth while retaining the amenities of suburban living would take shape in the campus-like "planned industrial park." In the early 1950s, a number of St. Louis developers, Andrew H. Bauer particularly, would help to pioneer the national trend in industrial "campus park" development. Yet beyond local residential pressures, a fundamental transformation in the nature of American industrial capitalism directed their focus on these planned suburban parks: the emergence of "knowledge-intensive" production.

St. Louis County leaders like Roos and Bauer fashioned their vision of suburban development according thus to a third factor: the production demands of postwar industries. Since the early twentieth century, the demands of traditional Fordist production increasingly encouraged industrialists to search for large expanses of space away from the inner city and, by the mid-twentieth century, more formal conceptions of an industrial park to house their facilities. Technological innovations and production planning trends had boost industrialists' need for large expanses of level land, as historians Robert Lewis, Josh Freeman, and Joel Rast, among others, have discussed.[356]

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[355]In 1974, for example, St. Louis County residents delayed plans for Mallinckrodt's new headquarters by challenging the proposed zoning changes.

[356]Robert Lewis, "Changing Fortunes of American Central-City Manufacturing, 1870-1950," *Journal of Urban History* #5 28 (July 2002): 573-98; Joshua B. Freeman, *Working-Class New York: Life and Labor Since WWII* (New York: The New Press, 2000); Joel Rast, *Remaking Chicago: The Political Origins of Urban Industrial Change* (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1999).

This "increase in industrial [land] needs," as St. Louis County planners asserted, "is reflected in. . . .the horizontal production methods, parking space, long-span buildings on one floor. . . . now required by industry" and made possible by technological and transportation advancements that had freed manufacturers from locating in inner-city, multi-storied facilities.[357]

The progenitors to suburban industrial parks, like the 700-acre Hazelwood-Airport Industrial District (1945) in St. Louis, intended to address these manufacturing needs. Industrial parks would prove highly attractive to industrial investors because they negotiate with just one property owner for land and are spared the time and effort of assembling acreage, checking ownerships, property lines, titles, and descriptions.[358] Even as these early parks began to serve traditional Fordist manufacturing demands, stand-alone mass production on this model was becoming less of an advantage, business leaders realized over the course of the 1950s and 1960s, as the organization of work, production, and corporate administration began to change. The rapid growth of advanced manufacturing technology, the high-technology sector (including biomedical industries, information technology, aeronautics, microelectronics, high-technology instruments, and the energy and the chemicals sectors), and research and development after WWII manifest a spatial dimension as it required upgraded and more land-intensive infrastructure for production and administration. Developers' early conception of the

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[357]St. Louis County Planning Commission, *Guide for Growth*, 52.

[358]See "St. Louis County's Dramatic Change: Bucolic to Boom," *St. Louis Commerce* v41 (November 1967): 11-12; "The Planned Industrial Subdivision: It is a Plus for Economic Development," *St. Louis Commerce* (November 1967): 8-9; and "Acres for Industry: St. Louis Industrial Parks," *St. Louis Commerce*, v37 (September 1963): 18. St. Louis County officials noted that tax incentives also encouraged firms to move to industrial parks in the suburbs.

industrial park would evolve in order to meet the physical-plant demands of this increasingly "knowledge-intensive" economy.[359]

In the early 1950s, St. Louis County developers and Monsanto executives launched development of Monsanto's 300-acre suburban headquarters and research park. Monsanto's suburban campus, with its high-tech labs and research facilities, administrative offices, and close communication with its production facilities, reflected the infrastructure demands of an increasingly knowledge-based economy. The success of knowledge-intensive industries depends upon continuous innovation and improvement in production and products. Thus corporate executives demand close communication among research labs, industrial production sites, and, most often, universities, and intend to harness the ideas and innovative capability of all of their workers, from the R&D lab to the factory floor. Thus, in contrast to traditional Fordism, where value and productivity growth depended upon physical input and split innovation/intellectual and physical labor, knowledge-based industries like Monsanto depended upon closer linkages between the two. And whereas traditional manufacturing depended heavily upon a mass of low-skilled workers, knowledge-intensive industries required growing numbers of highly skilled workers and technologically-trained professionals. Industrial developers and planners like Andrew Bauer conceived of the "campus-like" industrial park as a site at which

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[359]For discussions of the "knowledge-intensive" economy, see, for example, Richard Florida, "The Industrial Transformation of the Great Lakes Region," in *The Rise of the Rustbelt*, ed. by Philip Cook (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995): 162-76, and Daniel Felsenstein, "High Technology Employment Concentration and Urban Sprawl in the Chicago Metropolitan Area," in *Suburban Sprawl: Private Decisions and Public Policy*, ed. by Wim Wiewel and Joseph J. Persky (New York: M.A. Sharpe, 2001): 207-27.

businesses could combine their production, innovation, managerial, and back-office work in one setting (or a grouping of some of these functions) and in a controlled physical environment that allowed production flexibility to meet changes in market demands. Moreover, the campus-like setting appealed to its highly-trained employees. This suburban model also allowed corporations to centralize their operations in high-visibility headquarters, as did Monsanto. The philosophy of developers like Thomas J. White (president of White Development Corp.) astutely recognized the changing labor and location demands of postwar production. White's colleagues, in fact, considered him a visionary in his field as he pioneered the office-industrial park boom along St. Louis County's I-270 beltway.[360] "As needs have been transformed by technology, science and automation," White asserted,

> Industry of today requires vast pools of educated and skilled manpower, research facilities, access to ready markets, proper climate, roads and space. All this emphasizes the need for planning in order to set new standards in industrial development, to facilitate company and employee convenience, to increase efficiency and, through provision of beauty and green space, to improve morale, lower labor turnover, and create a better way of life for all.[361]

As White suggested, the expansion of a technologically-trained labor force contributed significantly to the demand of corporate executives for suburban business parks. To compete successfully for the industrial "brains," Mallinckrodt's CEO Harold Thayer argued, corporations must offer work settings with on-site amenities and green spaces, convenient highway access, and proximity to low-density suburban housing preferred by white-collar workers—"campus-like" work places set in well-planned

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[360]White built Westport Plaza, which sparked the I-270 corridor boom, and the Hanley Industrial Park (1951), the first of its kind in St. Louis. He was instrumental in encouraging downtown offices to relocate to St. Louis County.

[361]"Acres for Industry," 18.

suburban communities.[362] And a suburban-based facility would enable a business to draw more readily from the growing concentration of white- and pink-collar suburban residents for employee-intensive operations like new data processing centers.[363]

The diversity of industrial parks in St. Louis County would accommodate, then, more traditional manufacturing concerns and the needs of knowledge-intensive industries. Industrial designers in St. Louis County like Andrew Bauer, architects like William D. Peckham, and developers like John Dale Perkinson of the highly successful Linclay Corporation, influenced the national trend in suburban industrial parks as they experimented with new forms and designs in their projects.[364] Native St. Louisan Perksinson, known as a "wheeler and dealer" and innovator in his field, popularized the suburban park in St. Louis as his company (collaborating with Peckham's firm) led the way in rapid and efficient development. Behind the more transparent requirement for land-intensive industrial spaces, according to Perkinson, suburban business parks reflected changing ideas about property and space among corporate planners and developers. As the Linclay president explained, "our philosophy from the start has been to develop industrial areas that will hold their property value. Real estate is a particularly

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[362]"Mallinckrodt and Ralston Treat Community Differently," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, April 3, 1974; "City's Decline—Mallinckrodt Move An Example of the Problem," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, October 28, 1973.

[363]The growing educational demands of the postwar labor force encouraged educational and political leaders to create community colleges and expand vocational schools and universities. In St. Louis, city and county officials began the multi-campus St. Louis Community College system in the early 1960s, resulting in four extensive, new educational centers on St. Louis' metropolitan landscape. Thus their industrial strategies influenced other institutional changes that transformed the metropolitan landscape.

[364]John Dale Perkinson, from St. Louis County, studied engineering and then moved into development. At 29 years of age, he helped his company win the Western Electric contract to build their new office building (1965). Perkinson bought his first plot adjacent to Westport Plaza in 1966. William D. Peckham, an old friend of Perkinson, ran his own architectural firm. Their firms grew rapidly as they worked together closely and promoted I-270 development.

good investment if you can control the environment." Developers had begun pushing the idea to industrial leaders that property should become an investment for their companies, not merely a necessary factor of production, Perkinson explained.[365] "Aware that an investment in aesthetics pays long-range dividends, developers of industrial property in the St. Louis area are taking pains to provide new projects that are both functional and artistically correct," according to Peckham, and are "awakening to the importance of esthetics in environment."[366] According to Richard Shepard, vice president of Linclay, "there is a psychological plus for a firm that knows it has put a plant in an area designed and set aside for industry."[367]

In BIDC offices, St. Louis County Plan Commission meetings, real estate company offices, and through publications like *St. Louis Commerce*, county leaders like Perkinson articulated a view of postwar suburbanization informed by and contributing to ideas emerging in the fields of industrial design, aesthetics, human resources, and production planning. County planners like Malcolm Drummond pushed for the orderly, efficient, and strategic allocation of suburban land.[368] As the Plan Commission stated in *St. Louis Commerce* in 1961, the

> Key feature of modern American corporate growth is centered around planning, planning for efficiency in production, planning for new products, planning for the steady and orderly expansion of markets and business operation.

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[365]"Young Man on the Go," *St. Louis Commerce* v 43 (November 1968): 23-24.
[366]Art Baebler of St. Louis' Union Electric Company (UE) bolstered this point in "Developers of Industrial Property Find Built-In Esthetics Are Good Investment," *St. Louis Commerce* v42 (November 1968): 30-32. Art Baebler would resign from UE and became executive vice president of the St. Louis Regional Commerce and Growth Association (RCGA) in 1974.
[367]"Developers of Industrial Property Find Built-In Esthetics," 30-32.
[368]Malcolm Drummond was an associate partner of the nationally-known Harland Bartholomew and Associates urban planning consulting firm.

According to director Hermann F. Wagner, the Plan Commission intended to bring "that major corporate ingredient. . . .to aid the future growth of St. Louis County."[369] The "latest concepts of industrial site planning must be introduced" to meet the growing demand for industrial space, the Commission asserted. [370] Suburban business and public officials made the primary innovation in postwar industrial development—the planned industrial park—the keystone of their postwar planning practices.

St. Louis County leaders' industrial development ideas yielded tangible results on the suburban landscape. Planning officials like Hermann Wagner, private real estate developers like Andrew Bauer, and Chamber of Commerce officials like John Kerr created an effective institutional network for suburban development. They would prepare thousands of acres for industrial and commercial use in the 1950s and 1960s. The St. Louis County *Land Use Plan* of 1960 for example, called for an increase of industrial acreage from 2,000 acres to about 17,000 acres; commercial expansion from 177 acres to around 6,000 acres; residential development to 120,500 acres from 56,800 acres; and green spaces for recreation and public/semi-public areas to accommodate educational and government institutions.[371] County leaders envisioned large-scale industries like automobile and high-tech sectors like aerospace (by 1950, the county housed the Ford Company and McDonnell Aircraft) and a diversity of smaller industrial firms comprising

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[369]"Proposal Urged to Aid Orderly County Growth," 9-11.
[370]St. Louis County Planning Commission, *Guide for Growth*, 52. Most companies would prefer to locate in parks than to "fend for themselves to gain the shrinking number of available sites outside of the parks," Richard Shepard observed. See "Developers of Industrial Property Find Built-In Esthetics are Good Investment," 31.
[371]"Proposal Urged to Aid Orderly County Growth," 9-11.

the suburban economic base. St. Louis County leaders listed among the milestones in industrial park development the following sites: [372]

1945: 700-acre Hazelwood-Airport Industrial District
1947: 10-acre Maplewood Industrial Court
1953: 50-acre Hanley Industrial District
1954: 15-acre Rock Hill Industrial Court
1955: 130-acre Lindbergh-Warson Industrial Center and 35-acre Olivette Industrial Acres
1957: 50-acre Hampton Industrial District
1958: 47-acre Page Industrial Center
1959: 500-acre Meremac Industrial Park; 60-acre Lakeside Industrial Park; 16-acre DeSmet Industrial Park
1960: 16-acre Affton Industrial Park; 20-acre Brownport Industrial Park; 69-acre Lamberton Commercial-Industrial Center
1961: 52-acre Maryland Heights Industrial Court
1962: 11-acre Brentwood Industrial Park; 3500-acre Champ Industrial Village; 110-acre Tree Court Industrial Park; 13-acre Trenton Industrial park; 260-acre West Port Plaza
1963: 26-acre Lackland Industrial Park; 6-acre Seidel Industrial Park; 1037-acre St. Louis Air Park

By 1970, St. Louis County business developers and planners had tripled the amount of industrial park acreage that the county had in 1960. The county contained fifty-two such parks covering around 6,800 acres (St. Louis City had at that time seven such districts with 715 acres) and concentrating along growth corridors in the North, South, and West sections of St. Louis County.[373] BIDC official John Walsh attributed the county's industrial growth in large part to these industrial parks. Between 1956 and 1967, the number of manufacturing firms in the county increased by 70% and in warehousing and distribution, the percentage of increase was twice that figure (the Chamber of Commerce counted around 700 manufacturing firms in the county in 1967).[374]

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[372]"Acres for Industry," 15.
[373]During the 1960s, the industrial land absorption rate in the county due to relocations from the city, expansions, and new business start ups amounted to approximately 750 acres per year. See "Industrial Parks: A Plus for Economic Development," *St. Louis Commerce* v 70 (November 1970): 20-22. See also "St. Louis Metropolitan Area Planned Industrial Districts and Parks," *St. Louis Commerce* v43 (November 1969) (insert) and "St. Louis County's Dramatic Change," 11-12.
[374]"St. Louis County Green, Great, Growing," *St. Louis Commerce* v 41 (January 1967): 10-13, and "St. Louis County's Dramatic Change," 11-12.

This model of industrial-site expansion shaped the geography of metropolitan economic development not only in St. Louis but in urban centers nation-wide. Developers, planners, and industrial investors in St. Louis and elsewhere found industrial parks enticing enough to increase their total number more than ten-fold between 1950 (under 100) and 1970 (over 2400).[375] Reflecting the interrelationship between transportation and industrial infrastructure that shaped spatial patterns of metropolitanization, highway access and the construction of beltways, which circumvented most if not all of their central cities, significantly influenced metropolitan industrial development. In St. Louis, as developer Thomas J. White anticipated, the location of industrial parks proved highly sensitive to the location of St. Louis' beltway. To be sure, beltways have encouraged the dispersal of industry and commerce outside of central cities like St. Louis.[376]

Planned industrial parks, according to John Walsh, Thomas White, and other park advocates, resolved the industrial developmental challenges that they faced at mid-century. As one BIDC official asserted,

> This type of development is an ideal solution to the ever present problem of efficient land use. Progressive and responsible developers like Mr. Bauer have been one of St. Louis County's greatest assets. The development of [such parks] assures the citizens of the preservation of natural beauty and total living facilities, while providing the economic growth necessary to keep their tax base at proper level.[377]

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[375]Thomas M. Stanback, Jr., and Richard V. Knight, *Suburbanization and the City* (Montclair, N.J.: Allanheld, Osmun, and Co. Publishers, 1976), 38.

[376]A mid-1960s Federal Highway Administration study found that beltways encouraged growth outside central cities. In St. Louis between 1965 and 1970, industrial employment density rose most sharply in the area beyond the beltway, as noted in Stanback and Knight, *Suburbanization and the City*, 26.

[377]"Acres for Industry," 15, 16. The Chamber of Commerce also emphasized that twenty manufacturing jobs are generated by every net acre in an industrial park and that each new manufacturing job created 2.54 non-manufacturing jobs. Yet postwar industrial production was less labor intensive due to technological innovations so this could still represent a net loss of jobs as a city firm relocated to more automated facilities.

Industrial parks amounted to "creative real estate achievements" because they addressed the problems of haphazard growth and unprotected environment that hindered industrial development.[378] Supervisor Roos and his coterie of public officials and business leaders thus intended to transform their county from a rural community into a metropolitan partner for postwar growth: St. Louis County, they predicted, would become an easily accessible regional industrial center that fueled metropolitan demand for office, retail, and entertainment services in downtown St. Louis.

St. Louis County Industrial Development in Postwar Metropolitan Context

Scholars like Kenneth Jackson have shown how the federal government facilitated postwar suburbanization, particularly through home-ownership policies and highway construction programs.[379] The story of suburban leaders like Luman Matthews, Lawrence Roos, and Thomas White suggests how local leaders, within the context of federal-funded development, critically influenced the economic geography of their suburbs by shaping the location and extent of industrial development therein. Fishman, acknowledging that many observers view postwar suburban growth as "chaotic sprawl," argued that planners and developers imposed logic to suburban growth, particularly through the work-home ration.[380] The case of St. Louis fuels Fishman's argument against "chaotic growth." The story of St. Louis also supports his assertion that postwar

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[378]"Acres for Industry," 18.
[379]See, for example, Jackson, *Crabgrass Frontier*.
[380]The main structure to suburban development, he asserts, was the work-home ratio, Fishman, *Bourgeois Utopias*, 190-91.

suburbanization represents a structural discontinuity with pre-1945 suburbanization trends because the suburbs now had a more interdependent, less dependent, relationship with the urban core. For county leaders, this metropolitan interdependence was key to St. Louis' growth as development in the periphery, they argued, would ultimately provide dividends to the center and boost the regional economy as a whole.

Industrial expansion anchored St. Louis County leaders' broader concept of postwar metropolitan development. Hermann Wagner, John Perkinson, and their colleagues in county government called for the development of "multi-core" complexes across the suburban landscape. Each would comprise a high-density center of commercial services for industry surrounded by plants, warehouses, and office buildings. These complexes located in and fostered St. Louis County's growth corridors as they unfolded along main highways and thoroughfares. Suburban leaders' framework for metropolitan development intended to serve the demands of suburban residents and businesses.[381] Residents, Lawrence Roos predicted, would look to their immediate surroundings rather than the city for their jobs and other needs. High- and middle-income suburban workers usually favored low-density, outer suburban living and their lifestyles are heavily auto-dependent. St. Louis County leaders' metropolitan concept, similar to leaders in other metropolitan centers, thus included educational institutions (i.e., new junior colleges), governmental and business administrative centers (i.e., the City of Clayton), enclosed

[381]St. Louis County officials discussed metropolitan development in articles like "Industrial Park Gains Favor," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, October 31, 1968. Their vision compared to that of other suburban leaders. As Fishman discussed in *Bourgeois Utopias*, advanced communication technology and highways made such a decentralized region economically possible because it allows contact and journey time among work, home, and consumption areas. On the influence of high-technology industries on metropolitan land use see also Felsenstein, "High Technology Employment Concentration and Urban Sprawl," 207-27.

shopping malls, recreation/entertainment spaces, and a full range of housing types. The physical structure of metropolitan expansion is best expressed by its transportation infrastructure, which defined its boundaries, created convenient linkages among work, shopping, and home, and connected the metropolis with regional, national, and, increasingly global networks (i.e., Lambert International Airport).[382]

Observing suburban St. Louis' development along this model, John Walsh proclaimed that "St. Louis County can be thankful it has developers of vision and courage who have recognized the need for multi-faceted communities and are building accordingly."[383] Political scientist Todd Swanstrom and historian Fishman accurately described St. Louis and other metropolitan areas as a "polynucleated metropolis" because they became characterized by several nodes of concentrated economic activity.[384] Yet despite this emerging metropolitan geography, county officials asserted that downtown would always remain the "heartbeat" of St. Louis. Concurrently, St. Louis County officials and business leaders with suburban interests developed a rhetoric of "metropolitanism" that interpreted the nature of the regional and national industrial competition that postwar St. Louis faced and provided a prescription for sharpening her

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[382]County officials encouraged linkages between industrial centers and interstates as an incentive to industrialists like Bill Bangert of the R. C. Can Company. D. Reid Ross told Bangert that they would help him to receive approval from the Missouri State Highway Commission to construct an interchange with Interstate 270 and thus provide his company with direct access to the highway. Letter to Bill Bangert from D. Reid Ross, February 24, 1964 (Lawrence K. Roos Collection (hereafter cited as the Roos Collection), Box 104, Folder: Business and Industrial Inquiries; MHS). The suburban highway intersections and terminals would encourage suburban agglomeration of commercial and economic as firms sought to maximize their access to these high-traffic areas. Airports played an influential role in this development. See Stanback and Knight, *Suburbanization and the City*, 29.

[383]"Industrial Parks: Progenitors of Progress," 26.

[384]Dennis R. Judd and Todd Swanstrom, *City Politics: Private Power and Public Policy* (New York: Longman, 2002), 167.

competitive edge on this new playing field—which arose from structural transformations in the nation's industrial economy and the emergence of the aggressively pro-business Sunbelt.

St. Louis Suburban Leaders and a New Metropolitan Rhetoric

St. Louis County industrial development was critical in the emergence of an argument for "metropolitanism" as articulated by county officials, planners, and developers and corporate leaders with suburban interests. By the early 1960s, these suburban leaders had formulated a vision of metropolitan cooperation and regional development ("metropolitanism") that reflected their prescription for revitalization in postwar St. Louis. Supervisor Roos, county development officials like D. Reid Ross (director of the Public and Industrial Development Commission for St. Louis County; executive vice president of the St. Louis Regional Industrial Development Corp.), and business leaders like Mallinckrodt CEO Harold Thayer argued that the suburbs provided St. Louis' best opportunity to foster industrial growth. While existing inner-city programs to retain manufacturing will help to stabilize the urban core, St. Louis County leaders asserted that new industrial initiatives should target the suburbs because the inner city could not meet the infrastructure requirements of postwar industrial production trends. As we have seen, suburban leaders like Thayer and Ross intended to show that suburban development would actually complement inner-city revitalization initiatives like Mill Creek Valley and the Arch, not threaten their success, because it would generate greater demand for inner-city businesses and amenities. Indeed, in their view, these strategies were two sides of the coin of sound metropolitan development. This model for

economic growth represented not only their view of the interdependence between the city and its suburb. More significantly, their formula reflected St. Louis leaders' recognition that guiding development on a metropolitan scale was necessary if St. Louis intended to compete regionally and nationally for industrial and commercial investment and residents.

Metropolitanism, then, as articulated by suburban leaders, was ultimately an argument for how St. Louisans should respond to growing competition from the Sunbelt and the rural Midwest for industrial investment. In light of structural transformations that were reshaping industrial production (increasing automation of industry, accelerating shift to "knowledge-based" production, and the growth of the service and tourism sectors) and the rivalry posed by the Sunbelt, the expansion of urban industries in the suburbs was critical to securing St. Louis' long-run stability, they argued. Suburban industrial planning provided St. Louis firms with an incentive to remain in the metropolitan area: St. Louis County offered large land parcels for the expansion and modernization of operations while remaining linked to regional and national transportation, supply, and distribution networks. Suburban development thus made competitive upgrading and an industrial-belt address mutually compatible. The alternative, St. Louis County officials and businessmen argued, is the collapse of many St. Louis companies to the competition or to a more lucrative business climate in the Sunbelt. Metropolitan industrial development would prove to be a win-win game for St. Louis' center and periphery, Ross, Thayer, and like-minded businessmen argued. The price of regional stability might be paid by the urban core in the short term as the hub of

the industrial base shifted to the suburbs. But in the long-run, suburban development, complemented by emerging downtown services and tourism, would stabilize the St. Louis region. Metropolitan restructuring on this model would keep St. Louis a competitive regional and national player in postwar industrial development.

St. Louis suburban leaders' definition of metropolitanism thus resolved the apparent paradox in their simultaneous support for inner-city revitalization and recruitment of industrial and commercial firms to St. Louis County. In a letter to the St. Louis City Municipal Business Development Corporation (MBDC) from the St. Louis Regional Industrial Development Corporation (Chapter Five), D. Reid Ross and other RIDC leaders stated that suburban industrial activity "should have direct bearing on the city" as the firms will "be a customer of city-based firms" and so "generate more tax revenue for the city and generate more retail sales by firms located in the city."[385] And according to Carl G. Stifel of Stifel Realty Co.,

> It is not so important where industry locates in the metropolitan St. Louis area as it is that metropolitan St. Louis gets the industry that supplies the job opportunities and payrolls so badly needed in this area. Industry, regardless of which industrial area it locates in, will benefit all metropolitan St. Louisans. [386]

This sentiment was echoed by influential civic leaders like Alfred H. Kerth (former mayor of Clayton and chairman of the St. Louis Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce). The county's industrial growth, according to Roos, is "conclusive proof that people, jobs,

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[385]Letter to Sam Bernstein from D. Reid Ross, February 15, 1968 (City of St. Louis, Office of the Mayor, Files of Alfonso J. Cervantes (hereafter cited as the Cervantes Files), Series 1, Box 28, Folder: RIDC Feasibility Reports; University Archives Collections, Washington University).

[386]Attorney Alfred H. Kerth served as mayor (Republican) of Clayton from 1940-1946. Kerth served on many bank boards and campaigned successfully with Luman Matthews to convince the state legislature to grant St. Louis County home rule. "Acres for Industry," 24; "County Leading Area in State, Roos Asserts," 1965 newspaper clipping (Roos Collection, Box 34, Folder 2B); and "County Industry, Business Record Reported by Roos," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, December 17, 1965.

and purchasing power are more and more moving to the periphery of this metropolitan area, thereby accelerating the process of merging our metropolis into one economic entity."[387] As "one economic entity," Roos postulated, the St. Louis region could draw from all parts of the metropolitan whole to offer industrial and commercial firms the full panoply of services, infrastructure, and employees that they demand.

Yet their argument for metropolitanism would fail to submerge growing conflicts between city and suburban leaders over industrial development. During the 1960s, St. Louis County public officials, particularly D. Reid Ross and Lawrence Roos, would vocalize their position with increasing force as they argued that the persistent industrial losses from the inner-city only proved that suburban industrialization was critical to St. Louis' stability. Moreover, they intended to fend off growing numbers of city officials like Mayor A. J. Cervantes who asserted that city-suburban relocations counteracted inner-city revitalization projects. Yet suburban leaders' metropolitan economic theory transcended the implications of metropolitan political fragmentation. As Bernard A. Edison, president of Edison Bros. Stores Inc., argued (in regard to GM's proposed relocation),

> You have to look at this area with bifocals. . . If you just erased all the political boundaries and took the entire metropolitan area and looked at it, GM's move. . . . represented a huge investment with a lot of construction payroll and jobs and a real shot in the arm for the total area's economy.[388]

Thus metropolitanism, as articulated by suburban leaders, did not realistically account for the fact that the political separation between St. Louis City and St. Louis County meant

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[387]"City-to-County Moves By Firms Cited in Study," *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, March 10, 1965.
[388]"Resurging City Suffers a Setback," *Business Week*, April 7, 1980: 24A.

that a firm's relocation out of the urban core represented a direct tax and job loss from St. Louis City. St. Louis City leaders, in contrast, would confront head-on the harsh implications of political fragmentation in a period of rapid industrial and commercial metropolitanization. Theoretically, suburban leaders' version of metropolitanism postulated a win-win proposition if the St. Louis area gained investment sufficient to generate economic activity in the center and periphery and thereby counter the shift of the city's industrial base to the suburbs. But barring such investment, city-suburban relocations amount to a zero-sum game as St. Louis County grows at the city's expense. This insight is significant because it explains the seeming contradiction between city leaders' support for cooperation and development on a metropolitan scale and their "metropolitan cold war" to keep more industrial and commercial firms in the city. [389] City leaders' alternative vision of metropolitanism would balance inner-city reindustrialization policies with suburban industrial development. Indeed, the metropolitanization of industry between 1950 and 1980 confronted St. Louis City leaders with a problem whose scale and scope they had fully underestimated in the 1950s and early 1960s.

St. Louis Business Leaders and the Metropolitanization of Industry

Since the late 1940s, growing numbers of industrial firms in St. Louis City searched the urban core and began considering St. Louis County for new sites on which to expand or relocate their facilities.[390] After 1945, as Barry Bluestone, Joel Rast,

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[389]"No Metropolitan Cold War," *St. Louis Globe Democrat*, October 11, 1967. Until the late 1950s, most city leaders did not predict a "pronounced move" of the industrial base out of the city, as Noonan's 1955 report concluded. Although city leaders in the 1950s worried about industrial suburbanization, they felt optimistic that industrial retention efforts like MCV could stabilize its manufacturing sector.

[390]See Chapter Two of this dissertation.

Thomas Sugrue, and other scholars have shown, growing numbers of inner-city industrialists relocated to or expanded in suburban and semi-rural areas as they sought to reduce their labor and land costs and moved increasingly to the Sunbelt (and eventually across national borders). This decentralization strategy could help to minimize their need to negotiate with powerful labor unions and pay the high cost of land characteristic of traditional industrial centers.[391] Concurrently, industrialists' acceleration of manufacturing automation, long-span horizontal production, the emergence of research-based industrial production, and an increasingly well-educated labor force made a suburban location increasingly desirable, as we have seen. Additionally, industrial site preparation undertaken by suburban developers made such relocation substantially more efficient for industrialists.

As many St. Louis firms decentralized their facilities, the urban core suffered a persistent drain of industrial firms from virtually every sector of its highly diversified economy, despite local officials' industrial retention efforts (Chapter Two). Yet the decisions of industrialists in cities like St. Louis who chose to leave the urban core were not an automatic or an inevitable outcome of technological advancements and labor influence, a point that Jefferson Cowie, Thomas Noble, and Joel Rast suggest as they explore the role of labor (Cowie and Noble) and inner-city redevelopment pressures (Rast) in industrialists' location decisions. Between 1950 and 1980 in St. Louis, in fact,

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[391]Industrialists' acceleration of manufacturing automation was in part an attempt to reverse labor's gains in the 1930s and 1940s, Thomas Noble and other scholars argue. See Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, *The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry* (New York: Basic Books, 1982); David F. Noble, *Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial Automation* (New York: Knopf, 1984); Rast, *Remaking Chicago*; Thomas Sugrue, *The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

many local business leaders requested assistance from city planning officials and industrial real estate developers while making their decision to build a new plant or distribution center. These businessmen thus weighed their options between the city and the county (Chapter Two).[392]

Despite the desire of many St. Louis firms to invest in the urban core, the dearth of available industrial sites, as we have seen, would discourage many from undertaking capital expansion projects in the city. Yet the large number of firms that invested in St. Louis County rather than the city tends to obscure the contingency behind their industrial location decisions. Indeed it suggests, instead, an inevitable parade of industry from the city to the suburbs. Their move may have been almost certain, but not foreordained. Therefore, before discussing the suburbanization of industry in St. Louis, this section will highlight the voices of some of those businessmen who compared their options in St. Louis City and St. Louis County (see also Chapter Two).

Numerous St. Louis business leaders articulated the negative economic implications for the city if they relocated to St. Louis County. Their voices belied the "greater good" of intra-metropolitan relocations inherent in suburban leaders' viewpoint. Among those businessmen requesting assistance from Mayor Cervantes in the 1960s was G. Thomas Braznell, president of Spray-Chem Corporation. "What can you do to assist us in locating a site or building within the city?" Braznell asked Cervantes, noting that the city could not afford the loss of another firm. His company needed more space, Braznell asserted, and "like most firms in this position, we are naturally looking to the county"

[392]These letters will be cited in a later discussion.

because of the limited amount of sites in the city.[393] Similarly, Philip S. McGrath of the Springmeier Shipping Company wrote to officials in P.I.E. (St. Louis City Plan for Industrial Expansion) and the St. Louis City Plan Commission (CPC) in 1965. In order to avoid a county relocation, his company wanted help in finding room for expansion in the inner city, McGrath wrote.[394] That same year, L. S. Vagnino of the American Beauty Macaroni Co. requested P.I.E. to provide financing for the modernization of its facilities and thereby forego their search in the county.[395] Fred T. Lowy of the Fred T. Lowy Linoleum and Rug Co. Inc. requested Mayor Cervantes to lower the merchants' and manufacturers' tax because "many firms are moving to the county—and if this trend continues, more and more people will have to move to the county, because the ones who are left will find that they have to carry most of the tax load."[396] Lowry was among those businessmen telling city officials to do more to encourage businesses to remain in the urban core through efforts such as tax rate reduction.

In the 1960s and 1970s, St. Louis business leaders who remained in the urban core viewed their decision as a proud statement of support for the city and one that would

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[393] Letter to Mayor A. J. Cervantes from G. Thomas Braznell, October 11, 1965, and Letter to G. Thomas Braznell from Mayor A. J. Cervantes, October 22, 1965 (Cervantes Files, Series 1, Box 28, Folder: Industry, P.I.E.).

[394] Letter to John H. Poelker from Philip S. McGrath, October 27, 1965, and Letter to Mayor A. J. Cervantes from John H. Poelker, November 1, 1965 (Cervantes Files, Series 1, Box 28, Folder: Industry in St. Louis: P.I.E.). They were considering East St. Louis.

[395] Letter to Myron Moss from L. S. Vagnino, November 1, 1965, Letter to Mayor A. J. Cervantes from Myron Moss, November 2, 1965, and Letter to Myron Moss from Mayor A. J. Cervantes, November 24, 1965 (Cervantes Files, Series 1, Box 28, Folder: Industry, P.I.E.); "A Test for Mr. Cervantes," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch,* May 12, 1965.

[396] Mayor Cervantes told Lowry that they reduced the tax ratio two years ago and that he sees a need to revise the state tax structure as the city must get virtually all of its taxing authority from the state. See Letter to Mayor A. J. Cervantes from Fred. T. Lowy, April 20, 1967, and Letter to Fred T. Lowy from Mayor A. J. Cervantes, May 2, 1967 (Cervantes Files, Series 1, Box 28, Folder: St. Louis P.I.E.).

help to strengthen the metropolitan economy. The "enlightened management" of Continental Baking Co., according to the *St. Louis Globe-Democrat* in 1967, consolidated its operations in the city instead of St. Louis County in order to help city officials ameliorate industrial flight to the suburbs.[397] Similarly, Earl J. Boyce, president of Earl J. Boyce and Sons, Inc., purchased a downtown building for manufacturing with the help of the St. Louis City Municipal Business Development Corp. and was glad to abandon his consideration of county sites.[398] And according to the *St. Louis Globe-Democrat* in 1974, Killark Electric Manufacturing Company in North St. Louis has "decided to stay in a decaying inner city area rather than accept some attractive offers to move to the county."[399] St. Louis City's proudest example of corporate commitment to the inner city was Ralston Purina (RP), whose executives kept Ralston's headquarters downtown after exploring suburban sites in the 1950s. Chairman of the Board Donald Danforth made RP's commitment to adjacent urban revitalization efforts part of his corporation's development policy and advertising appeal.[400] Clearly, suburban leaders' argument for metropolitan industrial development failed to convince public officials and many city businessmen in the 1960s and 1970s that aggressive suburban industrialization would not encourage perhaps irreversible business and residential disinvestment from the urban core.

Nevertheless, St. Louis County boosters and investors like Harold E. Thayer firmly believed that they were good corporate citizens who contributed significantly to

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[397]"Hats Off to Continental Baking Company," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, September 7, 1967.
[398]Manufacturing Report, *St. Louis Commerce* v47 (September 1973): 94.
[399]"Killark Electric Caught in Classic Dilemma," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, October 26/27, 1974.
[400]"Four-Story Addition for Ralston Research," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, October 9, 1959.

St. Louis' socioeconomic stability. With Chamber of Commerce members in the 1960s (like John H. Berry, plant manager of Chrysler; Ralph W. Boeringer, vice president of Wagner Electric Corporation; Clark R. Gamble, chairman of the board of Brown Shoe Co.; Stanley Goodman, president of Famous-Barr department store) actively supporting the Arch and Mill Creek Valley, on the one hand, and suburban industrial growth, on the other hand, these leading businessmen made a strong showing for their position that suburbanization and inner city revitalization were mutually compatible. Moreover, they believed it evidenced that their suburban investment did not amount to an "abandonment" of the urban core, even as corporate executives like Ralton's Donald Danforth implicitly challenged this position.[401] This argument worked, within their framework, because business leaders like Thayer took as their unit of analysis a politically undifferentiated metropolitan landscape wherein investment in one part generated dividends for the whole. And the suburbs provided the greatest return on most industrial investment and thus the most logical site for development, from their perspective. In this way, Thayer's vision of metropolitanism melded good corporate citizenship with his business prerogative: what was good for business was good for metropolitan St. Louis. These arguments, which appeared with growing frequency in the 1960s and 1970s in journals like *St. Louis Commerce* did not mention that the city consequently lost a large volume of its tax receipts and jobs. Such recognition would highlight that their metropolitan theories and long-term prognoses did nothing to address the growing budget and employment crises in St. Louis City, problems that were structured by the very combination of the

[401]Records pertaining to the St. Louis Chamber of Commerce are held at MHS and at the Western Historical Manuscripts Collection, University of Missouri, St. Louis (hereafter cited as the WHMC).

city-county political separation and the metropolitanization of industry, commerce, and population in St. Louis.

The suburbanization of St. Louis manufacturing accelerated between the late 1950s and the 1970s.[402] The postwar pioneers in St. Louis County were Ford Motor Co. assembly plant (North St. Louis County) and Famous-Barr department store (Clayton) in 1948. These relocations exerted a marked influence on the business migration trend, one industrially and the other commercially. The decisions of hundreds of businessmen since the late 1940s to move beyond city boundaries would help to create a new metropolitan geography of industry and commerce in postwar St. Louis.[403]

A New Metropolitan Geography of Industry and Commerce

Many of St. Louis' oldest firms invested in St. Louis County, and they framed their suburban investments as evidence of their continued commitment to St. Louis. Electrical equipment, shoes, chemicals, automobile, and other durable goods industries fueled this metropolitanization of St. Louis' industrial and commercial base. Names well known in the city's industrial history—and backers of inner-city revitalization efforts—like Brown Shoe Company, Monsanto, Mallinckrodt, and GM were among those

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[402]"St. Louis County Green, Great, Growing," 10-13. Compare, for example, Noonan's 1955 City Plan Commission report with the monthly industrial and commercial reports in *St. Louis Commerce* in the 1960s and 1970s to see the shift of many industrial and commercial firms to St. Louis County.

[403]I do not have the data to trace the specific migration waves of distinct industries over time (in terms of its chronology of suburbanization and exact relocation pattern in St. Louis County). Therefore the following section is more descriptive for the 1945-1980 period rather than analytical in discussing the metropolitanization of industry in St. Louis. However, my research thus far suggests that during the 1950s most of St. Louis' primary manufacturing sectors began to be represented in St. Louis County with new factories. Concurrently, industrial firms began to locate managerial offices and advanced technological laboratories and production facilities in St. Louis County in the early 1950s (i.e., Monsanto). And Clayton's burgeoning growth since this time reflected the shift of production-service employment (banks, accountants, lawyers, advertising agencies, skilled technicians, and other support personnel for industries) from the urban core to the suburbs. Based on these patterns, I have not detected strongly distinct chronological patterns of suburbanization by different industries and employment sectors.

companies that built new production and distribution facilities, research labs, and office complexes in St. Louis County. In 1948, for example, Ford Motor Company (in St. Louis City since 1907) and GM (in St. Louis City since 1918) built additional plants in North St. Louis County. Ford and GM managers stated that they wanted to remain in metropolitan St. Louis due to its central location and their long-term relationship with St. Louis. They could not find adequate space for new, modernized facilities in the city, they asserted, and thus had to build in the suburbs.[404] In 1961, Wohl Shoe Company (division of Brown Shoe Co., founded in 1916) built a $2,500,000 national distributing warehouse on a 17.44 acre site in South St. Louis County. Reflecting the changing industrial geography of postwar St. Louis, Wohl converted downtown warehousing facilities to office space while exporting its industrial facilities to the suburbs.[405] Similarly, in 1963, S. M. Spencer, central operations director for Bemis Bro. Bag Co., announced that the company would replace its 102-year old factory downtown with a new plant on eighteen acres in St. Louis County. "We are happy to be able to relocate in Greater St. Louis," Spencer said, because we can further contribute to the growth of St. Louis.[406]

Meanwhile, Hussmann Refrigerator Company (founded in St. Louis in 1905) CEO W. B. McMillan announced in 1965 the construction of a seventy-five acre, eleven-million dollar plant and corporate headquarters in northwest St. Louis County. This new facility in Bridgeton would replace two inner-city plants. According to McMillan,

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[404]"The Automotive Industry in the Metropolitan St. Louis Area," *St. Louis Commerce*, v34 (February 1960): 3, 10-15.
[405]"Wohl Shoe Warehouse Completed," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, June 25, 1961.
[406]"Bemis Bag to Build Plant in County," *Watchman Advocate*, April 30, 1963.

> It was not possible to gain adequate expansion at our present St. Louis plants. Further, our headquarters plant is an outmoded, multi-story complex, and we will gain substantial operating advantages from a total consolidation of St. Louis facilities. We are very pleased that our engineers found a solution to the company's requirements within metropolitan St. Louis.[407]

In response, Supervisor Roos stated that "the plant will provide more jobs and greatly strengthen the St. Louis County tax base. . . . and our entire metropolitan St. Louis economy." Bridgeton Mayor Edwin C. Swan asserted that Hussmann's development is "precisely the type of industrial operation that provides substantial benefits in support of local government and schools without the problems of heavy industry."[408] In another blow to the city's manufacturing base, Robert Plank, spokesman for Bussman Manufacturing, announced in 1977 that the company would close its five plants and warehouses in the city and consolidate operations in a twenty-million dollar facility in West St. Louis County.[409] These firms represented just a few of those whose new plants had "begun to rise out of what had been farmland and river bottom land" in St. Louis County, according to the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*.[410]

In its popular business journal, the St. Louis Chamber of Commerce listed monthly the new industrial and commercial investments in St. Louis County. These investments accrued from relocations and expansions of city firms, new business start-ups in the county, and firms coming from outside of St. Louis. Yet between 1950 and 1980 they reflected most notably the suburbanization of industrial and commercial

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[407]*Newsrelease: Arthur B. Biddle* (vice president of Hussmann Refrigerator Co.), 1965 (Roos Collection, Box 104, Folder: Business and Industrial Inquiries, 1964-65).
[408]"Hussmann Will Construct Big Plant in County," *Watchman Advocate*, November 18, 1965.
[409]Bussmann is a division of McGraw-Edison Co. "800 Jobs Will Be Lost in Bussman Co. Move," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, April 4, 1977.
[410]"Manufacturer Plans to Leave St. Louis for Site in the County," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, August 15, 1972.

establishments in St. Louis. Chamber of Commerce members ranked the following developments among the milestones structuring the county's industrial and commercial growth. Most of these companies originated in the city: [411]

1946: Emerson Electric Mfg. Co., multi-million dollar expansion program
1950: St. Louis County Water Co., multi-million dollar facilities expansion; Mesker Bros., three-million dollar plus manufacturing plant (metal construction products)
1952: Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. began a $7.5 million central office construction program; Carter Carburetor Div., ACF Industries Inc. built a new small-assembly plant
1953: Union Electric opened its first unit of its giant Meramec steam electric installation, which would cost over $140,000,000
1955: Laclede Gas began a seventeen-million dollar construction project for a gas storage reservoir
1956: City of St. Louis opened a $7.7 million new Air Terminal at Lambert; Universal Match Corp. expanded by building a 24,000 square foot headquarters facility
1957: Stix, Baer, & Fuller Co. built a 420,000 square foot, two-million dollar service building; Central Hardware Co. opened a 51,000 square foot, one-million dollar store, the largest of its kind at the time
1958: McDonnell Aircraft Corp. completed multi-million dollar research and office facilities; Chevrolet Motors Division G.M.C., built a regional supply depot, c.500,000 square feet
1959: Kroger Co. opened a multi-million dollar food distribution center under nine acres of roof; Chrysler Corp. opened its fifty-million dollar assembly plant
1960: A. S. Aloe Division, Brunswick Corp., built a 105,000 square foot, one-million dollar warehouse
1961: Monsanto Chemical Co. opened its ten-million dollar general headquarters and research center campus; Crown Zellerbach Corp. opened a new Western-Waxide Specialty Packaging Division plant worth seven million including equipment; Wohl Shoe Div. of Brown Shoe opened a 365,000 square foot, $2.5 million warehouse; Mississippi River Fuel Corp. built a one-million dollar plus headquarters; Central Hardware Co. built a 60,000 square foot, one-million dollar store
1962: McDonnell Aircraft Corp. announced a twenty-one million dollar building program to include a new Space Center, expanding its floor space from 3,684,197 square feet to 4,392,197 square feet; Continental Baking Co. bought a twenty-six acre tract for a multi-million dollar bakery and distribution center; United Van Lines announced plans for a new $350,000 international headquarters building on a thirty-acre site; Wagner Electric Corp. opened a multi-million dollar 260,000 square foot center for production of distribution transformers
1963: Bennett Corrugated Box Co. broke ground for a one-million dollar plus new plant addition; Von Hoffman Corporation announced a four-million dollar expansion of its Publishers Lithographers Division plant; St. Louis Air Park started 740 more acres for development.
1970: Andrew H. Baur announced the opening of the 116-acre Creve Coeur Executive Office Park on Olive

Yet while White, Ross, and other county developers recruited city-based firms to the suburbs, they faced a far greater challenge attracting industrial and commercial investment from outside of the St. Louis area. Yet this dearth of new capital inflows created precisely the problem St. Louisans faced in realizing the full potential of

[411] "Showcase-Part II: St. Louis County," *St. Louis Commerce*, v37 (February 1963): 19-21.

metropolitan development: anemic outside investment meant that St. Louis County's economic growth would have to rely heavily on city-to-suburban migrations. Between 1945 and 1965, for example, only about 2% of the new St. Louis County firms came from outside of the St. Louis area.[412] Lawrence Roos, George E. Pake (vice chancellor and provost of Washington University), and Edwin Clark (Southwestern Bell executive), among other local leaders, attributed this problem most broadly to intensifying Sunbelt competition and then more specifically to St. Louis' reputation for poor labor-management relations, its conservative financial institutions, and St. Louisans' failure to boost their city nationally (Chapter Five).[413] These shortcomings created a heavy liability for St. Louis in terms of intra-industrial belt competition. In terms of the more formidable Sunbelt, with its aggressive pro-business political-economic climate, these liabilities could prove almost lethal.

Among the few newcomers to St. Louis County, Chrysler's move to the area generated perhaps the greatest fanfare among city and suburban leaders. Chrysler officials announced in 1957 that it would replace its thirty-year old Evansville, Indiana, plant with a fifty-million dollar plant on a 235-acre tract (over 3,500 employees) in South St. Louis County. According to W. C. Newberg, a Chrysler vice president, his company chose St. Louis because of its central location and low transportation costs. Reflecting postwar manufacturing design trends and the transformation of the metropolitan landscape, *Factory* magazine described Chrysler's new site as a "beautifully balanced"

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[412]"City-To-County Moves By Firms Cited in Study," *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, March 10, 1965.
[413]Edwin Clark came from Philadelphia in 1950 to serve as a Southwesterern Bell executive. Clark became a major civic leader and was outspoken about metropolitan development and central city revitalization in particular. As an outsider, he was blunter about St. Louis' problems, his cohorts believed.

and "self-contained manufacturing city rising out of the Missouri countryside.. . . .Their beauty is the beauty of purpose and productivity, as well as of color, line, and form."[414] The corporation's move resulted from a ten-year effort by local leaders like Mayor Tucker, J. Wesley McAfee (president of Union Electric Company), and Aloys P. Kaufmann (president of the St. Louis Chamber of Commerce), and Chrysler officials like W. C. Newberg. Tucker's enthusiastic support for this joint effort exemplified how city leaders readily drew rank behind industry locating in the suburbs when St. Louis would otherwise lose the facility. In this way, they agreed with suburban leaders that St. Louis must develop its metropolitan resources in order to attract new investment. But the anemic level of outside investment would make St. Louisans' intra-metropolitan competition for a piece of the existing industrial pie significantly more acute.

County developers like the Nooney Company and retail leaders like Howard Baer (Stix, Baer and Fuller) encouraged a rapid pace of commercial development integrated with suburban industrial expansion.[415] Located along major thoroughfares and serving as multi-centered complexes around which smaller business units and residential areas grew, shopping malls anchored St. Louis County's commercial landscape. County officials numbered among their commercial milestones the Northland Shopping Center, the Westroads Center, and Stix, Baer & Fuller in 1955; the 1958 Crestwood Shopping Center;

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[414]The quote is from "Chrysler's St. Louis Assembly Plant Wins National Distinction," *St. Louis Commerce* v34 (June 1960): 41. "$50 Million Chrysler Plant to be Built at Valley Park," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, October 11, 1957. Chrysler's relocation represented the dynamic of disinvestment and reindustrialization that accompanied the nation's postwar industrial restructuring.

[415]Howard Baer moved to St. Louis from the East in 1927 and became one of the city's most important civic leaders. He supported a metropolitan tax district for the zoo and art museum, among other projects, and was active in numerous service and philanthropic organizations.

the 1961 River Roads development; and the 1963 South County Shopping Center.[416] Department store magnates like Stanley J. Goodman (president of Famous-Barr in the 1960s) intended their new stores to create a metropolitan branch network, but these stores would contribute to the weakening of the retail presence in the urban core.[417]

Concurrently, the City of Clayton emerged as St. Louis' suburban office and government center. Clayton significantly boost the suburban push after it opened up for high-density commercial and residential development in the early 1950s. Outside of downtown, this centrally-located, two and one-half square mile city represented the largest concentration of people, jobs, and institutions in the metropolitan area. Lawrence Roos viewed Clayton as "an urban sub-capital to supplement downtown St. Louis in serving the St. Louis area."[418] Yet central business district interests viewed Clayton as a rival, not a partner, in serving St. Louis. Between 1955 and 1965, for example, Clayton enjoyed more than one billion dollars in construction of office buildings, hotels, and apartments. Between 1953 and 1961, forty-six new structures were built in Clayton while only three new offices buildings were built downtown between 1931 and 1961.[419] Clayton planning commissioners like Roy W. Jordan and Clayton developers like Edward

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[416]"Showcase-Part II: St. Louis County," 27-28.

[417] Stanley J. Goodman was president of Famous Barr (FB) in the 1960s. He came to St. Louis from Montreal in 1948 to open the Famous Barr branch in Clayton. Goodman pioneered floor displays, elegance, and food in St. Louis retail stores. Goodman would become board chair of May Co. and led the company to the number one position in the industry.

[418]Clayton is centrally located in St. Louis County about eight miles directly west of downtown. Earl W. Kersten, Jr., and D. Reid Ross, "Clayton: A New Metropolitan Focus in the St. Louis Area," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 58, #4 (December 1968): 637.

[419]In the mid-1960s, one-half of sales offices in Clayton dealt with industrial products and one-fourth in nondurable consumer goods. Many were branch offices of manufacturers whose operations were located outside of St. Louis. Kersten and Ross, "Clayton: A New Metropolitan Focus," 643-44.

L. Blakewell, Jr., encouraged its continued growth in the 1960s and 1970s.[420] Clayton's prestige encouraged some of the nation's largest companies to house their headquarters in St. Louis County (many of them long established in St. Louis City). Billion-dollar corporations like Monsanto, General Dynamics, McDonnell Douglas, Emerson Electric, Missouri Pacific, Chromalloy American, and Brown Group established their headquarters in the county between 1950 and 1980.

The planning and investment decisions of suburban officials and business leaders, within the context of federally-assisted infrastructure development, created a new metropolitan geography of industry in St. Louis.[421] In 1945, industry on the Missouri side of metropolitan St. Louis concentrated North-South along the Mississippi River and East-West along the city's central corridor (Chapter Two). By 1980, the pattern of industrial activity included this "T" zone in the city and concentrated industrial nodes in North, South, and West St. Louis County. D. Reid Ross, Hermann F. Wagner, and other suburban promoters did not view the industrialization of the county as the inevitable result of technological progress or a natural overflow of industries from the city. As the Metropolitan St. Louis Chamber of Commerce warned in the mid-1970s, St. Louis County needed to develop more land to meet industrial needs and estimated that local leaders must generate 50% more jobs than the county currently created.[422] Suburban leaders remained aware of their ongoing need to foster a physical and institutional

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[420]Roy W. Jordan (vice president of Merryl-Lynch) was a civic leader, arts supporter, and served on the Missouri State Highway Commission and the Clayton Planning Board. Edward Blakewell, Jr., was president of Blakewell, Corporation (an industrial real estate firm). See "St. Louis County Green, Great, Growing," 10-13.

[421]To emphasize, this chapter focuses on St. Louis' development on the west (Missouri) side of the Mississippi River and does not include East St. Louis City, Illinois.

[422]"Industrial Land and New Industry Equals Jobs," *St. Louis Commerce* v50 (November 1976): 16-21.

environment that met the demands of postwar industrialists if they hoped to recruit their firms to the county. Yet, these conditions met, leaders like Thomas J. White did tend to view the suburbanization of industry as a logical process and the "final phase of the city-to-suburban migration that started in most major metropolitan areas more than thirty years ago."[423]

By 1980, St. Louis County's industrial base had become highly diversified, including domestic and international exporting manufacturing firms. While it had large manufacturers like McDonnell Douglas (MD) and Chrysler, the bulk of county manufacturing firms were small firms (one to twenty employees; the region's largest private employer remains Boeing with 17,600 employees).[424] The county's industrial-commercial base became strongly rooted in transportation and encompasses an expanded base of firms for defense- and automobile-related products and services. Research and development industrial labs at Monsanto, Mallinckrodt, and other corporate campuses became closely linked to scientific resources at Washington University, St. Louis University, and other educational institutions. St. Louis' industrial managers, technicians, corporate planners, developers, and academics thus advanced high-tech industries (i.e., aeronautics, microelectronics, and biochemicals) that overlay the area's traditional manufacturing base (Chapter Five). Yet the expansion of transportation and defense industries (the area's highest growth industries) and the concurrent decline of other

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[423]"Industrial Park Gains Favor," *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, October 31, 1968.

[424]See *County Business Patterns, Missouri* (Washington, D.C.: Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census) for 1950, 1962, 1973, 1982. McDonnell merged with Douglas Corp. in 1967 in order to become less dependent upon defense contracts (Douglas was commercial). Boeing proposed a merger with MD in 1998 as Boeing wanted to expand its focus to include more than commercial aircraft. MD's name was lost in the transition.

manufacturing sectors (shoes and garments most notably) has rendered St. Louis' industrial base highly dependent upon these segments, and transportation and defense as very cyclical sectors has made job and economic growth highly unstable in St. Louis in the 1970s and 1980s.[425]

Leaving St. Louis City for St. Louis County: Where Business Prerogative Meets the Metropolitan "Greater Good"?

Business leaders who decided to invest in industrial-belt suburbs instead of the central city made their decisions within a particular institutional, intellectual, cultural, and economic context. In St. Louis, this institutional network, as we have seen, helped to establish a physical environment and intellectual basis upon which businessmen like Thayer framed their suburban investments as a contribution to greater St. Louis and not an "abandonment" of the urban core. Simultaneously, many local businessmen were loath to give up the professional and cultural advantages that they had in St. Louis if they relocated their operations to other Midwestern towns or to the Sunbelt.

Many of St. Louis' industrial, commercial, and financial firms in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s had long been established in the city. Their business leaders traditionally had come from St. Louis. These "insiders" benefited from long-standing professional and financial networks, they depended upon local customers, hired local

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[425]During the 1950s, McDonnell Douglas became the area's largest employer. Between 1958 and 1968, aircraft production accounted for 40% of the total growth in manufacturing jobs in the St. Louis area, and Missouri went from number fourteen to number four among all states in obtaining prime defense contracts during this period. McDonnell Douglas generated most of this growth. See *Aerospace-Defense and Auto Parts Opportunities in St. Louis*, report by the St. Louis Regional Industrial Development Corporation (hereafter cited as the RIDC), August 1967 (St. Louis Regional Commerce and Growth Association Records (hereafter cited as the RCGA Records), Box 16, Folder 469; WHMC); "State 4th in Defense Contracts," Edward W. O'Brian, *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, January 10, 1968, 5A; these trends are also reflected in the *County Business Patterns* reports for Missouri.

people, and their corporate image was closely linked with the community. This social capital would be difficult to replenish in another geographic location.[426] Business leaders like those of Brown Shoe who relocated to or expanded in St. Louis County thus viewed their decision as a way to sharpen their competition edge yet remain in the St. Louis area. Such personal ties may not have been true of outside owners like those of Ford Company, but many companies had long-established relationships with St. Louis that encouraged them to remain in the area in the 1950s and 1960s. In 1965, for example, vice president of Chrysler J. F. Kerigan stated that one of the reasons they chose St. Louis for their new truck plant was "because our past relationship with both the people and the officials of the community has been mutually satisfactory and rewarding."[427] As we have seen, businessmen who chose the suburbs over the city ranked their need for more space and modern facilities as the primary reason for their choice (Chapter Two). In addition to these considerations, St. Louis businessmen identified proximity to their employees and clientele, relief from traffic congestion, 'prestige' considerations, and relatively lower taxes as factors influencing their choice of the suburbs over the city.[428]

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[426]See Lana Stein, *St. Louis Politics: The Triumph of Tradition* (St. Louis: Missouri Historical Society Press, 2002), James N. Primm, *Lion of the Valley: St. Louis, Missouri 1764-1980* (3rd ed.; Columbia: University of Missouri, 1998), Richard E. Edgar, *Urban Power and Social Welfare: Corporate Influence in an American City* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1970), and Robert H. Salisbury, "Our Fading Civic Leadership," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, November 26, 1995.

[427]"Chrysler Announces Truck Plant to be Built," *St. Louis Commerce* v39 (April 1965): 11. Similarly, Benson Ford (vice president of Ford) stated that "we have liked it [St. Louis] so well that we have now built our newest plant [the Hazelwood plant] in your city," quoted in "The Automobile Industry in the Metropolitan St. Louis Area," *St. Louis Commerce* v34 (February 1960): 11.

[428]"Industry Still Bypassing City to Locate in County," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, April 21, 1970; "City-to-County Moves By Firms Cited in Study," *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, March 10, 196. On concern over taxes see, for example, Letter to Mayor A. J. Cervantes from Fred. T. Lowy, April 20, 1967.

Industrial-belt cities in the mid-twentieth century were characterized by strong labor unions, and St. Louis City ranked among the most heavily unionized.[429] Historians like Jefferson Cowie have shown that the presence of unions encouraged industrialists since the 1930s to seek sites outside of traditional industrial-belt centers. Yet during the postwar years they would have to relocate to the Sunbelt or to locations beyond the metropolitan periphery in order to find low- or non-unionized areas. In metropolitan St. Louis in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, around 35% of private sector, non-agricultural workers were unionized (around 50% of its production workers were unionized). This is a fairly typical percentage for industrial-belt metropolises, although St. Louis ranked on the high end of unionization rates.[430] Labor-management reports show that many employers in St. Louis indeed wanted to escape the bargaining and wage pressures exerted by unions, the AFL-CIO and Teamster unions particularly. Countless did. Tens of thousands of manufacturing jobs in St. Louis, consequently, were lost to the rural Midwest and,

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[429]Robert H. Salisbury, "Urban Politics: The New Convergence of Power," *The Journal of Politics*, v26, #4 (November 1964): 775-97; "Unions-Instruments of Counter-Pressure: St. Louis Ranks Third in Union Organizing Among U.S. Cities," *Missouri Teamsters* (June 16, 1963): 5. See also the statistics in the following footnotes.

[430]Unionization rates for St. Louis County specifically were unavailable. In 1964, 38.8% of Missouri workers in non-agricultural establishments were union members and the state ranked fifth highest among all states in terms of this percentage. In 1968, the percentage fell to 36% and the state ranked seventh highest in these terms. See the 1965 and 1969 *Directory of National and International Labor Unions in the United States* complied by the U. S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (GPO: 1966 and 1970). In the early 1970s, around 52% of all production workers in metropolitan St. Louis were in unions (33% of all private sector workers). For comparison, the percentage of private workers unionized during this same period in Columbus was 22%; Detroit (34%); Chicago (28%); Pittsburgh (35%); Baltimore (25%); Oklahoma City (10%); Charlotte (7%); Knoxville (14%). See Richard B. Freeman and James L. Medoff, "New Estimates of Private Sector Unionism in the United States," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, v32, #2. (January 1979), 143-74. For similar statistics on the 1980s, see Barry T. Hirsch and David A. MacPherson, "Union Membership and Coverage Database from the Current Population Survey," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, v56 #2. (January 2003), 349-54.

most heavily, to Sunbelt during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.[431] I thus conclude that business leaders who suburbanized their facilities did not count union power among the key factors driving their move since these unions were represented in the suburbs as well.[432]

The deeply-rooted racial antagonism and segregation in cities like St. Louis raises the question of whether or not white businessmen left the city to avoid racial conflict and the increasingly African-American urban environment. My research has not uncovered direct evidence that this was the case in St. Louis. Such evidence, however, may be unrecorded or ensconced in business archives. Many white business leaders undoubtedly viewed the predominantly white suburbs as a more attractive labor environment particularly as black St. Louisans increasingly pressured the political and business establishment to end discriminatory employment and housing practices.[433]

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[431]Edwin Clark of Southwestern Bell numbered among the few St. Louisans who harshly criticized labor in the 1950s, according to journalist Harry Wilensky. According to Clark, "labor leaders might well participate in proving to the world that St. Louis is a fine place in which to locate. . . . If they cannot prove it, then-hell!-St. Louis isn't going to attract industry," quoted in "What's Wrong With St. Louis?" by Harry Wilensky, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, April 25, 1954. In the early 1960s, the Missouri Department of Commerce predicted that St. Louis would continued to lose industries unless labor problems improved, see "Industrialists Say New Approach Is Needed for Jobs," by Alan Merritt, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, October 18, 1963; "A Constructive Analysis," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, by Alan Merritt, October 25, 1963; and "Survey Predicts City May Lose Industries Through High Wages," by Jack Flach, *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, July 15, 1964.

[432]Collective bargaining proved for them an acceptable bargain for remaining in St. Louis. Also, as industrial employers at mid-century concluded, the so-called labor-management accord of the 1950s would foster labor stability and a regional market of consumers who would spend their income on goods and services that benefit the local corporate economy. Collective bargaining since the so-called "Treaty of Detroit" (UAW-GM contract) in 1950 focused essentially on wages and benefits and not the more volatile but ultimately more fundamental question of control over production strategies and plant and equipment investment decisions, as historians like Nelson Lichtenstein have shown. Yet there was never a true "labor accord" as continue labor-management strife and industrialists' persistent efforts to curtail union leverage demonstrated.

[433]On African Americans' civil rights efforts, see, for example, "City Contracts Totaling $25,000,000 Without a Single Negro Skilled Mechanic On Job, Is Charged" and "A Basic Issue" in the *St. Louis Argus*, March 27, 1959; "Set Caucus on Resolution to Probe Employment Bias," *St. Louis Argus*, May 29, 1959;

This chapter asserts that the decentralization of businesses in cities like St. Louis can't be understood simply by listing factors like union power, racial preference, and land requirements. We must consider, more broadly, how business leaders interpreted the changing relationship between their business-professional needs and the evolving metropolitan political economy. Suburban relocation may not always have been a matter of "corporate survival," as developer John Perkinson asserted. [434] Nevertheless, businessmen and suburban officials viewed these moves as part of a fundamental restructuring of industrial-belt metropolises (and the national economy) as the demands of technologically-advanced and knowledge-based sectors encouraged city-suburban migration and as the burgeoning service and tourism sectors concentrated spatially in urban cores—and ostensibly help to counter the loss of traditional manufacturing production.

Yet restructuring metropolitan St. Louis for the "greater good" of the region depended heavily upon generating new investment in St. Louis. But suburbanization in St. Louis, we have seen, was not accompanied by the robust industrial and commercial investment (internal and external) that local leaders anticipated in the 1950s and 1960s. Suggesting the consequences of this economic imbalance is the fact that between 1950 and 1980, St. Louis experienced the rapid metropolitanization of its industrial and commercial operations yet simultaneously ranked at or near the bottom of the nation's

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"To Open War on Job Prejudices: Central Trades Council Target of Campaign," *St. Louis Argus*, June 7, 1957.

[434] According to John Perkinson, "even knowledgeable critics of the (migration) trend agree that in a free society the economics of corporate survival sometimes dictate such moves." "Industrial Park Gains Favor," *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, October 31, 1968.

212 metropolitan areas in terms of economic growth.[435] As scholars Joseph Persky and Wim Wiewel astutely observed,

> Rapid metropolitan growth generates considerable investment in central city residential structures and commercial activities. These investment, linked to urban services and amenities, respond to the area-wide expansion. They provide a more than adequate offset to any declines in manufacturing. . . . But in slow-growth metropolitan areas, demand for central city-based activities necessarily increases at a much more modest rate....*without the stimulus of strong, metropolitan-wide growth, the expansion in these more centralized activities fails to outpace continuing losses in manufacturing and other activities drifting away from the center.*[436]

These dynamics shaped the metropolitan political economy of industrial-belt centers after WWII. St. Louis' story suggests how they created a zero-sum game as the county "robbed Peter to pay Paul" to fund its expansion, according to one local official.[437] City officials, facing the daily reality of large-scale disinvestment, were finding little comfort in a hoped-for restructuring renaissance. Consequently, they would carry out a "metropolitan cold war" to keep industrial and commercial investment in the urban core.

"Robbing Peter to Pay Paul": The "Metropolitan Cold War" and the Limits of Metropolitanism

Three Skirmishes in the "Metropolitan Cold War"

Open conflict between city and suburban leaders in St. Louis over metropolitan industrial development emerged in the early 1960s. At this time, city officials began to publicly press their case that St. Louis County was pirating their industrial firms. City and

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[435]From *Merger of a Metropolis: A Case History of the St. Louis Region*, D. Reid Ross and Leroy J. Grossman (director of research, RIDC), published in *Business and Government Review* by the University of Missouri (c1965) (RCGA Records, Box 11, Folder 335). St Louis metropolitan growth lagged behind that of all 212 metro areas in the nation between 1950 and 1960 with St. Louis at 19.8% growth and the other SMSAs at an average of 26.4%.

[436]Joseph Persky and Wim Wiewel, *When Corporations Leave Town: The Costs and Benefits of Metropolitan Job Sprawl* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2000), 15. My emphasis.

[437]"Lag in Industrial Development Leading to Area-Wide Program," Cleon O. Swayzee, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, March 14, 1965.

suburban leaders in St. Louis recognized that the stakes over where firms located within the metropolis were growing. As we have seen, suburban industrialization did not result not from a "natural overflow," as Noonan assessed in the mid-1950s. Instead, it portended a "fundamental shift" of St. Louis' industrial base.[438] Simultaneously, the county's industrial expansion advanced relatively slowly compared to its population growth and to other metropolitan areas.[439] City and suburban officials thus came to view themselves locked in an intra-metropolitan competition for investment capital that would determine the potential growth and stability of their particular municipality.

Both city and suburban leaders aimed for coordinated metropolitan development. They agreed that they should build upon their comparative advantages: cultural sites and small firms in the core and Fordist industry in the suburbs. Yet within this broad metropolitan perspective, as suggested, they fought over the regional balance of industrial development. Suburban officials like Lawrence Roos argued that making aggressive inner-city reindustrialization the primary goal of metropolitan industrial development was a losing proposition because city competition for investment stifled St. Louis' best opportunity to strengthen her industrial base: suburban development. In contrast, city leaders like Mayor Cervantes, Edwin M. Clark, and Samuel Bernstein (Clark and Bernstein were MBDC officials) believed that they could promote inner-city industrial policies within the context of metropolitanism. That is, they could remain committed to a broad metropolitan perspective even as they tended to the city's manufacturing interests.

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[438] Kitagawa and Bogue, *Suburbanization of Manufacturing Activity,* 109-11.
[439] On 1950-1960, see Ross and Grossman, "Merger of a Metropolis."

This view, then, represented their alternative metropolitan vision to that proposed by suburban leaders.

A *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* editor described the intensifying industrial competition between St. Louis City and St. Louis County as a "metropolitan cold war."[440] This "cold war" concept is useful because it highlights that city and suburban leaders, in a metropolitan economy lacking substantial capital inflows, vied for very limited investment. Suburban industrial expansion, as we can see, thus did not create fundamental economic growth but instead created a metropolitan economic stalemate in which the urban core was drained and regional growth proved lackluster. St. Louisans' rivalry over the location of industrial and commercial firms helped each side to articulate its metropolitan viewpoint. This became apparent in three cases in which this "cold war" eclipsed the symbiotic metropolitan relations city and suburban leaders hoped to promote: St. Louis Plan for Industrial Expansion (P.I.E.), Mallinckrodt Corporation, and Clayton. Metropolitanism proved to be a contested vision that had real implications for the direction and success of public and private development policies in St. Louis.

St. Louis City Mayor Cervantes proposed P.I.E. in 1965 and framed the program within a metropolitan context for economic development. By offering low-interest loans to businesses, city officials hoped that P.I.E. would encourage industries to expand in the urban core rather than migrate to the St. Louis suburbs.[441] Cervantes intended P.I.E. to

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[440]"No Metropolitan Cold War," *St. Louis Globe Democrat*, October 11, 1967.

[441]The plan was modeled after the Philadelphia Industrial Development Corp. P.I.E. was to offer low interest loans to industry. The initial agency had a twenty-five member authority, created by ordinance, and was conceived as a new agency within the Municipal Business Development Commission. P.I.E's main function was to condemn property and issue tax-exempt bonds to stimulate industrial development in the

supplement industrial programs initiated in the 1950s, such as the Mill Creek Valley and the Kosciusko projects (Chapter Two). Many city businessmen like G. Thomas Braznell believed that such a program was "long overdue."[442] Concurrently, public officials and businessmen behind P.I.E. reiterated their commitment to a broad vision of metropolitanism. In so doing, they intended to show influential corporate leaders and suburban officials that city-specific industrial policies could be consistent with metropolitan cooperation. For example, Cervante's assistant, Richard McGee, asserted that "the mayor's position has long been what is good for East St. Louis or St. Louis County is good for the City of St. Louis and vice versa" and the mayor's commitment to P.I.E. "did not lessen this view."[443] And Alfred H. Kerth, St. Louis Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce chairman, assured local business and political leaders that the Chamber's support for P.I.E. "is not a retrenchment from our theme of metropolitanism. It is simply a recognition of the fact that the economic health of metropolitan St. Louis depends on maintaining an economically strong central city."[444]

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city. Yet in 1967 the Treasury Department canceled tax-exemption on interest on industrial development bonds and so P.I.E. could not be enacted. "Agency to Aid Industrial Growth Launched Here," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, January 18, 1968; "Industrial Expansion Plan in Jeopardy, Officials Say," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, March 24, 1968. See also Letter to Mayor A. J. Cervantes from G. Neilson Sigler, December 2, 1965, and Letter to G. Neilson Sigler from Mayor A. J. Cervantes, December 27, 1965 (Cervantes Files, Series 1, Box 28, Folder: St. Louis Industry, P.I.E).

[442]Letter to Mayor A. J. Cervantes from G. Thomas Braznell, October 11, 1965, and Letter to G. Thomas Braznell from Mayor A. J. Cervantes, October 22, 1965 (Cervantes Files, Series 1, Box 28, Folder: Industry, P.I.E.).

[443]Letter to Dorothy Flieger from Richard E. McGee, April 25, 1967 (Cervantes Files, Series 1, Box 28, Folder: St. Louis Industry, P.I.E.).

[444]"County Industry, Business Record Reported by Roos," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, December 17, 1965.

Yet P.I.E. brought to the surface of public debate St. Louisans' industrial "cold war."[445] According to County Supervisor Roos, P.I.E. fostered an "isolationist approach" and a "giant step backward" from regional industrial development efforts represented by the creation of the RIDC and the St. Louis Research Council (Chapter Five).[446] The RIDC would not support the "mayor's go-it-alone-plan" because "any organization that truly speaks or acts for the region must serve the region, not just the central city." P.I.E. would thus hinder metropolitan industrial development, he believed.[447] Cervantes emphasized that P.I.E. would not compete with the RIDC but work within its framework. Roos' position, the St. Louis mayor asserted, "is hardly the kind of attitude that will make for the kind of metropolitan progress that I have been working for since the earliest days of my political career."[448] Critics of P.I.E. nevertheless asserted that the city won't gain anything

> By trying to go it alone. . . .If Greater St. Louis is to realize the dream of a vibrant, exciting rebirth, it needs both the dynamic programs now in progress, inside and outside of St. Louis. A political collision of city and regional planners would turn the dream into a destructive regional cold war that could hamstring progress for the whole metropolitan gateway.[449]

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[445]Early industrial redevelopment projects like Mill Creek and Kosciusko did not elicit calls of competition as would P.I.E. because they satisfied the goal of city and suburban leaders in the 1950s for slum clearance. Moreover, they felt more confident at the time that the city and county could simultaneously boost industry.

[446]These institutions in actuality targeted suburban industrial development. "Industrial Land Expansion Planned," *St Louis Globe Democrat*, September 17, 1965 (Roos Collection, Box 34, Folder 2b); "Agency to Aid Industrial Growth Launched Here," *St Louis Globe-Democrat*, January 18, 1968 (Roos Collection, Box 41, Folder 7, #1).

[447]*Institutions to Serve the Region: The St. Louis Research Council and the St. Louis Regional Industrial Development Corporation*, publication by the St. Louis RIDC, 1970 (RCGA Records, Box 4, Folder 51); "The Mayor's Go-It-Alone Plan," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, May 17, 1965 (Roos Collection, Box 4, Folder 2b); "Industrial Expansion Plan in Jeopardy, Officials Say," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, March 24, 1968 (Roos Collection, Box 41, Folder 7, #1). In the latter 1970s, Lawrence Roos and the RIDC would come to support the P.I.E. program.

[448]*Newsrelease: Mayor A. J. Cervantes*, May 14, 1965 (Cervantes Files, Series 1, Box 29, Folder: Industrial Development in St. Louis).

[449]"No Metropolitan Cold War," *St. Louis Globe Democrat*, October 11, 1967.

Local leaders' debate over P.I.E. erupted frequently during the late 1960s as Cervantes sought repeatedly to initiate his program (finally introduced in the early 1970s). Alarmed by the city's drastic population and business losses by the early 1970s, suburban leaders would come to support P.I.E. and similar initiatives in the 1970s [450] But they would not back down from their objective to make the county the heart of metropolitan industrial-sector facilities, a perspective well-illustrated during the 1974 conflict over Mallinckrodt's expansion plans.

In 1974, Mallinckrodt Corporation executives announced their decision to build new corporate headquarters in St. Louis County. Almost one hundred years prior, Edward, Otto, and Gustav Mallinckrodt established just north of downtown the company that would become a chemical giant. Despite pressure from the St. Louis City Plan Commission and Mayor John H. Poelker (1973-1977) to expand in the city, Mallinckrodt chose instead, in the words of one city official, sixty-seven acres of "some farm land in western St. Louis County." [451] According to CEO Harold Thayer, the urban core simply could not compete with the county in terms of available acreage and an "idyllic setting" for a "campus-like" environment that would enable Mallinckrodt to attract top-notch

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[450] As noted, federal, not local, factors had hamstrung P.I.E. The program did not receive federal tax-exempt status until the early 1970s. St. Louis County businessmen were not automatically against P.I.E. For example, in 1965, Clayton lawyer Richard L. Ross congratulated the mayor for his "far-sighted and imaginative program relative to industrial development for the City of St. Louis," Letter to Mayor A. J. Cervantes from Richard L. Ross, October 2, 1965 (Cervantes Files, Series 1, Box 28, Folder: Industry in St. Louis, P.I.E.). On growing support for inner-city reindustrialization, see "City's Job Needs to Year 2000," *St. Louis Commerce*, v51 (November 1977): 85.

[451] *Suggested Draft of Resolution of the Board of Aldermen*, April 1973 (City of St. Louis, Office of the Mayor, Files of John H. Poelker (hereafter cited as the Poelker Files), Series 1, Box 28, Folder 2; University Archives Collections, Washington University); "Staying Could Save Mallinckrodt $60 Million, City Says," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, February 8, 1974; "Mallinckrodt and Ralston Treat Community Differently," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, April 3, 1974; "City's Decline—Mallinckrodt Move An Example of the Problem," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, October 28, 1973.

scientists and other professionals. Many city boosters argued that Mallinckrodt was abandoning its long-standing commitment to the urban core (Mallinckrodt did maintain its existing manufacturing plant in the city).[452] As Norman Murdoch of the CPC advised Mayor Poelker, "I suggest you encourage as much guilt feelings on the part of Mallinckrodt as possible and urge them to play an active role" in inner-city redevelopment as Ralston Purina has done.[453] Thayer, in response, carried his banner of metropolitanism in justifying Mallinckrodt's decision. Mallinckrodt was not abandoning the city, rather, "it merely wants to expand in the metropolitan area, enjoying the best of two worlds." Mallinckrodt's corporate leadership, Thayer argued, "does not consider the city and county as separate units, but as parts of the whole."[454] Meanwhile, Roos promised that his "government will work closely with Mallinckrodt in establishing its new headquarters," and the St. Louis County Plan Commission defeat suburban residences' protests against the new Mallinckrodt headquarters.[455]

Yet despite his initial criticisms, Mayor Poelker eventually adopted the metropolitan discourse sounded so strongly by suburban officials. After almost a year of acrimonious public debate over Mallinckrodt's expansion plans, Poelker, conceding

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[452]"Mallinckrodt and Ralston Treat Community Differently," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, April 3, 1974; "City's Decline—Mallinckrodt Move An Example of the Problem," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, October 28, 1973.

[453]Memo to Mayor John H. Poelker from Norman Murdoch, June 27, 1974, and Letter to Harold E. Thayer from Mayor John Poelker, July 2, 1974 (Poelker Files, Series 1, Box 28, Folder 2).

[454]The new site would ultimately have about 1500 employees. Mallinckrodt would build in two phases lasting twenty years with a projected thirty-seven million dollar investment.

[455]Roos' quote is in "Mallinckrodt Buys County Site for New Headquarters," *Watchman Advocate*, June 1, 1966. A group of St. Louis County residents protested against Mallinckrodt, but the County Plan Commission approved a rezoning application by the company to turn that land into commercial usage. See "West County Residents Assail Plan for Mallinckrodt Office," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, November 27, 1973, and "No Red Carpet for Mallinckrodt," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, November 28, 1973.

defeat, informed Thayer that he hoped for Mallinckrodt's "continued corporate growth to the benefit of the St. Louis economy."[456] St. Louis City officials concluded that they would alienate both city and suburban business leaders if they vilified corporate leaders from St. Louis' oldest and most important companies; and these business leaders provided the city administration critical support for urban revitalization projects like the Arch and the stadium projects. The case of Mallinckrodt thus illustrates how metropolitanism, by identifying the interests of St. Louis City and St. Louis County as ultimately mutual, left little room for city leaders to argue that corporate responsibility to St. Louis involved a stronger commitment to the urban core. The case of Mallinckrodt also suggests how the public sector's reliance upon the corporate community for urban revitalization projects stymied urban officials' ability to bring business leaders to task for investing outside of city boundaries.[457]

While Mallinckrodt elicited a short-lived but high-profile debate between city and suburban leaders, Clayton remained a thorn in the side of urban officials like Mayor Poelker and businessmen like David.R. Calhoun, Jr. Calhoun reflected the interests of many downtown businessmen: he was the president of St. Louis Union Trust and a member of the Civic Center Redevelopment Corporation, a group of city business leaders backing urban core redevelopment, particularly the Bush Stadium project. In 1971, the City of St. Louis and the City of Clayton competed for two major corporations from outside of St. Louis, among others in the 1970s, and these particular campaigns generated

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[456]Memo to Mayor John H. Poelker from Norman Murdoch, June 27, 1974, and Letter to Harold E. Thayer from Mayor John Poelker, July 2, 1974.

[457]Political scientists like Clarence Stone call this public-private alliance the "urban regime." See Clarence Stone, *Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946-1988* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989).

some of the most acrimonious debate. In the end, the decisions by General Dynamics Corporation (GD) and Chromalloy American Corporation to relocate their headquarters to Clayton dealt a serious blow to Poelker's efforts to promote the city. Explaining their decisions, Joseph Friedman, chairman of Chromalloy, and David S. Lewis, CEO of GD, cited factors similar to those identified by St. Louis-based companies who also chose Clayton over downtown (like W. H. L. Griffin, president of Brown Shoe Co., and Ben Fixman, chairman of Diversified Industries, Inc.). According to Friedman and Lewis, Clayton's new office complexes, proximity to clientele and employees, "prestige factor," and relatively uncongested business district could not be matched by the city. And in an implicit reference to the massive disinvestment and specter of racial unrest in the urban core, Friedman exclaimed, "what would I tell my employees if I told them they had to work downtown?"[458]

A 1971 *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* article entitled "Shhh! Clayton's Taking Firms From St. Louis City!" made farce of Clayton businessmen's assertions that their "new executive city" supplemented, not competed with, downtown St. Louis.[459] One group of Clayton businessmen proclaimed that Clayton surely "did not compete with the central business district." But laying bare their underlying sentiments, these businessmen explained that they

> Hesitated to criticize the city. . . .as they rouse the wrath of the biggest bankers and retailers downtown. . . . It isn't polite to seem to be competing with downtown, which is like competing with an old lady who needs help.[460]

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[458]GD, an aerospace, ship, and electronics equipment giant, relocated its headquarters from New York City. See "General Dynamics Picks Clayton," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, March 16, 1971, and "Shhh! Clayton's Taking Firms From St. Louis," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, April 26, 1971.

[459]ibid.

[460] "Shhh! Clayton's Taking Firms From St. Louis," *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, April 26, 1971.

Moreover, BIDC executive D. Reid Ross acknowledged that "no doubt the recent migration of industrial firms from the city to the county has increased the desirability of Clayton as a location for these industrial sales offices."[461] In so doing, Ross unintentionally associated Clayton's growth with downtown rivalry. Similar to downtown business interests and public officials in other cities, St. Louis City Hall, Downtown St. Louis, the Civic Center Redevelopment Corporation, and other organizations allied in the 1960s and 1970s to try to revitalize the central business district. Yet, as we know, they never reclaimed downtown's position as the unrivaled metropolitan business-office center.

The Changing Fortunes of St. Louis City and St. Louis County and the Limits of Metropolitanism

Although the "metropolitan cold war" explores local leaders and economic transitions in one urban center, the dynamics of metropolitanization in St. Louis reflect trends that reshaped industrial-belt metropolises after WWII. From 1958 to 1967, for example, central cities lost more than 338,000 manufacturing, trade, and service industry jobs, while the suburban areas around these cities gained more than 433,000.[462] Suburbs nation-wide accounted for at least three-fourths of all new manufacturing and retail jobs generated between 1950 and 1970.[463] Significantly, suburban leaders like those in St. Louis premised their optimistic predictions on strong investment just as industrialists accelerated the regional shift of production from the old industrial belt to the Sunbelt.

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[461]Kersten and Ross, "Clayton: A New Metropolitan Focus," 644.
[462]Fishman, *Bourgeois Utopias*, 196.
[463]ibid., 182. The metropolitanization of industry has historically weakened central city industrial employment. See Lewis, "Changing Fortunes of American Central-City Manufacturing," 573-98.

Paradoxically, the ostensibly productive trend of suburban expansion reinforced St. Louis' difficulty in attracting outside investment because it contributed to a level of inner-city deterioration whose reputation preceded it. Yet metropolitanism, as articulated by suburban leaders, had offered a powerful perspective upon which they predicted long-term growth for St. Louis. This held true even as their own BIDC reports suggested these limitations in their metropolitan development model.

In 1950, St. Louis City total manufacturing employment was about 166,000 and St. Louis County total manufacturing employment was around 20,000. By 1982, St. Louis City manufacturing employment had fallen to about 72,000 (out of around 250,000 total employment in the city) while St. Louis County manufacturing employment rose to about 102,000 (out of about 445,000 total employment in the county).[464] Industrial reports evidence that these reversing fortunes had much to do with city-suburban relocations. For example, between 1947 and 1964, according to BIDC reports, the

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[464] *1950:* St. Louis County total manufacturing employment in March, 1950: 20,555 and St. Louis City total manufacturing employment in March, 1950: 166,301. *1960:* St. Louis County total manufacturing employment in March, 1962: 53, 237 (reporting units: 531), and St. Louis City total manufacturing employment in March, 1962: 138, 941 (reporting units: 2,053). *1973:* St. Louis County total manufacturing employment in March, 1973: 90, 468 (reporting units: 834), and St. Louis City total manufacturing employment in March, 1973: 123, 746 (reporting units: 1, 536). *1982:* St. Louis County total manufacturing employment in March, 1982: 102, 118 (reporting units: 1,256), and St. Louis City total manufacturing employment in March, 1982: 72, 044 (reporting units: 1,058). From United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *County Business Patterns.*

Another set of manufacturing data for St. Louis City and St. Louis County (also from *County Business Patterns, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census*) but more illustrative is this: *1970:* St. Louis City had 132, 575 (out of 376,113 employees total in labor pool) employees in manufacturing and 1,677 businesses in manufacturing sector (15,023 total businesses in city). St. Louis County had 87,674 employees in manufacturing (out of 237,437 employees in labor pool) and 764 businesses in manufacturing sector (out of 12,166 total businesses listed in county). *1977*: St. Louis City had 97,127 employees in manufacturing (280,639 total labor pool) and 1,258 businesses in manufacturing sector (10,816 total businesses in city). St. Louis County had 97,499 employees in manufacturing (346,104 total labor pool) and 1,182 businesses in manufacturing (19,524 total businesses listed in county). *1984:* St. Louis City had 67, 176 manufacturing employees (260,203 total labor pool) and 1,056 business in manufacturing sector (10, 194 total businesses in city). St. Louis County had 107,526 manufacturing employees (447,397 total labor pool) and 1,356 businesses in manufacturing sector (25,404 total businesses listed).

number of manufacturing firms in St. Louis County grew from 127 to 605 and that 37% of the increase was due to firms relocating from the city. Between the mid-1950s and the mid-1960s, according to the BIDC, 55% of new businesses in the county had relocated from the city.[465] A 1958 Department of Commerce publication had placed St. Louis' growth dynamics within a national perspective when it identified the growing importance of suburban areas as business-industrial centers while their cities were losing this significance.[466] Drawing on Department of Commerce statistics, the BIDC warned in 1967 that "St. Louis County is continuing to gain industry at the expense of St. Louis City" and was only "robbing Peter to pay Paul."[467] By 1980, according to a *Business Week* report, St. Louis City had lost over 40,000 jobs since the BIDC's warning in the late 1960s; this loss was due in part to suburban competition although accounted for most heavily by the formidable competition from the Sunbelt.[468] In cities like St. Louis,

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[465] The 1947-1965 statistic is cited in Cleon O. Swayzee's "Lag in Industrial Development Leading to Area-Wide Program," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, March 14, 1965. The "55%" citation is quoted in "City-To-County Moves By Firms Cited in Study," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, March 10, 1965.

[466] According to the Department of Commerce, between 1954 and 1958 St. Louis City registered a decline of 102, or 4%, manufacturing establishments in the city, dropping to 2,128 in 1958 from 2,230 in 1954. The number of workers employed by manufacturing firms fell from 158,092 in 1954 to 137,818 in 1958, a 12.8% decline. In St. Louis County, the number of manufacturing establishments climbed by 13.4% in the four year period, from 419 to 475. The rise of workers employed in county factories rose by 35%, from 35,678 to 48,157, during this period. The Commerce Report was quoted in "St. Louis Shows Sharp Drop as Factory Center," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, March 6, 1960.

[467] The report noted that this is a documented factor in urban decline since the late 1940s in St. Louis and similar cities, as reflected in reports by the Social Security Administration, Department of Commerce, and by a 1967 Manpower Report of the President. See "Firms' Shift to Suburbs Leads to Plea for Plants in Slums," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, October 4, 1967.

[468] For example, a St. Louis County government report noted that 183 industrial firms announced plans to locate new facilities or expand existing structures in the county in 1968. Fifty-six of them are city companies relocating or expanding. See *Summary of New and Expanding Industries in St. Louis County, 1968*, St. Louis County BIDC (RCGA Records, Box 11, Folder 311). This trend can be seen in the early 1970s also, as seen in *Summary of New and Expanding Industries in the First Six Months of 1970*, report by the BIDC (Roos Collection, Box 104, Folder: BIDC); "City's Job Needs to Year 2000," *St. Louis Commerce*, v51 (November 1977): 85. The 1980 job statistic comes from "Resurging City Suffers a Setback," *Business Week* (April 7, 1980): 24A.

contrary to local leaders' aspirations, non-manufacturing sectors like tourism and services would prove insufficient to counteract conventional industrial losses; they do not generate comparable long-term, relatively high-wage employment, and economic multiplier effects.[469]

In the face of their own concerns, St. Louis County officials celebrated the transition of their once rural community into the fastest growing county in the state. In 1965, for example, as much as 70% of the total investment in new industry in Missouri was invested in St. Louis County and more than half of the state's economic growth that year was due to the county's industrial-commercial expansion.[470] Yet these statistics actually point more to the sluggish growth that characterized the St. Louis-Missouri region and against which the county's expansion looked impressive.

Metropolitan demographic transformations in St. Louis are also critical to explain the consequences of metropolitan industrial-commercial development, in particular, the concentrated pockets of racialized poverty. In 1950, St. Louis County had 406,349 residents and the city had 856,796 residents. By 1980, the county had 973, 896 residents and the city's population had fallen by about one-half to 453,085. In 1950, most blacks in

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[469]As one St. Louis Chamber of Commerce officer agreed, "it's the manufacturing jobs that really count because those products are sold outside the area. A city can't just keep selling services to itself. There's got to be some money brought in from the outside," "St. Louis Takes Aim At Industry," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, January 27, 1980. St. Louis City officials depend heavily on taxes on earnings and manufacturers' inventories to cover city services and so are somewhat cool to the prospect of lower-paying service jobs becoming an even great proportion of the St. Louis economy, as noted in "Resurging City Suffers a Setback," *Business Week* (April 7, 1980): 24A.

[470]Roos published such accounts in newspapers and public statements on St. Louis County's economic development. For example, see "County's Economic Gains Cited by Roos," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, June 2, 1966. "St. Louis Shows Sharp Drop as Factory Center," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, March 6, 1960, cites the county's strong performance relative to the state's overall growth in the 1950s and the city's lagging performance compared to the state's overall growth in the 1950s. The 70% statistic is quoted in "St. Louis County Green, Great, Growing," 12.

the St. Louis area, like most whites, lived in the central city.[471] By 1980, African Americans accounted for 45.6% of city residents (32.6% was the industrial-belt average), although around one-third of all blacks in the St. Louis area had moved outside of the central city.[472] While all city residents faced far fewer opportunities and services in the urban core due to industrial and commercial disinvestment, blacks suffered this transformation disproportionately.[473] The well-known problems of housing and job discrimination and underinvestment in predominantly black urban neighborhoods (North St. Louis) made African Americans' experiences in the inner city all the more difficult. Concurrently, predominantly black suburban municipalities like St. Louis' Kinloch remain among the poorest in metropolitan areas. In St. Louis, although suburbanizing firms provided thousands of county-based jobs for whites and blacks in the metropolitan

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[471]In 1950, African Americans comprised 15.3% of the city's population and 7.3% of the suburban ring population, according to the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of the Population (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950 and 1980). In 1980, the city had just 19.2% of the population out of the bi-state metropolitan area.

[472]The St. Louis area developed substantial pockets of black population outside the central city as population spilled beyond the city limits. Some areas, like Kinloch, were originally built as black suburbs. But most migrated into pockets left behind by whites. During the 1960s and 1970s, the black population continued its northwestward migration into the inner- and outer-ring suburbs but remained concentrated on the north side of St. Louis County. See Barry Checkoway and Patton, Carl V., eds., *Policy Problems and Prospects for Change* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1985): 159-60.

Percentage of blacks (of all population) in central cities--Total of all twelve SMSAs in the industrial belt: 1940—9% (St. Louis: 13.4%); 1950—13.7% (St. Louis: 5.3%); 1960—21.4% (St. Louis: 28.8%); 1970—30.8% (St. Louis: 41.3%); 1980—32.6% (St. Louis: 45.6%). Percentage of blacks (of all population) in the suburban ring: Total of all 12 SMSAs in the industrial belt: 1940—3.9% (St. Louis: 6.7%); 1950—4.4% (St. Louis: 7.3%); 1960—4.4% (St. Louis: 6.3%); 1970—6.0% (St. Louis: 7.7%); 1980—7.4% (St. Louis: 10.6%). Peter Dreier, John Mollenkopf, and Todd Swanstrom, *Place Matters: Metropolitics for the Twenty-First Century* (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2001), 144.

[473]Most residents stayed in their jurisdiction for employment. In 1980 about three-quarters of St. Louisans worked where they lived. In St. Louis City in 1984, 75.5% of city residents worked in the same jurisdiction and 23.9% of city residents worked elsewhere in the metropolitan area. The rest worked outside of the metropolitan area. In St. Louis County in 1984, 63.7% of county residents worked in the same jurisdiction, 35.3% of county residents worked elsewhere in the area, and the rest worked outside of the metropolitan area. See *Characteristics of St. Louis Area Workers*, compiled by the East West Gateway Coordinating Council (1984) (graph; no page number; report held at the University of Missouri, St. Louis, Thomas Jefferson Library).

area, African Americans still faced more limited employment opportunities than whites. This was due to the combination of the spatial mismatch between residences and jobs (and poor public transportation), the historically lower-level training blacks have received, and continued employment discrimination. Moreover, those sectors which had waged black industrial workers most heavily since the early twentieth century—low-skill manufacturing—moved disproportionately to the South, not to St. Louis County.

The Metropolitan Zero-Sum Game: Surrendering Central City Industrial Interests for Regional Stability in the Industrial Belt

In 1980, GM executives finalized their decision to close GM's fifty-year old plant in North St. Louis. The city just lost its largest taxpayer. In 1979, GM provided 5% of all local tax revenues and employed 10,000 St. Louis area residents at its peak time.[474] GM would relocate this plant to rural Wentzville, about thirty miles from St. Louis City. Many county officials had joined city officials in their fight to keep the plant because its loss would have a devastating impact on suburban inner rings, home to many GM workers.[475] The damage to the city due to GM's move became particularly clear not only in lost tax receipts, city leaders asserted, but in its impact on urban blacks (about one-third of GM workers were black skilled and semi-skilled workers). As Mayor James F. Conway argued, the city could never place GM's black workers back into productive jobs

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[474]In 1979, the GM plant paid eight and one-half million dollars in taxes to St. Louis City. Letter to Jim Conway from Harold L. Volkmer, February 21, 1980 (City of St. Louis, Office of the Mayor, Files of James Conway (hereafter cited as the Conway Files), Series 2, Box 29, Folder: Industry, April 1977; University Archives Collections, Washington University).

[475]As Arthur J. Oppenheim (president of the organization, Mayors of Large Cities in St. Louis County) wrote to the president of GM: "we do feel that the best interest of the St. Louis area and of General Motors Corporation will be served by remaining in the City of St. Louis." Letter to Elliot Estes from Arthur J. Oppenheim, February 26, 1980 (Conway Files, Series 2, Box 29, Folder: Industry, April 1977). For additional documentation of the relocation fight, see Conway Files, Series 2, Box 29, Folder: Industry, April 1977.

given St. Louis' already high unemployment rate (over 30%) for black males 18-35 years old.[476]

The GM move was the most striking example of how "metropolitanism" in St. Louis went drastically wrong. In the end, business leaders in the metropolitan area, U.S. congressional members from Missouri, and labor unions supported GM's argument for the move. GM executives stated that the Wenzville relocation was the only solution to staying in the metropolitan region. The alternative, they asserted, was to move the GM plant to the South. St. Louis suburban leaders, labor representatives, and congressional leaders warned city officials, quite implicitly, to place Missouri's interests above those of St. Louis City.[477] As Harold L. Volkmer, U.S. House of Representatives (MO), wrote to Mayor Conway,

> I hope you understand my position that I believe it is best that General Motors remains in the State of Missouri so that we don't lose the economic benefits gained from this industry. Now that GM has decided on the Wentzville site, I hope we can all work together to ensure the success of this project.[478]

The GM move most dramatically exemplified the shortcomings of industrial-belt leaders' fight to keep their plants from going to the Sunbelt: St. Louis City swallowed the loss of its most important plant ostensibly for Missouri's greater interests. For corporations like GM, the threat of a move South was leverage they employed often. But local leaders, for their part, operated within a worldview and political economy in which they felt they had little option but to accept these terms—and pressure city officials to do the same.

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[476]Letter to Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., from James F. Conway (Conway Files, Series 2, Box 29, Folder: Industry, April 1977).
[477]"GM Goes to Wentzville," *St. Louis Commerce* v54 (September 1980).
[478]Letter to Jim Conway from Harold L. Volkmer, February 21, 1980.

In St. Louis, as the GM case exemplifies, metropolitanism was a contested vision that had real implications for the direction and outcome of local leaders' economic development policies. The story of St. Louis, and cities like it, however, is not one of city versus suburb/winner and loser but one that is metropolitan in scope and in implication, although the outcome of their policies—suburban growth at the city's expense—suggests the alternative. Ultimately, the limitations of metropolitanism as pursued by city and suburban leaders impeded Greater St. Louis' development. This is not to say that business leaders did not put profit motive above the welfare of St. Louis City. Yet we must not simply identify them as self-interested business elites but instead interpret the meaning and implications of their decisions within a broader context that considers the economic, political, institutional, and cultural milieu of the postwar industrial belt. Perhaps the greatest tragedy is that business leaders' move to the suburbs, ostensibly for the greater good of St. Louis, upended inner-city revitalization efforts. In the end, a faction of St. Louis' metropolitan coalition—those behind St. Louis' urban renewal efforts—dramatically undermined the efforts of its own alliances.

By focusing on St. Louis' suburban industrial development, this chapter highlights why and how metropolitan development in the industrial belt, launched in the early 1950s in order to strengthen regional growth and at the same time stabilize the central city, faced crippling shortcomings and unintended consequences: anemic outside investment, metropolitan political fragmentation, and federal highway and housing policies that boost the periphery at the expense of its center. Local leaders in old industrial centers like St. Louis formulated their policies in a period when they

anticipated strong investment and population growth. They could not have estimated fully the regional and structural shifts in industrial production, the demographic transformations, and the regional imbalances in federal economic development that put their metropolises at a drastic disadvantage with the Sunbelt. Moreover, capital mobility enabled business leaders to relocate firms at will despite the best efforts of leaders like Mayor Tucker. Local leaders in St. Louis, to be sure, had racial and class biases and profit motive drives business decisions. But the most equitable and foresighted policies would have faced an uphill battle stabilizing St. Louis City given this political-economic context. These problems—anemic outside investment, for example—are well documented by scholars. This dissertation, however, seeks to place local leaders more squarely within the possibilities and constraints that they faced within this context.

Metropolitan development, however, is not inevitably a zero-sum scenario, as the experience of Sunbelt cities after WWII has shown.[479] Sunbelt metropolitan areas have experienced fundamental economic growth as both their suburbs and urban cores grew. Accounting for the Sunbelt's successful metropolitan development is the combination of rapid job and population growth, high public and private investment, and annexation.[480]

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[479]There is a growing literature on Sunbelt cities. Among the most useful works are Bruce Schulman, *From Cotton Belt to Sunbelt: Federal Policy, Economic Development, and the Transformation of the South, 1938-1980* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), and *Sunbelt Cities: Politics and Growth Since World War II*, ed. by Richard M. Bernard and Bradley R. Rice (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983).

[480]Between 1940 and 1980, the Sunbelt grew in population by 112.3%, almost three-fold the population growth in the old industrial belt during this period. Contributing critically to Sunbelt cities' demographic and job expansion has been federally-funded defense production and economic development since the mid-1940s. And whereas federal aid to the old industrial belt came heavily in the form of urban renewal and welfare grants, federal monies to the Sunbelt created permanent federal payrolls and infrastructure to support whole new industries. Moreover, the Sunbelt was not locked into old manufacturing infrastructure. On these and related topics, see Judd and Swanstrom, *City Politics*, 214-46 , 261, 271-72; Schulman, *From Cotton Belt to Sunbelt*, and the essays in *Sunbelt Cities,* ed. by Bernard and Rice (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983).

Precisely these trends were largely absent from industrial-belt centers. Thus the comparison between an old industrial city like St. Louis and Sunbelt centers highlights the scope of options and the limitations local leaders in the "rustbelt" faced as they sought to keep vibrant a region that had served for the last half-century as the center not only of the nation's, but the world's, industrial production.

In St. Louis, a critical measure through which business and political leaders and public officials tried to invigorate regional growth was through the creation of metropolitan-level planning and development institutions. While Chapter Four highlighted many of the (unintended) negative consequences of suburban industrialization, Chapter Five focuses on another facet of this development. For all its shortcomings, the bolstering of a high-tech sector in the central corridor and in the suburbs helped St. Louis to weather regional shifts in industrial production far more adequately than it would have in the absence of these efforts.

Chapter Five
Regional Solutions to Industrial Decline: Metropolitan Alliances for Public Planning and High-Tech Development in St. Louis

Transcending Political Fragmentation for Regional Growth in Postwar Metropolitan America

The regional and national economic transformations that we have seen in previous chapters spurred local leaders in St. Louis to foster institutional innovations on the metropolitan level. In the early 1960s, St. Louis business and political leaders created new organizations that would provide an institutional framework for their metropolitan vision: the St. Louis Research Council (RC) and the St. Louis Regional Industrial Development Corporation (RIDC). Local political officials like St. Louis City Mayor Tucker, St. Louis County Supervisor Roos, and businessmen like D. Reid Ross thus not only forwarded a metropolitan framework for development ("metropolitanism") but created regional organizations to promote metropolitan restructuring. As D. Reid Ross argued, St. Louisans must transcend metropolitan political fragmentation and create a "single voice" for Greater St. Louis. Otherwise St. Louis would continue to lose out to northeastern metropolises and the Sunbelt in the national competition for industrial capital. St. Louis leaders desperately needed to attract capital in order for their metropolitanization project to work (Chapter Four). In the absence of strong new investment, as we have seen, metropolitan development in St. Louis would remain a zero-sum game as the suburbs gained at the expense of the central city. In the 1960s, St. Louis business, educational, and political leaders would increasingly promote St. Louis' high-tech research sector in order to generate new investment in the metropolitan area.

These St. Louisans built upon significant, earlier efforts in St. Louis to foster regional planning and development through metropolitan institutions. In 1949 local business leaders, planners, and public officials created the Bi-State Development Agency. These two metropolitan projects—the creation of a bi-state public agency and the promotion of research and development (R&D)—were critical components of St. Louis leaders' regional redevelopment efforts after WWII. This chapter explores how St. Louisans attempted these ambitious metropolitan ventures in the difficult context of metropolitan political fragmentation and intensifying competition from the Sunbelt. Chapters Two, Three, and Four analyzed economic redevelopment projects that unfolded in the either the urban core (Mill Creek Valley and the Arch) or St. Louis County (suburbanizing industry). While these projects were place-specific, St. Louis leaders viewed them as metropolitan in scope because they intended urban revitalization and suburbanization to generate regional growth overall. This chapter, then, shows how St. Louis leaders created a regional institutional framework to bolster their metropolitan initiatives. St. Louisans' ability to carry out metropolitan planning and R&D policies would depend heavily upon their organizational networks. In order for their efforts to become successful, they would have to make skillful use of federal funding, industrial-university-governmental connections, and existing corporate and educational institutions in St. Louis.

St. Louis leaders faced a formidable challenge, however, in meeting the challenges posed by metropolitan political balkanization and rivalry from the Sunbelt. In this context, their creation of the Bi-State Agency and R&D development proved to be

notable achievements. Their story is significant also because it shows that industrial-belt leaders after 1945 not only understood that guided metropolitan development was necessary for economic stability but also fostered new institutional alliances to this end. In St. Louis, public officials, businessmen, and university directors thereby posited a new intellectual and institutional basis for economic leadership, one that would be regional in nature and supercede political boundaries. St. Louis leaders, like their counterparts in other industrial-belt centers, utilized creative regional institutions and local-metropolitan-federal partnerships to shape in significant, if limited, ways their postwar metropolitan economies. These urban leaders, we know, did not prevent metropolitan development from privileging the suburbs at the expense of their urban cores. Yet their significance is not to be measured merely against what they failed to accomplish, as this dissertation has posited, but rather against the challenges that local leaders faced and the means by which they tried to salvage their urban centers.

Political Fragmentation in American Metropolises

Metropolitan St. Louis' governmental structure has been the target of both high praise and pointed criticism by social scientists and federal urban officials in recent decades.[481] These contrasting views of metropolitan St. Louis' political structure reflect academic and policy debates over metropolitan political fragmentation. Advocates of metropolitan fragmentation argue that political fragmentation preserves local choice and accountability while leaving room for voluntary cooperation. Proponents argue that

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[481]Dennis R. Judd and Todd Swanstrom, *City Politics: Private Power and Public Policy* (3rd ed.; New York: Longman Press, 2002), 332-34; Donald Phares and Claude Louishomme, "St. Louis: A Politically Fragmented Area," *Urban Affairs Annual Review*, ed. H.V. Savitch and Ronald K. Vogel (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1996): 84.

metropolitan fragmentation preserves governmental inefficiencies and economic and political inequities and thus should be replaced with a more unified governmental system.[482] At the crux of these evolving debates is the problem of how local leaders can foster vibrant metropolitan economies in the context of politically fragmented metropolitan places.

The absence of a more unified political structure to handle economic problems metropolitan in scope have posed increasingly critical problems to local leaders since WWII. Concurrent with rapid metropolitanization in the 1940s and 1950s, suburban residents lived in new municipalities and unincorporated areas that lacked adequate public services and infrastructure. In St. Louis County, residents created more than fifty cities between 1945 and 1953 alone.[483] Meanwhile, as we know, this suburbanization trend drained central cities of a critical mass of working- and middle-class residents, mostly whites. In St. Louis, ambitious reformers from the city and the suburbs campaigned for consolidated government in order to address the problems posed by rapid metropolitanization. In fact, between 1921 and 1979, such reformers across the country went to voters eighty-three times to try to create unified city-county governments but with only a handful of successes. Reflecting both the persistence of a metropolitan vision among some St. Louis leaders and the obstinacy of local rule in St. Louis, St. Louis

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[482]The roots of this debate can be found in the late-nineteenth century annexation movements, as Jon C. Teaford shows in *Cities and Suburbs: The Political Fragmentation of Metropolitan America, 1850-1970* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979).On more recent debates over regionalism, see David Rusk, *Cities Without Suburbs* (2nd ed.; Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995) and Myron Orfield, *Metropolitics: A Regional Agenda for Community and Stability* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997).

[483]St. Louis County ranked among the six fastest-growing counties since 1940 and included ninety-one municipalities in 2002. See Teaford, *Post Suburbia*, 97.

reformers to date have tried, and failed, more than in any other place to create metropolitan-level governments (in 1926, 1930, 1959, 1962, 1989, and 1990).[484]

Among metropolitan areas, Greater St. Louis ranks among the most extreme in terms of the number of city-county consolidation efforts and the level of municipal political fragmentation. St. Louis is also unusual because its central city remains entirely politically separate from its original county and because its statistical metropolitan area includes municipalities in two separate states and furthermore is intersected by the Mississippi River (the political boundary between Missouri and Illinois).[485] The political separation between St. Louis City and St. Louis County has meant that many local officials and residents in the area felt particularly threatened by government cooperative efforts, which would diminish the number of offices and political units, than those in metropolitan areas where the city has remained part of its county and thus already shared some political functions. Yet it is a useful case study due to these characteristics because they place in high relief local leaders' emerging need, desire, and efforts to pursue metropolitan cooperative ventures, on the one hand, and the political, cultural, and economic obstacles that they faced in their endeavors, on the other hand. Jon Teaford suggests that division, not integration, best characterizes the relationship between city and suburban leaders after WWII.[486] Yet St. Louis' story suggests that metropolitan leaders after WWII were more integrated on some levels than Teaford indicates, as

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[484]Judd and Swanstrom, *City Politics*, 332-34; See also Chapter Three in E. Terrence Jones, *Fragmented By Design: Why St. Louis Has So Many Governments* (St. Louis: Palmerston and Reed Publishers, 2000).
[485]Metropolitan St. Louis includes three counties in Illinois (Madison, Monroe, and St. Clair) and four jurisdictions in Missouri (St. Louis City, St. Louis County, and the counties of Jefferson and Franklin).
[486]This is one of Teaford's themes in *Cities and Suburbs*.

postwar metropolitanization fostered varied and sometimes unusual alliances among business, political, educational, and civic leaders from the central city and her surrounding counties.

The Bi-State Development Corporation, Between Regionalism and Localism: Envisioning Solutions, Erecting Limitations in Public Planning Authorities

"We Will Sink or Swim Together": The Bi-State Movement for a Regional Public Authority in St. Louis, 1945-1950

In the early 1940s, as St. Louis workers manufactured, assembled, and polished wartime apparatus, local leaders considered the fate of St. Louis after WWII. Although buoyed by the rise in industrial production, Harland Bartholomew and the St. Louis City Plan Commission (CPC), public officials like Mayor Kaufmann, and industrialists like Stuart Symington remained aware that the war stymied their efforts to reverse downtown blight and modernize infrastructure in Greater St. Louis. Moreover, a postwar depression coupled with the absence of regional planning, according to Bartholomew, could fundamentally destabilize St. Louis' economy. These leaders were not unique in their concerns. Their counterparts in other cities and federal officials in the National Resources Planning Board (dismantled in 1943) were also giving a great deal of thought to the postwar reconstruction job facing American cities. In *St. Louis After the War* (1942), Bartholomew had proposed ideas that would shape American city planners' and officials' debates on metropolitan development: limiting suburbanization, unifying city and suburb, and reconstructing the urban core.[487] Yet this would require local leaders to transcend municipal political divisions and address, on a regional level, problems that were

[487]St. Louis City Plan Commission (hereafter cited as the St. Louis CPC), *Saint Louis After the War* (1942).

metropolitan in scope. Further complicating St. Louis leaders' postwar agenda is the fact that metropolitan St. Louis includes three counties in Illinois (the so-called "East Side"). The East Side housed vital coal, steel, railroad, meatpacking, grain processing, fuel, and chemical industries, and infrastructure terminals. The demands of wartime production had forced local officials, industrialists, and financiers to think in more regional terms as production operations, investment flows, and home-to-work journeys criss-crossed bi-state St. Louis. Yet St. Louisans, historically, had eschewed bi-state cooperation.

Divided by racial tensions, two-state politics, and the Mississippi River, cooperation between St. Louis City and East Side leaders had proven difficult in the past. Local industrialists and some political leaders tried to forge bi-state alliances through the Industrial Club of St. Louis (1920s) and the St. Louis Regional Planning Commission (RPC) (1930s). The lack of commitment among public officials and the Depression, however, cut short these efforts.[488] Local political rivalries and the long shadow of the East St. Louis race riot (1917) tended to dampen any incentive St. Louis City and East Side leaders had to forge cooperative economic initiatives. Yet the RPC had at least identified problems that Bartholomew, Symington, and their allies wanted to resolve

[488]The Industrial Club of St. Louis was created in 1926 by local businessmen and a small number of political leaders in order to promote the bi-state industrial district. The St. Louis Regional Planning Commission (RPC) was created by the federal government in the mid-1930s to help local officials and citizens investigate bi-state area problems and solutions. Neither organization survived the Depression as businessmen withdrew their financial support and political officials lost interest. See Thomas F. Hadac, *Bi-State St. Louis: Factors Significant to the Emergence of a Governing Leadership for the Missouri-Illinois Area, 1949-1965* (Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University 1976), 24.

through planned bi-state development, among them deteriorated infrastructure, blight in inner-city St. Louis and East St. Louis, and chaotic suburban expansion.[489]

Planners, political leaders, and businessmen in other metropolitan centers set out similar postwar plans. Yet St. Louis' bi-state status (peculiar to only a few metropolitan areas at mid-century) encouraged St. Louisans' sense of urgent action. "Without a bi-state authority," according to one industrialist, "the Mississippi would remain, politically speaking, a 'thousand miles wide' and leave metropolitan St. Louis increasingly at the mercy of area wide problems."[490] Bartholomew feared that for local citizens, "so battered and buffeted by wars and economic upheavals. . . .long-range community planning [was] a secondary, unimportant consideration."[491] Undeterred, Symington and Bartholomew sought to realize the unfulfilled goal of the Regional Plan Commission: the creation of a bi-state public authority.[492]

Bartholomew and Symington possessed the professional experience and intellectual worldview to enable them to become influential advocates of a bi-state public authority. Since his first major report for the CPC, *Problems of St. Louis* (1917),

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[489]St. Louis Regional Planning Commission, *Regional Planning: The St. Louis Region* (Washington, D.C.: National Resources Committee, GPO, 1936).

[490]Missouri-Illinois Bi-State Commission, *A Bi-State Development Agency for the Missouri-Illinois Metropolitan Area* (St. Louis, 1949), 20. Hadac, *Bi-State St. Louis*, 35.

[491]M. Christine Boyer, *Dreaming the Rational City: The Myth of American City Planning* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983), 267.

[492]Public authorities are corporate instruments of the state created by the legislature to further public interests. They are legally and administratively autonomous from the state. Public authorities are "special purpose governments." Special purpose governments include special districts (empowered to tax), such as school districts and public authorities (forbidden to tax). Given the failure of most metropolitan political consolidation efforts, reformers have instead tried to unify governments by creating two-tier systems (special purpose governments) that would promote some consolidation, by creating a metropolitan district that would have specific service responsibilities, but not full unity because they leave municipalities and counties with important powers.

Bartholomew's in-depth analyses of St. Louis contributed to his evolution into a nationally influential theorist of metropolitan planning (Chapters One and Two).[493] Symington, a Massachusetts native and future U.S. senator (D-MO), made his professional mark in the 1930s and 1940s as a business whiz.[494] As president of St. Louis' Emerson Electric Manufacturing Co. during WWII, Symington gained invaluable experience navigating the problems and potentials of the bi-state economy. Growing numbers of planners, industrialists, and financiers in 1940s St. Louis shared the views of Symington and Bartholomew; they would become the core constituency behind the public authority movement.[495] Public officials like St. Louis City Mayor Darst would strongly support Bi-State's creation, although in the 1950s they would devote their energies to slum clearance, public housing, and downtown renewal, not long-term planning. As Bartholomew suggested, public planning advocates would have to create strong citizen engagement in order to become effective; otherwise planning appears to threaten local political power and private property. Metropolitan political fragmentation combined with St. Louis City's unusual incorporation of both city and county offices

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[493]The earliest reports of the St. Louis CPC reflect their metropolitan framework, for example, *City Plan of St. Louis* (1907) (by the Civic League, the precursor to the St. Louis CPC), *Problems of St. Louis* (1916), *The Zone Plan* (1919), and *Ten Years Progress on the City Plan of St. Louis* (1926). See Chapter One of this dissertation.

[494]Stuart Symington was born in Amherst, Massachusetts, enlisted in the Army, and later attended Yale. He distinguished himself nationally in three separate careers, in industry, in government, and in politics. In 1938, executives at Emerson Electric Manufacturing Co. recruited Symington from New York to revive their St. Louis company. As president, Symington built Emerson into the world's largest airplane armament plant. Symington would serve as surplus property administrator, Assistant Secretary of War for Air, Secretary of the Air Force (the first secretary), and head of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. He returned to St. Louis in 1952 and was elected U.S. Senator that year. He was reelected in 1958, 1964, and again in 1970, and so served from January 3, 1953, until his resignation December 27, 1976. See Justin L. Faherty, et al., *Movers and Shakers: Men Who Have Shaped St. Louis* (Tuscon: Patrice Press, 1992).

[495]Industries which are tied to their location (due to dependence upon natural resources, for example) rely upon the metropolitan economy for financial investment, commercial networks, and labor.

(Chapter One) intensified this challenge in St. Louis by aggrandizing the number of local officials who may feel threatened by regional planning efforts.

Symington, Bartholomew, and their allies built upon and contributed to a rich, if truncated, intellectual and planning tradition. In the early twentieth century, a notable group of planners, architects, sociologists, and other social scientists, including Bartholomew and Chicago-school urban sociologist Lewis Wirth, argued that proper planning and technical expertise would enable metropolitan areas to reach their fullest economic growth potential. The assumptions of these "metropolitanists," in historian Robert Fishman's term, were reflected in their ambitious *Regional Plan of New York and its Environs* (1929-1931), which included Bartholomew among its authors, and the creation of the New York Port Authority, the nation's first bi-state public authority.[496] Planners in this tradition, such as Frederic Delano and Charles E. Merriam, inspired metropolitan and regional planning on a federal level during the New Deal (see also Chapter One). Yet long-range, metropolitan planning as a matter of federal policy became

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[496]The work of the Chicago School of Sociology and the *Regional Plan of New York* comprised the metropolitanists' main intellectual achievements. In contrast to the metropolitanists, so-called "regionalists," like Lewis Mumford, called for metropolitan decentralization, not restructuring, to resolve problems created by industrialization and immigration. See Robert Fishman, "The Metropolitan Tradition in American Planning," in *The American Planning Tradition: Culture and Policy*, ed. Robert Fishman (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Pres, 2000), 65-88, and Peter Hall, *Cities of Tomorrow: An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design in the Twentieth Century* (updated ed.; New York: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), 149-64. The New York Port Authority was not a direct product of this intellectual movement, although its sponsors, especially H. Julius Cohen, counsel to the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York, reflected their ideals. The Port Authority, created in 1921, was the first public authority of its kind and the first interstate agency. The Authority received high praise in the 1930s as a vehicle for interstate development and as a national model due in large part to its building of the George Washington Bridge (dedicated in 1931), the world's largest spanning bridge at its time. See Jameson W. Doig, "Joining New York City to the Greater Metropolis," in *Landscape of Modernity: Essays on New York City, 1900-1940*, ed. by David Ward and Olivier Zunz (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1992), 76-106.

sidelined during the war.[497] Postwar metropolitan planning thus would have to depend upon local energies, and planners would prove to be less ambitious than metropolitan advocates during the 1920s and 1930s. Bartholomew and Symington, however, carried out fundamental threads of this earlier movement by emphasizing, for example, that the fortunes of the city and its counties are interdependent and that planning on a metropolitan scale is essential for local growth. Moreover, Symington invited a professional planner to head their bi-state movement who would bring with him his experience at the Port Authority of New York.

In 1945, Symington invited W. Phillip Shatts to relocate from New York City to St. Louis and head the new St. Louis Metropolitan Plan Association (MPA). The MPA intended to foster broad support for planning, contributing to the growing number of citizen planning councils nationwide such as Chicago's Metropolitan Housing and Planning Council and Baltimore's Citizens' Planning and Housing Association.[498] Shatts had served as associate director of the New York Regional Plan Association, precursor to the planning agency for the New York-New Jersey-Connecticut region.[499] Shatts' professional career thus gave him detailed experience with bi-state institutions, including

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[497]These federal-level efforts took shape in projects like the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), agencies like the National Resources Planning Board, and federally-sponsored local groups like the St. Louis Regional Plan Commission. Federal initiatives like the TVA focused on ambitious regional economic restructuring. This is in contrast to planners' efforts to make discrete metropolitan areas more efficient through planned development. On the marginalization of federal-level regional planning, see Boyer, *Dreaming the Rational City*, 264-67, and Phillip J. Funigiello, *The Challenge of Urban Liberalism: City-Federal Relations During WWII* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1978). These scholars also suggest why federal urban policies have been problem-solving rather comprehensive in scope, an approach fully inadequate to make American cities economically and socially viable, as scholars like Sam Bass Warner, Jr., has argued in *Planning for a Nation of Cities* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966) and elsewhere.
[498]Boyer, *Dreaming the Rational City*, 264-65; Jon C. Teaford, *The Rough Road to Renaissance: Urban Revitalization in America, 1940-1985* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 53.
[499]Hadac, *Bi-State St. Louis,* 45. The Regional Plan Association (1922) focused initially on rail, water, and road transportation and open-space networks in metropolitan New York.

the Port Authority, and planning ideas upon which to draw as he mobilized support for a bi-state authority in St. Louis. Leaving leadership of St. Louis' new planning movement to Shatts, Symington accepted President Truman's offer to serve as the federal surplus property administrator in Washington, D.C., launching his almost four decade career in national government and politics.

Symington and Bartholomew established the Metropolitan Plan Association as a voluntary planning organization anchored in the business community and in municipal commissions. In the MPA *Guide Plan for Missouri-Illinois Metropolitan Area Development*, Bartholomew laid out an economic and intellectual rational for a St. Louis bi-state public authority.[500] Indeed, W. Phillip Shatts would continuously emphasize the *Guide Plan*'s message that bi-state St. Louis' "problems are interwoven with the area as a whole. . . .all must work together as one unit in the solution of these problems."[501] The main objective of the MPA was to build support for a bi-state public authority. The socioeconomic context of late 1940s St. Louis proved conducive for MPA's popularity among leading St. Louis businessmen, public officials, academics, and other local residents. Wartime industrial production suggested to residents the economic benefits that bi-state cooperation could generate but also highlighted potentially debilitating infrastructure inefficiencies. Many St. Louisans also feared that their regional economy would not adjust successfully to a peacetime economy. Concurrently, St. Louis suburban

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[500]Harland Bartholomew, *Guide Plan for Missouri-Illinois Metropolitan Area Development* (St. Louis: Harland Bartholomew and Associates, 1948) (Missouri Historical Society; hereafter cited as MHS).
[501]W. Philip Shatts, *Missouri-Illinois Team-Work for Metropolitan St. Louis Area Development: Metropolitan Plan Association Annual Report,* May 31, 1949, page 2 (St. Louis Regional Commerce and Growth Association Records (hereafter cited as the RCGA Records), Box 4, Folder 49; Western Historical Manuscripts Collection, University of Missouri, St. Louis; hereafter cited as the WHMC).

officials like St. Louis County Supervisor Luman Matthews (1951-1958) criticized the absence of planned municipal public services (Chapter Four). Area residents thus could list numerous reasons why a bi-state authority might well attend to urgent economic needs in Greater St. Louis.

Convinced by MPA's message, prominent members of the local industrial, financial, and academic communities become the Association's charter members. The MPA's officers included J. S. McDonnell, president of McDonnell Aircraft Co.; Girard C. Varnum, President of the St. Louis County Chamber of Commerce; M. R. Noack, president of the East St. Louis Chamber of Commerce; and A. S. Langsdorf, Dean Emeritus of Washington University.[502] Regional efforts in St. Louis for city-county consolidation and for bi-state planning would find its strongest supporters in the industrial, financial, news-media, and academic sectors. Local businessmen and editors served Greater St. Louis and thus had a professional-economic stake in its stability; social scientists from Washington University, St. Louis University, and the University of Missouri based their metropolitan advocacy upon their research into urban affairs. Public officials, in contrast, vested their professional interests in existing administrative jurisdictions, offices, and governing institutions. In postwar St. Louis, as in other cities,

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[502]Many of MPA's officers had ties to the Industrial Club and the Regional Plan Association. They also included George C. Smith, president, St. Louis Chamber of Commerce; Walter H. Head, chairman, St. Louis Supervisory Committee for Public Improvements; Spencer Olin, vice president, Olin Industries (metals and mining, East Alton, Illinois); and R. C. Obermann, vice president, Mercantile-Commerce Bank. The MPA's fourteen study committee leaders included Howard L. Young, president, American Zinc Co. (in Illinois); Armstrong Chinn, president, Terminal Railroad Assn.; R. O. Short of Southwestern Bell; Wm. T. Weir, president, St. Louis County Water Co.; Charles E. Michel, director, Union Electric; E. F. Wagner, president, 7-Up Bottling Co. (Madison, Illinois). These names are listed in the Metropolitan Plan Association publications found in the following location: City of St. Louis, Office of the Mayor, Files of Raymond R. Tucker (hereafter cited as the Tucker Files), Series 4, Box 1, Folder: Bi-State Agency; University Archives Collections, Washington University).

most would prove to be lackluster supporters of regional planning.[503] Yet in the late 1940s, St. Louis officials became convinced that a regional planning body could bolster economic stability and be safeguarded against the undemocratic wielding of its public powers.

As Shatts, Symington, and Bartholomew had hoped, the message of the MPA that Greater St. Louis was "interdependent" and "one great economic unit" spread quickly. [504] St. Louis area newspapers and government, civic, and educational groups encouraged local residents to transcend their parochial perspective. Newspaper editors from St. Louis City and from East St. Louis, Illinois, for example, argued that

> In the civic life and planning for the future of the whole metropolitan St. Louis area, on both sides of the river, competition now needs to be controlled and canalized. We can't compete. We must all grow up together.[505]

The MPA thus fostered an intellectual rationale for bi-state cooperation and an organizational base upon which advocates campaigned for a bi-state public authority. The Association was persuading St. Louis residents to look beyond metropolitan political fragmentation and consider, for the first time, public planning institutionalized on a metropolitan, bi-state level.

Concurrently, MPA President Shatts, Chairman A. S. Langsdorf, and other Association members lobbied state legislators in Jefferson City, Missouri, and Springfield, Illinois, to authorize the creation of a public authority for Greater St.

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[503]Local officials have generally been against regional consolidation, as scholars such as Judd and Swanstrom have discussed. See Judd and Swanstrom, *City Politics*, 332-34.

[504]*Metropolitan Plan Association Activities: Progress and Prospects,* November 16, 1955, page 1 (RCGA Records, Box 4, Folder 49).

[505]"The MPA appears to be the answer" to bi-state economic progress, the editor concluded. See the MPA's annual report, *Progress and Prospect*, March 28, 1945, page 4 (RCGA Records, Box 4, Folder 49).

Louis.[506]Yet they had to convince legislators that this fundamental institutional innovation—the two states had never before created a public compact between them—would provide critical economic benefits that local and private agencies could not offer. And given the concern of many Americans that public agencies could pose a very real threat to the local democratic process, MPA members had to persuade legislators that the problems facing Greater St. Louis not only demanded public intervention on a metropolitan level but that the authority's powers could be held in check. Taking up this challenge, Shatts and his allies argued to state legislators that bi-state planning and development would generate greater tax revenues for the states and jobs for residents. Moreover, as a public authority run by planning and engineering experts, the agency would remain free from political rivalries and from party politics and so foster "efficient economic governance." Furthermore, the authority could provide more cost-effective service than a private agency because it was tax-exempt and free from dividend payments. And these members of the Metropolitan Plan Association emphasized that Missouri and Illinois governors would exercise veto power over decisions made by the bi-state commission. Thus they would prevent the agency from becoming an "unaccountable" and "over-wielding" public body.

The Association members convinced Missouri and Illinois state representatives that a bi-state public authority would secure, in the words of one legislator, the "orderly

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[506]MPA advocates understood that state legislators may not support their proposal if legislators' constituents did not support it also, although a voter referendum was not required. During the 1940s, many state legislatures created study commissions on metropolitan development as did Missouri and Illinois legislators. See Bartholomew, *Guide Plan for Missouri-Illinois Metropolitan Area,* and Shatts, *Missouri-Illinois Team-Work for Metropolitan St. Louis.*

development of this great tax producing region" and was "a great bargain."[507] The Association's *Regional News* announced that Governors Forrest Smith (MO) and Adlai Stevenson (IL) had signed legislation in 1949 to create the St. Louis Bi-State Development Corporation, which represented an area of about 3,000 square miles and 225 municipalities.[508] Area businessmen, political leaders, and newspaper editors agreed that the new corporation would greatly assist St. Louis' development.[509] But despite the enthusiasm greeting the creation of Bi-State, Chairman Langsdorf emphasized the consistent citizen support public planning agencies need in order to become effective—and highlighted their Achilles' heel. Lansdorf told MPA members that

> Although it is certain that the establishment of the Bi-State Development Agency is an event of major importance to the people of this area and that it has attracted nation-wide attention.. . . .The future success of the movement, now so auspiciously launched, will depend in large measure upon your continued interest and participation.[510]

After WWII, as we have seen, St. Louis leaders thus began to conceptualize the St. Louis area in new, metropolitan terms as they viewed its problems and solutions as regional in scope. To be sure, members of the St. Louis Industrial Club, the Regional Plan Commission, and the City Plan Commission long advocated a bi-state framework for evaluating the area's economic conditions. Yet St. Louisans in the late 1940s managed to transform this idea into organizational and structural outcomes: they initiated a creative metropolitan venture that led to institutional innovations on the regional level

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[507]Shatts, *Missouri-Illinois Team-Work for Metropolitan St. Louis.*
[508]MPA, *Regional News*, Number 11, 1950 (Tucker Files, Series 4, Box 1, Folder: Bi-State Agency), and Shatts, *Missouri-Illinois Team-Work for Metropolitan St. Louis.* The Bi-State Compact statement, overviews of the campaign, and correspondence can also be found in the Tucker Files, Series 4, Box 1, Folder: Bi-State Agency.
[509]See Mayor Darst's correspondence and documents in the Tucker Files, Series 4, Box 1, Folder: Bi-State Agency.
[510]MPA, *Regional News*, Number 11, 1950, page 4.

(Bi-State Corporation). They were among the first to establish such a metropolitan planning body in the postwar period. Given the obstacles posed by metropolitan political fragmentation and the absence of bi-state cooperation in the past, the new institution represented a notable achievement for St. Louisans in terms of their civic leadership, their intellectual persuasiveness, and their organizational strategies.

Local leaders since 1945 have relied increasingly upon special purpose governments like the Bi-State Agency to address metropolitan socioeconomic concerns. By 1952 there were 4,943 nation-wide and their numbers have since grown exponentially as urban leaders have sought to address issues from recreation development to school districts.[511] Yet the case of Bi-State suggests why public planning authorities actually emerged as a compromise between the comprehensive needs of metropolitan planning and development, on the one hand, and the limited political possibilities available to reformers, on the other hand. By establishing this kind of special purpose government, that is, a regional planning body with restricted operational, financial, and jursidictional powers, members of the Metropolitan Plan Association were seeking a compromise between the political unification of metropolitan St. Louis, which they deemed politically impossible, and unfettered municipal fragmentation, which they considered economically untenable.

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[511]In metropolitan Detroit, for example, municipal officials in the 1940s and in the 1950s established special districts to handle recreation, health, and other facilities. Detroit's regional planning commission was created from the remnants of the wartime regional advisory committee. The commission had only research, analysis, and advisory functions, with no power to regulate or control. See June Manning Thomas, *Redevelopment and Race: Planning a Finer City in Postwar Detroit* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1997), 33, 213-14. On special purpose governments, see Jones, *Fragmented By Design*, 95-96.

The Bi-State Compact: The Problems and Promise of the St. Louis Bi-State Agency

Just as the founders of Bi-State predicted their agency's success, Bi-State's institutional structure undermined its potential to become an effective regional planning body. Shatts and the co-authors of the Bi-State Compact had structured the institution's powers in a manner that would earn broad approval of St. Louis area residents and state legislators. In order to galvanize this support, Shatts, Langsdorf, and their allies had to meet two challenges: internalize safeguards on Bi-State's authority and include bi-state representatives in the Agency's governing board. Yet, as a result, Bi-State's jurisdictional, operational, and financial scope of activity would face debilitating weaknesses. In 1950, however, the creators of Bi-State might have described their negotiations over the Compact as pragmatic compromises rather than constraints. The particular balance that they struck between the Compact's authority and the Compact's limitations amounted to what can be called their "metropolitan strategy" for regional cooperation. Bi-State represented their effort to create quasi-governmental institutional unity in Greater St. Louis and thereby transcend the political fragmentation that stymied regional solutions to metropolitan-wide problems.

The Bi-State Compact actually laid out a broad scope of action for the new corporation, including revenue-generating activities that could aid its evolution into an effective public agency. The Compact granted Bi-State the power to own, acquire, construct, and operate public works such as bridges, tunnels, airports, wharves, docks, storage facilities, grain elevators, terminal facilities, sewerage, and mass transit. In addition, Bi-State could manage other public development activities that crossed state

lines or that individual agencies could not handle. Moreover, Bi-State could submit plans for the coordinated development of highways, parkways, parking areas, terminals, water supply, and land-use patterns in the St. Louis area. And manifesting public authorities' legal status as creatures of the state, the Missouri and Illinois governors appoint a ten-member Commission to head the new Agency.

Yet Shatts built significant limitations into the functional mechanisms that structured Bi-State's financial, jurisdiction, and operational authority. The agency's founders created the corporation as a financially self-sustaining body. Bi-State could generate revenue through fees for use of its facilities, through revenue bonds, and through contributions to the Agency. But the corporation could not levy taxes; and Bi-State was fiscally autonomous from her states as the state legislatures did not fund Bi-State, although legally this was possible. The new corporation also faced restrictions in its jurisdictional scope. The Compact's philosophy of "non-intervention" prohibited the agency from taking on responsibilities that local or private agencies could manage. Moreover, it could not act without municipalities' approval. And Bi-State's operational powers explicitly excluded the owning, constructing, and managing of commercial and industrial facilities.[512]

Bi-State's Compact sought to meet concerns particular to St. Louisans, demands common to metropolitan residents, and requirements inherent in public authorities' legal status. Shatts, Bartholomew, and other Bi-State supporters had to assure local businessmen, officials, state legislators, and other residents that the Agency would

[512]For the Bi-State Compact statement, see the Tucker Files, Series 4, Box 1, Folder: Bi-State Agency. See also Hadac, *Bi-State St. Louis*, 37-40.

respect municipal authority and private enterprise and not create new financial obligations for the states and for citizens. While these concerns shaped debates over public authorities in many metropolitan areas, they took on particular resonance in St. Louis. The multiplicity of political and administrative offices in Greater St. Louis (driven by city-county separation and bi-state status) and still relatively low bonded indebtedness—and residents' intention to preserve both—had made many St. Louisans particularly wary of this new regional-institutional effort.[513] Moreover, the long-standing racial and political tensions between St. Louis City and East St. Louis bolstered the demand of residents that local authority supercede regional-institutional prerogative. The Bi-State movement had in fact rekindled East Side leaders' fear that St. Louis City leaders wanted to control their affairs and St. Louis City residents' concern that closer association with East St. Louis, tarnished by the 1917 race riot, would damage their own city's reputation.[514] In addition, the predominantly rural legislators in the Missouri state legislature eschewed cooperation for city-metropolitan interests and thus had to be convinced that Bi-State would not become a burden to the state. [515] Although Shatts used the New York Port Authority as a model for Bi-State's Compact, St. Louis' historical context illuminates more fully why the Agency had to be financially self-sufficient and non-interventionist in order to gain the approval of state legislators and local residents.

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[513]By the 1950s, however, St. Louis City residents were willing to fund millions of dollars in bond initiatives for urban renewal, as Chapter Two of this dissertation shows.
[514]Hadac, *Bi-State St. Louis*, 40.
[515]Political scientists Jones and Stein discuss the historic tendency of Missouri legislators to eschew city interests. See Jones, *Fragmented By Design*, 2, and Lana Stein, *St. Louis Politics: The Triumph of Tradition* (St. Louis: Missouri Historical Society Press, 2002), 2, 250. Rural-city tensions proved typical in state legislatures, although those in Missouri appeared particularly acute. See Judd and Swanstrom, *City Politics*, 45-46, 126.

The Bi-State Compact, however, also reflected the conditions of its legal status. Public authorities can be exempt from local taxation, they cannot levy taxes, and they have a board appointed by the governor. Bi-State's legal conditions actually made the Agency more palatable to area residents and state legislators in the late 1940s. But they simultaneously weakened the corporation's potential effectiveness. Bi-State's tax-exempt status unintentionally led to constraints on the Agency's operating powers: Bi-State's creators prohibited the Agency from operating commercial and industrial facilities to ensure that it would not abuse its tax-exempt status and consequently deprive local authorities of tax revenue.[516] And while Missouri and Illinois governors appointed labor, civic, and business representatives to the Agency's governing board, many residents would view the body as unaccountable to and removed from local citizens. Although the Bi-State institution was shaped by concerns particularly resonant in St. Louis, the Agency reflected compromises that were being built into public planning authorities in the postwar period.[517]

Assessing the Agency: Incremental Policy Evolution and Limited Successes

Bi-State's Compact thereby set the parameters within which Agency commissioners could pursue and adopt planning and development projects in Greater St. Louis. While the Compact created commissioners' structure of alternatives for their regional efforts, we must assess their policies also within the political and economic context of postwar metropolitan America. The evolution of Bi-State's policies transpired

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[516]Hadac, *Bi-State St. Louis*, 40.
[517]Such as Detroit's regional planning commission, as Thomas suggests in *Redevelopment and Race*, 28, 33, 213-14.

in two phases: pre-1960 and post-1960. After 1960, dramatic innovations in federal transportation and urban policy, combined with internal revisions to the Compact, would significantly broaden the financial and operational capacity of the Bi-State Corporation. At the same time, growing competition from the Sunbelt would aggravate local political tensions rooted in bi-state municipal balkanization. Consequently, the challenges to regional cooperation posed by metropolitan fragmentation became even more difficult for advocates like Shatts just as Sunbelt competition made their success all the more critical. In the 1950s, MPA members formed the nucleus of Bi-State's staff. Commissioners would include prominent men like Aloys Kaufmann (former St. Louis City mayor), Roy S. Rauschkolb (Granite City, Illinois, Chamber of Commerce), and Chester C. Davis (president of the St. Louis Federal Bank). Despite their optimistic predictions in 1950, however, the Agency would become influential in only two metropolitan ventures that decade: the upgrading of the sewerage infrastructure and the modernization of waterway terminals on the Mississippi River.

The most important development to come out of Bi-State's early studies was the Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District (MSD) in 1954. In the 1950s, the Agency's staff submitted numerous reports and recommendation to local officials and state legislatures on issues ranging from regional transportation planning to recreational development. Yet among them only their study on the city's and the county's sewerage infrastructure encouraged local officials to adopt a metropolitan-level approach to infrastructure improvement. Based on the Agency's recommendations, County Supervisor Luman Mathews, City Mayor Tucker, and other municipal leaders created the MSD, a special

district incorporating St. Louis City and St. Louis County (not under Bi-State's jurisdiction).

Bi-State planners and researchers had weighed in on an infrastructure issue that resonated strongly with local business and political leaders in St. Louis in the 1950s. With St. Louis County officials promoting suburban business and residential growth, and city officials campaigning for downtown public improvements, the area's extraordinarily insufficient and inefficient waste system, problematic primarily in the suburbs, stymied economic development. Sewerage infrastructure in St. Louis was irrefutably metropolitan in scope as the suburbs' raw sewage flowed through the city to reach purifying plants, thus burdening the city's own facilities. Moreover, the poor conditions of the suburban sewerage infrastructure posed a serious health hazard. Given its immediate link to economic development and mutual benefits to be gained by city-county cooperation, city and county officials, with strong support from the St. Louis Chamber of Commerce, moved quickly to create the MSD.[518]

The new special district was important not only for improving sanitation and investment potential in the St. Louis area. As a special district, MSD represented the first governmental-political bridge between St. Louis City and St. Louis County since their

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[518]Local leaders thus could not tackle sewerage system problems within one jurisdiction, in contrast to other types of public improvements like roads or parks in which they believed they could carry out improvements within their own municipality (albeit this was piecemeal and inefficient). St. Louis County had fifteen municipal systems, twenty-four sewer districts, seventy-five subdivision systems, and thousands of individual septic tanks (most inadequate) and had to pay St. Louis City to send its raw sewage through the city system. Since the 1849 cholera epidemic killed almost one out of every ten St. Louisans, city leaders made sewers a top public priority and over time it developed one of the best sets of urban sewers in the country. See Jones, *Fragmented By Design*, 104-10. See also the excellent study by Eric Sandweiss, "Construction and Community in South St. Louis, 1850-1910" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1991).

separation in 1876. The MSD is significant also because it showed the potential of Bi-State experts to identify urgent problems facing the region and provide critical economic research, technical support, and metropolitan-level sponsorship in addressing these challenges. Yet, the fact that MSD marked the only achievement in the 1950s in terms of political-governmental partnership on a metropolitan level to come out of the Agency's broad research, planning, and advocacy reflects a significant obstacle Bi-State faced in becoming an effective institution: Bi-State depended upon the invitation and approval of municipal officials in order to act. As Executive Director Elmer Brew would reflect, "we never do anything unless we are asked to do it. That's our philosophy."[519]

Bi-State commissioners like Chester Davis and Albert L. Wegener (East St. Louis Labor Council) addressed another debilitating public works problem in the 1950s: wharf and terminal upgrading on the Mississippi River. With a loan from Granite City Steel, Bi-State undertook its first major public project when it constructed and began operating a 600-foot public wharf and terminal at Granite City, Illinois. Local city planners, industrialists, and public officials, especially from riverside jurisdictions, called for the modernization of waterway infrastructure since the early 1940s. In the estimation of these St. Louisans, a public resolution to the problem had become absolutely critical as private investors in recent years declined to invest in inland waterway facilities. Bi-State's new wharf helped to ease a virtual embargo on the port district's cargo trading and handling (inefficient facilities had delayed barge service) and boost jobs, economic

[519]Brew held this position in the early 1970s. As quoted in "A Stronger Bi-State Could Serve as Region's Umbrella Agency," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, July 31, 1973 (Lawrence K. Roos Collection (hereafter cited as the Roos Collection), Box 7, Envelope #10; MHS).

activity, and local tax revenue. This endeavor proved significant for the Agency itself because it launched commissioners like Davis and Wegener into adopting and carrying out one of its main policies, that is, helping port districts to implement plans and to improve facilities through technical and research assistance. Most consequential for Bi-State, however, was the fact that revenues generated by the wharf became the Agency's main source of income in the 1950s.[520] The wharf essentially kept the Agency solvent for almost a decade.

The case of the wharf project illuminates why Agency commissioners did not carry out additional public works projects in the 1950s, particularly revenue-generating ventures. If the case of MSD highlights that Bi-State's relative inactivity in the 1950s resulted largely from disinterest among local officials, the wharf project highlights the financial constraints that also hindered the evolution of the Agency into an influential institution. Bi-State's port endeavor became possible due its loan from Granite City Steel. The Bi-State Compact debilitated the Agency's revenue bonding power and, as a result, Bi-State's ability to capitalize projects like the wharf. Shatts and his allies, as part of their metropolitan strategy to gain support among residents fearful of a regional "superagency," had prohibited the Agency from issuing revenue bonds to estates, trusts,

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[520]The Granite City wharf was located north of downtown on the Chain of Rocks Canal. The St. Louis region at the time had seven port districts handling coal, petroleum, chemicals, and grain and some other commodities. Into the 1970s, Bi-State operated the only public terminal on the Mississippi River that was entirely self-supporting. Yet river infrastructure continued to suffer despite calls for modernization by the Chamber of Commerce, Bi-State, and the East-West Gateway Coordinating Council. Chamber members' calls for this infrastructure modernization appeared in many newspaper reports, see, for example, the articles in Envelope Three (RCGA Newspaper Clippings) in the Newspaper Collection of the University of Missouri, St. Louis, Mercantile Library. See also Hadac, *Bi-State St. Louis*, 45, and James Neal Primm, *Lion of the Valley: St. Louis Missouri, 1764-1980* (St. Louis: Missouri Historical Society, 1998), 488.

and other such sources.[521] Yet this restriction severely curtailed the market for Bi-State bonds. "Highly restricted" and "shackled" in the words of even its strongest advocates, such as the social scientists comprising the Metropolitan St. Louis Survey team, Bi-State could not generate the capital necessary for public works endeavors, projects that in turn could have earned income for Bi-State.[522] Bi-State had to rely on a private-sector subsidy to initiate its wharf project.

Sewerage management and port upgrading in St. Louis shared four characteristics that help to explain why Bi-State commissioners became influential in these policy areas but not others, despite their advocacy for many public improvements. First, local officials and businessmen believed that private interests and local municipal units could not manage the task. Second, they perceived an urgent economic necessity. Third, public intervention in these areas did not threaten local authority. And fourth, metropolitan cooperation in this endeavor did not unduly burden any party involved.[523] Combined, these four conditions led local political and businessmen to welcome Bi-State's involvement. As these cases show, the jurisdictional and financial qualifications in Bi-State's Compact made the Agency thoroughly dependent upon the good will and support of metropolitan residents. The wharf and MSD also reveal, however, how Bi-State officials worked within these constraints with important, if highly uneven, outcomes.

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[521]Some local leaders feared that the subsequent financial support could enable Bi-State to monopolize public works projects thus far under the control of local officials.

[522]Bi-State's "powers and opportunities" were "sharply limited by law and by practical considerations," editors argued in "Progress or Decay? St. Louis Must Choose," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, March 2, 1952 (Municipal Enterprise Scrapbook, v. II, page 8; MHS). In their report, *Path of Progress for Metropolitan St. Louis* (St. Louis, 1957), the Metropolitan St. Louis Survey team expressed these concerns. The Survey's reports are held at numerous university libraries and public libraries in St. Louis.

[523]For example, by appearing to spread the costs and benefits unevenly across municipalities.

St. Louis in the 1950s, as it turned out, proved to be an adverse period for Bi-State advocates to sustain support for regional public planning and development. The main problems that had convinced local officials like Mayor Darst and businessmen like George C. Smith (president of the St. Louis Chamber of Commerce) to support Bi-State's creation in 1950 seemed to be getting resolved, in their view. In metropolitan areas like St. Louis, as we have seen, local political and business leaders took advantage of new federal policies for urban renewal and suburban development to address economic development problems. Concurrently, the Korean War spurred industrial growth in metropolitan St. Louis as in other urban centers that supported wartime production.[524] Addressing metropolitan problems and strategizing solutions, in their estimation, did not require an empowered Bi-State Agency after all. In this context, St. Louis businessmen and public officials began to view the corporation as inefficient and superfluous. And many officials, Mayors Darst and Alvin Fields (East St. Louis City) among them, feared that Bi-State still had the potential to become a regional "supergovernment."[525] Consequently, the financial contributions from businessmen and local and state government that fueled Bi-State's early years declined notably over the course of the

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[524]Previous chapters have shown local leaders' use of postwar federal policies. Meanwhile, as members of the MPA turned their attention to downtown renewal, the Association disintegrated. As Jones and Hadac note, those interests that consistently supported Bi-State (and also political consolidation) included the newspapers, some university officials, industrialists with holdings in both Illinois and Missouri, and, sometimes, the St. Louis Mayor. The minimal correspondence in the 1950s between City Hall and Bi-State suggests the low priority Bi State held for city officials. The main topics of correspondence in relevant archival files include Bi-State's legal right to manage parking facilities and charter reform efforts, see the Tucker Files, Series 2, Box 3, Folder: Bi-State Development Agency, and the Tucker Files, Series 4, Box 1, Folder: Bi-State Agency. See also Jones, *Fragmented By Design*, 97, Hadac, *Bi-State St. Louis*, 50-60, 91, 106, and Primm, *Lion of the Valley*, 475, 478-79.

[525]See the correspondence between St. Louis City Mayor Darst and East St. Louis City Mayor Fields in the Tucker Files, Series 2, Box 3, Folder: Bi-State Development Agency, and Tucker Files, Series 4, Box 1, Folder: Bi-State Agency.

1950s. St. Louisans' precarious support for the Agency, in turn, further weakened its bonding and planning capacities as the market for both subsequently deteriorated. Constrained by the metropolitan political culture and its internal institutional structure, Bi-State, paradoxically, appeared to most St. Louisans as the "monstrous ogre that promised so much but did so little."[526]

Bi-State's founders, however, must be held accountable for many of the limitations written into the Bi-State Compact. Shatts and his allies proved shortsighted in thinking through Bi-State's ability to wield its functional powers. Moreover, they underestimated the extent to which the Agency's appointed board appeared to St. Louisans as potentially unaccountable and unresponsive to local residents. And commissioners in the 1950s, for their part, generally went along with, rather than seek to modify, the "triumph of the tradition" of localism in St. Louis, in political scientist Lana Stein's term.[527] To the extent that these political compromises were necessary to gain the support of local residents, the leaders of the Bi-State movement exercised metropolitan political acumen. Yet they miscalculated both the immediate risks and long-term gains from this trade-off: the Compact did not equip the Agency with the institutional tools it needed to become effective and thereby sustain the good will of St. Louisans.

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In the 1960s, however, Bi-State commissioners had the opportunity to expand the Agency's scope of operational and financial capacities, marking a turning point in the

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[526]John R. Hahn, "The Bi-State Agency Still Is Shackled," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, February 11, 1959.
[527]And by the mid-1950s, Bi-State's early and most effective leaders no longer focused their energies on the Agency. Symington turned his attention to his national political career, Bartholomew focused on his private practice, and Shatts became less visible on the Bi-State leadership scene.

history of the Agency. Since the early 1950s, Bi-State's most ardent supporters, including U.S. Senator Symington, had tried to revise the Compact. Specifically, they wanted to strengthen the Agency's revenue-generating powers. By 1959, in the most effective display of Bi-State leadership that decade, they convinced state- and federal-level officials to grant Bi-State the power to sell its revenue bonds to trusts, estates, and similar sources.[528] In the early 1960s, transformations in federal metropolitan policies made it possible for cities like St. Louis and public agencies like Bi-State to pursue regional planning, particularly for transportation, to an extent never before possible. The Urban Mass Transportation Act (1964) and the Housing and Urban Development Act (1965) provided federal funding for metropolitan mass transportation and planning. Combined, the Compact revision and the new federal initiatives restructured the policy alternatives available to Bi-State commissioners and staff. They would make valuable use of these opportunities to adopt mass transit and bi-state transportation initiatives. Mass transportation and transport infrastructure thereafter would become Bi-State's exclusive policy focus.

St. Louis' mass transportation system had in fact raised serious concern among local officials since the early 1950s. The inefficient, privately-run transit system (busses) dampened the area's investment climate and economic growth potential as well as its quality of life, concluded the members of a St. Louis City-County commission on mass

[528]After almost a decade of the Agency's adherence to non-intervention, local political leaders like Mayors Tucker and Fields felt assured that Compact reform would not duplicate existing government functions or reverse the Agency's non-intervention policy. Thus the reform effort had taken almost a decade.

transit.[529] Concurrently, Bi-State commissioners wanted to establish a public mass transit system for the bi-state area but had been stymied by their inability to raise the necessary capital. They were also curtailed by local leaders' skepticism that the Agency was equipped for the job. By the early 1960s, however, a number of developments created the conditions under which local officials like Raymond Tucker and Alvin Fields, businessmen in Civic Progress, and residents endorsed the Agency becoming the transportation authority for the bi-state region.[530] As in the cases of sewerage upgrading and port modernization, these residents came to believe that private interests and local municipal units could not manage the task; that they faced an urgent economic necessity; and that the regional public venture did not benefit a particular jurisdiction or economic interest at the expense of another, a concern which had ranked among the main issues that hindered support for regional public agencies. Moreover, the commissioners' policy of unobtrusiveness, in this instance, paid off. Their strict adherence to Bi-State's non-intervention philosophy for over a decade persuaded many skeptics that the Agency did not intend to evolve into a metropolitan "superagency." In the early 1960s, commissioners like Chairman Leo A. Fisher (former chair of the Missouri Highway Commission) readily agreed to requests from St. Louis City, St. Louis County, and East Side officials to buy out the ailing bus companies. Bi-State Commissioners took

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[529]In 1959, a St. Louis City-St. Louis County mass transit commission recommended a unified public transit system for the city and the county in their *Gilman Report*. Their views seemed to be confirmed by the growing efforts of officials in other metropolitan areas and of federal officials to develop mass public transit systems.

[530]Business groups like Civic Progress, Inc., strongly believed that mass transit governed by a regional agency like Bi-State was necessary for economic growth. The support by leading businessmen encouraged initial proponents of Bi-State's potential new role to change their viewpoint. Correspondence between City Hall and the Bi-State on mass transit can be found in the Tucker Files, Series 3, Box 4, Folder: Bi-State Development Agency.

immediate advantage of the recent Charter revision to issue a $26.5 million revenue bond. The bond enabled the Agency to assume control of the private bus companies in 1963 and overnight become the region's public mass transit authority.[531] Over the next few decades, making use of bond issues and new funding possibilities from state, local, and federal governments, the Agency would expand its mass transit territory for bus service and operate various bi-state transportation facilities.

In the following decades, Bi-State leaders tapped numerous funding resources in order to development public mass transportation and bi-state transit facilities. With assistance from U.S. congressional allies like Senator Symington, Agency commissioners, city officials, and business leaders in St. Louis would seek federal mass transportation funds to underwrite Bi-State's transit system. At home, advocates consistently called upon residents, local governments, and state legislators to support metropolitan transportation development. Agreeing for the first time to a special purpose tax for metropolitan public-private transportation development, the St. Louis City Board of Aldermen and the St. Louis County Council, following state legislature authorization, passed a one-half cent sales tax in 1973 for transportation purposes. Concurrently, local government officials became more inclined to earmark budgetary resources for Bi-State. The market for the corporation's revenue bonds was also improving in the 1960s as St. Louis area financial and business interests recognized their own stake in upgrading bi-state area transportation system.

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[531]Hadac, *Bi-State St. Louis*, 52-63.

Bi-State's new funding possibilities enabled its leaders to promote two public projects that they believed were critical to regional economic development. In addition to the mass transit system (busses), Bi-State's other major projects included the construction and operation of the Gateway Arch Tram System, which they funded through three and one-third million dollars in revenue bonds, and the purchasing, re-opening, and managing of Parks Airport, which they funded through almost two million dollars in revenue bonds, Federal Aviation Administration grants, and a $500,000 loan from St. Louis City.[532] Bi-State leaders like commissioner Edwin J. Spiegel (former Missouri Division of Commerce and Industrial Development commissioner) pursued what they hoped would become reliable revenue-producing projects that they previously could not undertake due to the Agency's financial constraints. Yet their policy choices were also significant because Agency commissioners chose metropolitan projects intended to fulfill Bi-State's original mission: the provision of public services and the promotion of regional cooperation.

Bi-State's evolution into a regional transit authority proved highly significant for the Agency's capacity as a public planning institution, for economic development in St.

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[532]The bond revenue amounted to $1.7 million. Tram construction took place in the mid-1960s. In 1964, Bi-State began management of Parks Airport, located five miles from downtown on the East Side. On Bi-State's airport and Arch projects, see the Tucker Files, Series 3, Box 4, Folders: Bi-State Development Agency, Parks Airport, and Bi-State Development Agency. Correspondence between City Hall and Bi-State on mass transit can be found in the Tucker Files, Series 3, Box 4, Folder: Bi-State Development Agency. On Bi-State finances, see the City of St. Louis, Office of the Mayor, Files of Alfonso J. Cervantes (hereafter cited as the Cervantes Files), Series 1, Box 70, Folders: Bi-State Transit Fares, Bi-State Development Agency, and Bi-State Development Agency, Transit Services Corp. (University Archives Collections, Washington University). See also the Cervantes File, Series 1, Box 8, Folders: Bi-State Development Agency and Bi-State Development Agency, Transit Services Corp. Numerous Bi-State annual reports from the 1960s and the early 1970s are contained in the Tucker Files, Series 3, Box 4, Folder: Bi-State Development Agency, and in the Cervantes Files, Series 2, Box 15, Folder: Bi-State Development Agency.

Louis, and for metropolitan-federal relations. Bi-State's new public responsibilities represented a real advance in its scope of influence and in its operational power. As Bi State leaders managed mass transit bus lines, set fares, and considered modernization strategies for transit infrastructure, they directly affected the lives of thousands of area residents, they negotiated with local municipalities, and they shaped the contours of metropolitan infrastructure development. And for the first time, local residents had turned to Bi-State to provide a comprehensive public solution to a bi-state problem. Moreover, the Bi-State Agency played an important role in postwar revitalization efforts. Local political leaders, businessmen, and planners viewed the upgrading of metropolitan airports like Lambert International and the broader transportation infrastructure of which they were a part as critical to attracting business and residents to St. Louis. Concurrently, they relied upon the success of the Gateway Arch to boost the city's national profile and economic activity in the urban core (Chapter Three).

Bi-State's new policy role also helped to structure postwar local-federal relations in St. Louis. As the potential recipient of federal funds for transportation planning and development, Bi State became an intermediary between metropolitan-level and federal-level governance. Similar to urban renewal agencies (Chapter Two), public planning bodies like Bi State thus augmented the federal government's influence in metropolitan economic development. They encouraged local-metropolitan-national political alliances as urban leaders lobbied for public transportation funding and as national representatives, in turn, fostered their urban constituencies. Bi-State's new status thus highly politicized the Agency as it became one institution through which St. Louisans after WWII

negotiated intergovernmental relations. Yet Bi-State's new role transformed it from a relatively inconspicuous agency in the late 1950s into a lightening rod for debate over metropolitan public planning specifically and regional governance more broadly (fueled by County Supervisor Roos).[533] To the extent that local residents would espouse Bi-State's mandate, they influenced the scope of state and federal intervention in metropolitan development. Within this context, Bi-State's record in regional mass transit suggests the structure of opportunities public planning authorities faced in postwar metropolitan America.

Despite their auspicious beginnings in mass transportation, Agency leaders were unable to transform Bi-State into the highly effective regional transit authority that they had imagined. Bi-State leaders had made an astute decision to center their attention on mass transit: regional coordination therein was imperative, residents conceded that public management was necessary, and only the Agency had the legal authority to undertake this venture. In the 1960s and early 1970s, however, Bi-State commissioners struggled to keep mass transit operations solvent while watching ridership decline notably (the Arch Tram and Parks Airport generated little profit for Bi-State). Concurrently, Agency leaders faced intermittent criticism for what many residents and public officials perceived as financial and political mismanagement and inadequate service provision.[534] Yet the

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[533]Roos was a strong proponent of regional governmental cooperation. Such deliberations can be seen in the large number of newspaper articles in the latter 1960s and early 1970s on this topic, for example, "A Stronger Bi-State Could Serve as Region's Umbrella Agency," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, July 31, 1973; "Bi-State: The Problem Child Nobody Wants to Adopt," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, April 17, 1972; "Reshaping Regional Government," September 12, 1972, *St. Louis Globe-Democrat* (Roos Collection, Box 1, Envelope #10, Clipping File #9).

[534]Specifically, in the early 1960s, the Agency held closed-door hearings and announced a fare change without public notice, leading some to call the Agency a monopoly. As of 1963, all Bi-State meetings were

performance of Bi-State's leaders contributed only partially to the Agency's potential to become a more consequential mass transit authority.

More germane to Bi-State's level of performance is the fact that state and federal officials have never committed themselves fully to long-term funding strategies for public transportation in metropolitan America. Yet it is upon this support that regional transit authorities depend for a substantial part of their funding and their public mandate and, consequently, their success in meeting the needs of metropolitan mass transit. Governmental initiatives launched in the 1960s for mass transportation proved to be innovative policy responses to one of the challenges facing declining urban centers. Yet they did not represent a fundamental political commitment to regional public planning broadly and mass public transportation specifically by state and federal governments. They ultimately did not commit funds sufficient to make public transit very efficient. Bi State provides a particularly potent example of how public authorities' intergovernmental dependence could severely curtail their capabilities. St. Louis' half-cent sales tax for transportation was only a partial victory for the Agency: Bi-State ranked among numerous "transportation purposes" for which the tax could be used at the discretion of local officials and the tax had to be reauthorized every two years. In addition, the Missouri state legislature in the 1960s and 1970s provided only emergency funding to Bi-State; in contrast, most state legislatures actually began to commit more financial

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open to the public. However, Bi-State's precarious financial state then led many critics to blame its leadership for the problems rather than fully assessing the extent to which they were dependent upon governmental funds to operate. Newspaper clippings and correspondence on this topic can be found in the Cervantes Files, Series 1, Box 70, Folders: Bi-State Transit Fares, Bi-State Development Agency, and Bi-State Development Agency, Transit Services Corp., and in the Cervantes Files, Series 1, Box 8, Folders: Bi-State Development Agency and Bi-State Development Agency, Transit Services Corp.

resources. And federal funding for mass transportation via agencies like Bi-State proved piecemeal and highly sensitive to administrative politics.[535] This precarious financing structure significantly weakened the Agency's long-term planning and bonding capacity, while raising fares would have counterproductive effects on revenues.

In industrial-belt centers like St. Louis, intensifying Sunbelt competition and metropolitan demographic shifts heightened the challenge that public agencies like Bi-State faced in building local support. The significant loss of population and businesses from urban centers like St. Louis in the 1960s and 1970s aggravated the local tensions rooted in metropolitan political balkanization. In the context of increasingly uneven metropolitan growth, policies for regional public planning and development appeared ever more distributory in the view of many metropolitan residents. In St. Louis, the bi-state divide, coupled with urban core economic decline, reinforced the suspicions among these residents that regional-level public efforts burdened everyone with the costs incurred by the financial, political, and racial mismanagement of some and in return offered only uncertain metropolitan gains.[536] The metropolitan shift of population away from the urban core to increasingly distant suburban neighborhoods not only fostered these growing sentiments among St. Louisans but also dampened demand for public transit services (as automobile use increased).

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[535]Bi-State continues to face restrictions due to its financing structure, as noted in "Bi State Hits the Big 4-0," *St. Louis Commerce*, v3 #1 (January 1990), 15-16. For an overview of the federal influence in mass transportation, see George Smerk, *The Federal Role in Urban Mass Transportation* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1991).

[536]The "new regionalists" note this concern as one of the main obstacles to regional consolidation efforts.

The Bi-State Development Corporation was one of two regional public planning agencies that St. Louisans created after WWII. In 1965, local political and business leaders established the East-West Gateway Coordinating Council (EWGCC) in order to meet the requirements of the 1962 Highway Act.[537] This chapter has focused on the Bi-State Agency, however, because its history best illuminates the problem of promoting regional cooperation under the trying conditions of metropolitan political fragmentation and competition from the Sunbelt. Bi-State's history also reveals the strategies its advocates used to transform the Agency into an important player in metropolitan policy, despite the restrictions the Agency has faced. Bi-State's record, moreover, reveals how local leaders have created public authorities as a compromise between the comprehensive needs of metropolitan development and the limited political possibilities available to them.

Creating St. Louis' "Research Corridor": Metropolitan Cooperation for Research and Development in Greater St. Louis

The case of Bi-State reflects how the tensions between localism and regionalism constrained leaders' ability to cooperate within the realm of metropolitan-level public action. Most St. Louis businessmen and public officials, when it came to the coordination

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[537]The Highway Act required that metropolitan areas establish a regional planning body by 1965 in order to continue receiving highway funds. The Bi-State Agency governing board did not include elected area officials and thus did not qualify to fulfill this role. St. Louis area residents supported the East-West Gateway Coordinating Council (hereafter cited as the EWGCC) because they did not want to lose the substantial highway funds that the St. Louis area received. EWGCC would become St. Louis' official regional planning body, while Bi-State remained focused on metropolitan public transportation. During the 1970s, however, EWGCC faced similar constraints as Bi-State in implementing regional plans. EWGCC supporters lamented that it was more of a "structural shell" than an influential planning body. EWGCC publications, annual reports, and related documents can be found in the Tucker Files, in the Cervantes Files, and in the Roos Collection under the subject headings of EWGCC, regional planning, and Bi-State (see, for example, Tucker Files, Series 3, Box 4, and the Cervantes Files, Series 1, Boxes 20, 21, 33-36). Missouri Historical Society holds copies of the EWGCC *Gateway Council Reports*.

of regional-level development, found the realm of private-sector action far more palatable. In a period of rapid regional and national economic transformations, keeping metropolitan St. Louis industrially competitive demanded immediate and aggressive strategies, they agreed. Yet, County Supervisor Roos asserted, as they amplified their efforts to compete against the Sunbelt they could not also do battle at home against the controversies that accompanied public-sector metropolitan initiatives. Regional coordination, to be sure, was critical to their success but they must cooperate through private institutions, Roos argued. As we know, St. Louis leaders came to recognize that the absence of sufficient net capital inflows threatened to render their metropolitan project a zero-sum game (Chapter Four). In order to attract capital and to promote regional growth, local leaders would create two new institutions: the St. Louis Research Council (RC) and the St. Louis Regional Industrial Development Corporation (RIDC). These new organizations, allied with the Metropolitan St. Louis Chamber of Commerce, created the institutional framework for local leaders' pursuit of research and development (R&D) and advanced industrial production in St. Louis.

"It's Research or Die": The Role of R&D in St. Louis' Metropolitan Development

As local leaders considered metropolitan restructuring strategies, industrialists like Dr. Carroll Hochwalt (a vice president at Monsanto Chemical Co.) pushed heavily for the promotion of research and development.[538] As Hochwalt stressed, structural shifts

[538]Hochwalt made over seventy-five patented discoveries. He worked on the Manhattan Project and in the National Defense Research Committee. Hochwalt had joined with Dr. Charles Allen Thomas to organize the Thomas and Hochwalt Laboratories at Dayton, Ohio. Monsanto acquired the labs in 1936, and they became Monsanto's Central Research Department. See "Dr. Carroll Hochwalt Known Nationally as Researcher," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, September 24, 1963.

in American industrial capitalism—namely the rise of knowledge-intensive production and the accelerating migration of manufacturing firms from the Northeast to the Sunbelt—undermined St. Louis' economic stability (Chapter Four). As St. Louis faced an increasingly difficult time retaining traditional manufacturers, they must find a way to compete on new economic terms, terms that built upon the area's existing and potential economic possibilities and matched nationalizing trends in industrial production. The Sunbelt attracted a growing share of both conventional industrial capital and burgeoning R&D investment. Yet influential men like Dr. Hochwalt and St. Louis County Supervisor Roos argued that St. Louis, nevertheless, had great potential to develop technologically-advanced production. In this context, they began to refocus the direction and scope of their industrial development policies: local business, educational, and political leaders intended to promote metropolitan area industries and universities in order to attract R&D investment from federal and private resources. They believed that in so doing, St. Louis would be able to adapt successfully to the rapidly changing national economy.

In the early 1960s, leading industrialists thus argued with growing urgency that research and development was key to the region's long-term stability. According to Dr. Charles A. Thomas (Monsanto board chairman), local leaders' most important challenge was to transform the metropolitan area into "a major and nationally recognized educational, scientific, and research center."[539] The nationally prominent scientist Dr. Hochwalt put it simply: "it's research or die" for St. Louis. Hochwalt asserted that

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[539]See the reports by the St. Louis Regional Industrial Development Corp. (hereafter cited as the RIDC), *Strategy for Growth*, November 1, 1963, and *Institutions to Serve the Region: The St. Louis Research*

> There is no question of the critical interdependence of advanced education and industry in supplying the reservoir of sophisticated technology locally to attract and hold the commerce which is the life-blood of any community. In this technological age, it is quite evident that industry congregates about the seats of its most advanced knowledge and, in doing so, sponsors the development of the knowledge it feeds upon.[540]

Senator Symington, the area's most influential proponent of high-tech development, concurred with Hochwalt's assessment. Symington, in fact, became known as "the senator from McDonnell Douglas" due to the federal contracts he helped to procure for St. Louis companies and due to his support of national air defense and outer space exploration. According to Symington, "there is a very definite danger" to the future of St. Louis "if we do not move in this direction. Unless we make an attempt to meet these new scientific and technological demands on industry, our economy not only will fail to develop properly, but it may decline in relation to other states."[541] Similarly, another economic expert concluded that St. Louis must expand her research capacity because the "new technological age" demands resources that "only research can engender and skilled brainpower that only research facilities can attract."[542]

Hochwalt and Symington intended to reinforce structural shifts already underway in metropolitan St. Louis. Defense-related production at McDonnell Aircraft Corporation

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Council and the St. Louis Regional Industrial Development Corp. (1970), quote on page 5 (RCGA Records, Box 4, Folder 5).

[540]"A Constructive Analysis: St. Louis Today," an eight-week series by Allan Merritt, *St. Louis Globe-Dispatch,* articles appearing on October 30, 1963, and on November 1, 1963.

[541]"State's Lag in Scientific Industries and Research Gives Rise to Fears for its Economic Well-Being: Symington Favors Switch from Conventional Production," by Thomas W. Ottenad, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, July 15, 1962. Relatively advanced industrial lines such as electrical components, communications equipment, and other fields ranked relatively low in the state. Moreover, only three St. Louis firms ranked as very important in the field of military and space research. In 1961, only McDonnell Aircraft, Monsanto Chemical, and Emerson Electric Manufacturing Co., were among 154 firms nation-wide holding large research contracts from the Dept. of Defense. Moreover, only three Missouri organizations (the Midwest Research Institute of Kansas City, St. Louis University, and Washington University) were among the 110 educational and non-profit institutions with research contracts from the defense department in fiscal 1961.

[542]"Lodestar for New Industry: St. Louis Research Council," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, September 24, 1963.

and Emerson Electric, for example, accounted for a growing share of local industrial growth. Yet Hochwalt and his cohorts knew that they faced a serious challenge in building capital for high-technology production, in fostering a highly educated labor force, and in strengthening industry-university networks for research and development. Like other industrial-belt cities, St. Louis' industrial infrastructure and educational systems had been structured to support conventional manufacturing. Concurrently, the Sunbelt, not locked into old manufacturing infrastructure, posed intense competition for high-tech capital. Nevertheless, inventorying existing institutions for industrial research and development, corporations like Mallinckrodt Chemical Works and Olin Mathieson mining company and universities like Washington University (WU), the area's foremost businessmen and politicians predicted a promising future for St. Louis.[543] According to Mayor Tucker and Aloys Kaufmann (former mayor and now president of the Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce), St. Louis' central geographic location, cultural facilities, diversified labor pool, and research institutions made the area "well suited" to generate public and private investment in R&D.[544] Hochwalt and Symington would help to provide the leadership needed to expand advanced technological production in the metropolitan area.

Research and development became central to postwar regional restructuring plans in St. Louis. The benefits accruing to the area from knowledge-intensive production would go far beyond direct output, employment, and capital gains, proponents like

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[543]Dr. George E. Pake, *The University's Role in Encouraging Economic Development Through R&D Activity* (February 1967) (RCGA Records, Box 12, Folder 401).
[544]"Industrialists Say New Approach Is Needed for Jobs," by Allan Merritt, *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, October 18, 1963.

Hochwalt and Tucker argued. R&D expansion, they asserted, would help to stabilize the strategic components of their regional project. As previous chapters have shown, city and county leaders' framework for "metropolitanism" guided their restructuring policies. They intended to strengthen traditional manufacturing in the urban core (Mill Creek), complemented by expanding services (CBD) and new cultural attractions (Arch), while developing small- and large-scale light industry (Chrysler) and advanced-technology sectors (McDonnell Aircraft Co.) in suburban industrial-office parks (Mallinckrodt). They envisioned the East Side reinvigorating its traditional role as the bi-state heavy-industry center. Senator Symington, Dr. Hochwalt, and like-minded university and industrial leaders imagined a growing interchange between industrial R&D labs (such as those located in downtown corporations like Ralston Purina and in suburban corporations like Monsanto) and university research facilities in the central corridor (WU and SLU). St. Louis' emerging high-tech research sector extended spatially, then, from downtown to the suburban periphery along the East-West axis. This "research corridor" was critical for St. Louis' revitalization, they believed, because it would bolster central corridor investment and encourage redevelopment to its North, South, and West.

St. Louisans thus promoted high-tech industrial development to supplement, not supplant, traditional industries in metropolitan St. Louis. Many prominent businessmen argued with ever greater urgency, however, that industry-university agglomerations such as North Carolina's "research triangle" offered St. Louis' "best model for growth."[545] As W. R. Persons, president of Emerson Electric Manufacturing Company, and R. A.

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[545]St. Louis Chamber of Commerce, *A St. Louis Research Institute* (January 26, 1962) (RCGA Records, Box 1, Folder 8).

Goodson, president of Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, asserted, "the rapid expansion of research and development in all industries appears to be a most important answer" to "counteract the steady attrition in some of [St. Louis'] more conventional industries."[546] Metropolitan economic restructuring according to this model, they asserted, would transform St. Louis into a competitive player in the nation's increasingly knowledge-based industrial economy.

Campaigning for "Regional Economic Leadership" in Metropolitan St. Louis

Yet as County Supervisor Roos asserted, they could not advance industrial production in Greater St. Louis without regional cooperation among local officials and businessmen. As Roos and Hochwalt would persuasively argue, metropolitan political fragmentation decisively hindered their ability to attract capital to the area and to promote sound regional development. And their success in advancing R&D in particular depended upon their ability to transcend local fragmentation. Transforming the metropolis into a "major center" for advanced-technology industries required local leaders to promote St. Louis in a relatively new national market for high-tech research and development.[547] Prior to WWII, local business and political leaders secured St. Louis' industrial success and national reputation upon conventional manufacturing and commercial activities. Yet this industrial heritage, while impressive, did not create the competitive conditions or the national reputation that would necessarily attract advanced-technology investment to the

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[546] "A Constructive Analysis," by Allan Merrit, *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, October 28, 1963. On local business support, see also the report by the St. Louis Chamber of Commerce, *A St. Louis Research Institute*, especially page 3, and the report by the RIDC, *Institutions to Serve the Region: The St. Louis Research Council and the St. Louis Regional Industrial Development Corp.* (RCGA Records, Box 4, Folder 51).

[547] "A Constructive Analysis: St. Louis Today," by Allan Merritt, *St. Louis Globe-Dispatch,* see the articles appearing on October 30, 1963, and November 1, 1963.

region. While defense production at McDonnell Corp. had launched this investment trend in St. Louis, the existence of McDonnell alone would clearly be insufficient to recruit R&D capital to the area's broad economic base.

Thus local leaders faced the challenge of promoting Greater St. Louis' high-tech possibilities in a concerted way and on a metropolitan scale for the first time. Concurrently, they competed with centers in the Sunbelt (Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill) and in the Northeast (Boston) rapidly gaining an impressive reputation for research and advanced industrial production. The experience of the Bi-State Agency had shown Roos, Tucker, and their allies the difficulties of building effective collaboration on a metropolitan level in St. Louis. These problems became only more acute as increasingly unbalanced regional growth heightened local tensions. Therefore, they would have to offer compelling arguments, provide strong leadership, and create effective institutions in order to build cooperative support for their new metropolitan venture.

County Supervisor Roos and D. Reid Ross (director, St. Louis County Business and Industrial Development Corporation) would be among the most vocal proponents of regional strategies for new industrial initiatives. Many city and county leaders advocated a metropolitan framework for development, as we have seen (Chapter Four). Yet the Supervisor and Ross revised these arguments to promote a new development approach: regional institutions for industrial growth. Through speeches to local business and political leaders, publications, and newspaper interviews, Supervisor Roos and the BIDC director spread the message that local leaders must view Greater St. Louis as one economic unit, not as a collection of localities. As D. Reid Ross explained,

> Today the region constitutes one labor market, one source of income, one transportation surface, and one housing market for its population and most of its work force. Additionally, in its production and distribution functions, it constitutes one source of raw materials and semi-manufactured items, one set of customers and suppliers, one financial center for cash flow as well as capital, one transportation focal point connecting it to both its market territory and external sources of raw materials and one center for research and development for most of its producers. Further it is one central place for rendering most urban services to residential, commercial, and industrial activities. [548]

Without a doubt, metropolitan political fragmentation now weakened in a perceptible way the area's industrial growth capacity. In the early 1960s, as Aloys Kaufmann observed, over fifty economic development agencies existed in bi-state St. Louis. These agencies, Kaufmann argued, focused on localized municipal issues and thereby intensified intra-metropolitan rivalries for investment capital and uncoordinated planning.[549] Growing competition from the Sunbelt only heightened these local tensions as each jurisdiction fought for an increasingly limited amount of capital concentrated in the industrial belt. D. Reid Ross argued that if localities continue to see themselves as competitors, not allies, in augmenting job and investment capacity, they will never develop St. Louis to its fullest potential. Director Ross and Supervisor Roos reiterated that intra-metropolitan conflict only encouraged business investors to "leapfrog" these urban centers.[550] Metropolitan St. Louis, under these conditions, could not offer investors "one market" from which they could gain a competitive advantage. Local efforts have "too often been fragmented, sporadic, and ineffective because of inadequate research,

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[548]RIDC, *New Institutions to Serve the Region—Prospects for Progress*, page 1 (Roos Collection, Box 10, Folder 292). The RCGA Collection includes publications and speeches in which RIDC and RC leaders relay this message. See, for example, RCGA Records, Box 5, Folder 82.
[549]"Area Business Plan Termed as Historic First," March 9, 1965 (title of paper is missing) (Roos Collection, Box 24, Folder 2b); RIDC, *New Institutions to Serve the Region*, page 4.
[550]ibid.

financing, civic leadership, or some combination of the three," D. Reid Ross asserted. [551] The time to "go it alone" is over, according to Supervisor Roos. St. Louis more than ever needed a "regional leadership group."[552]

Through regional economic leadership, Roos argued, St. Louisans could create "one economic unit" out of the politically fragmented metropolitan whole.[553] "Divided by political boundaries," D. Reid Ross argued, the residents of the area are nevertheless "regional citizens" and need "regional leaders" who will "aid the process of merging our metropolis into one economic entity."[554] Meeting this challenge had become critical in the context of national economic transformations after WWII, he stressed. Local leaders must treat Greater St. Louis as a unified whole because metropolitan regions have become the critical framework, the "one market," within which industrialists and national officials assess their investment potential in traditional and high-tech production and in Cold War research, education, and defense spending. As such, metropolitan institutional cooperation was not an option but a necessity in order to develop St. Louis' industrial capacity. And, as D. Reid Ross emphasized, their ability to advance research and development in particular was critical to sharpening the area's competitive position in the postwar economy. Regional institutional leadership, he asserted, would further the restructuring underway in the metropolitan economy, pointing to the recent expansion of

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[551]RIDC, *Institutions to Serve the Region*, page 7.
[552]"Area Business Plan Termed as Historic First," March 9, 1965 (newspaper title missing) (Roos Collection, Box 24, Folder 2b); *Leadership in Economic Development: Merging the Metropolis,* remarks by D. Reid Ross to the Missouri Economics Association on October 24, 1969, page 2 (RCGA Records, Box 5, Folder 82).
[553]RIDC, *New Institutions to Serve the Region.*
[554]"City-To-County Moves by Firms Cited in Study," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, March 10, 1965; D. Reid Ross, *Leadership in Economic Development: Merging the Metropolis*, page 1.

science-based research at Monsanto Corp. and at Washington University, among other institutions. In so doing, they would enable the region to meet the demands of an increasingly knowledge-based national economy and thereby compete more effectively with the Sunbelt.

The leadership behind the creation of the RIDC and the RC would come from Supervisor Roos, Mayor Tucker, and leading businessmen like Hochwalt and D. Reid Ross. R&D policies would gain their strongest advocates among those business and educational leaders who had the economic perspective, professional experience, and institutional interest to transform St. Louis into a major research center. They posited a new intellectual and institutional basis for economic leadership, one that would be regional in nature and supercede political boundaries.

The RIDC and the RC: New Regional Institutions for Industrial Development

In the 1960s, Raymond Tucker, Lawrence Roos, and D. Reid Ross gained a growing audience for their message of regional economic cooperation. As bi-state officials faced the demoralizing realization that St. Louis' growth lagged behind that of every other metropolitan center, they concluded that their fervent response was required.[555] In contrast to their viewpoint during the 1950s, local officials during the 1960s agreed that they suffered from common and increasingly acute problems and so

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[555]Metropolitan St. Louis' economic growth during the 1960s lagged behind that of all two-hundred-and-twelve American metropolitan areas. Between 1950 and 1960 the St. Louis metropolis recorded 19.8% growth while the average growth in other metropolitan areas was 26.4%. See "Lag in Industrial Development Leading to Area-Wide Program," by Cleon O. Swayzee, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, March 14, 1965 (RCGA Records, Box 8, Folder 215); D. Reid Ross and Leroy J. Grossman, *Merger of a Metropolis: A Case History of the St. Louis Region*, published in *Business and Government Review*, University of Missouri (n.d.) (RCGA Records, Box 11, Folder 335).

needed to advance regional solutions to these challenges. As the leaders of the most influential political units in the metropolitan area, Tucker, Roos, and East St. Louis City Mayor Fields argued that "the responsibility and the cost" of improving the area's industrial growth "must be shared. . . .the problem is area-wide. The solution requires area-wide cooperation."[556] And as Kaufmann asserted: "we must find some means of unification and coordination" and enable metropolitan imperatives to transcend localized interests.[557] These advocates urged bi-state officials and businessmen to cooperate out of "enlightened self-interest and civic spirit" and thereby "help reverse the economic direction in which St. Louis has been traveling."[558]

In contrast to long-term public planning, regional strategies for industrial expansion, in the view of business leaders and officials, offered immediate growth benefits. Indeed the absence of a direct benefit to investment and job expansion from public planning accounted largely for Bi-State Agency's declining support after its creation in 1949. But local leaders readily identified their economic and political stake in metropolitan industrial initiatives: elected officials faced the demands of their constituents, labor leaders needed jobs for workers, financial leaders had investments to secure, industrialists wanted to sharpen productivity, and educational and other civic leaders viewed themselves as community stewards. Within this context, and persuaded by effective campaigning, public officials in Greater St. Louis began to think beyond

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[556]RIDC, *A United Plan for the Industrial Development of Metropolitan St. Louis* (January 1965), page 5 (RCGA Records, Box 8, Folder 215).
[557]"Kaufmann Urges City-County Industry Planning," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, September 20, 1962 (RCGA Records, Box 16, Folder 466).
[558]Letter to Mr. J. W. McAfee, president, Union Electric Co., from Andrew H. Bauer, president of Industrial Properties, Inc., March 10, 1965, page 4 (RCGA Records, Box 4, Folder 57).

municipal balkanization in order to support new regional institutions. Their new organizations would provide the institutional framework for the promotion of research and development.

In the early 1960s, industrialists and politicians in St. Louis established the area's first bi-state organizations for postwar industrial policy: the St. Louis Research Center and the St. Louis Regional Industrial Development Corp. The RC evolved out close cooperation among the area's most influential politicians and businessmen. Initially proposed by U.S. Senator Symington, members of Civic Progress and the Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce established the RC in 1963.[559] The following year, Mayor Tucker and Supervisor Roos organized bi-state area businessmen, public officials, and labor representatives behind their initiative to establish an industrial group based upon bi-state representation. Their *United Plan for the Industrial Development of Metropolitan St. Louis* (1964) laid the basis for the establishment of the RIDC the following year.[560] Industrialists like J.S. McDonnell (McDonnell Aircraft and board chair at Washington University) held a very direct interest in expanding high-tech and conventional industries. Business leaders thus provided a great deal of the motivation behind the creation of the

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[559]The Chamber of Commerce had been studying the possibility of an R&D institution since 1961 and its interests dovetailed with Symington's call for such a center. Civic Progress, Inc., also strongly supported R&D development. For documents on the founding of the St. Louis Research Council (hereafter cited as the RC), see the RCGA Records, Box 4, Folders 50-52.

[560]The major business organizations conflicted over the balance of responsibilities among the RIDC, the RC, and the Chamber of Commerce before coming to the compromise laid out in the *United Plan*. See RIDC, *A United Plan for the Industrial Development of Metropolitan St Louis*. Cleon O. Swayzee, "Lag in Industrial Development Leading to Area-Wide Program," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch,* March 14, 1965; *Invitation to Local Leaders from L.K. Roos* (November 5, 1964) (Roos Collection, Box 28, Folder: RIDC Development); St. Louis County Business and Industrial Development Corp. (hereafter cited as the BIDC), *Review of Events Leading to the Launching of a Regional Industrial Development Corp.* (February 25, 1965) (Roos Collection, Box 28, Folder: RIDC Development).

Research Council and the Regional Industrial Development Corp. Their involvement bolstered the visibility and the legitimacy of these institutions among other St. Louis residents. Political leaders, for their part, faced the economic imperative of stabilizing job growth for their constituencies. The strong commitment to the RIDC and to the RC evidenced by Mayor Tucker and Supervisor Roos also stemmed from their particular experiences as political office holders as well as their influential personalities. As we know, Tucker and Roos long advocated a metropolitan perspective for economic development. Their role in establishing the EWGCC in the early 1960s energized Roos and Tucker in their latest metropolitan venture. Their personal commitment to the establishment of the RIDC and the RC, moreover, helped to foster support among local officials for these new metropolitan organizations. Declining economic trends and strategic campaigning alone, however, do not explain how they managed to create new regional institutions within the difficult context of metropolitan political balkanization. The specific structure and goals that they built into the Regional Industrial Development Corp. and the Research Council were critical to persuading local residents to support the new organizations.[561]

In their promotion of the RIDC and the RC, St. Louisans incorporated the lessons that they had learned from the experience of the Bi-State Agency. So as to avoid the controversies that Bi-State encountered due to its status as a public agency, they intended to create both organizations as private, non-profit corporations. And in order to curtail

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[561]The Roos Collection includes numerous newspaper articles promoting these organizations. They can be found in the Roos Collection, Newspaper Clippings Files, in the envelopes under the subjects St. Louis RIDC, St. Louis RC, Bi-State Development Corp., St. Louis County BIDC, and EWGCC.

criticism from local residents that the new institutions were removed from and unaccountable to ordinary citizens, the founders of the RIDC and the RC established the organizations as volunteer-based groups with membership open to any economic group, labor organization, public agency, or business in the metropolitan area.[562] Leadership in the RIDC and the RC rested on private-sector expertise, and the organizations would generate funds through financial contributions and fees for service. As non-governmental agencies, the RIDC and the RC could act only as advisory institutions. In contrast to Bi-State, then, neither the Regional Industrial Development Corp. nor the Research Council raised the specter of an "unaccountable super-government." As advocates of the RC and the RIDC emphasized in their speeches and in their organizing documents, their proposed organizations, structured on this model, would elicit strong support among bi-state residents.[563] In this way, local residents would not have to choose between advancing regional industrial growth, on the one hand, and preserving metropolitan political fragmentation, on the other hand. Rather, Tucker, Roos, and their allies were creating institutional compromises (in lieu of governmental consolidation) that they hoped would allow them to transcend municipal divisions and effectively promote the St. Louis region as a whole.

The Research Council would provide the primary institutional leadership for the promotion of high-tech research and industrial production in St. Louis. The founders of the RIDC and the RC, however, envisioned a "triumvirate" among the RIDC, the RC, and

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[562]"Lag in Industrial Development Leading to Area-Wide Program," Cleon O. Swayzee, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, March 14, 1965.
[563]For documents on the founding of the St. Louis RC, see the RCGA Records, Box 4, Folders 50-52.

the St. Louis Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce. While the Research Council would foster the expansion of scientific, research, and development-oriented industries, groups, and services, the Regional Industrial Development Corp. would attract new industry to the area (and so contribute to postwar policies to stabilize manufacturing) and promote St. Louis nationally. Meanwhile, the Chamber of Commerce would focus its energies on expanding existing industry in metropolitan St. Louis. Members of the RIDC, the RC, and the Chamber of Commerce established interlocking executive boards and committees, binding affiliation agreements, and a joint fund to generate revenue for their programs.[564] The broader goal of the RIDC and the RC, according to Hochwalt and Roos, was thus to create a "single voice" for St. Louis. They would accomplish this goal by fashioning a regional leadership group, the "triumvirate," that would coordinate the work of these metropolitan institutions with local chambers of commerce and economic development organizations. As George E. Pake (Washington University provost and an RIDC executive) proclaimed:

> Now, for the first time in our history, a start has been made toward a practical, area-wide effort to compete with no fewer than 20,000 other U.S. communities which are seeking new industries. . . . .For the first time labor, management, government, civic, and educational groups have agreed on a single voice to promote the St. Louis are as a whole. . . .[Without this cooperation] the vital effort to get St. Louis moving again will be swallowed up in a renewal of the petty squabbles and rivalries which have hurt us in the past.[565]

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[564]Representatives from each of the three organizations would head the fund and solicit support from business, labor, education, and government groups. See the RIDC report, *A United Plan for the Industrial Development of Metropolitan St. Louis*, page 4 (RCGA Records, Box 8, Folder 215); "Comprise Plan for Area Growth," by Allan Merritt, *St. Louis Globe Democrat*, March 2, 1965 (Roos Collection, Box 34, Folder 2b).

[565]George E. Pake, "The R.I.D.C.," *The St. Louis Gateway Purchaser*, June 1967. A copy of the article is held in the RCGA Records, Box 5, Folder 76.

As a "single voice" for Greater St. Louis, Pake argued, the new institutions would be able to attract investment capital to St. Louis and to encourage the most efficient distribution of resources within the metropolitan area. The *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, the *Metro East*, and other newspapers agreed that the RC and the RIDC represented quite an achievement for an "area that, historically, for a century, had been divided against itself." [566]

Leading industrialists dominated the top positions of the RIDC and the RC. Bi-state area public officials, university leaders, labor and civic representatives, and local businessmen, however, comprised the staff and membership of the new organizations. Influential businessmen and university leaders heading the RC included: Charles Allen Thomas (Monsanto); W. R. Persons (president, Emerson Electric Manufacturing Co.); J. S. McDonnell (board chairman, McDonnell Aircraft Corp.); Irving Edison (president, Edison Brothers Stores Inc.); Harold E. Thayer (president, Mallinckrodt Chemical Works); Rev. Paul C. Reinert, S.J. (president, St. Louis University); and Dr. Thomas Eliot (chancellor, Washington University).[567] RIDC executives included: Dr. Carroll Hochwalt (president of the RC and the RIDC; SLU lay Board of Trustees); Nicholas Veeder (Granite Steel Corp.); Howard L. Young (president, American Zinc Co.); D. Reid Ross (director, BIDC); and Morton May (president, May Department Stores Co., and RIDC secretary).[568]

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[566]Hadac, *Bi-State St. Louis*, 135. The *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*'s response to the RIDC is in Cleon O. Swayzee's "Lag in Industrial Development Leading to Area-Wide Program," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, March 14, 1965 (RCGA Records, Box 8, Folder 215); "An Old St Louis Story," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, June 18, 1968 (Roos Collection, Box 41, Folder 7, #1).

[567]The RC's report, *Strategy for Growth* (1968), lists the board of directors (RCGA Records, Box 4, Folder 50).

[568]RIDC ex-officio members included the mayors of St. Louis City and East St. Louis City and the St. Louis County Supervisor. By the late 1960s, RIDC persuaded around 650 companies, 100 labor unions, the

The emerging institutional partnerships among economic development organizations in St. Louis brought together downtown businessmen like Morton May and technical-planning experts like D. Reid Ross. Their affiliation suggests how a new group of businessmen, whose claim to leadership lay in their professional-technical background, supplemented the traditional public-private alliances rooted in St. Louis' oldest industries and institutions. Only such a coalition, they believed, would enable them to advance metropolitan St. Louis to a new stage of development, wherein she would become a prominent research and production center. As D. Reid Ross stated, "the St. Louis Research Council and the St. Louis Regional Industrial Development Corp. are reflections of the awareness of the region as both an economic unit and a single scientific community that could emerge as a center of excellence in basic and applied research, as well as development and production."[569]

Partnerships and Policies for R&D in St. Louis

The partnership among the RC, the RIDC, and the Chamber of Commerce reinforced existing networks that business, political, and educational leaders had fostered for the promotion of knowledge-based industrial production. The success of St. Louis' R&D programs, to be sure, depended upon strengthening the industrial-educational-governmental alliances sparked by WWII mobilization, finessed by the Bi-State Agency

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St. Louis Board of Aldermen, the sixteen major local government jurisdictions, the St. Louis County Municipal League, the Southwestern Illinois Council of Mayors, the Federal Executive Board of Greater St Louis, the States of Illinois and Missouri, all four major universities in the area, numerous school districts, and nineteen chambers of commerce to become RIDC members. The 1966-67 *Second Annual Report of the St. Louis RIDC* lists board of directors' names (RCGA Records, Box 4, Folder 66). See also the following reports by the RIDC: *Institutions to Serve the Region: The St. Louis Research Council and RIDC* and *New Institutions to Serve the Region—Prospects for Progress*.

[569]RIDC, *Institutions to Serve the Region: The St. Louis Research Council and RIDC*, page 5.

campaign, and tightened during concurrent urban renewal and suburban development initiatives (Chapters Two, Three, and Four). Partnerships between influential politicians on the national level, like Stuart Symington, and prominent business, political, and educational leaders on the local level, like J. S. McDonnell and George Pake, made it possible for St. Louisans to combine federal resources and private investment for the expansion of high-technology industries and of university-based research. Moreover, the burgeoning university-industry connections in St. Louis fostered the institutional coordination necessary to transfer research-based knowledge into industrial production (Chapter 4).

As W. R. Persons argued, the Research Council would intensify the exchange of personnel, research technology, and investment among industrial, educational, and governmental agencies in the metropolitan area. The goal of the RC, as Dr. Pake explained, is to "coordinate and integrate the work of existing research facilities in St. Louis' educational and industrial communities."[570] Most critically, Pake reiterated, the Research Council would advance existing programs for R&D by creating a new organizational link between metropolitan facilities and federal government agencies. The founders of the RC stated that the institution would act as a regional clearinghouse for information on federally-supported programs in science and advanced technology, analyze the applicability of regional resources to these federal programs, promote Greater St. Louis to national industries and government, and assist the transmission of new

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[570]St. Louis RC, *A Report to the Community on the Formation of the St. Louis Research Council* (1963) (RCGA Records, Box 4, Folder 52).

knowledge from research into application in area industries. The dual leadership positions that industrialists like Carroll Hochwalt (SLU) and J.S McDonnell (WU) held at corporations and universities were common to most of the individuals energizing the programs and policies for advanced research and development. Indeed, their prominent institutional background accounted for their stewardship therein. Yet these industry-university connections characterized the middling-level scientists, engineers, technicians, and other experts, or, "brains," in D. Ried Ross' term, behind the evolving high-tech research sector in St. Louis.

St. Louis leaders in the 1960s framed their R&D initiatives in a regional perspective and in so doing expanded the scope and significance of existing corporate-centered policies for high-tech production. Local leaders in the 1960s built upon their previous successes in procuring federal funds for advanced production, such as winning defense contracts for McDonnell Aircraft in the 1940s and 1950s. By the 1960s, however, they increasingly interpreted R&D development as an interlocking component of their metropolitan restructuring strategy. St. Louis leaders, as this dissertation shows, intended to strengthen what they viewed as the comparative economic advantages of each part of metropolitan St. Louis and thereby sharpen regional competitiveness overall. Their R&D policies, both in their economic composition (knowledge-based) and spatial manifestation (central corridor), intended to mutually reinforce downtown service and tourism, inner-city manufacturing, and suburban development.[571] In this way, programs to promote research and development since the 1960s have become a far more comprehensive

[571]D. Reid Ross, *Leadership in Economic Development: Merging the Metropolis,* pages 8-9.

metropolitan venture as leaders' vision of regional development evolved since WWII. Their efforts would rely upon the procurement of federal funding, upon industry-university-government networks, and upon existing industrial and university facilities. According to Dr. George Pake, they must make skillful use of these "cross-fertilization opportunities" in order to "reach the critical self-sustaining state where R&D growth generates and regenerates itself." [572]

Local industrialists like Hochwalt and national-level politicians from the St. Louis area corresponded frequently during the 1960s and 1970s as they sought to attain federal production contracts and research grants for St. Louis companies and universities. Senators Symington and Edward C. Long (D-MO) would rank among the most prominent national-level politicians to assist these efforts; they were particularly focused on defense and nuclear energy projects.[573] Bolstering the financial flows from the federal government to local research facilities were significant investments by science-based corporations like Monsanto into the area's industries and universities. Investment flows for R&D in metropolitan St. Louis thereby mirrored and resulted from the networking among public officials, personnel, technical experts, researchers, and industrialists in St. Louis' government-industrial-university matrix. Their ability to combine federal funding and private investment made it possible for university and industrial facilities to physically expand and redevelop prominent locales in metropolitan St. Louis. In St.

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[572]Pake, *The University's Role in Encouraging Economic Development Through R&D Activity*, page 6.
[573]For example, see the documents held in Box 7 and Box 10 of the RCGA Records, and also see the RIDC annual reports beginning with the 1965-66 *First Annual Report, RIDC* (RCGA Records, Box 4, Folder 66). See also "Two Major U.S. Research Centers in Prospect Here," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, October 22, 1968, and "Message to Washington," *St. Louis Commerce* v49 #4 (April 1975): 51.

Louis City, their expansion manifest perhaps most dramatically in the growth of St. Louis University and Washington University (industries in the downtown area, like Ralston Purina, also expanded significantly their industrial research facilities). St. Louis leaders well understood that universities, in this way, could serve not only knowledge-based industrial production but inner-city redevelopment as well. Universities thereby have become important engines of development for metropolitan areas like St. Louis.

The Mill Creek Valley urban renewal site provided St. Louis University the opportunity to expand its facilities for science-based research and education. In the 1960s, SLU began a four-million dollar expansion program on twenty-two acres in Mill Creek, located directly along the East-West corridor (Chapter Two). The growth of this university placed in sharp relief how urban renewal and R&D initiatives could become mutually reinforcing, as its proponents had intended. Indeed, the directors of SLU had urged City Hall since the mid-1940s to raze MCV "slums" and thereby create new space for university development. The university's redevelopment program became financially possible largely through the contributions of area industries. Monsanto Chemical Co. gave $500,000 to SLU's new science center, encouraged by Edgar M. Queeny (chair of the board at Monsanto), Charles A. Thomas (president, Monsanto), and Carroll Hochwalt (a Monsanto vice president); Emerson Electric Charitable Trust gave $100,000 toward one of the new engineering labs; and Anheuser-Bush (A-B) gave $500,000 toward the overall development. Moreover, August A. Busch, Jr., chaired the Development Council that made SLU's capital expansion campaign a success. The university's technical upgrading also depended upon federal grants. Just to provide one example: SLU received

a National Science Foundation (NSF) $120,000 grant for the new Institute of Technology building. According to the president of SLU, Rev. Paul C. Reinert, S.J., the university-industry partnership behind the development program exemplified local leaders' "enlightened self-interest." Dr. Thomas replied that "the relationship between scientific education and our industry is a fundamental one and Monsanto is pleased to be able to play a part in the development of the university's new Science Center."[574] Not surprisingly, these business leaders and Rev. Reinert held board positions in the Research Council.

Concurrently, Washington University fostered the multi-million dollar expansion of its medical complex in the West End of St. Louis City, located about one mile directly West of St. Louis University. In the 1960s and 1970s, SLU also promoted the enlargement of its medical center, situated less than a half-mile south of its main campus. SLU and WU expanded their research, administration, and care facilities in two urban redevelopment areas that, combined, dominated about 550 acres of city space.[575] In the process, the universities converted many acres of old residential neighborhoods into new sites for service- and high-tech sector activities. SLU and WU benefited from both

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[574]*St. Louis University Magazine* (November 1959): 6-7; *St. Louis University Magazine* (June 1960), 15; *St. Louis University Magazine* (February 1964), 18.

[575]St. Louis City's two major medical centers, the Washington University complex in the West End and the St. Louis University medical center in midtown, organized umbrella development corporations under the Missouri Urban Redevelopment Corporation law (Chapter 353), thus acquiring public redevelopment powers within a city-approved project site. The Washington University Redevelopment Area comprised a 280-acre site bounded by Kingshighway Blvd. on the West, Lindell Blvd. on the North, Highway 40 on the South, and Boyle on the East and included a small residential area just South of Highway 40. The St. Louis University Midtown Medical Center Redevelopment Corp. acquired public redevelopment powers within a 270-acre area bordered by Choteau Ave. on the North, 39th Street on the West, Highway 44 on the South, and Compton Ave. on the East.

federal research grants and corporate donations.[576]The rapid growth of Washington University's research facilities at its West End campus and at its main campus, located about one mile further west along the central corridor (just across the city-county boundary), reflected the enormous amount of capital that industrial leaders devoted to the university. The sheer number of new buildings and campus quadrangles named after corporate sponsors physically manifest these financial and institutional connections. To name just a few: A-B gave $200,000 toward the Adolphus Busch III Biology Lab; J. S. McDonnell established the McDonnell Center for Space Sciences; and Monsanto gave millions of dollars in research funding to support the Monsanto Lab of Life Sciences. In the early 1960s, J. S. McDonnell and McDonnell Aircraft Co. also provided $400,000 for a joint space sciences program between WU and the St. Louis Planetarium, followed by McDonnell's pledge of one million dollars over the next decade to the university. [577]

St. Louis educational and business leaders and their allies in the U.S. Congress acquired federal research grants that augmented research capacity at WU and SLU in significant ways. The universities' joint research programs with local industries also advanced the knowledge-based production capacity of corporations like Monsanto. In the mid-1960s, for example, WU began building a Materials Research Lab in conjunction with Monsanto Research Corporation, financed by a federal grant from the Advanced Research Projects Agency. Concurrently, the Monsanto Company, together with WU, renewed a joint two-million dollar research contract with the Department of Defense. SLU and WU, moreover, were connected with the Argonne National Lab, one of the

[576]As noted in *St. Louis University Magazine* (November 1958) and (November 1959).
[577]"McDonnells Top List of St. Louis Builders," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, July 10, 1965.

nation's major atomic research and development establishments. In the mid-1960s, WU also began the development of a new science research center on two hundred acres in West St. Louis County, on property that housed federal munitions facilities during WWII.[578] Made possible by corporate contributions, federal funding, and aggressive leadership by directors like J.S. McDonnell, board chairman at WU, Washington University became the biggest and most comprehensive research complex in the St. Louis area (WU currently ranks among the most elite research universities in the nation). Between 1957 and 1964 alone, the dollar value of science-based research at WU tripled. And throughout the 1960s and 1970s, members of the RC, the RIDC, and the Chamber of Commerce continued to seek support for various educational programs from the National Science Foundation.[579] James S. McDonnell indeed fulfilled his mission to help transform Washington University into a national leader in "all branches of the sciences."[580]

In light of the growth of St. Louis University and Washington University, George Pake asserted that university expansion will "strengthen the professional and intellectually-oriented talents of the region." Partnerships between corporations and universities, finessed by institutional links through the Research Council, would match these talents "to the research requirements of industry." As a result, Pake concluded, not only will the area's knowledge-intensive industries benefit from "profitable investment

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[578]"Metropolitan St. Louis: Gateway to the West," *New York Times*, September 13, 1964, section 12. In 1964, WU won around 182 grants totaling $6,500,000, or more than half of such total awards to Missouri by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
[579]See the RCGA Records, Box 10, Folders 284 and 285.
[580]"McDonnell Tops List of St. Louis Builders," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, July 10, 1965.

possibilities that are the result of this joint venture by town and gown, but so also will the universities benefit because of the support they will ultimately draw from new and expanded industry."[581] Industrialists in St. Louis took advantage of their connections with congressmen like Senators Symington and Long in order to win federal contracts and garner research capital. Their expansion of science-based industrial production and corporate research campuses would have proven impossible without such federal funding.

St. Louis' advanced industrial production and research concentrated most heavily in St. Louis County. The new "industrial research parks" reshaped the metropolitan landscape as suburban officials and businessmen created hundreds of new acres of industrial space devoted to high-tech research and ancillary administrative facilities. Monsanto and Mallinckrodt built two of St. Louis County's most prominent campuses as industrialists sought to meet this growing demand for science-based production (Chapter Four). In the 1950s, Monsanto launched construction of its ten-million dollar, eleven-acre suburban campus; Monsanto already had four plants in the area and in 1961 ranked as the third largest chemical corporation in the nation.[582] In the early 1970s, Mallinkcrodt expanded its physical capacity in the suburbs in order house its new research facilities. Mallinkcrodt, like some other corporations in St. Louis, maintained industrial facilities in the inner city as they expanded research and production capacity in the suburbs. Their city-county linkages reinforced the metropolitan exchange of investment, ideas, and

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[581]Pake, *The University's Role in Encouraging Economic Development Through R&D Activity*, page 6.
[582]"St. Louis Industry on Parade—No. 2," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, September 9, 1956; "Monsanto Unveils Projects at New $10 Million Center, *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, October 28, 1961; "Contracts Awarded to Start $10 Million Monsanto Research Center," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, September 13, 1959.

personnel within the area's high-tech research sector. Ralston Purina, for example, doubled its existing research space at its company headquarters downtown during the 1950s and 1960s, while its founding family, the Danforth family, contributed significantly to Washington University's expansion during the 1970s (the Danforth family has close connections with WU and with the U.S. Congress).[583]

While Ralston Purina anchored the "research corridor" in the metropolitan downtown, McDonnell Aircraft Corp. anchored this research corridor in West St. Louis County at its 383-acre plant. During the 1950s, McDonnell Aircraft Co. became the area's largest employer due to its defense- and space-related federal contracts.[584] McDonnell-Douglas (1967 merger with Douglas Aircraft) and Emerson Electric Company accounted for most of the area's prime defense contracts. The ability of St. Louis industrialists and their congressional allies to procure these contracts accounted for Missouri's ranking among the top ten states in dollar amounts of prime government contracts of all types in the mid-1960s. In the early 1960s, Missouri ranked as second in the nation for space research and development, due largely to production at McDonnell Corporation.[585] St. Louis leaders built upon traditional industries as they expanded

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[583]William H. Danforth was chancellor of Washington University between 1971 and 1995. He also served as a director at Ralston Purina and as a trustee at the Danforth Foundation. His brother, John Danforth (R-MO), was one of the most powerful and influential senators of the postwar era. The Danforth family reflects the intersecting ties St. Louis' top leaders built among business, civic, and educational institutions. See also "Four-Story Addition for Ralston Research," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, October 9, 1959, and "Ralston Rebuilds, Expands," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, January 3, 1960.

[584]"McDonnell To Build Satellite for First U. S. Spaceman ," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, January 13, 1959; "McDonnell Getting $136.5 Million Order," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, December 23, 1958; "Venture Capital, Inc., Still Trying to Raise Initial Capitalization," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, (RCGA Records, Box 12, Folder 403).

[585]And local leaders documented that Missouri scientists and engineers did $344,000,000 worth of R&D for the federal government in 1964, according to a study by Senator Edward C. Long. The state's total was 2.7% of the total amount spent by the government for R&D in 1964. But this represents a jump of 400%

advanced-technology production in the area; in addition to McDonnell and Emerson, Olin Mathieson, General Steel Industries, and the Chevrolet Division of GM received major federal contracts during the 1960s. By the early 1970s, the directors of the Research Council and the Regional Industrial Development Corp. interpreted these growing industrial-federal ties as evidence of their success in transforming St. Louis into a major research center. The executives of the RC and the RIDC, however, understood that they must consistently foster working partnerships among business, political, and labor leaders. Encouraging this alliance, for example, the RIDC publicized a letter from E. Manning Seltzer, Department of the Army, General Counsel, Chief of Engineers, to the RIDC in which he praised the efforts of St. Louis industrial and labor leaders to attract federal contracts and plants to the area.[586]

In the early 1970s, members of the RIDC, the RC, and the Chamber of Commerce created the St. Louis Regional Commerce and Growth Association (RCGA). The RCGA merged the RIDC and the RC under the auspices of the St. Louis Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce.[587] As the president of RCGA, Harold E. Thayer (CEO of Mallinckrodt), explained, the new organization would enhance the institutional cooperation among local

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over the $70,00,000 received by the state in 1961. During these same years, such funds increased by 50% for the whole nation. NASA, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare supplied 98% of all federal R&D dollars awarded in the state. NASA accounted for the largest share, with over 79% of the total. "U.S. Research Spending Totaled $344 Million in State Last Year"; RIDC Paper on Research Investment (no author noted) (RCGA Records, Box 12, Folder 366); "Metropolitan St. Louis: Gateway to the West," *New York Times*, September 13, 1964, section 12.

[586]*Newsrelease: Letter from E. Manning Seltzer, General Counsel, Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army, to the RIDC*, 1968 (RCGA Records, Box 5, Folder 77).

[587]The RCGA Records contains both the records of the St. Louis RIDC and the St. Louis RC as well as the founding documents for the creation of the St. Louis Regional Commerce and Growth Association.

leaders that had begun with their creation of the RIDC and the RC. The RCGA to date remains the institutional umbrella for regional economic initiatives in the St. Louis area.

St. Louis' potential for becoming a "major national research and production center," however, was never as great as advocates like Hochwalt and Pake had suggested. To be sure, St. Louis has big winners in industry like Monsanto, McDonnell Douglas, Emerson Electric, and Mallinckrodt, and in education, like Washington University and St. Louis University. But the corporate-industrial foundation for high-tech development has proven insufficiently broad and deep to enable St. Louis to compete effectively with burgeoning research centers like Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill (enhanced by its location in the Sunbelt) and generate the strong metropolitan growth that Hochwalt, Roos, and their allies predicted. High-tech gains in St. Louis are centered in a relatively small number of corporations and educational institutions, thus rendering advanced industrial production highly vulnerable to sectoral and cyclical fluctuations. In addition, the benefits to St. Louis residents have been uneven. Job growth concentrates in the central corridor and in the suburbs and generates a two-tiered employment structure (high-skill professions and unskilled service jobs) which is inadequate to foster a stable employment base. Moreover, university development for medical and research centers in the urban core has priced many inhabitants, mainly low-income African Americans, out of their neighborhoods. Local leaders did not ultimately question, or perhaps realize fully, the trade off that they have made, that is, promoting high-tech policies but in returning gaining uncertain as well as uneven economic dividends. Cast in long-term perspective,

most advocates of these policies accepted their shortcomings as the temporary price for what they viewed as eventual economic stability and prosperity.

Yet the advanced industrial and research sector in St. Louis has nevertheless proven critical to the metropolitan economy. Job growth in St. Louis has been highest in these industrial and research-related economic components and thus helps to counteract, if inadequately, the loss of conventional manufacturing in the metropolitan area (the WU medical center, for example, has become one of the prime growth industries in the city with thousands of employees). Moreover, university and corporate investment for R&D in the urban core has helped to stabilize prominent sections of the inner city; their development programs have, in fact, led to ancillary neighborhood improvement projects in the urban core. St. Louis leaders contributed to a larger restructuring process underway in the industrial-belt and in the national economy. Their metropolitan venture for R&D, carried out in the context of municipal fragmentation and Sunbelt competition, has poised St. Louis to build upon and expand sectors that could bolster activity in varied, if limited, sectors of the metropolitan economy. For all their shortcomings, these efforts have helped St. Louis to endure significant regional and national economic shifts with less damage than the region would have faced otherwise.

Conclusions

By 1980, industrial-belt cities like St. Louis, Pittsburgh, and Detroit had failed to regain their once vibrant industrial base. This much we knew. But it is not enough merely to record the decline of these cities and the tectonic regional shift in the American economy as northern manufacturing shifted to the Sunbelt during the post-WWII decades. We must also analyze the process of political-economic change in these urban centers if we want fully to comprehend the transformations that occurred after WWII. Underlying the obvious narrative of industrial-belt decline is a more elusive, more nuanced, and in many ways more interesting story: the dynamics of postwar urban leadership. The record of local leadership is a critical, but heretofore understudied, factor in the transformation of these cities after the war. We need to understand more clearly and at greater depth what local leaders did, how and why they made the choices that they made, what limitations they encountered, and how they interpreted the problems they faced, if we wish to understand both the record of local leadership and the patterns of economic change in these cities.

The extant literature on northern urban liberalism suggests that local leadership contributed significantly not only to the problems of the central cities through a combination of ineptitude and biases of various types; but that therefore the failure of local leadership largely accounts for the ultimate demise of urban liberalism. While the literature provides important insights into the limitations of revitalization policies, it generally infers the character and efficacy of leadership from the final outcomes of its programs. My study differs from earlier scholarship insofar as it provides a close analysis

of the performance of local leadership through a detailed study of one emblematic city, St. Louis, Missouri, rather than deducing it from the fact of the ultimate decline of the city. In this study I have taken a new approach to the evaluation of local leadership, an approach that has led to findings that have implications for how we interpret northern urban liberalism in general, as well as for how we understand its relative successes and failures; further, the framework within which I operate reveals how the ideas and policies of local urban leaders shaped the economy geography of this particular metropolis; finally, my approach provides a model for analyzing the internal dynamics of leadership and development in other cities as well.

This study demonstrates that the local leaders in one city, St. Louis, had a strong sense of mission and exhibited an energetic commitment to save the city. I have found that they thought deeply and analytically about the problems of postwar development, and that they contributed to an intellectual transformation among urban leaders as they conceptualized the postwar metropolis and the role of the urban core; moreover, they conceived of sophisticated and creative strategies for economic revitalization. These St. Louisans devoted a great deal of energy to fostering new local-metropolitan coalitions that crossed race and class lines and allied city and suburban leaders; coalitions that built influential partnerships with state- and national-level politicians and officials that enabled them to harness the federal funds that made their efforts possible. They were able to combine public and private capital for ambitious programs that stabilized discrete sections of the inner city for industrial and commercial development, they fostered high-tech industrial research and production through expanded industries and universities in

St. Louis's central corridor and in the suburbs, and they established the city's downtown services and tourism as critical sectors of the economy, centered around the Gateway Arch, one of the world's most successful tourist attractions. Local leaders also transformed rural St. Louis County into the area's most vibrant industrial site, preserving jobs that may otherwise may have been lost to the Sunbelt, and they established St. Louis's first regional-level institutions for economic development. The leadership contributed to a fundamental restructuring of the local economy as it sought to stabilize St. Louis in the face of conventional industrial losses. In so doing, as my study shows, local leaders' ideas and policies influenced the economic geography of the emerging postwar metropolis; the contours of metropolitan development resulted thus not merely from federal policies nor from anonymous market forces. Their efforts enabled St. Louis to cope as best it could, albeit with great difficulty, in the face of momentous national-economic changes.

In the end, postwar metropolitan strategies failed to create the engine of growth and sound regional development that its proponents imagined. To be sure, their own shortcomings hindered their ability to achieve this goal: most glaring were, first, their inadequate attention to the social and economic needs of inner-city African Americans and, second, the adoption of policies that inadvertently promoted suburbanization and central corridor development at the expense of large sections of the inner city. Nevertheless, in assessing local leaders' performance in the years between 1945-1980 in the framework of the challenges that they faced and in light of the political possibilities available to them at the time, I find that their economic policies generally represented

reasonable responses to those challenges, pursuant to what they understood as the most effective way to generate investment in St. Louis. Moreover, I find that they were motivated by a vision of development that was more equitable for the broader urban community than extant scholarship concludes. Their programs were conceived in the early 1950s, at a time when it was generally assumed that population and economic growth would be sufficient to promote sound metropolitan development. Their worldview was predicated upon a restructuring process in which short-term losses would lead eventually to long-term gains. And for all their shortcomings, their programs centered on meeting a primary need of all urban residents: gainful employment.

My study reveals that when we compare the St. Louis City of 1945 with the St. Louis City of 1980, the most glaring facet of its history is the loss of tens of thousands of jobs, most ultimately going to the Sunbelt; that is, the bottom dropped out of an industrial base that had made St. Louis one of the nation's leading economic centers for over half of a century. Viewed from this perspective, while some aspects of local leaders' policies certainly made the game all the harder to win, their "metropolitan approach" and internal inconsistencies were not the root cause of their programs failures or of St. Louis' overall decline. Even if their policies were fully disinterested and entirely sound, in the context of unregulated capital mobility and metropolitan political fragmentation, they were incapable of competing successfully in economic terms against the powerful pro-growth coalitions of the Sunbelt.

The historical record of the performance of the St. Louis leadership during the years in question suggests a more positive interpretation of northern urban liberalism.

Close analysis of the dynamics of northern urban leadership highlights the fact that the approaches taken by local leadership in and of themselves, while problematic, were not bankrupt; the leadership was simply unequipped to deal with the seismic regional industrial shift in postwar America. The record suggests that we have something to learn from these leaders, not only from the mistakes that they made, as many scholars have stressed, but also from their energy and their endeavors that sought to provide some degree of stability in a rapidly changing regional, national, and international economy.

Note on Archival Sources

Industrial census data:

United States Department of Commerce industrial census studies and industrial reports by the Missouri Department of Commerce provided the statistical database for the identification of trends in industrial development and employment in St. Louis City and in St. Louis County between 1945 and 1980.

City and county directories:

St. Louis City and St. Louis County directories supplied the data for an analysis of the residential, commercial, and industrial composition of Mill Creek Valley between 1950 and 1990. This study utilized the directories to create a detailed snapshot of the people and businesses in MCV in 1950 and the out-migration trends of businesses forced to vacate the area due to its clearance. In addition, the directories enabled me to create a large database on the institutions and firms locating in MCV between 1973 and 1990, including the in- and out-migration patterns of these establishments.

Business journals and economic reports:

The project relied heavily upon the journal, *St. Louis Commerce*, in order to document and to evaluate industrial-commercial development in St. Louis County after WWII. The journal also allowed me to uncover the attitudes of businessmen and public officials regarding suburban development and how local leaders combined public and private investment for suburban industry and for high-tech research in the suburbs and in the central corridor. Numerous independent economic reports, such as *Analysis of*

Development Potentials Within St. Louis, Missouri (1968), by R. Gladstone and Associates, provided detailed analyses of the conditions of industrial facilities in city, the obstacles to industrial expansion in the urban core, the spatial and infrastructure demands of local firms, and the patterns of industrial and commercial transition after the war; they also included surveys of the locational preferences of St. Louis businessmen. These reports, in conjunction with the journal, helped me to analyze local investment decisions and the impact of local redevelopment policies on the metropolitan landscape.

Daily newspapers:

St. Louis newspapers, the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, the *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, and the *St. Louis Argus* in particular, offered details on a wide variety of topics concerning this study, including, among others: the creation and the composition of the local-metropolitan-state-federal partnerships behind inner-city redevelopment and the promotion of high-tech research and production; the evolution of the city's industrial renewal program; and the development of the Gateway Arch and its adjacent commercial and entertainment districts. The *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* and the *St. Louis Globe-Democrat* also offered critical insight into the relationship between city and suburban leaders as they sought to promote development on a metropolitan scale. The *St. Louis Argus* revealed the attitudes of African Americans toward the Mill Creek Valley project and their efforts to gain equal rights.

Records of local business organizations:

The institutional archives of St. Louis business groups made it possible for me to reconstruct the alliances that businessmen made among themselves and with local

officials and the vision of metropolitan development that their coalitions advanced. Moreover, the organizational records showed how their assumptions about inner-city redevelopment and suburban growth translated into specific economic policies: inner-city reindustrialization, downtown beautification, large-scale industrial-commercial expansion in St. Louis County, and high-tech development in the suburbs and in the urban core. The business archives that this study relied upon are those of St. Louis Civic Progress, Inc., Downtown St. Louis, Inc., the St. Louis Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce, the St. Louis Regional Industrial Development Corp., the St. Louis Research Council, and the St. Louis Redevelopment Corporation.

Records of local governmental agencies and of public officials:

The records and publications of the St. Louis Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority and the St. Louis City Plan Commission revealed most fully how local public officials and political leaders interpreted the challenges that they faced in postwar development and how they promoted public-sector resolutions to these problems. Their reports enabled me to uncover not only their views and their strategies but also to recreate the local-federal partnership behind redevelopment projects. Also critical to my analysis were the files of St. Louis City Mayors Raymond R. Tucker, Alfonso J. Cervantes, and John H. Poelker. Similarly, the records of the St. Louis County Plan Commission and the St. Louis County Business and Industrial Development Corporation and the files of St. Louis County Supervisor Lawrence K. Roos evidenced suburban officials' interpretation of what they understood as sound metropolitan growth and their corollary efforts to promote development. The records of these governmental agencies and of these public

officials helped me to demonstrate how leaders fostered their public-private alliances and how their redevelopment programs influenced the economic geography of the postwar metropolis.

Files of regional public bodies:

This study relied upon the institutional archives of the Bi-State Development Corporation and of the East-West Gateway Coordinating Council in order to evaluate how businessmen and public officials after WWII promoted cooperation on a regional level in St. Louis. The records of these agencies made it possible for me to assess the constraints that they faced in advancing regional cooperation, particularly for public planning, and the limited successes that they had therein.

Files of federal government agencies:

The federal records of the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission Records (USTEMCR) provided a key source for this study's evaluation of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial (JNEM). The USTEMCR records, in conjunction with the records of the local civic group, the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, and with the files of United States Representative Leonor K. Sullivan, documented the main players behind the project and the local-national connections that they made in order to launch the JNEM project and to bring the project to its completion fifty years later. Moreover, these records helped me to evaluate the role of the Gateway Arch in postwar metropolitan planning and development in St. Louis.

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Secondary Literature:

The literature on post-WWII liberalism provides critical insights into the dynamics of economic and political developments in the urban North, generally, and the limitations of postwar urban policies, specifically. My research built upon the important contributions of this scholarship. In light of the relevant literature, I was able to recognize that my findings offer an interpretation of postwar urban leadership that moves beyond extant scholarship by uncovering more fully the motivation, goals, and accomplishments of local leaders, and the obstacles that hindered their ability to revitalize the inner city. The most useful literature for my study includes: Alan Brinkley, *The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Press 1995); Michael B. Katz, ed., *The "Underclass" Debate: Views From History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Ira Katznelson, *City Trenches: Urban Politics and the Patterning of Class in the United States* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981); Nelson Lichtenstein, *The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor* (New York: Basic Books, 1995); Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority* (New York: Norton Press, 1969); John Mollenkopf, *The Contested City* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983); Thomas J. Sugrue, *The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); James Q. Wilson, ed., *Urban Renewal: The Record and the Controversy* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966); and

William J. Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

Many scholars have analyzed the patterns of industrial change in the twentieth-century urban North, the origins of manufacturing decline in the industrial belt, and the impact of manufacturing losses on old industrial cities. Their work has helped me to understand more fully the trajectory of St. Louis's development after WWII and how St. Louis' transformation compared with economic changes in other industrial centers. The literature I have found particularly relevant includes: Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, *The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry* (New York: Basic Books, 1982); Philip Cook, ed. *The Rise of the Rustbelt* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995); Jefferson Cowie and Joseph Heathcott, eds. *Beyond the Ruins: The Meanings of Deindustrialization* (Ithaca: ILR Press, 2003); John T. Cumbler, *A Social History of Economic Decline: Business, Politics, and Work in Trenton* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1989); Beverly Duncan and Stanley Lieberson, *Metropolis and Region in Transition* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1970); Joshua B. Freeman, *Working-Class New York: Life and Labor Since WWII* (New York: The New Press, 2000); Robert Lewis, "Changing Fortunes of American Central-City Manufacturing, 1870-1950," *Journal of Urban History*#5 28 (July 2002): 573-98; Guian McKee, "Liberal Ends Through Illiberal Means," *Journal of Urban History* v27, #5 (July 2001): 547-83; and Nelson Lichtenstein, "Vanishing Jobs in a Racialized America," *Radical History Review* 78 (2000): 178-88.

The composition of an urban coalition is rooted in the local political economy and influences the types of economic development policies that municipal government promotes. The relationship between the urban regime and policy choices, then, has become a critical topic of analysis for many political scientists and, increasingly, for urban historians. In delineating the origins and composition of St. Louis' postwar governing alliance and evaluating how its peculiar arrangement shaped policy decisions, I have relied upon the analytical models provided by the following scholars: Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); Carol E. Hoffecker, *Corporate Capital: Wilmington in the Twentieth Century* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983); Dennis R. Judd and Todd Swanstrom, *City Politics: Private Power and Public Policy* (3rd ed.; New York: Longman, 2002); Harvey Molotch, "The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place," *The American Journal of Sociology* v82 (2): 309-32; Michael A. Pagano, and Ann O'M. Bowman, *Cityscapes and Capital: The Politics of Urban Development* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Joel Rast, *Remaking Chicago: The Political Origins of Urban Industrial Change* (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1999); Robert Salisbury, "Urban Politics: The New Convergence of Power," *The Journal of Politics*, v26 #4 (November 1964): 775-97; Gregory D. Squires, ed., *Unequal Partnerships: The Political Economy of Urban Redevelopment in Post-War America* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1989); Clarence N. Stone, *Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946-1988* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989); Clarence N. Stone and Heywood T. Sanders, eds., *The Politics of Urban Development*

(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1987); and Jon C. Teaford, *City and Suburb: The Political Fragmentation of Metropolitan America, 1850-1970* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979).

The well-worn but ever useful studies on federalism by Phillip J. Funigiello and Roscoe C. Martin enabled me to identify the process through which St. Louis leaders created a local-federal partnership after WWII. Moreover, their work helped me to understand the shifting level of federal commitment to metropolitan planning and development between the 1930s and the 1960s. See Phillip J. Funigiello, *The Challenge of Urban Liberalism: Federal-City Relations During WWII* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1978), and Roscoe C. Martin, *The Cities and the Federal System* (New York: Atherton Press, 1965).

Although inner-city redevelopment initiatives in the 1950s and 1960s varied across space and time, these urban programs shared many characteristics in common. In order to ascertain their patterns and commonalities, in terms of the goals that local leaders articulated, the problems with which leaders grappled, and the federal guidelines and objectives for urban renewal programs, I relied upon the findings of the following scholars. Their work helped me to determine what aspects of St. Louis' postwar program were specific to the city and what facets of St. Louis' projects reflected trends in industrial centers: Robert A. Beauregard, *Voices of Decline: The Postwar Fate of U.S. Cities* (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1993); Larry Bennett, *Fragments of Cities: The New American Downtowns and Neighborhoods* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press,1990); Scott Cummings, ed., *Business Elites and Urban Development: Case Studies*

and Critical Perspectives (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988); Susan S. Fainstein, et al., *Restructuring the City: The Political Economy of Urban Redevelopment* (New York: Longman, 1983); Bernard J. Frieden and Lynne B. Sagalyn, *Downtown, Inc.: How America Rebuilds Cities* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1989); Briavel Holcomb and Robert A. Beauregard, *Revitalizing Cities* (Washington, D.C.: Association for American Geographers, 1981); and Jon C. Teaford, *The Rough Road to Renaissance: Urban Revitalization in America, 1940-1985* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990).

The dynamics of postwar inner-city redevelopment amplified existing patterns of racial segregation in the urban North in unintended and in intentional ways, as many historians have shown. These scholars provided the framework within which I evaluated the extent to which St. Louis leaders considered the impact of their programs on African Americans' housing options and the extent to which the consequences of their programs for inner-city blacks were unforeseen. Their work made it possible for me to compare the attitude of St. Louis leaders toward race relations with that of leaders in other urban centers. Among the most useful studies are John Bauman, *Public Housing, Race, and Renewal: Urban Planning in Philadelphia, 1920-1974* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1984); Robert A. Catlin, *Racial Politics and Urban Planning: Gary Indiana, 1980-1989* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1993); Arnold R. Hirsch, *Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983); and June M. Thomas, *Redevelopment and Race: Planning a Finer City in Postwar Detroit* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).

The rich intellectual history of city and regional planning informed my analysis of St. Louisans' perspective on metropolitan development. The history of planning initiatives provided the context within which I determined how St. Louisans conceptualized and implemented postwar planning and helped to set a national model for these endeavors. I have found most valuable the following literature: M. Christine Boyer, *Dreaming the Rational City: The Myth of American City Planning* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1983); Robert Fishman, *The American Planning Tradition: Culture and Policy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Pres, 2000); Charles T. Goodsell, *The Social Meaning of Civic Space: Studying Political Authority Through Architecture* (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1988); Peter G. Hall, *Cities of Tomorrow: An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Oxford, 1989); Joseph Heathcott, "The City Remade: Public Housing and the Urban Landscape in St. Louis, 1900-1960" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Indiana University, 2002); Donald A. Kruekeberg, ed., *Introduction to Planning History in the United States* (New Brunswick: Center for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers University, 1983); Mel Scott, *American City Planning Since 1890* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); Mary Corbin Seis and Christopher Silver, eds., *Planning the Twentieth-Century American City* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); and David Ward and Olivier Zunz, eds., *The Landscape of Modernity: New York City, 1900-1940* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992).

The burgeoning literature on postwar suburbanization illuminates the combination of economic and cultural conditions that promoted rapid suburban growth. This work

helped me to ascertain how suburban leaders, working within the structure of federal policies, fostered investment in St. Louis County. The literature also laid the cultural, intellectual, and economic foundation for my assessment of St. Louisans' vision of the relationship between the urban core and the periphery. In addition, the scholarship proved useful in positing the cost of suburban growth to the inner city. Among the most helpful works for my study are Robert Fishman, *Bourgeois Utopias: The Rise and Fall of Suburbia* (New York: Basic Books, 1987); Kenneth T. Jackson, *Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Joseph Persky and Wim Wiewel, *When Corporations Leave Town: The Costs and Benefits of Metropolitan Job Sprawl* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2000); and Joseph Persky and Wim Wiewel, eds. *Suburban Sprawl: Private Decisions and Public Policy* (New York: M.A. Sharpe, 2001).

In recent years, scholars have directed increasing attention to the development of the metropolitan area, thus moving beyond approaches that focus on either the city or the suburbs or take for granted the metropolis as an undifferentiated unit of analysis. This literature provided a model for my own methodological approach. Moreover, many of these studies demonstrate both the costs and the benefits of adopting a regional approach to development. These analyses enabled me to assess the possibilities and the limitations that St. Louis leaders faced in their postwar metropolitan ventures. See Richard M. Bernard, *Snowbelt Cities: Metropolitan Politics in the Northeast and Midwest Since World War II* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990); Peter Dreier, John Mollenkopf, and Todd Swanstrom, *Place Matters: Metropolitics for the Twenty-First*

Century (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2001); Kenneth Fox, *Metropolitan America: Urban Life and Urban Policy in the United States, 1940-1980* (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1986); Myron Orfield, *Metropolitics*: *A Regional Agenda for Community and Stability* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997); and David Rusk, *Cities Without Suburbs* (2nd ed.; Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995).

Metropolitan development is not necessary a zero-sum game, as this dissertation emphasizes and as the economic boom of Sunbelt metropolitan areas attests. In order to distinguish the economic, political, demographic, and structural characteristics that enabled Sunbelt centers to experience relatively sound economic growth (and the absence of such factors helped to account for unbalanced growth in the industrial belt), I found Richard M. Bernard's and Bradley R. Rice's *Sunbelt Cities: Politics and Growth Since World War II* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983) and Bruce Schulman's *From Cotton Belt to Sunbelt: Federal Policy, Economic Development, and the Transformation of the South, 1938-1980* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) particularly informative.

Scholars have provided rich histories into particular aspects of St. Louis' twentieth-century history. These topics include: urban renewal and riverfront development; the nature of political transformations and leadership; the structure of local government; the dynamics of race relations; and the evolution of city planning. I have relied upon the following literature to provide a general overview of St. Louis history and to offer insights into the peculiarities of the city's political economy, redevelopment

initiatives, and race relations: Oscar H. Allison, "Raymond Tucker: The Smoke Elimination Years" (Ph.D. Dissertation, St. Louis University, 1978); Ramin Bavar, "Laclede Town: An Analysis of Design and Government Policies in a Government-Sponsored Project" (Master's Thesis, Washington University, 1994); Sharon Brown, *Administrative History: Jefferson National Expansion Memorial* (St. Louis: Missouri Historical Society, 1984); Robert Bussel, "A Trade Union Oriented War on the Slums: Harold Gibbons, Ernest Calloway, and the St. Louis Teamsters in the 1960s," *Labor History*, v44, #1 (February 2003): 49-68; Barry Checkoway and Patton, Carl V., eds. *Policy Problems and Prospects for Change* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1985); Richard E. Edgar, *Urban Power and Social Welfare: Corporate Influence in an American City* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1970); Thomas F. Hadac, "Bi-State St. Louis: Factors Significant to the Emergence of a Governing Leadership for the Missouri-Illinois Area, 1949-1965" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 1976); Kristin Hammerstrom, "The St. Louis Scene: History, Place, and the St. Louis Arch," *Gateway Heritage* v19, #2 (Fall 1998); Virginia Anne Henry, "Sequent Occupancy of Mill Creek Valley," (Master's Thesis, Washington University, 1947); E. Terrence Jones, *Fragmented By Design: Why St. Louis Has So Many Governments* (St. Louis: Palmerston and Reed Publishers, 2000);George Lipsitz, *A Life In the Struggle: Ivory Perry and the Culture of Opposition* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988); Eldridge Lovelace, *Harland Bartholomew: His Contributions to American Urban Planning* (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1993); Scott McConachie, "The 'Big Cinch': A Business Elite in the Life of a City: Saint Louis, 1895-1915" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Missouri, 1976); Arthur

W. Mehrhoff, "The Image of the City: The Jefferson National Expansion Memorial as Monument to Progress," *Urban Affairs Quarterly* v24, #1 (September 1988): 46-68; Daniel J. Monti, *Race, Redevelopment, and the New Company Town* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990); E.F. Porter, *Harland Bartholomew* (St. Louis: St. Louis Public Library and Landmarks Association of St. Louis, 1990); James Neal Primm, *Lion of the Valley: St. Louis, Missouri, 1764-1980* (3rd ed., St. Louis: Missouri Historical Society, 1998); Robert H. Salisbury, "St. Louis Politics: Relationships Among Interests, Parties, and Governmental Structure," *Western Political Science Quarterly*, XIII 2 (June, 1960): 498-507; Robert H. Salisbury, "Our Fading Civic Leadership," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, November 26, 1995; Eric Sandweiss, *St. Louis: The Evolution of an Urban Landscape* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001); Paul C. Scrivner, "The Politics of Urban Renewal, A Case Study: The Mill Creek Valley Urban Renewal Project, St. Louis, Missouri" (Master's Thesis, Washington University, 1967); Thomas M. Spencer, *The St. Louis Veiled Prophet Celebration: Power on Parade, 1877-1995* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2000); and Lana Stein, *St. Louis Politics: The Triumph of Tradition* (St. Louis: Missouri Historical Society Press, 2000).

Primary Sources:

The publications of St. Louis municipal planning agencies enabled me to uncover how local planners and officials conceptualized the city and its development. The agencies' reports reveal the intellectual foundation and policy recommendations behind St. Louis planning and how their proposals changed over time. The following publications can be found at Washington University Olin Library (hereafter cited as WU)

and at the Missouri Historical Society (hereafter cited as MHS): St. Louis Civic League of St. Louis, *A City Plan for St. Louis* (1907); St. Louis City Plan Commission (hereafter cited as the St. Louis CPC), *Central-Traffic Parkway of St. Louis* (1915); St. Louis CPC, *Problems of St. Louis* (1917); St. Louis CPC, *A Major Street Plan for St. Louis* (1917); St. Louis CPC, *A Plan for the Central Riverfront* (1928); St. Louis CPC, *St. Louis After the War* (1942); St. Louis CPC, *Comprehensive City Plan* (1947); St. Louis CPC, *The Pattern of Industrial Land Use in St. Louis* (1948); St. Louis CPC, *Land Use Plan for St. Louis City* (1956); St. Louis CPC, *Master Plan for Downtown St. Louis* (1960); St. Louis County Planning Commission, *Guide for Growth* (1962).

Numerous articles on St. Louis's postwar economic development appeared in business journals and news magazines. These publications helped me to establish the perspective and objectives of St. Louis businessmen and public officials regarding metropolitan development as well as the challenges they faced therein. Moreover, the articles cited below assisted my creation of a statistical database on industrial transformation in St. Louis. Except where noted, these publications can be found at the libraries of the MHS, WU, and St. Louis University: "A New St. Louis Rips Up Her Past," *Business Week* (September 9, 1955), 130-31; The Automotive Industry in the Metropolitan St. Louis Area," *St. Louis Commerce*, v34 (February 1960): 3, 10-15; "Proposal Urged to Aid Orderly County Growth," *St. Louis Commerce* v35 (July 1961): 9-11; "Acres for Industry: St. Louis Industrial Parks," *St. Louis Commerce*, v37 (September 1963): 18; "Showcase-Part II: St. Louis County," *St. Louis Commerce*, v37 (February 1963): 14; "Chrysler Announces Truck Plant to be Built," *St. Louis Commerce*

v39 (April 1965): 11; "Re-Zoning Rundown Areas for Industrial Use," *St. Louis Commerce* v41 (November 1967), 21; "St. Louis County's Dramatic Change: Bucolic to Boom," *St. Louis Commerce* v41 (November 1967): 11-12; "The Planned Industrial Subdivision: It Is a Plus for Economic Development," *St. Louis Commerce* (November 1967): 8-9; "Mill Creek and Kosciusko: Commercial-Industrial Parks in the Heart of the City are Attractive and Highly Successful," *St. Louis Commerce (*November 1967): 14-15; "St. Louis County Green, Great, Growing," *St. Louis Commerce* v41 (January 1967): 10-13; "Young Man on the Go," *St. Louis Commerce* v43 (November 1968): 23-24; "Developers of Industrial Property Find Built-In Esthetics Are Good Investment," *St. Louis Commerce* v42 (November 1968): 30-32; Earl W. Kersten, Jr., and D. Reid Ross, "Clayton: A New Metropolitan Focus in the St. Louis Area," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* v58, #4 (December 1968): 636-39; "We Just Can't Make It Anymore," *U.S. News and World Report* 64 (June 24, 1968): 62;
St. Louis Metropolitan Area Planned Industrial Districts and Parks," *St. Louis Commerce* v43 (November 1969) (insert); "Industrial Parks: Progenitors of Progress," *St. Louis Commerce*, v46 (November 1972): 25-28; "Manufacturing Report," *St. Louis Commerce* v47 (September 1973): 94; Robert Cassidy, "St. Louis Tunes Out the Blues," *Planning* v40 (March 1974): 14; Message to Washington," *St. Louis Commerce* v49 #4 (April 1975): 51-55; "Industrial Land and New Industry Equals Jobs," *St. Louis Commerce* v50 (November 1976): 16-21; "City's Job Needs to Year 2000," *St. Louis Commerce*, v51 (November 1977): 85-86; Richard B. Freeman and James L. Medoff, "New Estimates of Private Sector Unionism in the United States," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*,

v32, #2. (January 1979), 143-74; "GM Goes to Wentzville," *St. Louis Commerce* v54 (September 1980); "Resurging City Suffers a Setback," *Business Week*, April 7, 1980: 24A; D. Reid Ross and Leroy J. Grossman, "Merger of a Metropolis: A Case History of the St. Louis Region," *Business and Government Review* (n.d.) [St. Louis Regional Commerce and Growth Association Records (hereafter cited as RCGA Records) Box 11, Folder 335; Western Historical Manuscripts Collection, University of Missouri in St. Louis (hereafter cited as the WHMC)].

In order to reconstruct the shifting debates over metropolitanization and city and regional planning at mid-century, I relied upon the publications of influential planners, geographers, land-use economists, and urban renewal experts. Among the most important books for this study are Lewis Mumford, *The Culture of Cities* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1938) and *The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its Prospects* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961); Harland Bartholomew, "The American City: Disintegration is Taking Place," *Vital Speeches* 7 (1 November 1940); Homer Hoyt, *The Urban Real Estate Cycle-Performance and Prospects* (Washington, D.C.: Urban Land Institute, 1960) and *The Changing Principles of Land Economics* (Washington, D.C.: Urban Land Institute, 1968); Jane Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (New York: Random House, 1961); Raymond Vernon, *The Myth and Reality of Our Urban Problems* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962, 1967); Wolf Von Eckardt, *The Challenge of Megalopolis: A Graphic Presentation of the Urbanized Northeastern Seaboard of the United States*. Based on the original study by Jean Gottmann published in 1961 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1964); Martin

Anderson, *The Federal Bulldozer: A Critical Analysis of Urban Renewal, 1949-1962* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Pres, 1964); Konstantinos A. Doxiadis, *Urban Renewal and the Future of the American City* (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1966); *Metropolis on the Move: Geographers Look at Urban Sprawl*, ed. Jean Gottmann and Robert A. Harper (New York City: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967).

Industrial development reports supplied me with quantitative and qualitative evidence of industrial changes in St. Louis and of the conditions of local industrial facilities. In many cases, these reports also documented the demand of businessmen for industrial sites in St. Louis and the patterns of investment decisions. Unless indicated otherwise, these publications can be found at the MHS Library: Kitagawa and Donald J. Bogue, *Suburbanization of Manufacturing Activity Within Standard Metropolitan Areas* (Chicago: Scripps Foundation and the Population Research Center of the University of Chicago, 1955) [University of Missouri Libraries Depository]; *Market Analysis and Reuse Appraisal of Mill Creek Valley Redevelopment Project*, by Roy Wenzlich Real Estate and Company (1956) [Roy Wenzlich Records; Series 4, Box 3, Folder 75; WHMC]; *Technical Report on Industrial Development Potential for St Louis*, by R. Gladstone and Associates, prepared for the St. Louis City Plan Commission (Washington, D.C., 1968); *Findings from the Analysis of Development Potentials Within St. Louis, Missouri*, by R. Gladstone and Associates, prepared for the St. Louis City Plan Commission (Washington, D.C., 1968); *Economic Development Program: St. Louis, Volume 1: The Economic Development of a St. Louis Poverty Area*, by Management and Economic Research, Inc., for the Economic Development Administration, United States

Dept. of Commerce (Washington, D.C., 1968); *Summary of New and Expanding Industries in St. Louis County* (1968), by the St. Louis County Business and Industrial Development Corp. (hereafter cited as the BIDC) [RCGA Records, Box 11, Folder 311]; *Highlights of Findings from the Existing Industrial Facilities Within St. Louis, Missouri*, by Alan M. Voorhees and Associates for the St. Louis City Plan Commission (1969); James W. Bodenstein, *Manufacturing in a Central Business District: St. Louis, Missouri* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1970); *Summary of New and Expanding Industries in the First Six Months of 1970*, by the BIDC [Lawrence K. Roos Collection, Box 104, Folder: BIDC; MHS].

The publications of the St. Louis Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority (hereafter cited as the St. Louis LCRA) presented documentation of how St. Louis City leaders transformed their proposed Mill Creek Valley program into an urban renewal project. They also indicated the relocation patterns of Mill Creek Valley residents. These reports, moreover, cited public and private investment figures for the Mill Creek Valley project and for St. Louis' second major industrial-commercial project, Kosckuisko. Unless noted otherwise, these publications can be found at the MHS Library: *Relocation Plan for the Mill Creek Valley Project*, by the St. Louis LCRA and the Housing and Land Clearance Committee of the St. Louis Board of Alderman [Freedom of Residence Collection, Drawer 6, Folder 539; WHMC]; *Redevelopment Plan for Mill Creek Valley* (St. Louis, 1957), by the St. Louis LCRA; *Mill Creek Fact Sheet*, by the St. Louis LCRA (St. Louis, 1962) [Mayor Raymond Tucker Files, Series 3, Box 18, Folder: MCV, St. Louis Redevelopment Corporation; University Archives Collection, WU]; *Facts About*

Urban Renewal in St. Louis: Projects of the St. Louis Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority (n.d), by the St. Louis LCRA; *Technical Report on the History of Renewal for St. Louis, Missouri*, by the St. Louis Development Program Staff for the St. Louis CPC (St. Louis, n.d.); *Highlights on Urban Renewal*, by the St. Louis LCRA (St. Louis, 1974).

My analysis of regional planning and development in St. Louis relied upon the records and publications of local metropolitan organizations. Particularly valuable for my study were those of the St. Louis Metropolitan Plan Association (hereafter cited as the MPA), the St. Louis Research Council (hereafter cited as the RC), and the St. Louis Regional Industrial Development Corporation (hereafter cited as the RIDC). Their publications illuminate how local businessmen, public officials, and planners identified the challenges that they faced in regional development and sought to overcome these obstacles: *Progress and Prospect: Annual Report,* by the MPA (1945) [RCGA Records, Box 4, Folder 49]; Harland Bartholomew, *Guide Plan for Missouri-Illinois Metropolitan Area Development* (St. Louis: Harland Bartholomew and Associates, 1948) [MHS Library]; W. Philip Shatts, *Missouri-Illinois Team-Work for Metropolitan St. Louis Area Development: Metropolitan Plan Association Annual Report* (1949) [RCGA Records, Box 4, Folder 49]; *Regional News*, Number 11 (1950), by the MPA [Tucker Files, Series 4, Box 1, Folder: Bi-State Agency]; *Metropolitan Plan Association Activities: Progress and Prospects* (1955), by the MPA [RCGA Records, Box 4, Folder 49); *Path of Progress for Metropolitan St. Louis* (St. Louis, 1957), by the Metropolitan St. Louis Survey [MHS Library]; *A Report to the Community on the Formation of the St. Louis Research Council* (1963), by the St. Louis RC [RCGA Records, Box 4, Folder 52]; *A Strategy for Growth*

(1963) and *A Strategy for Growth* (1968), by the St. Louis RC [RCGA Records, Box 4, Folder 50]; *A United Plan for the Industrial Development of Metropolitan St. Louis* (1964), by the St. Louis RIDC [RCGA Records, Box 8, Folder 215]; *1965-66 First Annual Report*, 1966-67, and *Second Annual Report of the St. Louis RIDC*, by the St. Louis RIDC [RCGA Records, Box 4, Folder 66]; *Aerospace-Defense and Auto Parts Opportunities in St. Louis* (1967), by the St. Louis RIDC [RCGA Records, Box 16, Folder 469]; *New Institutions to Serve the Region—Prospects for Progress,* by the St. Louis RIDC [Roos Collection, Box 10, Folder 292]; *Institutions to Serve the Region: The St. Louis Research Council and Regional Industrial Development Corp.* (1969), St. Louis RIDC [RCGA Records, Box 4, Folder 51].

Supporters of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial (hereafter cited as the JNEM) produced a number of reports that marshal evidence of the administrative process, lobbying efforts, and planning proposals behind the JNEM project. These reports include: *History of Authorization and Funding, 1934-1966*, by the JNEM Association [Downtown, St. Louis, Inc., Papers, Box 2, Folder 4;.WHMC]; *JNEM General Background and Status* (1957), by the JNEM Association [National Park Service: Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Archives, United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission Records, 1933-1973 (hereafter cited as the USTEMCR), Series 2, Box 4, Folder 34; St. Louis City Old Courthouse, Library and Archives]; *Report on the Redevelopment of Land Surrounding the JNEM Park*, by Eero Saarinen and William W. Wurster [USTEMCR, Series 6, Box 7, Folder 2]; *Report on Congressional Statements by St. Louis political and business leaders on May 19, 1953, to*

the United States House of Representatives Committee on House Administration, Subcommittee on Library, in support of Bill H.R. 2216 [Leonor K. Sullivan Papers, unprocessed archival item; Special Collections, St. Louis University Law Library].

Appendix

A.

Sectoral Composition and In-Migration Patterns for Industrial and Commercial Firms and Other Institutions Located in MCV in 1973

The following data is based on St. Louis city directories from 1952, 1955, 1960, and 1973. In every case possible, employment data is included. All of the employment statistics came from the 1973 Missouri Directory of Manufacturing, the only directory I found listing employment information for businesses in St. Louis in the early 1970s.

In 1973, the St. Louis City Directory listed around 147 non-residential establishments located within the MCV urban renewal site. Nine addresses in MCV in 1973 listed a vacancy. The following establishments are the non-residential establishments listed within MCV in 1973, excluding gas stations and St. Louis University addresses. Except for the listing of "Expansions," all of the establishments noted only had the MCV address listed in the St. Louis City Directory in 1973.

Total Number of Establishments in MCV in 1973, According to Sector:

Manufacturing: printing plants: 3 (number of employees in each firm: 33; 21; 4)
Manufacturing: paints, chemicals, and soap: 3 (employees: 49; 31; 36)
Manufacturing: electrical equipment and appliances: 5 (employees: 35; 18; 90; 78)
Manufacturing: meat processing, dairy, flour: 3 (employees: 24; 353; 18)
Manufacturer: misc: handbag and zippers: 2 (employees: 75; no data)

Railway facilities: 7

Warehouses: 2
Wholesalers: sporting goods, electrical supplies, appliance parts, jewelry: 4
Medical and pharmecutical supplies (distributors and offices): 4
Printing and photography (services, retail, and suppliers): 9
Publishing and packaging (offices, supplier, and retail): 4
Paper and office supply stores: 2
Automated office equipment (retail, supplies, and offices): 12
Machinery and equipment supply stores and offices: 8
Electrical appliance parts, repair, and related services: 4
Chemical and cleaning supply stores and services: 12
Mechanical services and auto parts stores and distributors: 4
Apparel: retail: 1
Auto leasing and auto dealers: 7
Financial and professional services: 27
Misc. retail stores, services, and offices: 5
Union offices: 5
Hotels: 5
Restaurants: 2
Schools and community centers: 3
Religious and social services or institutions: 9

The In-Migration Patterns of Establishments in MCV in 1973:
In Total: 147

Relocations to MCV:

From Downtown St. Louis: 25

From Midtown St. Louis City: 15
From South St. Louis: 5
From North St. Louis: 1

Firms Expanding Their Operations by Building in MCV: 12
Establishments Previously Located in MCV: 34
Establishments with No Prior St. Louis Listing: 55

Relocations into MCV from other St. Louis City Locations:

"Relocation" includes all of those firms that abandoned one address for the MCV location.

From Downtown St. Louis
Manufacturer's Steel Supply Co. Inc.; Sheet Metal Workers Internat. Assn Local 36; Thau-Nolde Inc., dental supply; State Div. of Welfare; Campbell 66 Express Inc.,; Artcraft Lithographers Inc., (*29 male and 4 female workers in 1973*); American Optical Corp.; Wilson Sporting Goods Co., wholesale; Talon Div of Textron, zipper mfg.; La France Industries Div. of Riegel Textile Corp., upholstery; Leveque J P Co., mfg. agent; Dictaphone Corp.; Marlo Reproduction Service Lithographers, mfg. plant (*14 male and 7 female employees in 1973*); Mine Safety Appliances, mfg.; Mendenhall Auto Leasing and Rental; Parker' Carburetor Service; Westinghouse Electric Supply Co.;Eagle Stamp Co.; St. Louis Photo Supply Co.; Ad-Sell Co.; Probe Emil and Co. Printers (*3 male and 1 female workers in 1973*); Dorrill Photocolor Co.; Dun and Brandstreet Inc.; Occidental Life Ins. Co.; Holloran P. J. Coin Laundry.

From North St. Louis City
Weather Tite Co. of St Louis

From South St. Louis City
DEC Manufacturing Corp.; Ohlendorf Co. Dental; Federal Sign and Signal Corp. *(31 male and four female workers in 1973);*Allied Photocolor; Kretschmar Brands, mfg.

From Midtown St. Louis City

Hall Melville B. Inc., electric supplies; Fidelty Union Life Ins.; Progressive Service Co, machine products *(83 males and 7 females in 1973);*St Louis Testing Laboratories Inc.; Baumfolder, folding equipment; Al's Auto Radiator and Air Conditioning Service; Lindberg Cadillac Co.; Fenwick Fasions *(15 male and 60 female workers in 1973),*Industrial Soap Co.; Sunbeam Appliance Service Co.; Burroughs Corp. Business Machines; Printers Supply Co.; Photek Copy Products Inc., St Louis Lodge No. 9; Tamm-Vogt Co. Flag.

Original MCV Establishments Retaining or Repurchasing Properties in MCV:
St. Louis Bible Society; United Christian Missionary Soc.; Christian Board of Publication; Sealtest Foods (*318 male and 35 female employees in 1973);*Goldstein, Alvin M. Inc., mfrs agents; Safety Inc., equipment; Allied Photocolor; Morgan Linen Service Inc.; St. Louis Towel Supply; Berea Presbyterian Church; Clark, M. K. and Co. electrical equip.; Taylor Buzz, Photography; Liquid Carbonics Co; Liquid Carbonic Corp.; Birmingham and Prosser Co. paper products; Bethany Book Store; National Benevolent Assn. of Christian Church; United Church Board for Homeland Ministries; Board of Higher Education, Disciples of Christ Inc.; Dixie Cream Flour Co. (*15 male and 3 female employees in 1973);*Misouri-Pacific yards and storage; Terminal RR Assn. Car Dept; Acetylene Gas Co In. *(38 male and 11 female employees in 1973);*Modern Engineering Co. Inc, welding/cutting equipment (*70 male and 8 female employees);*Harris Teachers College; Vashon Community Center; Goldman-Wyman and Co., furniture; Bushnell J. P. Packing Supply Co *(17 male and 1 female employees in 1973);*Hunt, Robt. W. Co Consulting Engineers; Duhart Packing Equipment; Packaging Equip Inc.; Lincoln Hotel; Suburban Tire Co.; Lottes A E Co. auto parts distributors.

Establishments that Expanded Their Operations in MCV:
This list includes firms that built new warehouses, offices, or plant facilities in MCV while retaining their original location at a non-MCV site. These firms have original locations listed in St. Louis City

U.S. Vehicle and Chemical, Co. (*29 male and 2 female workers*); Gould In. Century Electric Co.; Edwards, A. G. and Sons Inc.; Commercial State Life Ins. Co.; Samuel Shoe Co.; Executive Leasing Co.; Stanley Photo Service Inc.; Hertz Truck Rental; Mercantile-Commerce Trust Co.; Commonwealth Life and Accident Insurance Co Business Machines Co.

Establishments Not Appearing in St. Louis City Directories prior to MCV Address:
Rakel, Joseph A., book bindery; Stadium Hotel; ABKO Inc., jewelrs; Data Science Corp. processing service; Marcone Appliance Parts Center; Retailers Commercial Agency; S. C. M. Corp., business machines; Metro-Tech Electronics; Summit Ins. Co. of New York;
Ottenad Wm., L C.P.A.; Quill and Ink Office Supplies Co.; Project Inc. Vocational Training School; American States Ins. Co.; Olivetti Underwood Corp.; Imperial Paper Stock Co.;
Norfolk and Western Railway Co.;Dietzgen Co.; Alter Harry Co Inc. refrigerator parts; MidAmerica Dairymen Inc.; B. Boyd's warehouse; Given Machinery Co.; ARA Service of St. Louis, vending machines; Cor-Plex International Corp. video/audio systems; Magafile Co., mfrs agents; Bell and Howell Co., micro data division; Microfilm Machines Mfrs.; Phillipburg Inserter; Holiday Inn Downtown; Downtown Ford Sales Inc.;Executive Rent a Car; Metropolitan Life Inc.; Market Place Restaurant; Rodeway Inns of America Inc.; Rex Distributors pharmaceutical; Atlas Industrial Soap Co.; Barry Atlas Redevelopment Corp.; Industrial Atlas Soap Co.; Industrial Soap Co., soap supplies *(15 male and 21 female workers in 1973)*; Travelodge Motel; Kettle and Keg Lounge; Pants World; Barry C. E. Janitorial Service; Wells Fargo Armored Car Service; Lawyers offices: McLeod, A. E., Murphy, Wm. R. Jr., Seaton, Wm. C.; Midwest Accounting Service; Communication Wks of America Local 6350, AFL-CIO; Ideal Roller Co. Graphic Arts; Sarmin Hold Co. Real Estate; Communications Workers of America, Dist. 6, AFL-CIO; Beffa Bar and Restaurant; Aloe Medical Division of Sherwood Medical Industries, Inc.; Family and Children Service.

B.

Retention Rate of Firms and Institutions Listed in MCV in 1973
(source: St. Louis City and St. Louis County Directories)

MCV in 1990:

Out of the approximately 147 establishments with addresses in the MCV urban renewal site in 1973, around 42 of these firms were still in MCV there in 1990. In 1990, there were around 129 business establishments and institutions with addresses in the original MCV renewal area in 1990; there were 32 MCV addresses with vacancies.

Thus, although many of the original businesses moved out of MCV over the next fifteen years, many of those sites were taken up by other firms between the early 1970s and 1990. MCV in 1990 retained the general character of printing, publishing, business machines, auto dealers, and financial services. In many cases, the address site retained the same types of firms even when the specific establishment from 1973 had moved out.

Vashon Community Center, Harris Teachers College, Bushnell J. P. Packing Supply Co., Berea Presbyterian Church, and Morgan Linen Service Inc., were the only establishments in MCV in 1990 that had been there prior to MCV's redevelopment.

Firms and Institutions Listed at MCV addresses in 1990:
Those highlighted have been there since 1973

Liquid Carbonics Co. industrial med. Dept.; Manufacturer's Steel Supply Co. Inc.; Zellerbach Mead Co.; Sheet Metal Workers International Assn. Local 36; Thau-Nolde Inc. Dental Supply; Hoffman-Marquard Machinery Co.; Holy Cross Lutheran Church; Equitable Life Ins.; **Edwards A G and Sons Inc.; Dixie Cream Flour Co.;**
DEC Manufacturing Corp bakers equip.; Glass Eye Inc; High Priority Mail; Micrographic SV; CAT Inc; Computer Art Tech; Crawford Post; Propeller Animation; **Acetylene Gas Co.; Hall Melville B. Inc electric supplies;** Federal-Mogul who auto parts; Sheet Metal Industry Training School; Sigma Chemical; **Harris Teachers College (in MCV in 1952);** The Going Thing; Johnnies's Beauty Salone; Grainger WW Inc. electric mtrs; Marcone Applnc. Parts; Back Mueller Inc.; **Artcraft Graphic** Sv; Nies Art Craft; Response Market.; Progressive Service Co cutting dies specialist; C.F. Printing Co.; ABT Bookbindery; Alter Harry Co whol refrig; Valestin J. C. Co.; Caps Printing service; Nestle Beich; St Louis Testing Laboratories Inc.; Tiermann Industrial Hardware; Brewer Machine and Gear; Grossi Herchert Inc; Mitch Murchs mntc;
Ohlendorf Co. dental supplies; Midwest Sales Co; Quality Trim Inc.;Mailing Systems Inc.; bricklayers local; Maggie O'Briens rstr; **Mid-America Diarymen Inc.; Dictaphone Corp.;** Hampton Inn; Boulevard Motors; Mercedes Benz; Jefferson Bank and Trust; Enterprise Rent a Car; Courtyard Marriot; Accurate Auto repair; Beaumont Graphics Ltd.; Arrow Speed wrhs; Block Kim photo; Bremer Press Inc.; Games to be Played; Brice Photo Copy Products; Sunshine Distributing; **Westinghouse Electric Supply Co;** Fox Photo Service Inc.; Qualex Inc.; Market St. Deli; **Industrial Soap Co Soap; Atlas Industrial Soap Co.;** Barry Atlas Redevelopment Corp.; Industrial Atlas Soap Co, soap Janitorial Soap; Industrial Soap Co (Action Division); Airborn Floor Mats; Accurate Div; Action Division; Hertz Truck Rental; KYKY station; **Vashon Community Center;** Bell and Beau Blazers; Municipal Information Systems Inc.; Forst Western Inn; **Bushnell J. P. Packing Supply Co.;** Record Research ; Rental Entertainment; Good Stuff stores; **St. Louis Photo;** City Photo St. Louis; Commercial State Life Inc. Co.; Insurance agencies; Sinclair Marketing; Boston and Assoc. Inc.; **Duhart Packing Equipment; Hunt Robert W. Co Packaging Equip. Inc.;** Atlas Reserve Temps; Keane Printing;
Mr. and Mrs. Travel; A. S. I. Sign Systems; Lincoln retirement Home;

Business Machines Co.; Firestone Mstrcrd Sv.; Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO Dist 6; Provident Counseling; Kinetic Corp.; Turpin Auto Service; Abuse Hotline; Berea Presbyterian Church; Morgan Linen Service Inc.; Jamison's Standard Service; Chinese Express;Allied Photocolor; A. and B. Drapery Mfg Co; Todd Photo Studio;Action One Stop In; BMG Distribution; Data Science Corp., All World Business Inc.; Mansfield Business Clg.; **Lawyers offices;** Guardian Sentry Alarm; Universal Drug Co.; Brown Graphics; U.S. VA Vietnam Cnslg; Vet Center; Whitestone Productions; Drury Inn; Holloran P J Coin Laundry; **Kretschmar Brands mfg.;** Gilt Edge Inc..

Out-Migration Trends and Relocation Sites of Establishments that left MCV between 1973 and 1990:

If a firm did not appear in the St. Louis City or St. Louis County directories in the few years following their disappearance from their MCV address, I assumed they closed or left the St. Louis metropolitan area. For those firms that relocated, I have noted "city" or "county" to denote their relocation destination either within the city of St. Louis or St. Louis County. I've noted below that some firms closed their branch site in MCV but kept other stores of offices open in the city or county.

Establishments That Left MCV between 1973-1975/6:

Given Machinery Co. (**close/left area**); Pat's Grill (**closed/left area**); Fidelty Union Life Ins Co. (**closed/left area**); Wilson Sporting Goods Co. (**closed/left area**); Dietzgen Co. (**closed/left area**); Weather Tite Co. of St. Louis, storm doors (**closed /left area**);Leveque J. P. Co., Inc mfg agent (**county**); Samuel Shoe Co., whse (**closed/left area**); Cor-Plex International Corp., video-audio (**close/left area**); Magafile Co., mfrs agents (**county**); Bell and Howell Co., machine mfrs (**county**); Baumfolder (**county**); Phillipburg Inserter (**closed/left area**); Parker' Carburetor Service (**closed**); Downtown Ford Sales Inc. (**closed/left area**);Fenwick Fashions (**closed/left area**); Pants World (**moved further downtown**);Wells Fargo Armored Car Service (**closed/left area**); Midwest Accounting Service (**county**); Ideal Roller Co., Graphic Arts (**closed/left area**);St. Louis Towel Supply (**closed/left area**); Photek Copy Products Inc. (**county**);Summit Insurance Co. of NY (**closed/left area**).

Closed/left area: 16 (including branch sites)
City relocation: 1
County relocation: 6
Total: 23

Establishments That Left MCV between 1975 and 1980:

La France Industries Division of Riegel Textile Corp., (**county**); Metro-Tech Electronics (**closed/left area**);Taylor Buzz Photography (**closed/left**); Liquid Carbonic Corp., (**this branch closed**); Project Inc. Vocational Training School (**moved to county**); Board of Higher Ed. Disciples of Christ Inc. (**county**)

Occidental Life Inc. Co. of CA (**closed branch**); United Church Board for Homeland Ministries (**closed/left**); State Div. of Welfare (**closed or relocated**); Modern Eng Co. Inc (**moved to anther city site, then county**); Mendenhall Auto Leasing and Rental (**closed/left area**); Metropolitan Life Inc. (**branch closed**); Rex Distributors, pharmaceutical (**closed/left area**); Stanley Photo Service Inc., Photo Developing (**closed branch**); Sunbeam Appliance Service Co. (**city**); Quill and Ink Office Supplies Co. (**closed/left area**); Goldstein Alvin M. Inc. (**closed/left area**).

Closed/left area: 12 (including branch sites)
City relocation: 1

County relocation: 4

Total: 17

Establishments That Left MCV between 1980 and 1985:

Reuckert Meat Co In. **(closed/left area)**; Retailers Commercial Agency **(closed/left area)**; Ottenad Wm. L., CPA **(moved)**; Dun and Brandstreet Inc. **(county)**; ABKO Inc. jewelers **(closed/left area)**; Suburban Tire Co. **(became Firestone in 1990; Suburban moved to county)**; Sarmin Hold Co., real estate **(closed/left area)**; Al's Auto Radiator and Air Conditioning Service **(closed/left area)**; American States Ins. Co. **(county)**; Dorrill Photocolor Co., **(closed/left area)**; Olivetti Underwood Corp. **(closed/left area)**;

National Benevolent Assn of Christian Ch **(county)**; Norfolk and Western Railway Co. **(closed/left area)**; American Optical Corp **(closed/left area)**; Talon Div of Textron, zipper mfg **(looks like it moved to county then closed/left area)**; Tools and Supplies Inc. **(county)**; Marlo Reproduction Service Litho. **(looks to be county)**; B. Boyd's, warehouse **(closed/left area)**; Mine Safety Appliances, mff. **(county)**;ARA Service of St. Louis, vending machines **(county)**;Burroughs Corp. Business Machs **(closed this branch)**;Barry C. E. Janitorial Service Inc. **(county)**; Probe, Emil and Co. Printrs **(moved just west of MCV)**; Communication Wks of Am Loc 6350 AFL CIO **(closed/left area)**; Beffa Bar and Rest. **(closed/left area)**; Aloe Medical Division of Sherwood Medical Inc. **(downtown)**; S. C. M. Corp. bus. machines **(county)**; Supreme Meat Co. (Kretschmar took this site by 1980 and still there in 90; Supreme was either **bought out or closed)**; Gould Inc. Century Electric Co. **(downtown)**;U.S. Vehicle and Chemical Co. **(city)**.

Closed/left area: 15 (including branch sites)
City relocation: 4
County relocation: 10
Total: 29

Establishments Leaving MCV Between 1985 and 1990
Imperial Paper Stock Co. **(county)**; 2000 St. Louis Lodge No. 9 **(closed/left area)**; Lindberg Cadillac Co.**(either changes owners or closed branch)**; Market Place Restaurant **(closed/left area)**; Eagle Stamp Co. **(closed/left area)**;Federal Sign and Signal Corp, neon signs **(city)**; Mercantile-Commerce Trust Co. **(closed this branch due to SLU's expansion)**; Commonwealth Life and Accident Insurance Co. **(moved just west of MCV)**; Goldman-Wyman and Co., furniture **(closed/left area)**; Ad-Sell Co Mail Adv **(another midtown site)**; Tamm-Vogt Co. Flag **(closed/left area)**; Printers Supply Co. **(county)**; Lottes A. E. Co., auto parts distributors **(downtown)**;Family and Children Service **(closed branch)**;
Clark, M. K. and Co., elec. equip. **(county)**;Safety Inc safety and fire equip. **(closed/left area)**; Long R. A. Building: Christian BD of Publication **(downtown).**

Closed/Left Area: 9 (including branch sites)
City Relocation: 5

County Relocation: 3

Total: 17

Final Tally:
Total Number of Establishment That Left MCV between 1973 and 1990: 86
Closed/Left St. Louis City and County: 52
Relocated to City Site: 11
Relocate to County Site: 21

C.

Total Employment for St. Louis City and St. Louis County*

Year	St. Louis City	St. Louis County
1951a	419,813	43,621
1962b	355, 739	28,699
1973c	357,240	259,551
1982d	266,613	408, 363

a. *County Business Patterns*, United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census: County Business Patterns First Quarter, 1951, Part 5: West North Central States, Reported March 1951.

b. *County Business Patterns*, United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census: County Business Patterns First Quarter, 1962, Part 5A: West North Central States, Reported March 1962.

c. *County Business Patterns*, United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census: County Business Patterns, Reported March 1973.

d. *County Business Patterns*, United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census: County Business Patterns, Reported March 1982.

*the census data excludes government employees, railroad employees, and self-employed persons.

D.

Total Manufacturing Employment for St. Louis City and St. Louis County

Year	St. Louis City	Pct.	St. Louis County	Pct.	Total
1950a	166,301	89%	20,557	11%	186,858
1962b	138,941	72%	53,239	28%	192,180
1973c	123,746	58%	90,470	42%	214,216
1982d	72,044	41%	102,120	59%	174,164

a. *County Business Patterns*, United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census: County Business Patterns First Quarter, 1951, Part II: East-North Central and West-North Central States, March 1950.

b. *County Business Patterns*, United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census: County Business Patterns First Quarter, 1962, Part 5A: East-North Central and West-North Central States, March 1962.

c. *County Business Patterns*, United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census: County Business Patterns First Quarter, 1973, Part II: East-North Central and West-North Central States, March 1973.

d. *County Business Patterns*, United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census: County Business Patterns First Quarter, 1982, Part II: East-North Central and West-North Central States, March 1982.

E.

St. Louis Area Population: City, County and Metropolitan Area

Year	City	%Change	County	%Change	Metropolitan Area	%Change
1900	575,238a.		50,040a.		649,711d.	
1910	687,029a.	19%	82,417a.	65%	828,733d.	28%
1920	772,897a.	12%	100,737a.	22%	952,012c.	15%
1930	821,960a.	6%	211,593a.	110%	1,293,516b.	36%
1940	816,048e.	1%	274,230e.	30%	1,367,977e.	6%
1950	856,796f.	5%	406,349f.	48%	1,681,281f.	23%
1960	750,026g.	-13%	703,532g.	73%	2,144,205g.	28%
1970	622,235g.	-17%	951,671g.	35%	2,410,884g.	12%
1980	453,085g.	-27%	973,896g.	2%	2,356,460g.	-2%

a. Bureau of the Census, *Number and Distribution of Inhabitants: Total Population for States, Counties, and Townships or other Minor Civil Divisions for Urban and Rural Area and for Cities and other incorporated Places*, 1930. vol 1, Table 3, p.602. Prepared by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C., 1931.
b. Bureau of the Census. *Population, Land Area, and Density for Metropolitan Districts*: *1930* vol II, Table 11, p. 19. Prepared by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C., 1933.
c. Bureau of the Census. *Area and Population of Central City, Metropolitan Districts, and Adjacent Territory for Cities of 200,000 Inhabitants or More: 1920 and 1910*. vol I, Table 40, p.64. Prepared by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C., 1921.
d. Bureau of the Census. *Area and Population of Central City, Metropolitan Districts, and Adjacent Territory for Cities of 200,000 Inhabitants or More: 1910 and 1920*. vol I, Table 50, p.74. Prepared by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C., 1913.
e. Bureau of the Census: *Characteristics of the Population, 1940, Part 4: Minnesota-New Mexico*. vol III. Prepared by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C., 1943.
f. Bureau of the Census: *Characteristics of the Population: Number of Inhabitants, General and Detailed Characteristics of the Population, 1950*. vol II. Prepared by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C., 1952.
g. Bureau of the Census: *State and Metropolitan Area Data Book, 1982: Metropolitan Areas*. Prepared by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C., 1982.